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2013 DIGILAW 80 (UTT)

VINOD KUMAR GUPTA v. COMMISSIONER GARHWAL MANDAL

2013-03-01

Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta

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JUDGMENT Hon’ble Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta, J. (Oral) By this writ petition two orders revoking licence for holding arms have been challenged. One order was passed by the first authority and the second one by the appellate authority. 2. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that order revoking licence is illegal, as the precondition for revocation licence has mentioned in Section 17 (3) of the Arms Act are not fulfilled as there has not been fact finding which has sine qua non recorded. He further submits that revocation has taken place because of the pendency of the criminal case. However, he fairly admits that his client had carried revolver while he participated in the marriage ceremony and during the marriage ceremony accidently there has been automatic opening of fire as a result of which two persons were injured. According to him, pendency of this criminal case prompted the authority concerned to revoke licence. The judicial pronouncement does not support this kind of ground for revocation. It has been held by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Satish Singh Vs District Magistrate, Sultanpur & others reported in 2010(8) ACC 1994. 3. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied on the reasoning of the appellate authority and submits that the pendency of the criminal case is not the ground of revocation of the licence. It has been held and decided that the security of public peace and the public safety and also for other reasons the revocation was required. This case according to him comes within the category of Clause (a) and Clause (b) of Sub Section (3) of Section 17 of the Arms Act. When the authority concerned has come to a fact finding, based on the admitted fact, this Court, on such fact finding, will not substitute its own reasoning and fact finding to upset the impugned order. I have considered the respective arguments of the learned counsel for the parties. Before I discuss the matter, I set out the power of licencing authority under Section 17 (3)(b) of the Arms Act. Section 17 (3) (b) of the Arms Act reads as under:- “17. Variation, suspension and revocation of licences.- (1) ……….. (2) ……….. (3) The licensing authority may by order in writing suspend a licence for such period as it thinks fit or revoke a licence,-- (a) ………. Section 17 (3) (b) of the Arms Act reads as under:- “17. Variation, suspension and revocation of licences.- (1) ……….. (2) ……….. (3) The licensing authority may by order in writing suspend a licence for such period as it thinks fit or revoke a licence,-- (a) ………. (b) if the licensing authority deems it necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety to suspend or revoke the licence; or (c) ………. (d) …… (e) ……” 4. I agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that precondition mentioned in Section 17 of the Arms Act has to be fulfilled before any order of revocation is passed, meaning thereby, the authority concerned must come to a fact finding of the conditions mentioned in the said Section exist. It appears from the Single Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court, cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, ruled amongst other that pendency of criminal case per se is not ground for revocation of licence. In the context of the aforesaid legal position, I examine the fact finding of both the authorities. It appears that the licencing authority order does not carry the detailed reason and finding. However, the operative portion of the appellate authority reads as under:- ß’kknh lekjksg esa ‘L= dk izn’kZu djuk] yksMsM fjokYoj dks csYV esa yxkdj pyuk] fookg lekjksg esa fjokYoj ls xksyh py tkuk rFkk bl izdkj ds gh Qk;j ls fookg lekjksg esa lfEefyr yksxksa dk pksfVy gks tkuk ,d xEHkhj izd`fr dh ?kVuk gS ,oa ‘kknh lekjksg esa bl izdkj dk ‘kL= izn’kZu o Qk;fjax ij vadq’k yxk;k tkuk vko’;d gS vkSj ;fn bl izdkj ‘kfDr dj vad’”k ugha tkrk rks ‘kknh lekjksg esa yksxksa ds ejus ,oa pkfVy gksus dh ?kVukvksa dh iqujko`fr gksrh jgsxhA voj U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr vkns’k fof/klEer~ gS ,oa blesa fdlh izdkj ds gLr{ksi dh vko’;drk ugha gSA vihy cyghu gksus ds dkj.k fujLr fd;s tkus ;ksX; gSA vr vihy fujLr dh tkrh gSA i=koyh ckn vko’;d nf[ky nQrj gksosaAÞ 6. Thus it appears that the authority concerned vide its impugned order has not revoked the licence on the ground of criminal case. The authority concerned came to a fact finding that in substance that in order to preserve the security of the public peace and public safety such revocation is required. Thus it appears that the authority concerned vide its impugned order has not revoked the licence on the ground of criminal case. The authority concerned came to a fact finding that in substance that in order to preserve the security of the public peace and public safety such revocation is required. There was no ground and reason for petitioner to carry the arm while joining the marriage party or participating in a wedding ceremony. There was no reason either accidental or otherwise to use the firearm in a peaceful atmosphere and assembly where there is no provocation of any unlawful activity at all. I fail to understand why the holder of the licence should carry an arm while joining marriage party. It is judicious discretion of the authority that this sort of licence holder should not be encouraged to retain licence. I can not substitute anything contrary to what the Appellate Authority has found. 7. I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the licence has been revoked merely on the ground of pendency of the criminal proceeding. It has been done on some other ground as mentioned in Section 17 (3) of the Arms Act quoted above. I, therefore, do not find any reason to interfere with the same. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. 8. However, I make it clear, in the event, the petitioner is acquitted in the criminal trial, it would be open for him to apply fresh and in that case, the authority concerned shall consider the matter without taking note of the past incident.