Per Masoodi, J.;— 1. Srinagar Municipality, in the year 1977, through its Executive Officer, allotted four shops in Blocks "A", "B" and "C" of its Shopping Complex at Iqbal Park opposite Naaz Cinema, Srinagar, one each to Sh. Jagdish Lal and three others-respondents herein, on a rent of Rs, 275/- per month. The parties duly executed the lease agreements wherein terms and conditions of the lease were set out. The lease was for a fixed term of 17 years from the date of execution of the lease agreement and was to come to an end on expiry of period fixed. 2. The shops allotted to the respondents were destroyed in a fire mishap on 21.08.1990. The occurrence led to registration of case FIR No. 175/90 under Section 436 RFC at Police Station, Sherghari, Srinagar. The Executive Officer, Srinagar Municipality, on 30.07.1994 issued a Public Notice stating therein that three buildings owned by Srinagar Municipality identified as Block A, B and C were completely damaged in fire incident in 1990, that the shops allotted to the respondents were also damaged in fire incident and that as there was likelihood of the damaged property being mis-used and encroached upon, the Municipality proposed to protect the property and make it useful. Anyone having any objection to the reconstruction of the damaged property, was given opportunity to submit objections to the proposal within two weeks from the date of publication of the Public Notice, whereafter, any objection raised was not to be entertained. 3. The appellants, after none, including the present respondents, came forward to oppose the proposal, proceeded with the proposed construction and after reconstruction leased out the reconstructed shops to fresh allottees subject to the conditions laid down in the agreement executed with them. 4. Respondents on 05.02.1996 filed a writ petition being OWP No. 99/96, pleading therein that they were constrained to migrate from the Valley because of the militancy and continued to be in possession of the shops leased out in their favour on the date of filing of the writ petition. Respondents complained that the appellant in league with a few persons were keen to illegally occupy the leased out premises. They claimed to have earlier addressed a representation to the Chief Secretary of the State, Director General of Police, Deputy Inspector General, Jammu and other officers. 5. Respondents complained that the appellant in league with a few persons were keen to illegally occupy the leased out premises. They claimed to have earlier addressed a representation to the Chief Secretary of the State, Director General of Police, Deputy Inspector General, Jammu and other officers. 5. Respondents on the strength of the averments made in the petition, sought following relief:- (i) A writ of mandamus commanding the respondents not to evict the petitioners from leased out shops i.e No. 7 Block-A, No. 12 Block B, No. 2 & 3 in Block C. 6. The appellants opposed the writ petition on the grounds that the subject matter of the writ petition was destroyed in fire incident in the year 1990 and the rights of the respondents, if any, over the property in question, ended once the subject matter of the lease got destructed and ceased to exist. It was further pleaded that the respondents having failed to deposit the rent for three consecutive months the lease was determined on said failure. The appellant next contended that as the lease was for a fixed term of 17 years, it came toan end by efflux of time much before the writ petition was filed and the petition, therefore, was not maintainable. It was pleaded that the shops in three buildings after re-construction were allotted to S/Shri Hamid Ullah Shah, Mushtaq Ahmad Wani, Mushtaq Alimad Shah, Haji Abdul Rashid, on the terms and conditions laid down in the lease agreements executed by the allottees in favour of the appellants and that the fresh allottees had taken over the possession of the°shops allotted to them before the respondents came up with the writ petition. 7. S/Shri Hamid Ullah Shah and three other allottees of the reconstructed shops were arrayed as a party respondents 4 to 7 at the instance of the respondents vide order dated 20.05.1998. The respondents, accordingly amended the writ petition and sought following additional relief: - (i) Writ of certiorari for quashing the allotment orders made in favour of respondents 4 to 7 with respect to shop Nos. 12/B, 7/A, 2/C and 3/C situated at Iqbal Park, Opposite Naaz Cinema, Hazuri Bagh, Srinagar, after directing the respondents to produce copies thereof before this Hon'ble Court. 12/B, 7/A, 2/C and 3/C situated at Iqbal Park, Opposite Naaz Cinema, Hazuri Bagh, Srinagar, after directing the respondents to produce copies thereof before this Hon'ble Court. (ii) Writ of mandamus commanding the respondents not to evict the petitioners from their shops situated at Municipal Building, Opposite Naaz Cineman, Bazuri Bagh, Srinagar under Nos. 7A-Block No. 12, in Block-B No. 2, and in Block C No. 3 respectively. The respondents 4 to 7 did not appear before the writ court. 8. The writ court vide judgment dated 20.11.2000, allowed the writ petition, held the respondents entitled to restoration of the property and directed the appellants to hand over the alternate shops to the respondents, in case, it was not possible to hand over possession of the shops earlier allotted to them. 9. Writ court judgment is questioned in LPA on hand, on the grounds set out in the memo of appeal. 10. We have gone through the appeal, the writ court judgment as also the writ record and have heard learned counsel for the parties. 