JUDGMENT Dev Darshan Sud , J. This appeal has been preferred by the State against the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, Chamba acquitting the respondent who was charged for committing offences under Sections 307, 498-A and 325 IPC. 2. The prosecution case is that on 2.6.2000 Ext. PA statement of complainant PW1 Shrishatha Devi was recorded by PW15 ASI Joga Singh, Incharge of Police Post, Banikhet, in Civil Hospital, Dalhousie. The complainant stated that she was married to the accused-respondent about 3½ months prior to the incident in accordance with the Hindu customs and rites. On 1.6.2000 the accused persuaded her to travel to Dalhousie for a picnic and told her that she should replace her ornaments with artificial jewellery which she did. They started at 4 PM and travelled on motor cycle of the accused and after reaching Pathankot, they parked the motor cycle at the bus terminus. From there they boarded bus at around 4.30 PM bound for Dalhousie. When they reached near Banikhet at around 8.20 PM, the accused suggested to the complainant that they should walk to Dalhousie on foot and accordingly they alighted from the bus. The case then proceeds that when they reached near a culvert on Banikhet-Chamba road, he asked her to wait there and went to the nallah flowing near the culvert. After some time, the accused returned and asked the complainant to accompany him to the nallah so that they could rest there. She complied with this request when he suddenly pounced upon her, gagged her mouth and assaulted her brutally. She thought that the accused was jesting with her. But she was horrified when the accused put his both hands in her mouth and started pulling her jaws in the opposite directions i.e. up with one hand and down with the other. She protested and cried but was unable to free herself from his clutches. She bit his finger on which the accused started thrashing her. She was caught hold from her throat with the intention of choking her and she became unconscious. She regained consciousness after some time and found that her clothes were stained with blood and blood was oozing from her mouth and head. The accused was not present there as he had left her presuming her to be dead. She was caught hold from her throat with the intention of choking her and she became unconscious. She regained consciousness after some time and found that her clothes were stained with blood and blood was oozing from her mouth and head. The accused was not present there as he had left her presuming her to be dead. She was in a state of exhaustion and it was with great difficulty that she managed to climb up from the nallah and reach the main road. She saw a maruti van was coming from Banikhet going towards Chamba. She signaled the driver to stop, but the van sped on. She started dragging herself towards Banikhet. She had hardly covered some distance, when one maruti van came from Chamba side; she signaled frantically and the van stopped. The accused was also sitting in this van. When she boarded it, the accused and the driver alighted from the van. Thereafter the accused boarded the vehicle, rammed her with fist blows and then left the place. The driver was accompanied by two more persons who came to the spot and took the complainant to Police Post, Banikhet. She was then taken by the police to Civil Hospital, Dalhousie. Case was registered and investigation followed. The accused was charged for offences under Sections 307, 498-A and 325 IPC. The case was committed for trial to the Court of Sessions on 8.9.2000. 3. The prosecution has examined 17 witnesses in support of its case. We advert to the evidence on record. PW1 Sarishtha Devi complainant has given a vivid description of the incident. She corroborated the facts as stated by her in the complaint Ext.PA. She states that the accused was working as JBT teacher. When they started walking on foot and reached a milestone showing the distance to Chamba, she requested the accused to arrange for transport as she had become tired. But he ordered that he would do so after walking some distance. The accused insisted that they should sit below the culvert for two minutes and when she refused to comply with the request she was dragged down there. Thereafter, he assaulted her and pulled her jaws in the opposite directions after inserting his hands in her mouth. She could not free herself from his grip. The accused tried to choke her by throttling her and he thought that she was dead. Thereafter, he assaulted her and pulled her jaws in the opposite directions after inserting his hands in her mouth. She could not free herself from his grip. The accused tried to choke her by throttling her and he thought that she was dead. After regaining consciousness, she found that she was lying down on her face; parts of her face were soaked with blood. She tied her chunni (head-scarf) on her head and crawled to the main road. She tried to thumb a lift from a number of vehicles passing by, but none stopped. After sometime, a car came from Chamba side and on seeing her it stopped. She requested the driver to take her to any