JUDGMENT B.S. Verma, J. 1. By means of this writ petition, the petitioner has sought a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the judgments and orders dated 11.3.1996 passed by Settlement Officer Consolidation (Annexure No. 6) and dated 1.5.1999 passed by Deputy Director of Consolidation (Annexure No. 19). 2. The dispute in the present writ petition relates to khata no.129 khasra no.862/1, 863/1, 864/1 and 865-A situated in village Majhola, Khatima, District Udham Singh Nagar. The respondent nos.3 and 4 claim themselves to be owners by adverse possession on parts of the aforesaid land on the basis of their alleged continuous possession since 1966. The proceedings under the Consolidation of Holdings Act (for short, the Act) started in the year 1986 by issuance of notification dated 20.9.1986 u/s 4 of the Act. Pursuant to the initiation of proceedings under the Act, the respondent no.3 filed his objections u/s 9-A of the Act claiming themselves owners of the land on the basis of adverse possession on the hand in question since 1966. Similar objection was also filed by respondent no.4 who also claimed themselves to be in physical possession of a part of the land in dispute. Besides this, additional objection was also filed on behalf of the respondent no.4 claiming themselves to be a legal person and it was stated by them that they are society registered under the Societies Registration Act since 1978. Against the objections filed by respondent nos.3 and 4, the predecessor of the petitioner i.e. his mother Smt. Rukmani Devi, who was a recorded tenure holder of the land in dispute filed her objections wherein Smt. Rukmani Devi categorically denied the possession of the respondents. It was also stated that respondent no.3 and 4 were not owners of the land in dispute by adverse possession. It was further stated that a society cannot be equated with an individual and hence cannot mature its title over the land in dispute by adverse possession. It was also stated that objections filed on behalf of respondent no.3 are not maintainable as they were filed by one Father Rudolf Rodrgredges who had no concerned with the society and that he was contesting the matter in personal capacity. Thereafter both the parties led oral as well as documentary evidence. It was also stated that objections filed on behalf of respondent no.3 are not maintainable as they were filed by one Father Rudolf Rodrgredges who had no concerned with the society and that he was contesting the matter in personal capacity. Thereafter both the parties led oral as well as documentary evidence. On the basis of material available on record, the learned Consolidation Officer (for short C.O.) vide his order dated 17.1.1996, dismissed the objections of respondent nos.3 and 4. Aggrieved by the order of learned C.O. appeal was filed by Catholic Dioscese of Bareilly and Medical Sisters through their representatives managers, before the Settlement Officer Consolidation (for short S.O.C.) which was registered as consolidation appeal no.1518 of 1995-96. By judgment and order dated 11.3.1996, learned S.O.C. has allowed the appeal on the ground that the statement of Ganga Ram, husband of Smt. Rukmani, recorded in case no.51/172 of 1974 is admissible against Smt. Rukmani devi, which proved the possession of Catholic Diocese of Bareilly over the land in dispute. Secondly, that the statement of Father Mandosa given in ceiling case is also admissible against Smt. Rukmani Devi and he stated that Smt. Rukmani Devi had a right to cross-examine Ganga Ram and Father Mandosa, but she did not do so, hence the statements are admissible. Thirdly, that on the basis of revenue receipt and entry made by the Supervisor Kanungo P.K. 24 rent receipt it was held since Zamindari Abolition was enforced on 1st July, 1969 and prior to enforcement Father Mandosa was in possession and became sirdar by operation of law. Further aggrieved, the petitioner filed a revision in the court of Deputy Director of Consolidation (for short, D.D.C.). The ground taken in the revision was that the S.O.C. has based his judgments on inadmissible evidence therefore the judgment is perverse and that any religious society cannot acquire right on a land by way of adverse possession. Adverse possession is an individual right and the constructive possession is not admissible, as Father Rudolf has stated before Consolidation Officer that he was in possession of the land through his servants and that his servants were cultivating the land. During the pendency of revision, Smt. Rukmani Devi died, who was then substituted by her legal heir Ram Prasad Verma (the petitioner herein). During the pendency of revision, Smt. Rukmani Devi died, who was then substituted by her legal heir Ram Prasad Verma (the petitioner herein). After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the record, learned D.D.C., by his judgment and order dated 7.5.1999, affirmed the findings of learned S.O.C. and dismissed the revision. Feeling aggrieved by the order passed by learned S.O.C. dated 11.3.1996 and learned D.D.C. dated 7.5.1999, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. 