JUDGMENT : ” Appellants have filed the present appeal under the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, assailing the judgment and decree dated 20.9.2004, passed by the learned District Judge, Hamirpur, in Civil Appeal No.106 of 2002, titled as Smt. Sandhia Devi and another v. Tara Chand and others, whereby judgment and decree dated 24.9.2002, passed by the Sub-Judge 1st Class, Barsar, District Hamirpur, in Civil Suit No.RBT 1-7/98/96, titled as Tara Chand v. Smt. Sandhia Devi and others, stands affirmed. 2. Parties, i.e. plaintiffs (respondents herein) and defendants (appellants herein), are closely related. The lis essentially pertains to inheritance of the estate of Smt. Mangti Devi. According to the plaintiffs, Mangti Devi died intestate and as such they along with the defendants are entitled to inherit her estate, in equal shares, whereas according to the appellants Sandhia Devi (defendant No.1) and Roshan Lal (defendant No.2), they alone have inherited the property, by virtue of Will dated 15.1.1987 (Ex. DW-3/A) executed by Smt. Mangti Devi in their favour. 3. Based on the pleadings of the parties, trial Court framed the following issues: 1. Whether the plaintiffs are the owners in possession of the suit property as alleged? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the injunction as prayed for? OPP 3. Whether the mutation No.473 is wrong and illegal as alleged? OPP 4. Whether the plaintiffs have the locus standi to sue? OPP 5. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD 6. Whether the suit has not been properly valued for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction? OPD 7. Whether Smt. Mangti made a valid gift in favour of defendant No.1, as alleged? OPD 8. Whether Smt. Mangti made a valid Will in favour of defendant No.1? OPD 9. Whether the plaintiffs have a cause of action? OPP 10. Relief. 4. Plaintiffs” suit for declaration and injunction, with respect to their claim in the estate of Smt. Mangti Devi along with the defendants, stands decreed in the following terms: ' Net result of all the discussions made above and the conclusions arrived at supra is that the instant suit succeeds and the same is, therefore, decreed. I, accordingly, declare that the plaintiffs along with the defendant Nos.2 to 5 are the owners in possession in equal shares of the suit property which belonged to their mother (late Smt. Mangti Devi). I, accordingly, declare that the plaintiffs along with the defendant Nos.2 to 5 are the owners in possession in equal shares of the suit property which belonged to their mother (late Smt. Mangti Devi). Mutation No.473 which has been attested to the contrary in favour of the defendant No.1 is declared as wrong and illegal. Further, the defendant No.I is restrained by a decree of perpetual injunction from interfering in the peaceful ownership and possession of the plaintiffs and the defendant Nos.2 to 5. Keeping in view the relations between the parties, they are left to bear their own costs. Decree sheet be drawn.' 5. Lower appellate Court has affirmed findings of fact, judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. Will (Ex. DW-3/A) has been disbelieved by the Courts below for the reason that it is shrouded by suspicious circumstances and the propounder has failed to clear such suspicion, with regard to valid execution of the same. 6. Present appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether the non appearance of the propounder/beneficiary of the Will as witness rendered the execution of the Will doubtful? If so, its effect. 2. Whether both the courts below have misunderstood and misinterpreted the provisions of sections 63 and 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff, when it has been proved on record that there is valid execution of the Will? 3. Whether the document Ex. DW-3/A has been misread and misinterpreted by both the learned courts below? 