ORDER : Dev Dharshan Sud, J. The State has challenged the order dated 30.07.2008 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court, Solan allowing the appeal preferred by the petitioner herein under Section 47- A of the Indian Stamp Act (H.P. Amendment) Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), which was preferred against the order dated 23.12.2006 passed by the District Collector, Solan. 2. The District Collector Solan adjudicated proceedings under Section 47-A of the Act on the facts that the Sub Registrar Arki had sent a report on proforma-I that mining lease deed No.43, dated 3.6.1992 executed by the State of H.P. through the Director of Industries, H.P. in favour of the petitioner was under valued on the basis of annual rent of Rs. 32,274/- whereas the petitioner has deposited the royalty of Rs. 10,66,58,415/- which was not taken into account. According to the State after taking into account annual royalty of Rs. 10,66,58,4150/-, the stamp duty of Rs. 31,99,752/- was required to be affixed which was pointed out by the Audit Department. The case was tried by the Collector, who on merits of the case holds that stamp duty is not in consonance with the conditions incorporated in the Deed. Aggrieved respondent preferred an appeal in the Court of the learned Additional District Judge which was allowed on the grounds urged therein including the question of limitation and valuation. 3. When this petition was taken up for hearing, learned counsel appearing for the respondent has urged that the Collector has no jurisdiction to entertain the case as it was barred by limitation. Learned counsel referred to Section 47-A of the Act which provides: "47-A. Instruments under-valued, how to be dealt with.--- (1) if the Registering Officer, appointed under the Registration Act, 1908, while registering any instrument relating to the transfer of any property, has reason to believe that the market value of the property or the consideration, as the case may be, has not been truly set forth in the instrument, he may, after registering such instrument, refer the same to the Collector for determination of the market value or consideration, as the case may be, and the property due payable thereon. (2) On receipt of reference under sub-section (1), the Collector shall, after giving the parties a reasonable opportunity of being heard and after holding an enquiry in such manner, as may be prescribed by rules, made under this Act, determine the market value or consideration and the duty, as aforesaid, and the deficient amount of duty, if any, shall be payable by the person liable to pay the duty. (3) The collector may, suo motu or on receipt of reference from the Inspector General of Registration or the Registrar of a District, in whose jurisdiction the property, or any portion thereof, which is the subject-matter of the instrument is situated, appointed under the Registration Act, 1908, shall, within three years from the date of registration of any instrument, not already referred to him under sub-section (1) call for and examine the instrument for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the correctness of its market value or consideration, as the case may be, and the duty payable thereon and if, after such examination, he has reason to believe that the market value or consideration has not been truly set forth in the instrument, he may determine the market value or consideration and the duty, as aforesaid, in accordance with the procedure provided for in sub-section (2), and the deficient amount of duty, if any, shall be payable by the person liable to pay the duty: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any instrument registered before the date of the commencement of the Indian Stamp (Himachal Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1988. (4) Where for any reason the original document called for by the Collector under sub-section (3) is not produced or cannot be produced, the Collector may, after recording the reasons for its non-production, call for a certified copy of the entries of the document from registering officer concerned and exercise the powers conferred on him under sub-section (3). (5) Any person, aggrieved by an order of the Collector, under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3), may, within thirty days from the date of the order, prefer an appeal before the District Judge and all such appeals shall be heard and disposed of in such manner as may be prescribed by rules made under this Act. (5) Any person, aggrieved by an order of the Collector, under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3), may, within thirty days from the date of the order, prefer an appeal before the District Judge and all such appeals shall be heard and disposed of in such manner as may be prescribed by rules made under this Act. (6) For the purpose of this section "market value" of any property shall be estimated to be the price which, in the opinion of the Collector or the appellate authority, as the case may be, such property would have fetched, if sold in the open market on the date of execution of the instrument relating to the transfer of such property." 4. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that sub-section (3) of the Act bars the jurisdiction of the Collector and invokes the bar of limitation. It provides for two situations. First, the Collector may suo motu or on receipt of reference from the Inspector General of Registration or the Registrar of a District, in whose jurisdiction the property or any portion thereof is situated shall within three years from the date of registration, call for and examine the instrument for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the correctness of its market value etc. This excludes the situation envisaged under sub-section (1) where the Registering Officer while registering any instrument relating to the transfer of any property can make a reference to the Collector where he has reasons to believe that it is undervalued. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in C.J. Paul and others v. District Collector and others, (2009)14 SCC 564 in support of his contention. The Supreme Court while dealing with the provisions of Section 19(b) of the Tamil Nadu Act holds: "9. We may notice that the proviso appended to Section 19B (4) underwent an amendment insofar as in stead and place of "from the date of registration of such instrument", the words "from the date of receipt of the copy of such instrument in the State of Tamil Nadu under the Registration Act, 1908" were inserted. The said amendment came into force with effect from 22.02.2000 in terms of Tamil Nadu Act 39 of 1999. 