3. The petitioner has also filed supplementary affidavit annexing the order dated 17.1.1996 passed by learned C.O. and order dated 11.3.1996 passed by S.O.C. The petitioner has also filed another supplementary affidavit annexing the judgment and order dated 26.7.1994 passed by Consolidation Officer Khatima in case no.344 Catholic Dicoese Bareilly vs. Hakim Singh and certified copy of sale deed dated 21.10.1992 executed by Father Francis D’souza and copies of khatoni of the disputed land from 178 fasli to 1380 fasli and 1381 to 1683 fasli. 4. Counter affidavit has been filed by respondent no.3 wherein the averments made in the writ petition have been denied. It has been specifically stated in para-14 that in the Catholic Christian Religion, the Pope is the head of the religious order. Since the religion is spread over the whole world and properties are gifted by people all over the world and in order to manage and preserve the properties and to administer the religion, the administration is divided into several Diocese. The Diocese in any area get itself constituted in such manner that it becomes a juristic person capable of holding and managing the property according to the law applicable to that area. The area of Kumaun and Bareilly Divisions were earlier governed by the Diocese of Lucknow and since 1988 is under the management of the Diocese of Bareilly after it was constituted. The property continued to be in possession of the same religious order. Medical Sisters of St. Joseph is also a society of Christian religious order which deals in providing medical assistance to poor and incapable persons of the society. A part of the land in dispute was given to them for establishing and running a hospital. The property continued to be in possession of the same religious order. Medical Sisters of St. Joseph is also a society of Christian religious order which deals in providing medical assistance to poor and incapable persons of the society. A part of the land in dispute was given to them for establishing and running a hospital. It has been further pleaded in counter affidavit that Diocese of Lucknow and Diocese of Bareilly are part of same organisation and that the registration of the Society gives it a legal status only but has no effect on its existence earlier to its registration. It has been further stated in para-22 that Late Ganga Ram was father of petitioner and husband of Smt. Rukmani Devi. He had admitted possession of the respondent nos.3 and 4 over the land in dispute in ceiling proceedings. Nothing has been stated in the writ petition as to why he stated against the interests of his own wife. It is further stated that certified copies of the statement of Sri Ganga Ram and memo of appeal filed in the ceiling matter were relevant and was admissible in evidence even without referring the same to the witnesses of the other party therefore the contention of the petitioner is misconceived. It is further stated that Late Ganga Ram and his wife Late Smt. Rukmani Devi were holding lands under the Government Grants Act. They had no transferable rights under the grant. However, they had transferred 113 Bigha land to Catholic Diocese of Lucknow in the year 1966 and had handed over possession of the same to the Catholic Diocese of Lucknow. The provisions of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act were not applicable to the area at that time and were applied in the year 1969. No action for eviction of Catholic Diocese of Lucknow was taken and the Catholic Diocese of Lucknow continued to be in possession of the land in dispute. In the meantime, U.P. Imposition of Ceilings of Land Holdings Act, 1960 was amended and proceedings under the said Act were initiated against both of them treating them to be one unit. In those proceedings, the possession of Catholic Diocese of Lucknow over the land in dispute was admitted. In the meantime, U.P. Imposition of Ceilings of Land Holdings Act, 1960 was amended and proceedings under the said Act were initiated against both of them treating them to be one unit. In those proceedings, the possession of Catholic Diocese of Lucknow over the land in dispute was admitted. The respondent no.3 was created in the year 1988 out of the area of Catholic Diocese of Lucknow and land for hospital was given to the respondent no.4 by the Catholic Diocese of Lucknow as the respondent no.4 is also the part of Catholic Christian religious order. It is further stated that presently the land in dispute is under the administrative control of respondent no.3 and 4 and they are entitled to the benefit of anterior possession of the Catholic Diocese of Lucknow. 