Airports Authority of India through the Chairperson, New Delhi v. Hariyali, A registered Society Through its Secretary
2013-03-13
NARAYAN SHUKLA
body2013
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Shri Narayan Shukla, J. – Heard Sri K. D. Nag, learned counsel for the petitioners as well as Sri R.K. Srivastava, learned counsel for the opposite parties. Through the instant writ petition, the petitioners have challenged the ex parte decree dated 28.5. 1999, passed by the III Additional Civil Judge ( Senior Division ) Lucknow in Original Suit No. 386 of 1996, order dated 8.12.2000, passed by the same very Court on the application moved under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. along with application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act registered as Application No. C-5 in Miscellaneous Case No. 30-C of 1999 and also the order dated 12.1.2006 , passed by the District Judge, Lucknow in Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 20 of 2001. 2. Respondent no. 1 filed a suit for permanent injunction against the petitioners/ defendants. Defendants were noticed. In response the defendant no. 1 appeared but subsequently he disappeared, therefore, the learned court proceeded ex parte and held that there is a valid contract between the parties, therefore, the defendants/ petitioners have no right to cut the trees and remove the tree guards and name plates displayed thereon. 3. Petitioners/ defendants moved an application under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. along with application for condonation of delay in filing the said application to recall the judgment and order dated 28.5.1999 with some delay. They explained the laches in the manner that at the first time they came to know about the ex parte judgment only on 16.8.1999 and immediately contacted the learned Standing Counsel to move the necessary application to recall the order, who inspected the file on 30 th August, 1999 and prepared the application and filed the same just within two days thereafter. Thus, he explained that the delay in filing the application under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. is not deliberate rather it is bona fide. Therefore, the delay deserves to be condoned. 4. Further for setting aside the ex parte decree he submitted that after inspection of the record it reveals that one Mr Brijesh Saxena, learned Advocate had filed his Vakalatnama on behalf of Sri Arun Talwar, Air Port Director, Lucknow Air Port. Mr Talwar filed an objection against the plaint in the year 1996 itself.
4. Further for setting aside the ex parte decree he submitted that after inspection of the record it reveals that one Mr Brijesh Saxena, learned Advocate had filed his Vakalatnama on behalf of Sri Arun Talwar, Air Port Director, Lucknow Air Port. Mr Talwar filed an objection against the plaint in the year 1996 itself. The trial court issued an interim injunction on 20.11.1996 which was time bound and after 19th December, 1996 it was not extended the next date was fixed on 7th January 1997. On that date, lawyers were on strike. Therefore, the case was adjourned to 4th February,1997 and 11 th February, 1997 for hearing, but before reaching the said date, the case was transferred to the different court. It is stated that the recipient court never issued fresh notice or summonses to the defendants at registered address. It is further stated by learned counsel for the petitioner that after 19 th December, 1996, the counsel representing the petitioners/ defendants neither appeared in the court nor communicated the progress of the case. Mr Arun Talwar being defendant no. 3 was pursuing the case on his own level. He was transferred from Lucknow on 31.3.1998. As such the office of defendant did not have any knowledge about the case. Therefore, nobody could attend the proceedings of the court and on 25 th November, 1998 the court proceeded ex parte and ultimately passed ex parte judgment on 28 th May, 1999. It is accordingly stated by learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners are not at fault. Therefore, the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act as well as the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC deserves to be allowed. At this stage he points out one more fact that the department is governed under the Airport Authority of India Act, 1994 (in short ''Act'). Section 20 of the Act provides that subject to the provisions of Section 21, the Authority shall be competent to enter into and perform and contract necessary for the discharge of its functions under this Act. Section 2 (g) of the Act defined the term" authority" as under; "" Authority" means the Airports Authority of India constituted under Section 3." 5.
Section 2 (g) of the Act defined the term" authority" as under; "" Authority" means the Airports Authority of India constituted under Section 3." 5. Section 21(1) provides that every contract shall, on behalf of the Authority, be made by the Chairperson or such other member of such officer of the Authority as may be generally or specially empowered in this behalf by the Authority and such contracts or class of contracts as may be specified in the regulations shall be sealed with the common seal of the authority. 6. Section 3(2) of the Act speaks that " the authority shall be a body corporate by the name aforesaid having perpetual succession and a common seal, with power, subject to the provisions of this Act, to acquire, hold and dispose of property both movable and immovable, and to contract and shall be the said name sue and be sued." 7. Under the strength of the aforesaid provisions, the learned counsel for the authority submits that the suit itself deserves to be dismissed for non joinder of necessary and appropriate party as the ''Authority' as defined under the Act has not been impleaded in the suit. He also questioned the nature of document and submitted that the recital of the documents shows that it is not a contract rather to some extent it may be licence which is revokable at any point of time . 8. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioners cited following decisions; (1) Munilakshmamma and another Vs. B.V. Sampath and another (Supreme Court) reported at Indian Kanoon Civil Appeal No. 18 of 2009, (2) Asit Kumar Kar Vs. State of W.B. (2009) 2 SCC 703 , (3) Kasturi Vs. Ivyamperumal and another 2005(23) L CD1473(SC) (4) Smt. Kailashwati Sharma Vs. Additional District Judge, Hapur and others 1999 (17) LCD 1339 (All.) 9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that at this stage there is no occasion for the Court to deal with the new facts as raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners first time before this court . He cited following decision; Noor Mohamad and others Vs. Ist Addl. District Judge Rae Barei and others reported in 2009 (27) LCD. 10.
He cited following decision; Noor Mohamad and others Vs. Ist Addl. District Judge Rae Barei and others reported in 2009 (27) LCD. 10. Learned counsel for the respondents further stated that the matter has come before this Court challenging various orders, passed by the courts below in which there are no error as at each and every stage the petitioners failed to contest the case. Therefore, the Courts below had no option but to proceed with the case ex parte. He also produced documents of contract as entered into between the parties and submitted that the same has rightly been acknowledged by the trial court as contract between the parties . Relying upon which the court below has passed a decree of permanent injunction. Since at this stage I am not examining the matter on merit, I hereby give liberty to the petitioners to raise this issue including others before the trial court. 11. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties as well as perusal of the record, I am of the view that since the lawyer engaged by the petitioner failed to discharge his duty as he did not communicate the defendants to attend the proceedings of the case, therefore, the defendants could not attend the proceedings timely. I am of the view that once the litigant is bona fidely pursuing the case he should not put to suffer in default of his counsel. 12. Therefore, I hereby allow the application moved under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and condone the delay in filing the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC and restore the suit in its original number to proceed from the stage where it proceeded ex parte. The petitioners/ defendants are at liberty to raise objection against the maintainability of the suit as has been raised before this Court. 13. In the result, the ex parte decree dated 28.5. 1999, passed by the III Additional Civil Judge ( Senior Division ) Lucknow in Original Suit No. 386 of 1996, order dated 8.12.2000, passed by the same very Court on the application moved under Order IX Rule 13 along with application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act registered as Application No. C- in Miscellaneous Case No. 30-C of 1999 and also the order dated 12.1.2006 , passed by the District Judge, Lucknow in Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 20 of 2001 are hereby quashed. 13.
13. Accordingly the writ petition is allowed. Costs of this case shall be borne by the petitioners.