Judgment : The attempt on the part of the petitioner to have his service tenure extended has resulted in initiation of disciplinary proceeding against him for making wrong statement as regards his date of birth at the time of entering into service in Calcutta Tramways Co-operative Credit Society' Limited. The authority has passed an order of stoppage of two increments. In this writ petition, under challenge is the legality of the said proceeding as also the order of the authorities, by which punishment has been imposed. The petitioner had joined the society in the year 1968 as a clerk, disclosing his age to be 20 years. Subsequently he was promoted to the post of Grade-1 Assistant. In his job application, he had indicated that he had passed Higher Secondary Examination in technical science group in the year 1967, he was pursuing B.Sc course. Case of the petitioner is that during the month of December, 1996, he came to learn that his date of birth was wrongly recorded and he sought for correction of his recorded date of birth. In support of his plea, he has annexed to the writ petition as "P2", a copy of his admit card for Higher Secondary Examination. In this document, his date of birth is recorded as 5th January, 1951. 2. It is also his case that when he has made his plea for such correction, majority members of the managing committee of the society had accepted his request by making endorsement on his application itself, which was lying with the authorities. A copy of this application has been made Annexune P12 to the writ petition. From this Annexure, I find that there is endorsement to the effect that "Date of birth accepted as (5-1-1950)" and there are initials of several persons, who appear to take the same view. The petitioner has identified these individual members of the managing committee of the society as T.C. Dey (Chairman), A. K. Mukherjee (Secretary), S.K. Bhattacharjee (Vice-Chairman), P. K. Sen (Director), Gurudas Chatterjee (Director), S. N. Singh (Director), N.C. Chatterjee (Director), S. P. Yadav (Director) and N. K. Singh (Director). These facts have been pleaded in paragraph 22 of the writ petition and paragraph 2 of a Supplementary Affidavit filed by the petitioner, affirmed on 19th May, 2009. These facts have been pleaded in paragraph 22 of the writ petition and paragraph 2 of a Supplementary Affidavit filed by the petitioner, affirmed on 19th May, 2009. The petitioner claims to have acquired knowledge of the said fact from an annexure to the charge-sheet which was served on him. Otherwise, it does not appear that any official communication was made to the petitioner after the he had made his application for correction of age, until a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 9th February, 2004, requiring him to explain as to why the authority would not have stuck to his original date of birth of 29th April, 1948 instead of 5th January, 1951. His explanation did not satisfy the employer, and a charge-sheet followed. Eventually the departmental proceeding led to imposition of punishment which I have already referred to. 3. On or about 21st April, 2004, the charge-sheet was issued against the petitioner on the ground of suppression of true age at the time of his appointment, as was reflected in his Higher Secondary examination admit card. Though the factual basis of the charges against him remained the same, he was charged on two counts. The first charge was of willful suppression of material fact for the purpose of gaining employment "through gross misconduct" and the second charge was of accepting employment in an illegal manner, which as per the charge-sheet, constituted cheating. He was also placed under suspension from that date itself, but the order of suspension was subsequently lifted. The reply of the petitioner to the chargesheet was that at the time he joined his service, he was not asked to produce any certificate in support of his age or date of birth and by mistake he had disclosed his age to be 20 years at the time of making his application. Enquiry was held thereafter in which, the petitioner participated. The disciplinary authority was satisfied of the guilt of the petitioner in respect of the charges brought against him. His date of birth was restored to 19th April, 1948, as was originally disclosed by him, and the disciplinary authority ordered permanent stoppage of increment. There appears to be a minor discrepancy in specifying his date of birth as originally recorded, since as per the charge-sheet itself, original recordal of his date of birth was 29th April, 1948. His date of birth was restored to 19th April, 1948, as was originally disclosed by him, and the disciplinary authority ordered permanent stoppage of increment. There appears to be a minor discrepancy in specifying his date of birth as originally recorded, since as per the charge-sheet itself, original recordal of his date of birth was 29th April, 1948. But so far as the controversy involved in this proceeding is concerned, this discrepancy is not of major significance. The order of the disciplinary authority was appealed against before the appellate forum and the appellate authority modified the punishment of the petitioner enhancing the same to stoppage of two stage increments with effect from May 2005. The appellate body found no reason to interfere with finding of fact by the disciplinary authority to the effect that the petitioner had suppressed his actual age to obtain employment. It is recorded in the order of the appellate authority that on the basis of admission of the petitioner, his age on the date of entry into the service was 17 years 3 months and 24 days, whereas to be employed in the said organization, the minimum stipulated age was 18 years. There was another writ petition filed before this Court at that stage with regard to complaint of the petitioner over delay in conclusion of the appeal proceeding, but so far as the present writ petition is concerned, that proceeding is not of much relevance. The petitioner has applied for quashing the notice to show-cause as also the charge-sheet and the order of punishment. 