5. Supplementary counter affidavit has also been filed on behalf of respondent no.3 wherein the copy of objections and the statement recorded in ceiling case have been filed. 6. Supplementary rejoinder affidavit has also been filed by the petitioner annexing the objections dated 3.11.1993 and questionnaire dated 28.4.1994 as SRA-1. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the Society cannot acquire any right on the land in dispute on the basis of adverse possession. The possession of the Society can only be constructive in nature. He further contended that the entry regarding possession was not made as per revenue record manual and that the Diocese of Luknow and Bareilly are different society. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further contended that before filing objections u/s 9-A of the Act, a suit no.128 of 78-79 was filed by Catholic Diocese of Lucknow u/s 229-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act on the basis of transfer by sale and adverse possession. Vide order dated 16.2.1982, the said suit was dismissed by Assistant Collector, against which appeal was filed by Catholic Diocese of Lucknow before the Commissioner, Nainital Division, but due to the notification dated 20.09.1986 u/s 4 of the Act, the appeal stood abated under Section 52(a) of the Act. He further contended that during the consolidation proceedings, Catholic Diocese of Lucknow did not file any objection u/s 9-A of the Act. Therefore, whatever was alleged by Catholic Diocese of Lucknow, extinguished u/s 11-A of the Act. 9. He further contended that during the consolidation proceedings, Catholic Diocese of Lucknow did not file any objection u/s 9-A of the Act. Therefore, whatever was alleged by Catholic Diocese of Lucknow, extinguished u/s 11-A of the Act. 9. In support of his case, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the following judgments:- (i) Kunwar Orendra Chandra Singh vs. Bulaki Ram, AIR 1942 Allahabad 1 (ii) Ambika Prasad Thakur vs. Ram Iqbal Rai, AIR 1966 SC 605 (iii) Sita Ram Bhan Patel vs. Ram Chandra Nago, AIR 1977 SC 1712 (iv) Illachi Devi and Others vs. Jain Society, AIR 2003 SC 3397 (v) Church of North India vs. Lavajibhai Ratanji Bhai and Others, AIR 2005 SC 2544 (vi) Hemaji Waghaji Jat vs. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhail Harijan and Others, AIR 2009 SC 103 (vii) State of Haryana vs. Mukesh Kumar and Others, AIR 2012 SC 559 (viii) Patiala Aviation Club vs. Presiding Officer Labourt Court, AIR 1974 P&H 256 10. In Kunwar Orendra Chandra Singh vs. Bulaki Ram AIR 1942 Allahabad High Court 1, Hon’ble Allahabad High Court has held that in such a case the possession which goes to time immemorial should be presumed to have a legal origin and must be respected thought it may not be possible having regard to the pleadings in the case to find the nature and the extent of the possession. 11. In Ambika Prasad Thakur vs. Ram Iqbal Rai, AIR 1966 SC 605 , it has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court as under:- “(13) On the question of title also, the plaintiffs must fail. In the plaint, the basis of their claim of title was (a) occupation of 426 bighas 18 kathas and 9 dhurs of Dubha Taufir by their ancestor Naurang Thakur as occupancy tenant and the record of his rights in the survey papers of 1892 and (b) the oral arrangement with the Dumraon Raj. The first branch of this claim is obviously incorrect. The survey papers of 1892 do not record occupancy tenancy rights of Naurang Thakur in 426 bighas 18 kathas and 9 dhurs. In the High Court, counsel for the plaintiffs conceded that in the Khasra of 1892-1893 survey the plaintiff’s branch was recorded as tenant for about 19 bighas only. The oral arrangement is not established, and the second branch of this claim also fails. In the High Court, counsel for the plaintiffs conceded that in the Khasra of 1892-1893 survey the plaintiff’s branch was recorded as tenant for about 19 bighas only. The oral arrangement is not established, and the second branch of this claim also fails. The Subordinate Judge did not examine the basis of the plaintiff’s claim of title. His finding in favour of the plaintiff’s title was based chiefly on (1) oral evidence, (2) depositions of witnesses in previous litigations, (3) possession, (4) an admission of the Maharaja. The oral evidence on the point is not convincing. The claim is not supported by the documentary evidence. The survey papers of 1892, 1895, 1904, 1909 and 1937 do not support the plaintiff’s claim of occupancy rights in the lands in suit. The depositions of witnesses in other litgations