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2013 DIGILAW 811 (AP)

Divisional Commercial Manager, Vijayawada v. Y. Meher Baba

2013-09-25

CHALLA KODANDA RAM, L.NARASIMHA REDDY

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Judgment : L. Narasimha Reddy, J. 1. The respondent was appointed as Ticket Collector on 15-12-1992 in the South Central Railway. On 18-04-1996, he was discharging his duties in Tenali Railway Station. A decoy check was conducted by the Railway Vigilance Organization upon the respondent. It was alleged that a disguised person attempted to come out of the station without ticket and the respondent stopped him for production of ticket. It is stated that being informed that the said person did not have the ticket, the respondent indicated that a sum of Rs.158/- is to be paid towards fare and penalty and that amount shall be paid to another person waiting within the station. 2. Alleging that the respondent resorted to the acts of misconduct in the matter of collecting the fare and penalty, a charge was issued on 27-08-1996, invoking Rule 3 (1) (i) (ii) and (iii) of Railway Service (Conduct) Rules 1966, framing a charge alleging violation. The respondent submitted his explanation. Not satisfied with that, the disciplinary authority appointed an enquiry officer. The enquiry officer submitted his report holding that the charge is not proved. The disciplinary authority, the 1st petitioner herein, dropped the proceedings against the respondent through order dated 08-01-1998. 3. The Additional Divisional Railway Manager, the 2nd petitioner, however, in exercise of his powers of revision, issued a memorandum dated 06-07-1998 to the respondent, stating that he proposes to take action against him in accordance with the provisions of Rule 25 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 (for short ‘the Rules’). He required the respondent to explain as to why the punishment of withholding of his increments for a period of 24 months, recurring, should not be imposed. The petitioner submitted his explanation on 23-07-1998. Not satisfied with that, the 2nd petitioner passed an order dated 07-09-1998, imposing the penalty of withholding of increments for a period of 24 months with cumulative effect. The respondent preferred an appeal to the 3rd petitioner. The appeal was rejected through order dated 26-06-1999. Challenging the order of penalty imposed against him, the respondent filed O.A. No.1671 of 1999 before the Hyderabad Bench of Central Administrative Tribunal (for short “the Tribunal”). He pleaded that the order passed by the 2nd petitioner is contrary to law and without jurisdiction. 4. The O.A. was opposed by the petitioners by filing a counter. Challenging the order of penalty imposed against him, the respondent filed O.A. No.1671 of 1999 before the Hyderabad Bench of Central Administrative Tribunal (for short “the Tribunal”). He pleaded that the order passed by the 2nd petitioner is contrary to law and without jurisdiction. 4. The O.A. was opposed by the petitioners by filing a counter. According to them, prescribed procedure was followed and that no exception can be taken to the order passed by the 2nd petitioner. The Tribunal allowed the O.A., through order dated 08-08-2000. Hence, this writ petition. 5. Sri R.S. Murthy, learned Standing Counsel for the petitioners submits that the 2nd petitioner is conferred with the power under Rule 25 of the Rules to call for records pertaining to the orders passed by any officer subordinate to him, and to pass appropriate orders. He contends that the requirement under the rule, namely, to issue a show-cause notice, if it is proposed to enhance the punishment, has been issued, and the 2nd petitioner passed a detailed order, after taking into account, the explanation submitted by the respondent. He submits that the Tribunal was not at all justified in analyzing the events and taking the view that it is a case of no evidence against the respondent. Learned counsel submits that the gravity of the matter and the acts of misconduct resorted to by the respondent were taken into account and suitable punishment was imposed. 6. Sri P.S. Ramachandra Murthy, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that the order dated 07-09-1998 passed by the 2nd petitioner is totally without jurisdiction and the Tribunal has correctly set aside the same. He contends that once the enquiry officer has submitted his report, holding that the charges are not proved, and the disciplinary authority accepted the same and dropped the proceedings, there was no basis for the 2nd petitioner to entertain the matter in any form, whatever. Learned counsel submits that the prerogative of disagreeing with the findings of the enquiry officer is only with the disciplinary authority, and by no stretch of imagination, the appellate or revisional authority can exercise that power. 7. The charge-sheet was issued against the respondent on 27-08-1996, alleging certain acts of misconduct, and invoking the relevant provisions of the Conduct Rules. It is not necessary to refer to the charges, in detail. 7. The charge-sheet was issued against the respondent on 27-08-1996, alleging certain acts of misconduct, and invoking the relevant provisions of the Conduct Rules. It is not necessary to refer to the charges, in detail. Suffice it to mention that the enquiry officer appointed by the disciplinary authority submitted a report, holding that the charges are not proved. The 1st petitioner accepted the findings of the enquiry officer and accordingly dropped the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent, through order dated 08-01-1998. 