11. The Letters Patent Appeal against the writ court judgment in question, must succeed for the following reasons:- i) The subject matter of lease was destroyed in fire mishap a few years before the respondents approached the writ court with OWP No. 99/1996. The leased out shops therefore ceased to exist after the fire incident and did not exist on the date, writ petition was filed. The lease with the destruction of the leased out property came to an end, and all rights in the subject matter of the lease got extinguished because of destruction of the leased out property. Learned Single Judge noticed that the shops were destroyed in fire mishap. However it was held that the respondents were to be evicted from the leased out property only after following due procedure of law. It would be appropriate to extract hereunder observation made by learned Single Judge in this regard:- "Even if the shops were gutted in fire the petitioners could have been evicted by following due procedure of law. If in the exercise of executive power, somebody is dispossessed, then that would also not be in accordance with law". Learned Single Judge while holding so placed reliance on law laid down in "Bishan Das and others v. State of Punjab and others AIR 1961 SC 1570 ". If in the exercise of executive power, somebody is dispossessed, then that would also not be in accordance with law". Learned Single Judge while holding so placed reliance on law laid down in "Bishan Das and others v. State of Punjab and others AIR 1961 SC 1570 ". ii) The view taken by learned Single Judge is untenable for the reasons 1 that once the subject matter of a lease is destroyed, the question of 1 eviction of lessee therefrom does not arise and so does not adherence 1 to due procedure of law. In such a situation the lessee cease to have any right in the subject matter of the lease as the subject matter is no i more in existence. Conversely the landlord is not to follow duel procedure of law. The facts of the case relied upon by learned Single Judge are markedly distinguishable from the facts of the case before the writ court. The view taken by learned Single Judge, therefore, does not find support from the case law relied upon. It is important to note that in the present case the shop site was not leased out to the respondents as is usually done by the Local Bodies and the respondents allowed to construct shops on the shops site at their own expense. Had it been so the respondents possibly could insist that the destruction of shops constructed by them did not extinguish their rights over the shop site. In the present case the multi block shopping complex was constructed by the appellant and after its construction, four of the constructed shops in Block A, B and C, were leased out to the respondents. In the circumstances, all rights of respondents in the leased out shops came to an end with the destruction of the shops. iii) The question identical to one that arises, in the present case, arose before Division Bench of Kerala High Court in Dr. V. Sidharthan v. Pattioi Ramadasan AIR 1984 Kerala 18. The Court held:- "Where the subject-matter of a lease like the building is totally destroyed the tenant is not entitled to squat on the ground where the building stood or construct a new building in its place or require the landlord to put up a new structure. A demise must have a subject-matter and if it is destroyed, the lease comes to an end. A demise must have a subject-matter and if it is destroyed, the lease comes to an end. The question regarding due notice to quit under S. 106 The court referred with approval to the following observation made in AIR 1979 Ker 156 :- "The lease being a transfer to enjoy the property transferred, with the total destruction of the property the lease cannot be considered as continuing. There cannot be a lease subsisting in regard to a property not in existence. In this case the appellant has not been able to establish that what has been leased out is not only the building but also the land on which the building stood." iv) We are in agreement with the view taken by Kerala High Court in Dr. V. Sidharthan's case (supra). The legal proposition that emerges from the above discussion is that a lease comes to an end with the destruction of the leased out property, and in such a situation insistence on adherence to procedure would be contradiction and not tenable. v) So viewed, the lease came to an end on the date, the subject matter of the lease was destroyed in the fire incident, leaving the respondents without any right to maintain the writ petition and seek a writ of mandamus commanding the appellant to allot re-constructed shops or alternative shops to them. vi) The lease commenced in the year 1977 and the parties bound down themselves by the terms and conditions incorporated in the lease agreement. One of the terms and conditions agreed upon by the parties, fixed the term of the lease as 17 years from the date of execution of the lease agreement. The lease agreement was executed in the year 1977. The lease therefore outlived its life and came to end by efflux of time in the year 1997. Even if, it is assumed that lease continued to exist, after the subject matter of the lease was destroyed in fire mishap, on 21st August, 1990, though such an assumption would be erroneous, and legally impermissible in view of settled legal position, the lease came to end by efflux of time much before the writ petition was filed. Even if, it is assumed that lease continued to exist, after the subject matter of the lease was destroyed in fire mishap, on 21st August, 1990, though such an assumption would be erroneous, and legally impermissible in view of settled legal position, the lease came to end by efflux of time much before the writ petition was filed. It is pertinent to point out that appellant is a local body and in terms of Section 1(3)(iv) the Jammu and Kashmir House and Shops Control Act 1967, the subject matter of the lease does not fall within purview of the Act. The respondents, therefore, cannot insist on benefit under Section 2(6) of the Act and claim to be tenants because they continued in possession after termination of the tenancy by efflux of time. The respondents, in the circumstances cease to have any right or interest in the subject matter of lease that was destroyed much before the period of lease came to an end, in the year 1994. They, therefore, did not have any right to maintain, let alone succeed in the writ petition. 12. For the reasons discussed, the Letters Patent appeal has merit and is allowed. The Writ Court Judgment deserved to be overset. The writ Court Judgment dated 20.11.2000 and is, accordingly, set aside.