do not carry the matter further. The deposition of defendant no.11, Ram Dass Rai, in Suit No. 217 of 1911 is of weak evidentiary value. Though admissible against him as an admission, it is not admissible against the other defendants. The other depositions relied upon do not satisfy the test of S.33 of the Indian Evidence Act, and are not admissible in evidence. We have already found that the plaintiffs and their ancestors were not in possession of the disputed land since 1909. The oral evidence as to their possession before 1909 is not convincing, and we are not inclined to accept it. The documentary evidence does not support the story of their possession before 1909. With regard to the admission of the Maharaja in Suit No.247/10 of 1913 relating to the plaintiffs’ title to 244 bighas, we find that in his written statement the Maharaja asserted his khas zeraiti rights and denied the alleged guzashta kastha rights of the plaitntiffs’ ancestors. It seems that in Bihar ‘guzashta kasht’ means a holding on a rent not liable to enhancement. Later, on June 10, 1913, a petition was filed on his behalf stating that the plaintiffs’ ancestors were tenants in occupation of the disputed land having guzashta kasht rights. The Maharaja was interested in the success of the suit, and it was necessary for him in his own interest to make this admission. The admission was made under somewhat suspicious circumstances at the end of the trial of the case when the arguments had begun. The Maharaja was interested in the success of the suit, and it was necessary for him in his own interest to make this admission. The admission was made under somewhat suspicious circumstances at the end of the trial of the case when the arguments had begun. Thought this petition was filed, the written statement of the Maharaja was never formally amended. In the circumstances, this admission has weak evidentiary value. In this suit, the plaintiffs do not claim tenancy right either by express grant or by adverse possession. Title cannot pass by mere admission. The plaintiffs now claim title under Cl. (1) of S. 4 of Regulation XI of 1825. The evidence on the record does not establish this claim.” 12. In Sita Ram Bhan Patel vs. Ram Chandra Nago, AIR 1977 SC 1712 , Hon’ble Apex Court has held that a mere proof of admission, after the person whose admission it is alleged to be has concluded his evidence will be of no avail and cannot be utilised against him. 13. In Church of North India vs. Lavajibhai Ratanji Bhai and Others, AIR 2005 SC 2544, AIR 2005 SC 2544 Hon’ble Apex Court has held in para-44 and 46 as under:- “44. The BPT Act is a special law. It confers jurisdiction upon the Charity Commissioner and other authorities named therein. The statute has been enacted by the Parliament in public interest to safegurard the properties vested in the trusts as also control and management thereof so that the trust property may not be squandered or the object or purport for which a public trust is created may not be defeated by the persons having control thereover. A society may be created either for charitable or religious purposes as also for other purposes. A society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a juristic person. It cannot own any property. The properties belonging to a society admittedly vest in the trustees. In terms of Section 2(13) of the BPT Act, a society is also a charitable trust. Both the Acts are regulatory in nature. The object and purport of both the Acts are clear and the provisions thereof do not contain any obscurity. It cannot own any property. The properties belonging to a society admittedly vest in the trustees. In terms of Section 2(13) of the BPT Act, a society is also a charitable trust. Both the Acts are regulatory in nature. The object and purport of both the Acts are clear and the provisions thereof do not contain any obscurity. It has not been argued before us was done before the learned Trial Judge, that there exists any inconsistency between the provisions of the Societies Registration Act which is a Parliamentary Act, on the one hand, and the BPT Act, which is a State Act, on the other. The core question which had been raised before us is as to whether the Society managing or governing the trust having a separate entity; in relation to its affairs the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred. 46. The Brethern Church has its history which has been traced in paragraph 1 of the plaint. Paragraph 2 speaks of registration of the church under the Societies Registration Act in the year 1944 and registered under BPT Act after the same came into force.” 14. In Illachi Devi and others vs. Jain Society, AIR 2003 SC 3397 , Hon’ble Apex Court has held in paragraphs 26, 31 and 50 as under:- “26. Vesting of property, therefore, does not take place in the Society. Similarly, the society cannot sue or be sued. It must sue or be sued through a person nominated in that behalf. 