place for medical help. The driver of the car asked her to recognize the occupants sitting on the rear seat and she was surprised to find that even Baldev accused-respondent was one of the passengers. She feigned ignorance and did not recognize the accused as she was paralyzed with fear. The accused talked to the driver and then the driver and his companion ran towards Banikhet. The accused-respondent then came out of the car and asked her a few questions as to whether she was able to recognize him. She stated that she could not recognize him as at that time she was gripped with fear. Thereafter, he gave 2/3 fist blows on her head and ran towards Banikhet. After sometime, the driver of the car came there with his companions namely Sanjay, Chhinda, Tejinder and one constable. She states that names of the passengers were disclosed to her by Tejinder Singh later on. She was taken to Police Post, Banikhet. Thereafter, she was taken to the dispensary for medical treatment. The next day, she was taken to Dalhousie hospital and her statement Ext.PA was recorded which she admitted to be correct. She states that she was wearing a coca-cola colour dress, artificial jewellary consisting of one necklace, ear rings, sandals and purse containing ` 1800/-. Her clothes were blood stained, sandals were lying at the spot and her purse was with the accused. Her shirt, salwar and duppata etc. were taken into possession by the police. On 3.6.2000 she took the police to the spot of occurrence. PW2 Satpal was also present there. Certain recoveries were made from the spot. She proved the seizures and samples etc. Her shirt, salwar and duppata etc. were taken into possession by the police. On 3.6.2000 she took the police to the spot of occurrence. PW2 Satpal was also present there. Certain recoveries were made from the spot. She proved the seizures and samples etc. She had injuries on her head, right cheek, lips, eyes and throat. She states that the accused behaved with her in this manner because he was having illicit relations with his sister-in-law and she had seen them in an objectionable and compromising state. She had warned the accused that she would not tolerate this behaviour but he had informed her that he would continue with such relationship. In cross examination, she stated that she is the only sister of five brothers. She admitted having filed a divorce petition against the accused at Gurdaspur and in that petition she had instructed her counsel to plead about the illicit relations of the accused with her sister-in-law. She says that she learnt about this state of affairs about 25-30 days after her marriage with the accused. She says that probably her statement was recorded twice. Firstly she was taken from the spot to the police post but at that time she could not talk much because of her injured condition. She had informed the police about the telephone numbers of her brothers etc. who had thereafter been contacted by them. Her elder brother Daya Ram had come about 5.30 AM in the morning. She could not disclose the names and identity of the persons whom she had met for the reason that till she reached Banikhet she was not able to recognize these persons. The accused was searching for her and had also accompanied her to the dispensary at Banikhet. She states that when Sanjay etc. met her she told that somebody had beaten her up but she did not name the accused because of fear of retaliation and being thrashed again. 4. PW2 Satpal states that on 2.6.2000 he had visited Civil Hospital, Dalhousie and in his presence Sarishtha Devi produced her blood stained clothes which consisted of her shirt, salwar, dupatta and brazier which were taken into possession by the police and sealed in his presence. 5. 4. PW2 Satpal states that on 2.6.2000 he had visited Civil Hospital, Dalhousie and in his presence Sarishtha Devi produced her blood stained clothes which consisted of her shirt, salwar, dupatta and brazier which were taken into possession by the police and sealed in his presence. 5. PW3 Bachan Singh stated that on 3.6.2000 he alongwith the police, complainant Sarishtha Devi, Prithi Chand driver visited Samra where some recoveries of one pair of sandals, pen, one plastic bangle, one stick stained with blood and hair were made. 6. PW4 Tej Partap Singh, photographer says that he was associated with the investigation and had taken the photographs of the spot. PW5 Tejinder Singh stated that he was a taxi driver. He says that on 31.5.2000 he had gone to Pathankot for getting his taxi repaired. On 31st night at around 9 PM he started from Pathankot to Chamba. He was all alone in the taxi and reached near Banikhet at 11.30 PM and when he reached at Sukrain Bain, 3 Km. from Banikhet, he saw one lady standing on the spot who signaled the taxi to stop. Her face was soaked with blood and he did not stop the taxi as he thought that it was apparition of a ghost (churel) and he sped on. He reached Goli which was at a distance of 4 Km. from Sukrain Bain where he met a “tyre-man”, (a person who repairs tyres) and he told him that he had seen some lady soaked with blood standing on the