4. Preliminary objection has been taken by the learned Counsel for the society on maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that no petition under Article 226 lies against a co-operative society. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Arjed Ali Gazi v. State of West Bengal & Ors. [1991 (1) Cal LT 211] has considered this issue and held that a cooperative society can come within the ambit of the Constitutional writ jurisdiction of this Court in relation to service related disputes with its employee, if the service condition of the employee is controlled by statutory rules and not by contract of service or by-law of a society which again is not a statutory instrument. A decision of-the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. State Co-operative Land Development Punjab Limited v. Charandas Dubay ( AIR 1999 SC 753 ), on the same issue has been relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. In that case, it, was held that the appellant, who was a co-operative land development bank came within the ambit of the writ jurisdiction in relation to service related disputes with their employees as the service rules of the said organization had been framed under a statute, and there were other statutory provisions to be adhered to for giving effect to an order of dismissal of an employee. In the case of Bikash Talukdar v. State of West Bengal, [2005) 11 SCC 593], the Court had exercised constitutional writ jurisdiction in relation to disputes over service' of an employee with a co-operative society. In the instant case, the respondents have contended that the acts of the petitioner for which he has been charged constitutes misconduct under clause 13 of Appendix to chapter VI the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Rules, 1987 and it is for such misconduct punishment has been imposed upon the petitioner. While the petitioner denies such allegation, fact remains that the basis of exercise of power of the respondents is derived from a statutory provision. It has been held by the Hon'ble Division Bench in the case of Arjed Ali Gazi (supra) : - "7. It appears to us that in" the instant case, the conditions of service of Sri Gazi as an employee of the Society have not been controlled by terms of contract but in the absence of terms of contract for service, such conditions have been left to be controlled by the said Rule 108 which is undoubtedly a statutory rule. The Society has, therefore, an obligation to comply with the said statutory rule in the matter of discipline relating to the employment of Sri Gazi. When a duty flows from the statutory rule in the matter of employment, although such employment may be at the inception a product of private contract between the parties. In the matter of regulation of the condition of service of such employment a duty of a public nature comes into operation. Accordingly, for breach of such obligation under statutory rules a writ petition for appropriate writs and/or directions are maintainable. In the matter of regulation of the condition of service of such employment a duty of a public nature comes into operation. Accordingly, for breach of such obligation under statutory rules a writ petition for appropriate writs and/or directions are maintainable. In view of the special facts involved in this case, the decisions relied on by Mr. Bhattacharya and Mr. Moitra are not applicable. It, however, must be made clear that Co-operative Society in West Bengal is not a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 and is also not a public undertaking. It is essentially a private body formed at the initiations of private individuals. Hence, if the conditions of service of an employee of the Co-operative Society are not left to be controlled by the said statutory rules but are controlled by the terms of contract of service or bye-laws of the Society which is not a statutory rule, no writ will lie for enforcing any breach of the terms of employment of the employee of the Co-operative Society. 8. As in the instant case, it could not be established that the conditions of service of Sri Gazi were controlled by the terms of contract between the parties but it appears that the same have been left to be controlled by the aforesaid statutory rules, in our view the instant writ petition is maintainable. We have indicated that in the facts of the case, the impugned order of dismissal was illegal and made in violation of the principles of natural justice and also not in accordance with the provisions relating to disciplinary action as contained under the said rule 108. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be sustained. We, therefore, allow this writ petition and quash the impugned order of dismissal passed by the Society against Sri Gazi. Sri Gazi must be deemed to be in service and continue in such service in terms of the resolution of the Governing Body of the Society held in the meeting dated. 17.4.1998 and should be paid all arrear salaries and employments as may be admissible to him as an employee of the Society if the order of dismissal had not been passed against him. Let such arrear salaries etc., if any, be paid to Sri Gazi within two months from today. There will no order as to costs in this petition" 5. Let such arrear salaries etc., if any, be paid to Sri Gazi within two months from today. There will no order as to costs in this petition" 5. In these circumstances, I reject the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents. I find the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of UP. State Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd. (supra) and the judgement of the Division bench of this Court in the case of Arjed Ali Gazi (supra) applicable in this case on the question of maintainability of the writ petition, and the respondent society is amenable to the Constitutional Writ jurisdiction of this Court. 6. The next question I shall deal with is as to whether disclosure of incorrect age at the time of entering into service in the given facts of this case could constitute misconduct or not, and if such act on the part of the petitioner warrants punishment as per the service regulation applicable in the case of the petitioner. Argument of the petitioner on this point is that at the time of his entry into service, there was no rule providing for minimum age for entry into service. As such, the petitioner cannot be said to have committed any service related offence by declaring his age to be 20 years at the time of taking up employment. The petitioner's case is that at the point of time he took up employment, his service was guided by the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1940 and the Rules in that regard made in the year 1943. Under the aforesaid provisions, there was no prescribed minimum age, and such minimum age of 18 years for taking up employment was introduced only in the year 1987, under the provisions of the Cooperative Societies Rules, 1987 and this was specifically provided in clause 4 of the Appendix to chapter VI of the 1987 Rules. On the basis of these statutory provisions, it was argued on behalf of the petitioner that at the time he obtained employment on the basis of his recordal of age as 20 years, no misconduct was committed by him and it was only a mistake on his part. On the basis of these statutory provisions, it was argued on behalf of the petitioner that at the time he obtained employment on the basis of his recordal of age as 20 years, no misconduct was committed by him and it was only a mistake on his part. Reliance was placed on two judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of A. L. Kalra v. Project and Equipment Corporation (India) Limited, (1984) 3 SCC 316 ] and Peary Lal Sharma v. Managing Director Jammu and Kashmir Industries Limited & Ors., [ (1989) 3 SCC 448 ] on this count. Citing these authorities, it was argued on behalf of the petitioner that to punish an employee on charges of misconduct, there must be specific provision in the statue or the applicable service regulation enumerating the wrong which would constitute misconduct and there must be finding that the employee concerned had committed such defined misconduct. On the same point, another judgement of the Supreme Court, in the case of (Salem Erode Electricity Distribution Co. (P) Ltd. v. Employees' Union, ( AIR 1966 SC 808 ) has been relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. According to the petitioner, since no minimum age was prescribed for joining the organization when he was engaged, no punishment could be imposed on him for getting employment at an age below 18 years. Learned Counsel for the respondents however produced photocopy of a regulation entitled "The Calcutta Tramways Employees' Co-operative Credit Society Ltd. CONDITIONS OF SERVICE". Clause 1 (b) of this regulation stipulates that no person who has not attained the age of 18 years shall be eligible for appointment to any post under the society. 7. The petitioner has raised question of applicability of the said service regulation in his case. There is no indication, in the copy of the regulation as to when this regulation became operational. On behalf of the respondents also no specific date was disclosed to this Court as regards the date on which the said regulation became operational. From a plain reading of the copy of this regulation which was produced before this Court, it is apparent that this was not in existence when the petitioner, was engaged. On behalf of the respondents also no specific date was disclosed to this Court as regards the date on which the said regulation became operational. From a plain reading of the copy of this regulation which was produced before this Court, it is apparent that this was not in existence when the petitioner, was engaged. Clause (a) of this regulation provides that no person shall be eligible for being appointed in the society at any post unless he possesses the qualification prescribed as per Rule 53 of the W.B.C.S. Rules, 1974, which implies that the said service conditions were introduced after the year 1974. No material has been produced before me from where I can reach the conclusion that at the time the petitioner was appointed in the said organization, there was any subsisting regulation of the society providing for minimum age of entry. 