31. A bare perusal thereof would show that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act as contra-distinguished from a company registered under the Company Act cannot sue in its own name. It is to be sued in the name of the president, chairman, or principal secretary or trustees as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the society or in the name of such person as shall be appointed by the Governing Body for the occasion in default of such determination. It is, therefore, not correct to contend that it is capable of suing or being sued in its own name. 50. It is, therefore, not correct to contend that it is capable of suing or being sued in its own name. 50. We may state that, as noticed hereinbefore, in terms of rules framed by the States under the Societies Registration Act, a society may sue or may be sued through its President or Secretary or in absence of any specific provisions in that behalf, any person authorised by the Society.” 15. In State of Haryana vs. Mukesh Kumar and Others, AIR 2012 SC 559 , Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “47. Adverse possession allows a trespasser-a person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, in the eye of law-to gain legal title to land which he has illegally possessd for 12 years. How 12 years of illegality can suddenly be converted to legal title is, logically and morally speaking, baffling. This outmoded law essentially asks the judiciary to place its stamp of approval upon conduct that the ordinary Indian citizen would find reprehensible.” 16. In Hemaji Waghaji Jat v. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhail Harijan and Others, AIR 2009 SC 103 , it has been held as under:- “6. The learned District Judge referred to in the case of B.N. Venkatarayapa vs. State of Karnataka, (1998) 2 CLJ 414 S.C. wherein it was held that in absence of crucial pleadings regarding adverse possession and evidence to show that the petitioners have been in continuous and interrupted possession of the lands in question claiming right, title and interest of the original grantee, the petitioners cannot claim that they have perfected their title by adverse possession. The burden of proof lies on the petitioners to show that they have title to and have been in possession and he was dispossessed and discontinued his possession within 12 years from the date of filing his sit. Adverse possession implies that it commenced in wrong and is maintained against right.” 17. In Patiala Aviation Club vs. Presiding Officer Labourt Court, AIR 1974 Punjab and Haryana 256, Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that every society registered under this Act may sue or be sued in the name of the president, chairman, or principal secretary, or trustees, as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the society, and, in default of such determination, in the name of such person as shall be appointed by the governing body for the occasion. 18. 18. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent nos.3 and 4 has contended that Late Sri Ganga Ram and his wife Late Smt. Rukmani Devi were holding lands under the Government Grant Act. They had no transferable rights under the grant. However, they had transferred 113 Bigha land to Catholic Diocese of Lucknow in the year 1966 and had handed over possession of the same to the Catholic Diocese of Luknow. It was also contended that provisions of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act were not applicable to the area at that time and were applied in the year 1969. On behalf of the tenure holder, no action for eviction of the Catholic Diocese of Lucknow was taken and the Catholic Diocese of Lucknow continued to be in possession on the land in dispute. In the meantime, U.P. Imposition of Ceilings of Land Holdings Act, 1960 was amended and proceedings under the said Act were initiated against both of them treating them to be one unit. In those proceedings, the possession of Catholic Diocese of Lucknow over the land in dispute was admitted by the tenure holders. Objections were raised when this area was brought under the Consolidation Holdings Act. The petitioner and his predecessor in interest out of sheer greed began to deny the claim of respondent nos.3 and 4. 19. In support of his arguments, learned counsel appearing for respondent nos.3 and 4 has placed reliance upon the following judgments:- (i) Amba Prasad vs. Mohaboob Ali Shah and Others, AIR 1965 SC 54 (ii) Sri Nath Singh and Others vs. Board of Revenue and Others, AIR 1968 SC 1351 (iii) Basant Collective Agricultural Farming Cooperative Society Ltd. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, 2008 (2) U.D. 285 (iv) New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA) vs. Army Welfare Housing Organisation and Others, (2010) 9 SCC 354 (v) State of Uttarakhand and Others vs. Guru Ramdas Educational Trust Society, 2012 (2) U.D. 470 20. In Amba Prasad vs. Mohaboob Ali Shah and Others, AIR 1965 SC 54 , Hon’ble Apex Court has held in para-16 as under:- “Speaking generally, S. 20 says that certain persons “recorded as occupants” of lands (other than grove lands or lands to which Section 16 applies) shall be known as adhivasis and shall be entitled to retain or to regain possession of them, after the date of vesting, which was July 1, 1952. Such persons do not include an intermediary (Explanation IV). Such persons must be recorded as occupants in Khasra or Khatauni for 1356F (1-748 to 30-6-49). If such a person is in possession, he continues in possession. If he is evicted after June 30, 1948, he is to be put back in possession, notwithstanding anything in any order or decree. By fiction such persons are deemed to be entitled to regain possession (Explanation 1). The emphasis has been laid on the record of khasra or khatauni of 1356 F and June 30, 1948 in the datum line. The importance of an entry in these two documents is further apparent from explanations II and III. Under the former, if the entry is corrected before the date of vesting (1-7-52), the corrected entry is to prevail and order (under?) the later the entry is deemed to be corrected (even though not actually corrected) if an order or decree of a competent court ordering the correction had been made before the date of vesting and the order or decree had become final. There are thus two date lines. They are June 30, 1948 and July 1, 1952, and the title to possession as adhivasi depends on the entries in the khasra or khatauni for the year 1356 F.” 21. In Sri Nath Singh and others vs. Board of Revenue and others, AIR 1968 SC 1351 , Hon’ble Apex Court has held in para-12 as under:- “12. This case establishes that a person recorded as an occupant on the relevant date although found by courts of law to have no right to possession even prior thereto, is not to be denied adhivasi rights.” 22. In Basant’s case, this Court has held that no suit for eviction of the petitioner had been filed by the original tenure holder under the U.P. Tenancy Act or under the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act and hence, petitioner had perfected his rights as hereditary tenant under the U.P. Tenancy Act and as Sirdar u/s 131, U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act and subsequently as Bhumidhar with transferable rights in 1977, by operation of law. 23. In Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA) vs. Army Welfare Housing Organisation and Others, (2010) 9 SCC 354 , Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “43. 23. In Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA) vs. Army Welfare Housing Organisation and Others, (2010) 9 SCC 354 , Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “43. We are, therefore, of the opinion that AWHO, though registered under the Societies Registration Act, has certain characteristics which would enable it to hold property and therefore transfer of land-cum-superstructure would be by way of sub-lease from the lessor i.e. NOIDA to the lessee which is AWHO to the sub-lessees who are the individual allottees, by way of a stamped and registered document. 24. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 25. Before dwelling into the rival contentions of the parties and discussing the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for both the parties, some undisputed facts of the case are that U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was enforced in the area w.e.f. 1.7.1969, prior to enforcement of U.P. Tenancy Act. It is also not disputed that the land in dispute was originally granted lease of the land in dispute of originally of land of State Government which was given under the Government on lease to the predecessor of the petitioner and the predecessor of the petitioner was also recorded bhumidhar after the Zamindari Abolition came into force. It is also not disputed that no suit for ejectment of respondent no.3 and 4 was filed by his predecessor in interest of his predecessor’s claim to be in possession over the land in dispute. This fact is also not disputed by the father of the petitioner and husband of Smt. Rukmani, Ganga Ram, who has clearly stated that the land in dispute was in possession of Diocese of Lucknow. 