JUDGEMNT 1. This First Appeal is at the instance of an Insurance Company and is directed against an award dated 5th November 2001 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal [Aux.I], Kachchh, at Bhuj, in MACP No. 193 of 1994 thereby allowing the claim-petition and awarding a sum of Rs.8,95,000/- with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of filing of the claim-petition till the deposit or realization with proportionate costs thereon. 2. Being dissatisfied, the Insurance Company has come up with the present appeal. 3. There is no dispute that on the date of the accident, the victim was travelling in a Matador van bearing registration No. GJ.3.T.9537 in the course of his employment in Gujarat Electricity Board, with which, a truck bearing registration No. GJ.3.T.906 coming from the opposite direction, collided, as a result, he was seriously injured. 3.1 According to the claim-petition, the victim suffered injuries on his head and several fractures on different part of his body, as a result, even after prolonged treatment, the Doctors have found him 70% permanently disabled qua body as a whole. As a result of such disablement, the employer of the victim has also found him unfit for further continuation in the job. The Tribunal, therefore, held the victim to be totally disabled. 3.2 It appears that at the time of discharge from service, the victim had income of Rs.2700/- and odd a month. 3.3 It further appears that his wife was given employment by the employer in the same post of helper on compassionate ground. 3.4 It further appears that the total expenditures towards medical treatment was Rs.1,00,000-00 but 80% thereof was paid by his employer as the victim suffered the injuries in the course of his employment. As regards the balance 20%, the Tribunal thought it fit to award only Rs.10,000/-, i.e. 10% of the total expenditure. 3.5 While calculating the amount of compensation under the head of future loss of income, the Tribunal was of the view that the last payment received by the claimant should first be doubled, and thus, it comes to Rs.2724 X 2 = 5448. 3.5 While calculating the amount of compensation under the head of future loss of income, the Tribunal was of the view that the last payment received by the claimant should first be doubled, and thus, it comes to Rs.2724 X 2 = 5448. The Tribunal further added a sum of Rs.2724/- to the said amount and thus, the Tribunal came to a figure of Rs.8172/- and half of the said amount, i.e. Rs.4086/-, rounded off to Rs.4000/-, was taken to be the monthly prospective income of the petitioner, i.e. Rs.48,000/- per annum. Applying thereto a multiplier of 17, the Tribunal arrived at the figure of Rs.8,16,000/- under the head of future loss of income. The Tribunal further awarded a sum of Rs.38,000/- being the actual loss of income from 23rd November 1993 to 31st May 1995, the date of dismissal of the victim from service. The total amount thus came to Rs.9,24,000/- but the claimant having claimed only Rs.8,95,000/-, the Tribunal awarded the amount of compensation only to the extent claimed in the claim-petition. 4. Mr. Mehta, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the Insurance Company of both the offending vehicles, did not dispute the fact that both the vehicles were insured by his client and there was negligence on the part of drivers of both the vehicles. Mr. Mehta, however, restricted his submission to the quantum of the award. According to Mr. Mehta, the employer of the victim having given employment to his wife on compassionate ground, while calculating the amount of compensation, the Tribunal below should have taken such factor into consideration. Mr. Mehta further contends that while awarding the sum of Rs.8,16,000/- as future loss of income, the Tribunal did not take into consideration the fact that disability was 70% and, therefore, 30% ought to have been deducted from the said amount. 5. Mr. Purohit, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the claimant, has, however, supported the order passed by the Tribunal below. 6. Therefore, the first question that arises for determination in this appeal is while arriving at the figure of Rs. 8,16,000/- as compensation under the head of future loss of income, the Tribunal committed any error in not taking into consideration the fact that the victim suffered disability only to the extent of 70% and thus, 30% should have been deducted from the said amount. 7. 8,16,000/- as compensation under the head of future loss of income, the Tribunal committed any error in not taking into consideration the fact that the victim suffered disability only to the extent of 70% and thus, 30% should have been deducted from the said amount. 7. I am of the opinion that although the victim suffered permanent disability only to the extent of 70%, it appears that he is unable to understand or speak properly and, at the same time, he has been found to be not suitable for any job. Thus, the victim was not capable of earning any amount in view of such disability of 70%. He was serving as a Helper with Gujarat Electricity Board and it appears from the evidence that there is even no chance of any future recovery. In such circumstances, in my opinion, there is no justification for deducting 30% amount from the amount assessed by the Tribunal towards future loss of income. It should be also noted that since the victim is alive, there will be further expenses in future for his maintenance, medical treatment and for constant attendants. I, thus, find no reason to reduce the amount awarded under the head of future loss of income by 30% as suggested by Mr. Mehta. 