road side and he asked this man to accompany him so that he could confirm whether she was actually a human being or a ghost. When they reached the spot, they saw the lady standing there and she boarded the taxi at which the “tyre-man” fled from there. He says that he does not know the name of that person. He also ran from the spot and reached Banikhet by thumbing a lift in the truck. Then he went to his friend Sanjay and both of them went to the Police Post, Banikhet. Thereafter they went to one Inderjit @ Chhinda and all of them came to Sukrain Bain in the van. He then asked this lady what had happened to her but she insisted that she should be taken to the hospital first. Then he went to his friend Sanjay and both of them went to the Police Post, Banikhet. Thereafter they went to one Inderjit @ Chhinda and all of them came to Sukrain Bain in the van. He then asked this lady what had happened to her but she insisted that she should be taken to the hospital first. They took her to Police Post, Banikhet where she stated that she had sustained injuries as she had fallen down. At that time, one unidentified person appeared in the Police Post and the lady stated that he was her husband. The police inquired from this lady as to whether she was beaten up by her husband to which her answer was in the negative. Thereafter, she was taken to the hospital where she communicated some telephone numbers to him and his friend. At this stage, this witness was declared hostile as had resiled from his previous statement. He was cross examined by the Public Prosecutor. He admits that the husband of the lady never told as to from where he had come from. He admitted Ext.PG (Rapat No. 20) which was lodged by him stating that at around 1.30 AM at night he alongwith Inderjeet Singh, son of Chattar Singh, resident of Pukhari and Sanjay Kumar, son of Sh. Jai Gopal, resident of Banikhet in the presence of accused were present in Police Post. He stated that he was resident of Chamba and that he is owner of a maruti van bearing registration No. HP-48-5712. On 1.6.2000 he was returning from Pathankot after having the van serviced. At around 11.30 PM when he reached Bokhari he saw one lady soaked with blood standing on the side of the road, who signaled him to stop, but since it was late night, he was scared and did not respond to the signal. 7. PW8 Waryam Chand, Member of Gram Panchayat, Kalachak is the witness to the recovery of motor cycle. PW9 Dr. Manju Mittal is an important witness. She states that she remained at Civil Hospital, Dalhousie since March, 1996. On 2.6.2000 one Sharishtha Devi was brought to the hospital by the police. She had been referred by the Public Health Centre, Banikhet. The police had moved an application for recording her statement. PW9 Dr. Manju Mittal is an important witness. She states that she remained at Civil Hospital, Dalhousie since March, 1996. On 2.6.2000 one Sharishtha Devi was brought to the hospital by the police. She had been referred by the Public Health Centre, Banikhet. The police had moved an application for recording her statement. She states that since she (complainant) had been injected with medicine Fortwin (a sedative drug), she was not fit to give any statement. She was declared fit to give statement at 5.45 PM on the same day. She proved on record Ext.PL and Ext.PL/1. Ext.PL/1 which was in the hand writing of the Doctor stating:- “as injection fortwinis being given to patient. Pt. is not able to give the statement. Sd/- 2.6.2K at 12.15 PM Pt. is still under the effect of injection. Sd/- 2.6.2K at 3.20 PM Pt. is fit to give statement Sd/- 2.6.2K at 5.45 PM” 8. PW10 Dr. Vinay Patyal, was the Medical Officer/Incharge of Public Health Centre, Banikhet and it is his statement which will assume importance. He was called twice. On 5.3.2001, he stated that the record was not available and therefore, his examination was deferred. On 18.8.2001 he was again examined as a witness on behalf of the prosecution. He says that on 2.6.2000, at about 2 AM in the night he examined Shrishtha Devi complainant and found the following injuries: 1. Injury to upper incissor and canine upper jaw. 2. A lacerated wound right angle of mouth. Wound is irregular in shape, which was 3 Cms. X 2 cms. 3. A lacerated wounds on right cheek which were 2 x 1 cms and other was 2 x ½ cms. 4. Black eye right side with hammourage in soft issue around eye and in eyelid i.e. spectacle haematoma. 5. Bruises on front and lateral side of the neck with swelling. She was referred to the Zonal hospital, Chamba for expert opinion of dental surgeon, Radiologist and eye surgeon. According to him, injury No. 1 was grievous according to the dental surgeon and probable duration of the injury was also 4 to 5 hours. He proved on record MLC Ext.PJ/1 detailing these injuries. He also examined Baldev Singh on that day at 5 AM in the morning and found the following injuries: 1. Scratches three in nos. on extensor aspect left hand about 3 inches distal to wrist. 2. He proved on record MLC Ext.PJ/1 detailing these injuries. He also examined Baldev Singh on that day at 5 AM in the morning and found the following injuries: 1. Scratches three in nos. on extensor aspect left hand about 3 inches distal to wrist. 2. Scratches terminal part right little finger, extensor aspect and medial side. 3. Scratches two in nos. on left side of face below eye. 4. Scratch terminal phalanx left thumb. 9. He opined these injuries to be simple and probable duration was 5 to 6 hours. He says that injuries on Baldev Singh had been caused by sharp object such as teeth and finger nails and these are possible if a lady makes an attempt to free herself from the clutches of her aggressor. Ext.PX is the MLC of Baldev Singh which was issued and written by him. According to him, the injuries in Ext.PJ/1 (MLC of the complainant) are not possible if a person puts his own hand in his/her mouth. But these are possible if a person strikes with a fist and then forcibly inserts his hand in the mouth of the victim. Application Ext.PP was submitted to him by PW15 ASI Joga Singh on which he recorded his opinion Ext.PP stating “Pt. unfit for statement. Sd/- 5.00 AM 2.6.2000” The opinion was written in his hand. His opinion was sought with respect to the injuries on which vide Ext.PQ he has recorded his opinion Ext.PQ/1 which reads: “As noted in MLC report injury No.1is grevious in nature. Injury No. 5 i.e. bruises on front and lateral sides of neck are simple, but neck is a delicate part and excess force applied could lead to strangulation & death. Sd/-“ He says that injuries sustained by hitting or fist blows would be similar to those sustained by blunt edged weapon. In cross examination, he admits that injury Nos. 1 and 5 were added later on in MLC Ext.PJ/1, but these were noticed by him at the time of examination. He admits that unless the trachea is pressed for a particular duration of time with calibrated force, only then it would result in death. He says that without judging the colour of the scratches on the person of the accused, it was not possible to give the duration. He admits that unless the trachea is pressed for a particular duration of time with calibrated force, only then it would result in death. He says that without judging the colour of the scratches on the person of the accused, it was not possible to give the duration. In his cross examination, he admits that injury No. 1 and 5 were added in the MLC at a later point of time but had been noticed by him at the time of examination. He continues and states: “…..It is correct that the entries in MLC of Sarista Devi Ext.PJ/1 pertaining to injury Nos. 1, 4and 5 which I have made on the carbon copy, were also later on made in the original MLC at the time of submission of the MLC. It is incorrect that I incorporated entries in the MLC Ext.PJ/1 pertaining to injuries nos. 1, 4 and 5 later on. Self stated that the entries were made at one and same time….” He also admits that in the medical examination of Shrishatha Devi, there is cutting in the serial number of the injuries, where injury No. 1 has been described as injury No. 2, injury No. 2 as 3, 3 as 4 and 5 has been written by him in his own hand. He admits the discrepancy in the date of MLC of Baldev Singh (Ext.PO) where at the top the date has been mentioned as 2.6.2000 at 5 AM whereas at the bottom as 6.6.2000. He admits that when he prepared Ext.PJ/1 in the original, he did not mention injury Nos. 1 and 5; there were cuttings in the serial number mentioned against these injuries where their sequential numbering has been changed. 10. We now advert to the evidence of PW17 Inspector Khub Ram SHO, Police Station, Dalhousie. On 2.6.2000 he received ruka Ext.PA on which basis FIR Ext.PT was recorded. He took over the investigation from PW15 ASI Joga Singh. He went to Dalhousie hospital where the complainant was admitted for medical treatment and management and took into possession the blood stained clothes etc. He took a personal search of the accused-respondent and went to the spot where recovery of chappal etc. was made. 11. PW15 ASI Joga Singh states that he was posted as Incharge of Police Post, Banikhet. He went to Dalhousie hospital where the complainant was admitted for medical treatment and management and took into possession the blood stained clothes etc. He took a personal search of the accused-respondent and went to the spot where recovery of chappal etc. was made. 11. PW15 ASI Joga Singh states that he was posted as Incharge of Police Post, Banikhet. On 2.6.2000 at around 1-30 AM PW5 Tejinder Singh alongwith Inderjeet Singh, Sanjay Kumar, complainant Shrishtha Devi and her husband Baldev came to Police Post, Banikhet where daily dairy No. 20 dated 2.6.2000 was recorded by him on the basis of the statement made by Tejinder Singh, PW5. Statement Ext.PG was explained and read over to the witness. He admitted the same to be correct and signed it in his presence. Application Ext.PN was submitted by him to the Medical Officer, Primary Health Centre, Banikhet for getting the complainant and her husband examined and MLCs Ext.PJ/1 and Ext.PO of the complainant and her husband Baldev respectively were handed over to him. He wanted to record the statement of