26. So far as the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that Diocese of Bareilly and Lucknow is a separate society, in this regard, it was specifically stated by the respondent nos.3 and 4 that the word ‘Diocese’ means district under the supervision of a Bishop. It was further stated by the respondents that they are Catholic Christian Organisation of which Pope is the head and the administration is divided into diocese to manage the properties and to supervise religious rituals and administration. It was further stated by the respondents that they are Catholic Christian Organisation of which Pope is the head and the administration is divided into diocese to manage the properties and to supervise religious rituals and administration. The land in dispute was being administered by Catholic Diocese of Lucknow at that time but by the creation of Catholic Diocese of Bareilly, same came under the administration of the newly created Catholic Diocese of Bareilly. It is not disputed that the Catholic Diocese of Lucknow and the Catholic Diocese of Bareilly belong to different religious order and are not part of the same organization. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that the respondents are not entitled to get any benefit of the alleged possession of the earlier Catholic Diocese of Lucknow is liable to be rejected. 27. The petitioner in support of his contention has relied upon a judgment of Illaychi Devi (supra) and Church of North India (supra) in which Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a juristic person and is not capable of ownership of any property. The petitioner has further relied upon a judgment of Allahabad High Court passed in Kunwar Orendra’s case (supra) in which it is held that fluctuating and indefinite body cannot acquire property by adverse possession. So far as aforesaid judgments are concerned, the ratio is not disputed but Section 5-A as added by the State of U.P. Legislature in the Societies Registration Act provided that property of a society can be transferred with the permission of the District Judge. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent has referred above Guru Ramdas’s case and NOIDA’s case in which it has been held that societies registered under the Societies Registration Act is capable of holding property. The decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court relied upon by the petitioner do not relate to the State of U.P. Further, in view of judgment of this Court passed in Basant Collective’s case (supra), it has been held by this court that where the name of the Society is recorded as occupier before the date of vesting, the society shall become bhumidhar thereof after enforcement of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. In view of decision of this Court, the contention of the petitioner that a society cannot get title by way of adverse possession is also liable to be rejected. 28. So far as the judgment rendered by Punjab & Haryana High Court in Patiala Aviation’s case relied upon by the petitioner is concerned, wherein it has been held that the society registered under the Societies Registration Act can sue or be sued in the name of its President, Chairman, Principal Secretary or Trustees as may be determined by the rules and regulations of the Society or in the name of such person as may be appointed by the governing body, in that case, the appeal filed on behalf of the Society by its manager was dismissed on the ground of incompetence. Said objection was taken in appeal itself and were dealt in detail by the appellate court. In the case at hand, the petitioner did not press the objection at the stage of appeal nor before the revisional court as such this plea cannot be raised at this stage. 29. The petitioner has further relied upon the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ambika Prasad Thukur and Others vs. Ram Iqbal Rai and Others AIR 1966 SC 605 ; Sita Ram Bhan Patel vs. Ram Vhandra Nago, AIR 1977 SC 1712 ; Mithu Lal and Another vs. State of Madhay Pradesh, 1975 SCC (Crl.) 93 and the decisions of Allahabad High Court in the case of Smt. Phuljhari Devi vs. Mithari Lal, AIR 1971 ALL 494 . In all these cases, it has been held that the admission made by a party cannot be used against another party. In the case at hand, the ceiling notices were issued to both Ganga Ram and Smt. Rukmani Devi. Both filed joint objections. Only Ganga Ram examined himself as a witness in the case for himself and on behalf of his wife he categorically admitted possession of the Catholic Diocese over the land in dispute. After decision of the case against them, single appeal was preferred jointly by both of them. This shows that Late Ganga Ram had implied authority from Late Smt. Rukmani Devi in the aforesaid ceiling case. Apart from above, under Section 120 of the Evidence Act, the husband is a competent witness on behalf of his wife during marriage. After decision of the case against them, single appeal was preferred jointly by both of them. This