8. Although the entire medical expenses have not been awarded, since the claimant has not preferred any appeal or Cross Objections, there is no scope of enhancement of the amount. 9. The next question is whether the fact that the wife of the victim has been given job in the same post on compassionate appointment by the employer should have been taken into consideration as a factor for calculating the pecuniary loss suffered by the victim. 10. In my opinion, the fact that wife of the victim is given employment on compassionate ground cannot be a relevant factor in considering the total amount of compensation for the loss suffered by the victim in a proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act involving two vehicles where employer has no role to play. 10. In my opinion, the fact that wife of the victim is given employment on compassionate ground cannot be a relevant factor in considering the total amount of compensation for the loss suffered by the victim in a proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act involving two vehicles where employer has no role to play. The Gujarat Electricity Board, the employer of the victim, has given employment to the wife of the victim because she is otherwise capable of doing the job and the wife of the victim is earning the amount by giving her labour for performing her duties towards employer and it is not a gratuitous payment given to her by the owner of the offending vehicles. She might do similar job in other organizations than that of the employer of the victim, and by giving such labour, she could also earn her livelihood by earning similar income. Therefore, the fact that an employment is given to the wife of the victim on compassionate ground by his employer does not justify reduction of the amount otherwise entitled by the victim from the owners of the offending vehicles. 11. Mr. Mehta, in this connection, strongly relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of BHAKRA BEAS MANAGEMENT BOARD vs. KANTA AGGARWAL AND OTHERS reported in 2008 ACJ 2372 . In that case, a claim-petition was filed by the widow and the children of the victim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs.8,48,160/- along with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of institution of the proceedings. An appeal was filed by the owner of the vehicle before the High Court. It was pointed out that on the death of K.C. Aggarwal, the respondent No.1, the widow of the victim, had been provided with compassionate appointment and she was getting salary of nearly Rs.4,700/- p.m. (basic pay of nearly Rs.4,700/-) and a residence was provided to her. The High Court did not accept this plea and observed that the quantum of compensation had been rightly fixed. Being dissatisfied, the owner of the vehicle moved the Apex Court. In such a situation, a two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court was of the view having regard to the fact that the widow was given compassionate appointment by the employer, the just amount of compensation should be limited to Rs.5 lakh. Being dissatisfied, the owner of the vehicle moved the Apex Court. In such a situation, a two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court was of the view having regard to the fact that the widow was given compassionate appointment by the employer, the just amount of compensation should be limited to Rs.5 lakh. It appears from the materials on record that the victim was a passenger of the jeep owned by the appellant and at the time of accident, he sat just behind the driver of the jeep. Due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the jeep the same collided with a truck resulting in the death of the victim. The truck sped away and the claim-application was filed against the owner of the jeep. Although it is not clear from the judgment, most probably the victim was an employee of the owner of the jeep, the appellant before the Apex Court, as would appear from the fact that he was a passenger of the jeep and the Insurance Company was not involved in the litigation. Therefore, the compensation was claimed against the owner of the jeep, the employer of the victim, who provided the widow of the victim with compassionate appointment. 11.1 It may be mentioned here that in paragraphs 12, the Supreme Court made the following observations: 12. But we find that the High Court lost sight of the fact that the benefits which the claimant receives on account of the death or injury have to be duly considered while fixing the compensation. It is pointed out that respondent No.1 was getting Rs.4700/- per month and a residence has been provided to her and actually the compassionate appoint was given immediately after the accident. 11.2 The Apex Court although took note of the earlier decision in the case of Helen C. Rebello vs. Maharashtra S.R.T.C reported in AIR 1998 SC 3191 = (1999) 1 SCC 90 , did not make any observations and ultimately, reduced the amount to Rs.5 lakh on the ground that the fact of providing compassionate appointment should have been taken into consideration by the High Court. 