Shrishtha Devi complainant but since she was not in a fit condition, it could not be recorded. He says that Ext.PA statement of Shrishtha Devi was recorded by him and sent to Police Station, Dalhousie for recording FIR. This forms the basis for criminal prosecution against the accused. He states in cross examination that during the period when the accused was in hospital at Police Post Banikhet, he asked the accused a number of questions, but found his answers to be unsatisfactory and evasive. He had thus reason to believe that the respondent/accused was not speaking the truth. He submitted an application Ext.PP to the Medical Officer, Primary Health Centre, Banikhet seeking the opinion of doctor as to whether the complainant was in a fit state to give statement or not. The doctor stated that she was unfit. On 13.6.2000 application Ext.PQ was submitted to the Primary Health Centre for opinion of the doctor as to whether the injuries were dangerous to life or not. This is the major part of the evidence which we have to consider and which forms the core of the prosecution case. We may not advert to the other evidence in detail which can be described as formal. This is the major part of the evidence which we have to consider and which forms the core of the prosecution case. We may not advert to the other evidence in detail which can be described as formal. We will consider it in order to see as to whether the conclusions arrived at by the learned trial Court are correct or not. 12. On a broad conspectus of the evidence, it is the evidence of PW1 Shrishtha Devi, PW5 Tejinder Singh driver of the taxi, PW10 Dr. Vinay Patial, PW15 Joga Singh and PW17 Shri Khub Ram SHO which constitutes the mainstay of the prosecution case. The learned trial Court on consideration of the evidence which we have noted above holds that there are several infirmities, contradictions and improvements in the evidence of the prosecution. The first infirmity is (a) that there is no mention in Ext.PT which is the FIR that the accused was having illicit relations with his sister-in-law whereas the complainant states this fact for the first time in the Court; (b) there is delay of more than seventeen hours in recording the First Information Report, which has not been satisfactorily explained; (c) the respondent was not named as an accused when he was present alongwith other persons in Police Post, Banikhet; (d) PW15 Joga Singh states that brother of the complainant arrived at Banikhet on the morning of 2.6.2000 and the story was changed when the respondent was named as the accused for the first time; (e) ASI Joga Singh PW15 did not record the statements of Sanjay Kumar, Inderjeet Singh and Shrishtha Devi; (f) did not examine the “tyre-man” and Chhinda when they were present in Police Post coupled with the fact that Tejinder Singh PW5 was declared hostile and relying on a part of his testimony which consists that of the fact that complainant Sharishtha Devi was not in shock or depression and was talking normally. The cuttings and over-writing tampering in MLC Ext.PJ/1 as admitted by PW10 Dr. Vinay Patial who admitted that injuries No. 1 and 5 were inserted subsequently and that these injuries could be caused by fall. 13. It was urged that Ext.PO shows two different dates of the examination of the respondent-accused namely 2.6.2000 and 6.6.2000 for which there is no explanation. Vinay Patial who admitted that injuries No. 1 and 5 were inserted subsequently and that these injuries could be caused by fall. 13. It was urged that Ext.PO shows two different dates of the examination of the respondent-accused namely 2.6.2000 and 6.6.2000 for which there is no explanation. The complainant alongwith 4-5 persons reached Police Post Banikhet in the late night hours on 2.6.2000 but ruka was sent next day late in the evening at 6.25 PM and the accused was arrested at 8 PM. The accused was throughout present in Police Post Banikhet but no action was taken. The cumulative effect of these major contradictions which are fundamental to the very basis of the case, itself establishes that the respondent has been falsely roped in at the behest of the complainant and her brother. 14. At the outset, we do note with consternation that PW10 Dr. Vinay Patial has displayed a callous and lackadaisical attitude in discharge of his duties. We say this because his evidence is not consistent and we note, in his cross examination, that he admits that injury Nos. 1 and 5 namely injury to upper incisor and canine upper jaw and bruises on front and lateral side of the neck with swelling were added later on though these were noticed at the time of examination. He then says that entries in MLC Ext.PJ/1 have been made on the carbon copy, but later on added in the original MLC. We refer to the exact portion of his cross examination: “………It is correct that injuries no. 5 and 1 was added later on in the MLC of Sarishta Devi, but the same were noticed at the time of examination. ……..It is correct that the entries in MLC of Sarista Devi Ex.PJ/1 pertaining to injury Nos. 1, 4 and 5 which I have made on the carbon copy, were also lateron made in the original MLC at the time of submission of MLC.” 15. There is no explanation as to why this course of action was adopted by him. We do not suggest any motive of this witness to implicate the accused since none has been established on record, but nonetheless we express our anguish at the casual manner in which he conducted the medical examination by not recording the MLC in one go but adding certain injuries later on in the original MLC as produced on record. We do not suggest any motive of this witness to implicate the accused since none has been established on record, but nonetheless we express our anguish at the casual manner in which he conducted the medical examination by not recording the MLC in one go but adding certain injuries later on in the original MLC as produced on record. There is no explanation on behalf of the prosecution on this aspect. 16. Now we advert to the other evidence on record and that is of the complainant. It is her evidence which we have to consider in terms of corroboration of the eye witnesses as also of the doctor. She is the victim in the present case. The point for consideration before us is as to whether the statement of the injured/complainant can be relied upon or has to be discarded when considered as a whole. In Appabhai and another vs. State of Gujarat AIR 1988 SC 696 the Supreme Court holds: “13…….It is true that there are many contradictions in the evidence of Devji. He has not attributed overt acts to individual accused in his statement before the police whereas he has attributed such overt acts in his evidence before the Court. But that is no ground to reject his entire testimony. It must not be forgotten that he was a victim of the assault. Fortunately he has survived. He must, therefore, be considered as the best eye-witness. The Court while appreciating the evidence must not attach undue importance to minor discrepancies. The discrepancies which do not shake the basic version of the prosecution case may be discarded. The discrepancies which are due to normal errors of perception or observation should not be given importance. The errors due to lapse of memory may be given due allowance. The Court by calling into aid its vast experience of men and matters in different cases must evaluate the entire material on record by excluding the exaggerated version given by any witness. When a doubt arises in respect of certain facts alleged by such witness, the proper course is to ignore that fact only unless it goes into the root of the matter so as to demolish the entire prosecution story. The witnesses nowadays go on adding embellishments to their version perhaps for the fear of their testimony being rejected by the court. The witnesses nowadays go on adding embellishments to their version perhaps for the fear of their testimony being rejected by the court. The courts, however, should not disbelieve the evidence of such witnesses altogether if they are otherwise trustworthy. Jaganmohan Raddy, J. speaking for this court in Sohrab v State of Madhya Pradesh 1972 Cri.LJ 1302 at 1305 : ( AIR 1972 SC 2020 at p. 2024) observed: “This Court has held that falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not a sound rule for the reason that hardly one comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or embellishments. In most cases, the witnesses when asked about details venture to give some answer, not necessarily true or relevant for fear that their evidence may not be accepted in respect of the main incident which they have witnessed but that is not to say that their evidence as to the salient features of the cases after cautious scrutiny cannot be considered.” 14. In Bharwada Bhogibhai Hirjibhai v.State of Gujara (1983) 3 SCR 280 at p. 287 : ( AIR 1983 SC 753 at p. 756) M.L. Thakkar, J. observed: “A witness though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross examination made by counsel and out of nervousness mix up facts, get confused regarding sequence of events, or fill up details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The sub-conscious mind of the witness sometimes so operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him-perhaps it is a sort of a psychological defence mechanism activated on the spur of the moment.” “Discrepancies which do not go to the root of the matter and shake the basic version of the witnesses therefore cannot be annexed with undue importance. More so when the a important “probabilities-factor”achoes in favour of the version narrated by the witnesses.” (at p. 700) This princ i ple finds reaffirmation in State of U.P. vs. Brahma Das, AIR 1986 SC 1769 . In Malkhan Singh and another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1975 SC 12 the Supreme Court holds:- “6. More so when the a important “probabilities-factor”achoes in favour of the version narrated by the witnesses.” (at p. 700) This princ i ple finds reaffirmation in State of U.P. vs. Brahma Das, AIR 1986 SC 1769 . In Malkhan Singh and another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1975 SC 12 the Supreme Court holds:- “6. …….It is difficult to believe that