shows that Late Ganga Ram had implied authority from Late Smt. Rukmani Devi in the aforesaid ceiling case. Apart from above, under Section 120 of the Evidence Act, the husband is a competent witness on behalf of his wife during marriage. So far as ceiling case is concerned, the husband and wife is a single unit therefore the statement made by husband as a witness will have binding effect upon the wife also. Furthermore, no explanation was put forward by the petitioner or his predecessor before the appellate court as well as before the revisional court that Ganga Ram has given false statement against his wife. 30. On the request of the learned counsel for the parties, lower court record of ceiling case was summoned, photocopy of which was kept on record. 31. In addition to above, it is also pertinent to mention that on behalf of Ganga Ram and Smt. Rukmani Devi written arguments were filed by their counsel before the Prescribed Authority in ceiling case on 25.3.1976 wherein it was stated the tenure holder Smt. Rumani Devi is wife of tenure holder Ganga Ram and on the land of Smt. Rukmani Devi, Catholic Diocese of Lucknow are in adverse possession from 12-13 years and who have matured Sirdar rights against Smt. Rukmani Devi on 84-10-0 land. The rights of Smt. Rukmani Devi have come to an end. Therefore, this land cannot be included in the land for calculation of ceiling area in the name of Smt. Rukmani Devi and Ganga Ram. It appears that when the ceiling case had become final by making interpretation by Additional District Judge that wife and husband would be a separate tenure holder then the proceedings were initiated on behalf of the petitioner to grab the land on which the Society firstly acquired adhiwasi rights being occupier on the land prior to creation of enforcement of Zamindari Abolition. 32. It was also the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the entry which was made in favour of Late Smt. Rukmani Devi was not made in accordance with law. Therefore, no reliance can be placed in that entry which was not made in accordance with law. 33. 32. It was also the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the entry which was made in favour of Late Smt. Rukmani Devi was not made in accordance with law. Therefore, no reliance can be placed in that entry which was not made in accordance with law. 33. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further relied upon the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy vs. Revaram, AIR 2007 SC 1753 ; State of Haryana vs. Mukesh Kumar and Others, AIR 2012 SC 559 ; Hemaji Waghaji Jat vs. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan, AIR 2009 SC 103 and the decisions of Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the cases of Ganga Ram vs. D.D.C. and Others, 1982 RD 1; Jamuna Prasad vs. D.D.C. and Others, 1981 RD 112; Bitiya Bano vs. D.D.C. and Others, 1980 RD 190 in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as the Hon’ble High Court have laid down the guidelines for ascertaining the adverse possession. All these judgments are not applicable to the present case since there was an entry of possession of respondent nos.3 and 4 in 1374 F and there is no dispute about this fact and in view of judgments referred by the learned counsel for the respondent nos.3 and 4 Amba Prasad vs. Mohaboob Ali Shah and Others AIR 1965 SC 54 ; Sri Nath Singh and Others vs. Board of Revenue and Others, AIR 1968 SC 1351 , wherein it has been held that Section 20(b) (i) of the Z.A. Act has been interpreted and it has been held on the fact that who were the persons whose name were recorded in column no. 23 (miscellaneous) in khasra for the year 1356 Fasli in possession and who claimed by reason of entry to be recorded occupants of filed in dispute had obtained, adhiwasi rights in under Section 20 of U.P. Z.A.L.R Act. The clauses (b)(i) and (b) (ii) of Section do not require the proof of actual possession in the 1356 Fasli. In the village where land is situated it is 1374 Fasli. The clauses (b)(i) and (b) (ii) of Section do not require the proof of actual possession in the 1356 Fasli. In the village where land is situated it is 1374 Fasli. The occupants will acquire adhiwasi rights in view of Section 131 of U.P. Z.A.L.R Act since the suits were not filed within the limitation of under Section 180 of Tenancy Act or under Section 209 of U.P. Z.A.L.R Act after Z.A was enforced as has been held by this Court in Basant Collectives’s case supra. 34. In view of the discussions made in foregoing paragraphs, I do not find any error in the impugned judgments and order passed by the learned S.O.C. as well as learned D.D.C. The writ petition is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed. Interim order passed by this Court dated 04.08.1999 is vacated.