11.3 In the above case of Helen C Rebello [supura], the question was whether in adjudicating the amount of just compensation within the meaning of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the Tribunal was justified in deducting the amount of money received by maturity of the life Insurance of the deceased. While answering the question in negative, the Apex Court made the following important observations: So far as the general principle of estimating damages under the common law is concerned, it is settled that the pecuniary loss can be ascertained only by balancing on one hand, the loss to the claimant of the future pecuniary benefits that would have accrued to him but for the death with the 'pecuniary advantage' which from whatever source comes to him by reason of the death. In other words, it is the balancing of loss and gain of the claimant occasioned by the death. But this has to change its colour to the extent a statute intends to do. Thus, this has to be interpreted in the light of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. It is very clear, to which there could be no doubt that this Act delivers compensation to the claimant only on account of accidental injury or death, not on account of any other death. Thus, the pecuniary advantage accruing under this Act has to be deciphered, co-relating with the accidental death. The compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act is on account of the pecuniary loss to the claimant by accidental injury or death and not other forms of death. If there is natural death or death by suicide, serious illness, including even death by accident, through train, air flight not involving motor vehicle, would not be covered under the Motor Vehicles Act. Thus, the application of general principle under the common law of loss and gain for the computation of compensation under this Act must co-relate to this type of injury or deaths, viz., accidental. If the words 'pecuniary advantage' from whatever source are to be interpreted to mean any form of death under this Act it would dilute all possible benefits conferred on the claimant and would be contrary to the spirit of the law. If the words 'pecuniary advantage' from whatever source are to be interpreted to mean any form of death under this Act it would dilute all possible benefits conferred on the claimant and would be contrary to the spirit of the law. If the 'pecuniary advantage' resulting from death means pecuniary advantage coming under all forms of death then it will include all the assets movable, immovable shares, bank accounts, cash and every amount receivable under any contract. In other words, all heritable assets including what is willed by the deceased etc. This would obliterate both, all possible conferment of economic security to the claimant by the deceased and the intentions of the legislature. By such an interpretation the tort-feasor in spite of his wrongful act or negligence, which contributes to the death, would have in many cases no liability or meagre liability. In our considered opinion, the general principle of loss and gain takes colour of this statute, viz., the gain has to be interpreted which is as a result of the accidental death and the loss on account of the accidental death. Thus, under the present Act whatever pecuniary advantage is received by the claimant, from whatever source, would only mean which comes to the claimant on account of the accidental death and not other form of death. The constitution of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal itself under Section 110, is as the Section states; "....for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to,....." Thus, it would not include that which claimant receives on account of other form of deaths, which he would have received even apart from accidental death. Thus, such pecuniary advantage would have no correlation to the accidental death for which compensation is computed. Any amount received or receivable not only on account of the accidental death but that would have come to the claimant even otherwise, could not be construed to be the 'pecuniary advantage', liable for deduction. However, where the employer insures his employee, as against injury or death arising out of an accident, any amount received out of such insurance on the happening of such incidence may be an amount liable for deduction. However, our legislature has taken note of such contingency, through the proviso of Section 95. However, where the employer insures his employee, as against injury or death arising out of an accident, any amount received out of such insurance on the happening of such incidence may be an amount liable for deduction. However, our legislature has taken note of such contingency, through the proviso of Section 95. Under it, the liability of the insurer is excluded in respect of injury or death, arising out of, in the course of employment of an employee. This is based on the principle that the claimant for the happening of the same incidence may not gain twice from two sources. This, it is excluded thus, either through the wisdom of legislature or through the principle of loss and gain through deduction not to give gain to the claimant twice arising from the