8. On behalf of the respondents, the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 as also Indian Majority Act, 1875 were referred to in support of their stand that the petitioner could not have had entered into service when he was below 18 years of age, as on that date he was not competent to enter into an agreement. In this regard, a judgment of the Patna High Court in the case of Bhim Mondal v. Magaram Coria & Ors., reported in AIR 1961 Patna 21 has been referred to and relying on this decision it has been argued that no contract could have been entered into by the petitioner on the date he entered into service. Three decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Dinesh Chandra Sharma v. State of Assam & Ors. reported in AIR 1978 SC 17 , Union of India v. Arun Kumar Roy, reported in AIR 1986 SC 737 and Sultan Adik v. Sanjay Raj Subba, reported in AIR 2004 SC 1377 has been referred to on behalf of the respondents to contend that the petitioner's service has its origin in a contract. As a corollary, a case is sought to be made out by the respondents that in the event the petitioner's argument on his age is accepted, then the petitioner would not have been entitled to enter into service in the first place, as in such a situation, he would not be entitled to enter into an agreement. As a corollary, a case is sought to be made out by the respondents that in the event the petitioner's argument on his age is accepted, then the petitioner would not have been entitled to enter into service in the first place, as in such a situation, he would not be entitled to enter into an agreement. Further submission of the respondents on this point is that if the petitioner's age was below 18 years on the date he entered into service, the very contract of service would have been void and the petitioner would not be able to derive any benefit from such contract. 9. Citing a judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. C. Rama Swamy, [ (1997) 4 SCC 647 ], learned Counsel for the respondents has argued that while entering into service at a particular age disclosed by him only, the petitioner has gained certain advantage, and now he cannot turn around and claim that such disclosure was a mistake. As regards jurisdiction of this Court to test the correctness of steps taken, by an employer on conclusion of a departmental proceeding, it has been argued that unless there is procedural irregularity, there cannot be any interference in the decision of the administrative authority. Two authorities have been relied upon on this point Bank of India v. T. Jogram, (2007)7 SCC 236 and High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil, [ (2000) 1 SCC 416 ]. Main contention 9f the respondents is that the petitioner has been found guilty of having committed misconduct in terms of clauses 13 and 14 of the said Appendix to the 1987 Rules, and punishment has been imposed on him after giving him opportunity of hearing, and this Court ought not to interfere in this matter any further, and assume the jurisdiction of an appellate authority over disciplinary bodies within the administrative hierarchy. Clauses 13 and 14 of the said Appendix to the 1987 Rules provide; "13. Conduct and discipline-(a) Every employee of a co-operative society shall at all times- (i) maintain absolute integrity; (ii) maintain devotion to duty; (iii) abide by and comply with the rules of society and/or orders and directions of the superior authorities; (iv) discharge his duty to the best of his ability in the interest of the society. Conduct and discipline-(a) Every employee of a co-operative society shall at all times- (i) maintain absolute integrity; (ii) maintain devotion to duty; (iii) abide by and comply with the rules of society and/or orders and directions of the superior authorities; (iv) discharge his duty to the best of his ability in the interest of the society. (b) All employees shall so manage the private affairs as to avoid habitual indebtedness or insolvency; and an employee against whom legal proceedings are instituted for recovery of any debt due from him or for adjudging him as an insolvent/ shall forthwith report [to the society] the full facts of the legal proceedings. (c) No employee shall, except in accordance with any general or special order of the board or of his superior or in the performance in good faith of the duties assigned to him communicate directly or indirectly the contents of any official documents or any part thereof or other information to any other employee or any person to whom he is not authorised to communicate such contents or information: Provided that nothing in this rule shall apply to any statements made or views expressed by an employee in his official capacity or in the due performance of the duties assigned to him. (d) No employee shall accept or permit any member of his family or any person acting on his behalf to accept any illegal gratification or pecuniary advantage or gifts etc., from any person or agent who have or may have dealing with the society. (e) No employee shall, except for unavoidable reasons, absent himself from duty without taking prior sanction of leave nor shall overstay the period of sanctioned leave. 