Research › Search › Judgment

Andhra High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 800 (AP)

APSRTC rep. by Regional Manager v. Lachaiah

2013-09-23

ASHUTOSH MOHUNTA, DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU

body2013
Judgment : DamaSeshadri Naidu, J. This is an appeal preferred by the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (APSRTC), which was aggrieved by the order dated 28.12.2005 passed in W.P.No.27855 of 2005 by the learned single Judge. Basically, the said writ petition was filed by the Corporation, seeking judicial review by way of writ of certiorari, of the order dated 15.12.2004 in M.P.No.13 of 2001 by the Labour Court-III, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad. 2. The facts in brief are that the 1st respondent in the present writ appeal was appointed as conductor on 17.02.1968, got his services regularized on 01.07.1971, got his promotions in due course of time, and was eventually retired from service on 31.07.1997. After the said retirement, a dispute arose consequent to refusal of his request to the respondent Corporation to permit him to encash the un-availed leaves, which comprise about 400 sick leaves and 297 earned leaves, to his credit. 3. On refusal to be paid the wages of encashment of un-availed leaves, the 1st respondent invoked the jurisdiction of the 2nd respondent herein. On appearance, while meeting the contentions of the 1st respondent herein, the appellant corporation has raised various pleas, which include that the application was barred by limitation, that there is no provision for the 1st respondent to encash his un-availed sick leaves and earned leaves and that there was no merit at all in the claim of the 1st respondent. Before the Labour Court, the 1st respondent herein examined himself as W.W.1 and marked Exs.W.1 and W.2. On the part of the appellant Corporation, one of its officials was examined as M.W.1 and Ex.M.1, which is the list of leave cards, was marked. 4. After appreciating the entire material, including the oral evidence, the Labour Court has held that the 1st respondent is entitled for 95 days of earned leave to be encashed and the amount was quantified at Rs.19,313-50 ps. It was held that the respondent was not entitled to any interest. Aggrieved by the order dated 15.12.2004, as passed in M.P.No.13 of 2001 by the Labour Court-III, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, the appellant Corporation initially filed W.P.No.27855 of 2005, which came to be dismissed by a learned single Judge through an order dated 28.12.2005. It was held that the respondent was not entitled to any interest. Aggrieved by the order dated 15.12.2004, as passed in M.P.No.13 of 2001 by the Labour Court-III, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, the appellant Corporation initially filed W.P.No.27855 of 2005, which came to be dismissed by a learned single Judge through an order dated 28.12.2005. The learned single Judge has justly concluded that the Labour Court has undertaken an extensive discussion of the issue and has appropriately directed the appellant Corporation to allow the encashment of 400 sick leaves and 297 earned leaves, amounting to Rs.19,313-50 ps. 5. Heard both sides. 6. The Supreme Court, as well as this Court, has time and again, reiterated the scope of judicial review, especially under the writ of certiorari, which is to confine itself to examining the decision making process, rather than the decision itself. Indisputably, the primary fact finding Tribunal i.e., the 2nd respondent in this appeal, has passed a reasoned order and it does not suffer from any infirmity - either legal or factual. The learned single Judge, accordingly, has refused to interfere with the findings of fact, as the same being beyond the domain of judicial review, especially in a matter of this nature. 7. We may profitably refer to Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan ( AIR 1964 SC 477 ), in which a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court considered the scope of the High Court’s jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in cases involving challenge to the orders passed by the authorities entrusted with quasi-judicial functions. Speaking for the majority of the Constitution Bench, Gajendragadkar, J., as his Lordship then was, observed as under: “7. … A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the court or tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the court or tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” (emphasis added) 8. The Supreme Court has further held in Sadhu Ram v. Delhi Transport Corpn. (1983) 4 SCC 156 , to the effect: “3. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” (emphasis added) 8. The Supreme Court has further held in Sadhu Ram v. Delhi Transport Corpn. (1983) 4 SCC 156 , to the effect: “3. … The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is truly wide but, for that very reason, it has to be exercised with great circumspection. It is not for the High Court to constitute itself into an appellate court over tribunals constituted under special legislations to resolve disputes of a kind qualitatively different from ordinary civil disputes and to re-adjudicate upon questions of fact decided by those tribunals. That the questions decided pertain to jurisdictional facts does not entitle the High Court to interfere with the findings on jurisdictional facts which the Tribunal is well competent to decide. Where the circumstances indicate that the Tribunal has snatched at jurisdiction, the High Court may be justified in interfering. But where the Tribunal gets jurisdiction only if a reference is made and it is therefore impossible ever to say that the Tribunal has clutched at jurisdiction, we do not think that it was proper for the High Court to substitute its judgment for that of the Labour Court and hold that the workman had raised no demand with the management.” 9. Keeping in view the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the above judgments, we deem it inappropriate to disturb the concurrent findings rendered by the 2nd respondent Tribunal and also the learned single Judge. 10. In the light of the above facts and circumstances, we do not find any merit in the appeal and it shall fail. Accordingly, the writ appeal is dismissed. No costs. As a sequel to it, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending in this writ appeal, shall stand closed.