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties as also perused the record, I am of the considered view that the suspicious circumstances culled out by the lower appellate Court, as reproduced hereinunder, are sufficient enough to disbelieve the Will, apart from the fact that the propounder herself failed to step into the witness box and avoided cross-examination. ' 14. The first and foremost suspicious circumstance is qua mental faculty of the testator at the time of execution of the Will. DW.1 Roshan Lal defendant No.2 and husband of defendant No.1 has clearly stated that Mangti Devi was paralytic since three years and used to answer the call of nature on the bed. Her left side of the body in entirety was paralysed. DW.1 Roshan Lal defendant No.2 and husband of defendant No.1 has clearly stated that Mangti Devi was paralytic since three years and used to answer the call of nature on the bed. Her left side of the body in entirety was paralysed. But the scribe DW.3 Arjun Singh in totality denied it when refuted the suggestion that in January, 1987, she was paralytic or that she was unable to walk and talk. Consequently, on this mental faculty and physical condition of the testator, the record contained different narration of the son of testator, scribe and witnesses. Narration of the son qua her mental faculty can be believed and it shows that she was completely paralysed from left side since three years. She was unable to move. 15. The second point on which the witnesses have differed, is whether defendant Nos.1 and 2 were present at the time of execution of the Will, copy of which is Ext. DW-3/A. DW.3 Arjun Singh stated that Roshan and Sandhia at the time of execution were present, but contrary deposed by DW.4 Tulsi Ram who denied their presence. 16. Also there is different narration of witnesses qua the place where the Will was scribed. According to DW.1 Roshan Lal, it was scribed in the house of Mangti Devi, but DW.3 Arjun Singh narrated contrary that it was executed in the house of Roshan Lal. 17. Thus the Will as propounded by defendant No.1 is shrouded by different well founded suspicious circumstances namely; whether the testator was paralytic, presence of the propounder and her husband and place of execution. 18. Be it stated that the testator had good relations with all her sons and daughters as conceded by DW.1 Roshan Lal. Consequently, there would have been no occasion for the testator to have deprived her other legal heirs from inheritance. No doubt, purpose of the Will only is to deprive the natural heirs from inheritance, but there should be some motive or purpose to deprive such natural heirs and no such reasons have forthcome on the record.' 8. At this juncture, it be only observed that Roshan Lal (defendant No.2), who appeared as attorney of his wife Sandhia Devi (defendant No.1), the beneficiary, has admitted that Smt. Mangti Devi had cordial relations both with the plaintiffs and the defendants. Apparently, there was no reason for Smt. Mangti Devi to have disinherited the other legal heirs. At this juncture, it be only observed that Roshan Lal (defendant No.2), who appeared as attorney of his wife Sandhia Devi (defendant No.1), the beneficiary, has admitted that Smt. Mangti Devi had cordial relations both with the plaintiffs and the defendants. Apparently, there was no reason for Smt. Mangti Devi to have disinherited the other legal heirs. It be also noticed that defendant No.1 has admitted that Smt. Mangti Devi was suffering from paralysis and was bedridden. Under these circumstances, it was absolutely necessary for the beneficiary to have stepped into the witness box and explained the special circumstances under which testator had executed the Will in her favour, to the exclusion of the other legal heirs. She failed to do so for the reason not disclosed on record. 9. Apex Court in Man Kaur (Dead) by LRs v. Hartar Singh Sangha, (2010) 10 SCC 512 : (2010 AIR SCW 6198) has held that where a party to a suit does not appear in the witness box and state his case on oath, nor does he offer himself to be cross-examined by the opposite party, a presumption would arise that the case set up by him is not correct. Presumption in law flows from the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Court in para-18 of the report has held as under: ' 18. We may now summarise for convenience, the position as to who should give evidence in regard to matters involving personal knowledge: (a) An attorney-holder who has signed the plaint and instituted the suit, but has no personal knowledge of the transaction can only give formal evidence about the validity of the power of attorney and the filing of the suit. (b) If the attorney-holder has done any act or handled any transactions, in pursuance of the power of attorney granted by the principal, he may be examined as a witness to prove those acts or transactions. If the attorney holder alone has personal knowledge of such acts and transactions and not the principal, the attorney-holder shall be examined, if those acts and transactions have to be proved. (c) The attorney-holder cannot depose or give evidence in place of his principal