14. (e) No employee shall, except for unavoidable reasons, absent himself from duty without taking prior sanction of leave nor shall overstay the period of sanctioned leave. 14. Misconduct and disciplinary action.- (a) The following acts shall constitute misconduct of an employee, namely- (i) wilful insubordination or disobedience, whether in alliance with a co-employee or not, of any lawful and reasonable order of superior; (ii) wilful avoidance of work or abetment or instigation thereof; (iii) theft, fraud misappropriation or dishonesty in connection with employer's business or property business or property or otherwise; (iv) habitual absence without leave, overstaying the sanctioned leave without sufficient ground or proper and satisfactory explanation of habitual late attendance; (v) commission of any act subversive of discipline or good behaviour in any public place such as drunkenness, riotous, disorderly or indecent behaviour, gambling or taking or giving bribes or any illegal gratification of any kind whatsover; (vi) gross or habitual negligence of duty; Explanation.-For the purpose of this clause "gross or habitual negligence of duty shall include, in the case of an employee of a cooperative society whose function or duty" includes recovery of dues inadequate recovery of such dues unless he can prove that there was no negligence whatsoever in this respect on his part; (vii) disclosing to a person any information with regard to the society which may be detrimental to the interest of the society; (viii) wilful damage to any property of the society; (ix) indulging in scurrilous attacks against the management and other superiors, (b) Any of the following penalties may be imposed on an employee for such misconduct by the disciplinary Authority, namely- (i) censure: (ii) recovery from a pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the society by negligence or breach of orders; (iii) withholding of increments with or without cumulative effect; (iv) withholding of promotion; (v) reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay or reduction to a lower time scale of pay, grade, post or service; (vi) removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment under the society; (vii) dismissal from service which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment under the society; Explanation.- The following shall not amount to penalty within the meaning of this rule, namely- (i) reversion to lower grade or post of an employee officiating in a higher grade or post for want of vacancy or on administrative grounds unconnected with his conduct; (ii) reversion to permanent service, grade or post of an employee appointed on deputation to another service, grade or post during or at the end of the period of deputation; (iii) termination of service- (a) of an employee appointed on probation during or at the end of the period of probation; or (b) of an employee employed temporarily or under an agreement in accordance with the terms of such agreement or at one month's notice, for abolition of the post or otherwise." 10. The jurisdiction of the Writ Court over decisions of administrative body in relation to disciplinary proceeding is limited, and the scope of the Court's jurisdiction in such matters has been spelt out by the Supreme Court in the case reported in [ (2000) 1 SCC 416 ]. Violation of the principles of natural justice, taking steps inconsistent with statutory provisions regulating a disciplinary proceeding, consideration of irrelevant and extraneous materials by the disciplinary authority and arriving at a decision ex-facie arbitrary or irrational are four grounds on which a departmental proceeding or punishment imposed on an employee after conclusion of a departmental proceeding can be challenged under the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 11. So far as the present proceeding is concerned, the procedural error on which argument has been advanced before me is that the appellate authority could not have enhanced punishment without being specifically empowered to do so. Main argument of the petitioner assailing the impugned action of initiation of the disciplinary proceeding itself is based on applicability of certain provisions of the statutory rules, which, according to the petitioner would constitute jurisdictional issues and it has been argued on his behalf that interference by the Writ Court on such ground is not impermissible. The respondents have neither demonstrated, nor argued that the service of the petitioner was guided purely by any contractual provision or any by-law which does not have its origin in any statutory instrument. 