ORDER 1. This is plaintiff’s second appeal against the judgement and decree passed by the Additional Judge, Sardarpur to the Court of District Judge, Dhar in Civil Appeal No. 25A/2006. It may be mentioned here that the plaintiff appellant has lost in both the Courts. 2. At this stage, the following facts are not in dispute:- The suit property is an agricultural land situated in Village Bhangarh. The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction. To understand the claim of the plaintiff the following family tree is as under :- : FAMILY TREE : Radhabai ! Pemibai Jamnabai Dhapubai (Defendant No.4) ! ! Bagmal Kriparam Mangilal Narsingh Premchand (Def.No.5) (Plaintiff) (Def.No.1) (Def.No.2) (Def.No.3) 3. The plaintiff sought the declaration of title alleging that he was adopted by Radhabai vide Ex. P/3, therefore, after the death of Radhabai, he became the sole owner of the properties of Radhabai, hence declaration of title and injunction. 4. It may be relevant to point out that on the date of the suit Pemibai and one of his sister namely Jamunabai has already passed away, therefore, the rest of the legal heirs viz. Dhapubai, Bagmal, Mangilal, Narsingh and Premchand were impleaded as defendants to the suit. The defendants No. 1 to 3 in their joint statement denied the entire claim of the plaintiff. It was denied that he was adopted by late Radhabai. It was also denied that plaintiff was the sole heir of Radhabai. Defendants No. 4 and 5 Dhapubai and Bagmal also denied the claim of the plaintiff. The defendants No. 1 to 3 in their joint statement denied the entire claim of the plaintiff. It was denied that he was adopted by late Radhabai. It was also denied that plaintiff was the sole heir of Radhabai. Defendants No. 4 and 5 Dhapubai and Bagmal also denied the claim of the plaintiff. With these pleadings parties went to the trial on the following issues :- 1- D;k Lo- jk/kkckbZ us oknh dks fnukad 31-3-1976 dks tkfr iapksa ds le{k ixM+h ca/kkdj nRrd dh lkjh jLesa iw.kZ dj nRrd dk;Zokgh iapksa ds le{k fu”ikfnr dj nRrd fy;k gS \ 2- ;fn gka rks D;k Lo- jk/kkckbZ dh tehu tk;nkn oknpj.k&5 eas of.kZr dk ,d ek= okfjl oknh gS \ 3- D;k oknh dk ,dek= okfjl ukrs oknxzLr Hkwfe ij vdsys dk vkf/kiR; pyk vk jgk gS \ 4- D;k izfroknhx.k us oknpj.k 5 esa of.kZr Hkwfe ij jktLo i=ksa esa vius uke ls ukekarj.k tks djok fy;k gS] og O;FkZ voS/k gksdj ‘kwU; ?kksf”kr fd;s tkus ;ksX; gS \ 5- D;k oknxzLr Hkwfe esa oknh o izfroknhx.k dk leku LoRo gS \ 6- D;k oknh dk okn vof/k esa gS \ 7- D;k ikfjokfjd O;oLFkk ds vuqlkj oknxzLr Hkwfe dh ns[kHkky oknh o izfroknh Ø- 5 djrs pys vk jgs gSa \ and adduced the evidence. Learned Trial Judge on due consideration of the evidence found that plaintiff could not establish and prove that he was adopted by Radhabai vide Ex. P/3. The suit was, therefore, dismissed. The matter was carried in appeal by the plaintiff but to no avail. The learned lower appellate Court on due consideration of evidence and material that has come on record found no illegality or infirmity with the judgement and decree passed by the trial Court, therefore, it was affirmed by dismissing the appeal. Hence, this appeal by the plaintiff. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant at length. Perused the record. The first question that has been argued before me is that the Court below did not consider the alternate claim of the plaintiff that Radhabai had executed a Will in favour of the plaintiff. According to learned counsel for the appellant, Ex. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant at length. Perused the record. The first question that has been argued before me is that the Court below did not consider the alternate claim of the plaintiff that Radhabai had executed a Will in favour of the plaintiff. According to learned counsel for the appellant, Ex. P/3 is a deed of adoption-cum-Will, therefore, in case, the case of the plaintiff regarding adoption is not accepted then the Court below ought to have consider the case of plaintiff in the light of the Will executed by Radhabai in his favour. I have carefully gone through the pleadings and specially the pleadings in the plaint and found that no case regarding the Will was set up in the plaint. In the absence of specific pleadings regarding the Will, the Courts below have rightly did not consider the case of the plaintiff qua the Will. The entire case of the plaintiff was that he was adopted by Radhabai during her life time and this fact plaintiff failed to prove before the Courts below and, therefore, he was non-suited by the trial Court as well as by the lower appellate Court and I do not find any flaw with the pure findings of fact recorded by the Courts below in this regard so as to upset them. In absence of any question of law much less any substantial question of law involved in appeal. 6. It was next argued that during the pendency of first appeal one of the respondents namely Narsingh died and his legal represent atives were not brought on record within time, therefore, the judgement passed by the lower appellate Court is a nullity. It is trite to say that a judgement against dead person is a nullity but this principle will not help the plaintiff in any manner in the opinion of this Court. The appeal was preferred by the plaintiff and in order to save the appeal it was duty of the plaintiff to bring legal representatives of the respondent on record. Having failed to do so, he cannot take advantage of his own fault and say that the matter should be remanded back to the lower appellate Court for deciding afresh. The appeal was preferred by the plaintiff and in order to save the appeal it was duty of the plaintiff to bring legal representatives of the respondent on record. Having failed to do so, he cannot take advantage of his own fault and say that the matter should be remanded back to the lower appellate Court for deciding afresh. In the opinion of this Court, on account of the death of Narsingh the suit without bringing legal representatives on record could not survive, therefore, the suit as a whole must abate on account of death of Narsingh during the pendency of this appeal. 7. In view of the above discussion, I find no merit and substance in this appeal which does not involve any question of law much less substantial question of law. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily.