ORDER : Narinder Chauhan, Financial Commissioner The revision has been filed against the orders of Divisional Commissioner, Shimla who in Revenue Appeal No. 251/2010, vide order dated 18.12.2010, dismissed the appeal of the petitioner and upheld orders of Collector, Sirmour dated 5.2.2009, in case No. 15/2007, wherein land comprised in khata khatauni No. 21/ 37, khasra No. 312/15, 4/1, 314/17, 2/12, 18, 13/19, 19, 8/11, 20, 17/ 11, 21, 0/5, 26,8/14, 25 and 19/14 kitas 8, measuring 75-7 bigha land, situated in mauja Haripur Tohana, Tehsil Paonla Sahib, District Sirmour, was ordered by the District Collector, Sirmour to be vested in favour of the State Government under Section 118 (2) (h) of H.P. Tenancy and Land Reform Act, 1972 (hereinafter called as "the Act") free from all encumbrances. 2. Advocate for petitioner Ms. Archna Dutt, has argued that the petitioner had proposed to set up a Chemical Carbonate Plant in Himachal Pradesh for which purpose they purchased a piece of land and all necessary clearances were obtained by the petitioner. It is the contention of the Ld. Advocate, that a similar unit is functioning in close proximity to the proposed site and the owners of the existing unit were able to thwart the proposal, by inciting the local public and garnered sentiments against establishment of a 2nd chemical unit. An FIR was also lodged, No. 353 dated 18.9.1997, at Police Station Paonta, and the petitioner also filed a Civil Suit before Sub Judge Paonta Sahib, seeking injunction against the miscreants. It has been further alleged that individuals inimical to the establishment of the plant also filed a CWP No. 499/1997, which CWP was finally withdrawn by tie individuals opposing the establishment of the chemical factory. The Hon'ble High Court granted permission for withdrawal of the CWP, with liberty to the petitioner to approach the Court again in the event of the petitioner endeavoring settling up of such a plant. 3. In the light of the above background Ld. Advocate for petitioner has stated that the uncertain investment climate, coupled with a lack of support from the State Government, the vestment orders of Collector Sirmour dated 5.2.2009 and Divisional Commissioner dated 18.12.2010, cannot be sustained as they have failed to give their findings on each and every ground taken by the petitioner before them,. Advocate for petitioner has stated that the uncertain investment climate, coupled with a lack of support from the State Government, the vestment orders of Collector Sirmour dated 5.2.2009 and Divisional Commissioner dated 18.12.2010, cannot be sustained as they have failed to give their findings on each and every ground taken by the petitioner before them,. It has been argued that petitioner had invested lacs of rupees not only in the land but also in other expenditure on staff/security etc. and even boundary wall etc. was damaged and that the petitioner inspite of his best intention and efforts is unable to set up the industrial unit and has thus prayed for the setting aside of the orders of vestment. 4. Ld. Deputy D.A., Sh. Giri Raj Singh, has argued that it is clear that the land has not been put to use for the purpose for which it was allowed and the provision of utilisation of land being mandatory, as per the Act, coupled with the fact that they have not applied for any extension beyond the 2 years period as envisaged under Section 118 (2) (h) of the 1972 Act'. The orders of the lower Court are legally valid and the revision should be rejected. 5. On appreciation of the arguments of the parties, it is clear that the Hon'ble High Court order dated 12.5.2003, in CWP No. 499/97, gave liberty to the individuals to approach the Hon'ble High Court, again in the event of the petitioner endeavoring to establish a Chemical plant. There can be no better proof of the uncertainty of the industrial climate than the above said orders. What has been the final outcome of the FIR, and injunction suit filed by the petitioner in Paonta Sahib is not known. It is equally clear that the petitioner had purchased the land possibly for about Rs. 60-70 lacs, much before the industrial package was announced for Himachal Pradesh and orders of Ld. Deputy Collector, Sirmour dated 5.2.2009, are based on a report dated 17.9.2007, received from Tehsildar Paonta Sahib, wherein the land purchased by the petitioner was still lying vacant and banjar. The Ld. Collector, Sirmour, ordered vestment of the land for the simple reason that ever since the land was purchased the same has been lying as banjar and this was construed to be a violation of Section 118 (3) of the Act. Ld. The Ld. Collector, Sirmour, ordered vestment of the land for the simple reason that ever since the land was purchased the same has been lying as banjar and this was construed to be a violation of Section 118 (3) of the Act. Ld. Divisional Commissioner, has also concluded that service of summons was made through proclamation which is a substituted mode of service under the H.P. Land Revenue Act, and even after the Hon'ble High Court orders dated 12.5.2003, the petitioner has not constructed his factory and thus upheld the orders of vestment. The land was purchased on 2.8.1997, through a registered deed after obtaining all formalities under Section 118. As stated earlier, it is clear that there was opposition to the establishment of a chemical plant, whether such opposition was at the behest of management of existing chemical plant or a genuine fear among the local of not having a chemical plant in their vicinity, it is difficult to assess. However, it is equally clear that efforts were made by the petitioner to initiate construction activities, which were opposed. While it is correct that Section 118 (2) (h) proviso stipulates a period of 2 years within which period the petitioner should have completed his building, with a further clause for extension by a period not exceeding one year. This issue is whether vestment is 'automatic' or petitioner can be given some relief. 