12. Argument of the respondents, based on the provisions of Section 11 of the Contract Act, 1872 and Section 3 of the Majority Act, 1875 does not appear to be logical to me. Section 3 of the Majority Act stipulates that a person shall attain majority in India on reaching eighteen years of age, and Section 11 of the Contract Act postulates that a minor would not be competent to enter into an agreement. Relying on these two provisions, it has been contended by the respondents that the petitioner must have been a major when he entered the service as per his own admission. As his employment is founded on a contract, the contract would have been otherwise void. Relying on these two provisions, it has been contended by the respondents that the petitioner must have been a major when he entered the service as per his own admission. As his employment is founded on a contract, the contract would have been otherwise void. But just because the petitioner had obtained employment with a declaration that he was twenty years of age at that point of time does not lead to an unrebuttable presumption that he was of that age at that point of time. Even if I proceed on the basis that the petitioner was a minor when he joined his service, whether the entire service of the petitioner would have been rendered nugatory because of this reason could have been an issue in this proceeding if the charge-sheet against the petitioner was based on that allegation. I have my doubt if in such a situation also punishment could be imposed on the petitioner in a departmental proceeding, as initiation of such proceeding itself would imply that the employer-employee relationship was being recognized by the employer. If the very foundation of such relationship was reject on a void contract, the employer might have had some other relief in law against the petitioner, but he could not have been subjected to a disciplinary proceeding unless the sole object of such proceeding was to determine as to whether the petitioner was a minor or not when he had taken up his employment, and what would have been the consequence if he was indeed a minor at that point of time. In any event, charge against the petitioner is not that his employment contract is void because he was a minor when he took up employment. Charge against the petitioner is that he had given wrong declaration about his age. In this proceeding thus it is not necessary to adjudicate on the implication on the service contract if the petitioner was a minor when he was employed on the basis of wrong declaration of his age. 13. In the instant case, allegation against the petitioner is that he had entered into the service without disclosing his real age. The said position has continued for a long period of time. 13. In the instant case, allegation against the petitioner is that he had entered into the service without disclosing his real age. The said position has continued for a long period of time. The authority at one stage was inclined to accept his prayer for correction of his age, as it appears from endorsement made on his application for correction of age, in Annexure P12 to the writ petition. The said fact has not been specifically denied by the respondents either in their affidavit-in-opposition to the main writ petition, or in any other affidavit filed in connection with this proceeding. The stand of the respondents on this point is that no decision in this regard was taken in a properly convened meeting and such decision in any event was not communicated to the petitioner. Opinion of different authorities or officers within the society as reflected on the application of the petitioner for correction of age, according to the respondents, was stillborn. Case of the petitioner is that such decision was communicated to him earlier verbally. He claims to have derived specific knowledge of such opinion of the majority of the members of the Board from annexures to the charge-sheet. 14. There is however no explanation from the respondents as to why the application or representation of the petitioner was kept pending for about eight years from 1996, in spite of there being some form of application of mind on the part of the authorities, as it appears from such endorsement. The petitioner was asked to show-cause initially as to why his originally recorded age shall not be retained. The charge-sheet however was on the allegation of obtaining employment through deceitful means. Making prayer for correction of recorded age is not an uncommon incidence in service and the mere fact of recording wrong age at the time of entry into service does not automatically entail disciplinary measures. The consequence of such prayer is either rejection or acceptance of the application of the employee, as is reflected in the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of C. Rama Swamy (supra). The present legal position is to reject such applications if made at a late stage of service, close to the date of superannuation. The consequence of such prayer is either rejection or acceptance of the application of the employee, as is reflected in the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of C. Rama Swamy (supra). The present legal position is to reject such applications if made at a late stage of service, close to the date of superannuation. In this proceeding, a case however is sought to be made out by the respondents that because of fixing of minimum age of entry into the service, the petitioner had to his age in spite of some form of application of mind on the part of the authorities. The fact that majority of the members of the Board had endorsed that the petitioner's plea for correction of age ought to be accepted has also not been denied by the respondents. The only point raised on this count is that the endorsement that the petitioner's date of birth ought to be treated as 5th January, 1950 was erroneous as the petitioner's own case is that his date of birth should have been recorded as 5th January, 1951. This appears to be an error, but such error substantially does not alter the stand of the respondents. No explanation has been disclosed by the respondents as to what prompted them to initiate proceeding against the petitioner after