8. The 2nd petitioner, no doubt, is conferred with the powers, under Rule 25 of the Rules, to call for records pertaining to an order of punishment, and to pass appropriate orders, confirming, modifying, or even enhancing the punishment. The Rule 25 of the Rules reads, “Rule 25(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, (i) the President, or (ii) the Railway Board, or (iii) The General Manager of a Zonal Railway or an authority of that status in any other Railway Unit or Administration in the case of a railway servant serving under his or its control, or iv) The appellate authority not below the rank of a Deputy Head of Department or a Divisional Railway Manager in cases where no appeal has been preferred, or v) any other authority not below the rank of Deputy Head of Department or a Divisional Railway manager in the case of a railway servant servicing under its control, may at any time, either on his or its own motion or otherwise call for the records of any inquiry and revise any order made under the rules or under the rules repealed by Rule 29 and may, after consultation with the Commission where such consultation is necessary,-- (a) confirm, modify or set aside the order; or (b) confirm, reduce, enhance or set aside the penalty imposed by the order, or impose any penalty where no penalty has been imposed; or (c) remit the case to the authority which made order or any other authority directing such authority to make such further inquiry as it may consider proper in the circumstances of the case; or (d) pass such orders as it may deem fit. xxx” 9. It is only in rare and exceptional cases that suo motu powers, wherever conferred, are exercised by the concerned authorities. xxx” 9. It is only in rare and exceptional cases that suo motu powers, wherever conferred, are exercised by the concerned authorities. Since exercise of such powers would adversely effect the rights of the employees, or other subjects, it should be strictly in terms of the relevant provisions of law. A perusal of the Rule, referred to above, discloses that the subject-matter of the consideration by the 2nd petitioner can be only an order passed against an employee, imposing punishment. Such an order does not exist in the instant case. The respondent was totally exonerated of the charges and proceedings against him were dropped. Hence, there was no occasion for the 2nd petitioner to call for the file, at all. 10. Assuming that even an order dropping the disciplinary proceedings against an employee can be treated as falling within the description of order of punishment, the nature and scope of interference, is guided by certain principles. If punishment of a particular description was imposed by the disciplinary authority for the charges, which were held proved, the revisional authority may feel that punishment of a higher degree can be imposed on the basis of the same charges. He cannot take into account, any additional factor, nor can he differ with the findings of the enquiry officer. 11. Where an enquiry officer submits a report, holding that the charges framed against an employee are not proved, it is open to the disciplinary authority, either to agree with the findings, or to differ with the same. In case he decides to differ with the finding, a notice in this behalf must be issued to the employee. Here again, the disciplinary authority cannot take into account, any additional material, other than what has already formed part of the record, before the enquiry officer. If he accepts the explanation of the employee, the findings of the enquiry officer stand accepted and if he differs with the same and takes the view that the charges, or any of them are proved, appropriate punishment may be imposed. 12. The phase at which, the findings of the enquiry officer can be accepted or varied, comes to an end with the disciplinary authority exercises his discretion and passing an order. 12. The phase at which, the findings of the enquiry officer can be accepted or varied, comes to an end with the disciplinary authority exercises his discretion and passing an order. Thereafter, in an appeal or revision, whether filed by the employee, assailing the order of punishment, or in the proceedings taken up suo motu, by an authority conferred with such power, the examination can be only with reference to the material that is available on record. In the cases where the charges are held not proved and the disciplinary authority accepts those findings, there would not be any occasion for any superior authority to re-open the matter. 13. It is the exclusive prerogative of the disciplinary authority to differ with the findings of the enquiry officer. The appellate or revisional authority can not usurp into such power. In the instant case, the 2nd petitioner has chosen to issue a notice to the respondent, proposing to differ with the findings, and has acted as though, he is the disciplinary authority himself. Such a course of action is impermissible in law. 14. In extreme cases where the superior authority feels that the findings are motivated, he can initiate proceedings against the very disciplinary authority, or for that matter, the enquiry officer, for their inept handling of the matter, provided that the facts of the case warrant. It cannot be on the ipsi dixit of the authority. 15. The Tribunal, no doubt, has dealt with the matter, in detail, on merits. Such an exercise was warranted to demonstrate that the decision taken by the 2nd petitioner was not proper. No illegality can be said to have crept into the order passed by the Tribunal. 16. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is dismissed. The miscellaneous petitions filed in this writ petition shall also stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.