for the acts done by the principal or transactions or dealings of the principal, of which principal alone has personal knowledge. (c) The attorney-holder cannot depose or give evidence in place of his principal for the acts done by the principal or transactions or dealings of the principal, of which principal alone has personal knowledge. (d) Where the principal at no point of time had personally handled or dealt with or participated in the transaction and has no personal knowledge of the transaction, and where the entire transaction has been handled by an attorney-holder, necessarily the attorney-holder alone can give evidence in regard to the transaction. This frequently happens in case of principals carrying on business through authorized managers/attorney-holders or persons residing abroad managing their affairs through their attorney-holders. (e) Where the entire transaction has been conducted through a particular attorney-holder, the principal has to examine that attorney-holder to prove the transaction, and not a different or subsequent attorney-holder. (f) Where different attorney-holders had dealt with the matter at different stages of the transaction, if evidence has to be led as to what transpired at those different stages, all the attorney-holders will have to be examined. (g) Where the law requires or contemplated the plaintiff or other party to a proceeding, to establish or prove something with reference to his ' state of mind' or ' conduct' , normally the person concerned alone has to give evidence and not an attorney-holder. A landlord who seeks eviction of his tenant, on the ground of his ' bona fide' need and a purchaser seeking specific performance who has to show his ' readiness and willingness' fall under this category. There is however a recognised exception to this requirement. Where all the affairs of a party are completely managed, transacted and looked after by an attorney (who may happen to be a close family member), it may be possible to accept the evidence of such attorney even with reference to bona fides or ' readiness and willingness' . Examples of such attorney-holders are a husband/wife exclusively managing the affairs of his/her spouse, a son/daughter exclusively managing the affairs of an old and infirm parent, a father/mother exclusively managing the affairs of a son/daughter living abroad.' 10. View taken by the apex Court in Man Kaur (2010 AIR SCW 6198) (supra) stands reiterated in Mrs. Saradamani Kandappan v. Mrs. S. Rajalakshmi & Ors., (2011) 12 SCC 18 : ( AIR 2011 SC 3234 ). 11. View taken by the apex Court in Man Kaur (2010 AIR SCW 6198) (supra) stands reiterated in Mrs. Saradamani Kandappan v. Mrs. S. Rajalakshmi & Ors., (2011) 12 SCC 18 : ( AIR 2011 SC 3234 ). 11. Reason for drawing presumption against the defendants is in view of the settled position of law that where Will is shrouded by suspicious circumstances, the onus to dispel the same is on the propounder. (See: Mahesh Kumar (Dead) by LRs v. Vinod Kumar and others, (2012) 4 SCC 387 : (AIR 2012 SC (Civ) 1302)). 12. It already stands observed that reasons of suspicion, correctly culled out by the lower appellate Court, in my considered view are based on sound principles of law on correct and complete appreciation of testimonies of the witnesses. 13. No doubt, scribe Arjun Singh (DW-3) and marginal witness Tulsi Ram (DW-4) have tried to prove the Will but it be only observed that even their testimonies do not inspire confidence. According to the scribe, Will was written in the house of defendant No.1, when both defendant No.1 and defendant No.2 were present, whereas according to the marginal witness (DW-4), the Will was written in the house of the testator, when he was present. He does not disclose presence of the beneficiary. 14. Also there is material contradiction with regard to date of execution of the Will. According to the marginal witness, Will was executed 2آ½ months prior to the death of the testator, whereas the fact is that Will is dated 15.1.1987 and the testator expired on 14.3.1988. Also, the propounder and her husband had taken an active part in the execution of the Will. This fact is evident from the testimony of Roshan Lal (DW-1). 15. As such, it cannot be held that findings returned by the Courts below are illegal, perverse and erroneous, warranting interference by this Court. Substantial question of law are answered accordingly. For all the aforesaid reasons, the appeal is dismissed and disposed of, so also the pending application(s), if any. Appeal dismissed.