6. Given the facts of the above case, I am inclined to use the language of Justice D. Raju in 1998 STPL (LE-Civil) 17632 H.P., wherein in Ravinder Chauhan Vs. State of H.P., (1998) STPL LE Civil 17632 HP, the Hon'ble Court has held as follows: - "In our view. it is not that on the mere expiry of a period of two years, as may be granted by the State Government or a further period not exceeding one year that the vesting will automatically take place. The legislative intention apparently keeping in view of the drastic and penal nature and far reaching consequences of such vesting clause has been thoughtfully, carefully and meticulously expressed in engrafting a condition stipulating 'if he fails to do so', which in our view will operate as a condition precedent for adust vesting. The legislative intention apparently keeping in view of the drastic and penal nature and far reaching consequences of such vesting clause has been thoughtfully, carefully and meticulously expressed in engrafting a condition stipulating 'if he fails to do so', which in our view will operate as a condition precedent for adust vesting. Failure on the part of the person favoured with a permission under the provision, therefore, is the vital and pivotal fact which brings into operation the vesting clause and consequently it is but necessary and essential that some authority must place on record the failure on the part of the persons, who have been favoured with the permission after an objective consideration of the matter and such finding can be recorded only after complying with the principles of natural justice by giving an opportunity to the persons concerned before condemning them. What-Rule 38-B has proposed to do is nothing but giving statutory recognition by means of prescription of a rule to the otherwise essential, vital and necessary procedure as a measure of safeguard to be observed in terms of the principles of nature justice, too, before visiting a citizen with such penal and far reaching consequences involving substantial property rights. "In our view when the statute contemplated the failure on the part of the person, who has been granted with permission to purchase, as a condition precedent for bringing into the force of the operation of the vesting clause, the failure should be on account of the conscious default, negligence or refusal on the part of the person concerned and where the non-compliance was for reasons beyond his control or due to the fact that it was incapable or impossible of performance due to the operation of their provisions of lazy in force and that the authorities, who accorded the permission with such conditions, which are not capable of being complied with end performed and were equally at fault, it is not permissible for the respondents or for that matter any body from public including the petitioners to insist or assert that despite the obvious and for no fault of the 6th respondent, he should be condemned as having failed to comply with the conditions, that which otherwise he could have complied with, and thereby take over his property by enforcing the vesting clause engrafted in the second proviso". 7. 7. The Hon'ble Court further held that "the time stipulated in the second proviso to clause (i) of sub-section (2) of Section 118 is for putting the land to such use for which the permission has been granted and this provision in our view cannot be construed so to deny the undisputed power of the Government to alter the purpose on coming to know that the earlier purpose for which the land was permitted to be used has been found to be impossible of performance. The said time bound limitation will be for the purpose of allowing the person in whose favour the permission has been granted to put the land to the same purpose for which the initial permission was granted and the said limitation of time will not apply in our view also to cases and instances involving the grant of permission to change the nature of use to which the land has to be put, different from the one already permitted to be put to. The inherent powers of the State, otherwise available in the absence of any specific provision disentitling the State Government from according such change in the user of the land for which the permission has been earlier accorded as also the powers available under the General Clauses Act will ensure to the State Government to accord such permission." 8. The Government of Himachal Pradesh notification No. Rev. B.F. (lO)-7/2008-II dated 15th March, 2012, has provided as under: - Where the land was not used at all within the prescribed period - "In case this situation has arisen despite bona fide efforts of the person to whom permission has been granted, the time period that has elapsed in obtaining statutory approvals that are essential for putting the land to use for the stated purpose, shall be excluded for calculating the time period stipulated. For this purpose, the concerned department responsible for issuing the essentiality certificate shall ascertain the factual position and pass a speaking order and thereafter forward the proposal to this Department through, the Deputy Commissioner concerned. In cases of residential purpose or shop the Deputy Commissioner, concerned shall ascertain such position and forward the cases to Government with his clear cut recommendations." 9. Although the said instructions are now withdrawn vide letter No. 31.10.2013, (No. Rev. B.A.3-5/2000-II. In cases of residential purpose or shop the Deputy Commissioner, concerned shall ascertain such position and forward the cases to Government with his clear cut recommendations." 9. Although the said instructions are now withdrawn vide letter No. 31.10.2013, (No. Rev. B.A.3-5/2000-II. Nevertheless, the principles of natural justice dictate that the case be examined in the light of Hon'ble High Court observations that there is no automaticity of vestment and revenue authorities need to keep in mind the findings of the Hon'ble High Court: "In construing the second proviso to clause (1) of sub-section (2) of Section 118 of the Act, which in our view, the legislature has carefully thought to introduce a rider and a condition precedent by inserting the words, if he fails to do so". 10. The petition is accepted and case remanded back to the Deputy Commissioner to examine the matter afresh. Orders of lower Courts are set aside. 11. Announced in open Court on 10.09.2013. The file of this Court be consigned to the record room after due completion.