same transaction, viz., same accident. It is significant to record here in both the sources, viz., either under the Motor Vehicles Act or from the employer, the compensation receivable by the claimant is either statutory or through the security of the employer securing for his employee but in both cases he receives the amount without his contribution. How thus an amount earned out of one's labour or contribution towards one's wealth, savings, etc. either for himself or for his family, which such person knows, under the law, has to go to his heirs after his death either by succession or under a will could be said to be the 'pecuniary gain' only on account of one's accidental death. This, of course, is a pecuniary gain but how this is equitable or could be balanced out of the amount to be received as compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. There is no co-relation between the two amounts. Not even remotely. How can an amount of loss and gain of one contract could be made applicable to the loss and gain of another contract. Similarly, how an amount receivable under a statute has any co-relation with an amount earned by an individual. Principle of loss and gain has to be on the same place within the same sphere, of course, subject to the contract to the contrary or any provisions of law. Broadly, we may examine the receipt of the provident fund which is a deferred payment out of the contribution made by an employee during the tenure of his service. Principle of loss and gain has to be on the same place within the same sphere, of course, subject to the contract to the contrary or any provisions of law. Broadly, we may examine the receipt of the provident fund which is a deferred payment out of the contribution made by an employee during the tenure of his service. Such employee or his heirs are entitled to receive this amount irrespective of the accidental death. This amount is secured, is certain to be received, while the amount under the Motor Vehicles Act is uncertain and is receivable only on the happening of the event, viz., accident, which may not take place at all. Similarly, family pension is also earned by an employee for the benefit of his family in the form of his contribution in the service in terms of the service conditions receivable by the heirs after his death. The heirs receive family pension even otherwise than the accidental death. No co-relation between the two. Similarly, life insurance policy is received either by the insured or the heirs of the insured on account of the contract with the insurer, for which insured contributes in the form of premium. It is receivable even by the insured, if he lives till maturity after paying all the premiums, in the case of death insurer indemnifies to pay the sum to the heirs, again in terms of the contracts for the premium paid. Again, this amount is receivable by the claimant not on account of any accidental death but otherwise on insured's death. Death is only a step or contingency in terms of the contract, to receive the amount. Similarly any cash, bank balance, shares, fixed deposits, etc. though are all a pecuniary advantage receivable by the heirs on account of one's death but all these have no co-relation with the amount receivable under a statute occasioned only on account of accidental death. How could such an amount come within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as 'pecuniary advantage' liable for deduction. When we seek the principle of loss and gain, it has to be on similar and same plane having nexus inter se between them and not to which, there is no semblance of any co-relation. How could such an amount come within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as 'pecuniary advantage' liable for deduction. When we seek the principle of loss and gain, it has to be on similar and same plane having nexus inter se between them and not to which, there is no semblance of any co-relation. The insured (deceased) contributes his own money for which he receives the amount has no co-relation to the compensation computed as against tort-feasor for his negligence on account of accident. As aforesaid, the amount receivable as compensation under the Act is on account of the injury or death without making any contribution towards it, then how can fruits of an amount received through contributions of the insured be deducted out of the amount receivable under the Motor Vehicles Act. The amount under this Act, he receives without any contribution. As we have said the compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act is statutory while the amount receivable under the life insurance policy is contractual. (Emphasis supplied). 12. Thus, the above contention of Mr. Mehta is not tenable in the eye of law. If the above contention is accepted then in a case where a third party being moved by the precarious condition of the heirs of a victim donates any amount, the owner of the offending vehicle will be entitled to claim deduction of that amount in a proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act. 13. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, I, thus, find no reason to interfere with the ultimate calculation arrived at by the Tribunal below. 14. The appeal is, thus, devoid of any merits and is consequently dismissed. No order as to costs.