allowing that position to continue for eight years. Without disclosure of reasons for fresh initiation of proceeding after allowing the said position to continue, the proceeding initiated against the petitioner reflects arbitrary action on the part of the respondents and becomes a belated proceeding liable to be quashed. The time gap between the date of entry of the petitioner in the service and the date on which the employer acquired knowledge can be condoned, as in such a Situation the respondents could legitimately contend that they had no means of knowing the actual age of the petitioner at an earlier date. But taken recourse to deceitful means. That is the substance of allegations against the petitioner in the chargesheet. But the respondents have not been able to establish in this proceeding that under any valid service regulation, there was such minimum age stipulation. But taken recourse to deceitful means. That is the substance of allegations against the petitioner in the chargesheet. But the respondents have not been able to establish in this proceeding that under any valid service regulation, there was such minimum age stipulation. On the other hand, provisions of Contract Act, 1872 and the Majority Act, 1875 have been referred to in order to establish that the petitioner was not entitled to enter into a contract for service at that point of time under the law and the entire service contract would be void in such circumstances. But that is not the case which has been made out in the charge-sheet and the respondents cannot be permitted to defend their disciplinary action on a ground not specifically spelt out in the notice to show-cause or the charge-sheet. Moreover, whatever be the implication of a contract with a minor, fact remains that the petitioner has rendered service under that contract, against consideration. In this factual background, in the absence of a specific charge made out that the service contract is void because the petitioner was a minor when he entered into the agreement or contract of service, the respondents cannot be permitted to raise this issue at this stage. There is no proper explanation for initiation of the proceeding after 8 long years the petitioner made his request for alteration of records pertaining to his age in spite of some form of application of mind on the part of the authorities. The fact that majority of the members of the Board had endorsed that the petitioner's plea for correction of age ought to be accepted has also not been denied by the respondents. The only point raised on this count is that the endorsement that the petitioner's date of birth ought to be treated as 5th January, 1950 was erroneous as the petitioner's own case is that his date of birth should have been recorded as 5th January, 1951. This appears to be an error, but such error substantially does not alter the stand of the respondents. No explanation has been disclosed by the respondents as to what prompted them to initiate proceeding against the petitioner after allowing that position to continue for eight years. This appears to be an error, but such error substantially does not alter the stand of the respondents. No explanation has been disclosed by the respondents as to what prompted them to initiate proceeding against the petitioner after allowing that position to continue for eight years. Without disclosure of reasons for fresh initiation of proceeding after allowing the said position to continue, the proceeding initiated against the petitioner reflects arbitrary action on the part of the respondents and becomes a belated proceeding liable to be quashed. The time gap between the date of entry of the petitioner in the service and the date on which the employer acquired knowledge can be condoned, as in such a situation the respondents could legitimately contend that they had no means of knowing the actual age of the petitioner at an earlier date. But part of the appellate authority to enhance the punishment, as I am inclined to quash the orders of punishment imposed by the disciplinary as well as the appellate authority. 15. I accordingly quash the show-cause notice, charge-sheet as also the orders of punishment imposed against the petitioner by the authority of the first instance as well as the appellate authority and direct the authorities to restore all the service benefits to the petitioner which he would have been normally entitled to if such punishment was not imposed. In the event the petitioner has superannuated already, the retrial benefits shall be recomputed and such benefits shall be made available to the petitioner within a period of eight weeks from the date of communication of this order. 16. As I am quashing the orders of punishment on the aforesaid grounds, I also do not consider it necessary to deal with the question as to whether disclosure of incorrect age while obtaining entry into service constitutes misconduct or not under the provisions of 1987 Rules Certain allegations have been made by the petitioner as regards conducting the departmental proceeding in on improper manner. For the same reason, I do not consider it necessary to decide that issue also. 17. The writ petition stands allowed in the above terms. There shall however be no order as to costs. Urgent certified photocopy of this order shall be made available to the parties if applied for, subject to compliance with all necessary requisite formalities.