10. Section 47A of the Act was inserted in the State of Tamil Nadu by Act 24 of 1967. The said amendment came into force with effect from 22.02.2000 in terms of Tamil Nadu Act 39 of 1999. 10. Section 47A of the Act was inserted in the State of Tamil Nadu by Act 24 of 1967. Indisputably, the period of limitation was two years for initiation of a proceedings there under. However, Section 47A of the Act also underwent an amendment by Tamil Nadu Act 1 of 2000 which came into force with effect from 6.03.2000 whereby and where under the period of limitation was extended to five years. 11. The liability to pay stamp duty arises on presentation of a document. Indisputably, the registration office of the State of Kerala had the requisite jurisdiction to register the document in terms of the provisions of the Registration Act. The registration authorities of the State of Tamil Nadu came to know of the registration of the said documents on 30.03.1996 when they were filed before some authorities. In terms of the provisions of the Act, the Collector alone would initiate a proceeding for recovery of deficit stamp duty. The proceeding was initiated on 5.05.1998 but the notices were issued only on 7.06.1998. 12. The period of limitation so far as Section 47A of the Act is concerned is two years. The limitation of period of four years was provided for in terms of the proviso appended to Section 19B (4) of the Act but the statute which was applicable at the relevant point of time provided for invoking the period of limitation was four years from the date of registration. 13. Sections 47A and 19B of the Act provide for penalty. A statute of limitation conferring jurisdiction upon the statutory authorities to impose penalty must, therefore, be construed strictly. A penal statute, as is well- known, unless expressly provided, cannot be given a retrospective effect. [See Ritesh Agarwal V. SEB, (2008) 8 SCC 205 : (AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 268) The amendments carried out by the State of Tamil Nadu in the Act must, therefore, be held to have a prospective operation only. 14. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that ordinarily in a case of this nature, the date of knowledge would be the starting point for computing the period of limitation. The authorities of the State of Tamil Nadu came to know of the execution of the deeds of sale dated 1.02.1990 only on 30.03.1996. 14. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that ordinarily in a case of this nature, the date of knowledge would be the starting point for computing the period of limitation. The authorities of the State of Tamil Nadu came to know of the execution of the deeds of sale dated 1.02.1990 only on 30.03.1996. They could have initiated a proceeding, if any, within a period of two years from the said date as provided for in Section 47A of the Act. However, in terms of Section 19B of the Act, the period of limitation provided was four years from the date of registration and not from the date of knowledge. 15. Submission of Mr. Sundaravaradan that the subsequent amendment carried out by Act 1 of 2000 was only clarificatory in nature cannot be accepted. The State advisedly used the words "four years" from the date of registration. Only at a later stage, wisdom dawned on them that they may not be able to find out the evasion of stamp duty within the aforementioned period, amended the said provision so that the period of limitation may start from the date of knowledge and not from the date of registration. The said amendment is, thus, also not retrospective in nature. It is now well-settled that the Court cannot supply casus omissus. [See Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v. Electricity Inspector & ETIO (2007) 5 SCC 447 ]" (pp.567 & 568) 5. Learned counsel also relies upon the decision of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Raghbir and others v. State of Haryana and others, 2004 (1) S.L.J. 602 holding: "8. We also agree with the petitioner that the notice issued by respondent No.3 is barred by time and is liable to be quashed as such. Under sub-section 92) of Section 47-A of the Act, the Collector can take action on a reference made by the Registering Officer under sub-section (1) thereof. No limitation has been prescribed for initiation of action by the Registering Officer under sub-section (1) of Section 47-A, but the language of that subsection makes it clear that the officer concerned can make a reference to the Collector only if while registering the document he has reason to believe that the value of the property or consideration has not been truly set forth. This necessarily means that he has to make a reference immediately after registering the document. This necessarily means that he has to make a reference immediately after registering the document. Under sub-section (3), the Collector can take such action, either suo-motu or on receipt of reference from Inspector General of Registration or the Registrar of a District in whose jurisdiction the property or any portion thereof, which is subject-matter of instrument, is situated. For taking action under sub-section (3), limitation of three years from the date of registration of the instrument has been prescribed. In other words, no action can be taken by the Collector under subsection (3) after expiry of three years counted from the date of registration of the instrument. If that be the position, we have no hesitation to hold that the notice issued by respondent Nos. 3 after 7 years of the registration of sale deed is clearly barred by time and is liable to be quashed." 6. It is undisputed before me that the instrument, which is lease deed in this case was registered on 3.6.1992 and action was taken thereon on 29.3.2000 in terms of sub section 3 of Section 47-A. Admittedly and it is not disputed that action was taken after three years which is a clear bar to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Collector. In these circumstances, there is no merit in this petition. The judgment of the learned District Judge is affirmed. Petition dismissed. 7. All pending miscellaneous applications also stand disposed of.