an injured person would spare his real assailant and falsely involve another person as one responsible for causing him injury. The fact that Munshi Lal was seen holding a pistol in his hand by Jai Narain immediately after being short at goes to show that it was Munish Lal who had fired the shot at Jai Narain. Munish Lal was also identified near the Galss Works by Radhey Shyam when Jai Narain raised an alarm. The conduct of Munshi Lal in then running away to arhar field lends further assurance to the inference of his complicity. In the circumstances, we find no sufficient ground to interfere with the conviction of Munshi Lal.” (atp.13) 17. In Ram Janam v. State of U.P. AIR 1979 SC 1507 the Supreme Court holds that the evidence of the witness, who grappled with the accused and received injuries, could not disbelieved. In Surendra Singh Rautela @ Surendra Singh Bengali v. State of Bihar (Now State of Jharkhand) AIR 2002 SC 260 the Court holds that the injured witness cannot be disbelieved merely because another eye witness does not support the case of prosecution and has been declared hostile. 18. We are also conscious to the decision of the Supreme Court in Sudhir and another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1985 SC 515 stating that when evidence of the injured witness who was the victim contains so many infirmities then acquittal is the only possible course left to the Courts. 19. In the present case, the evidence of the complainant and that of Tejinder Singh PW5 has to be considered. We note that the complainant states that she was taken to the culvert and then assaulted by the respondent as a result of which she sustained serious injuries. She has given a graphic and vivid description of the manner in which the assault was carried out. Resultantly, she fainted and when she regained consciousness when it was late night. She came to the road side signaling passing cars/other vehicles for help. She has given a graphic and vivid description of the manner in which the assault was carried out. Resultantly, she fainted and when she regained consciousness when it was late night. She came to the road side signaling passing cars/other vehicles for help. PW5 Tejinder Singh who was travelling on this road at around 11.30 PM and when he reached Sukrain Bain which is at a distance of 3 Km. from Banikhet, he saw the complainant, whom he identified as one lady, standing on the road side signaling him to stop. He fled from the spot thinking that she was a ghostly apparition or Churel. He gives a detailed description when he states that he saw her face soaked with blood. He drove 4 Km. down the road and there he met a “tyre-man” (person engaged in repair of tyres) and requested him to accompany him to the spot to ascertain as to whether this lady was in fact a human being or a ghost which he had seen. He says that when he reached at Sukrain Bain, she was still standing there and she immediately boarded the taxi. He and the tyre-man fled from the spot and thumbed a lift in a truck to Banikhet. Then he went to his friend Sanjay and both of them went to Police Post Banikhet and thereafter with one Inderjit @ Chhinda they came to Sukhrain Bain in one vehicle. Thereafter, he questioned her as to what had happened to her, on which she replied that first she should be taken to the hospital. Thereafter she was taken to Banikhet hospital (again stated to Police Police, Banikhet) where she stated that she had fallen down and she had sustained injuries. At this time, one person came to Police Post and she stated that this person is her husband. The police then asked her as to whether she had been beaten up by her husband, she replied in the negative. At this juncture, he was declared hostile. The reason is obvious since he has stated in examination in chief that this lady had herself stated to the Investigating Officer that she had fallen down and sustained injuries. He denied that his statement was recorded by the police. At this juncture, he was declared hostile. The reason is obvious since he has stated in examination in chief that this lady had herself stated to the Investigating Officer that she had fallen down and sustained injuries. He denied that his statement was recorded by the police. He says that he stopped the taxi about 10 feet from the spot where the complainant was standing whereupon she came there and sat on the front seat as the door of car was not locked. He further continues that “jab doshi police post Banikhet main aya, to usne ek bhi shabad na kaha.” (Translation: when the accused reached the Police Post at Banikhet, he did not utter even a single word.) He did not see any mark of injury on the person of accused. He then admits that he is stating first time whatever he has stated in examination in chief. Ext.PG which is the rapat roznamcha recorded on the statement of PW5 Tajinder Singh has been admitted by him to be correct. He states: “maine Ext.PG ko sun liya hai. Iska hissa ‘A’ to ‘A’ theek hai.Jab aurat mujhemili to vah dari va ghabrai huie na thi aur vah samanay roop mein baaten kar rahi thi. Maine use na puchha tha ki vah Sukrain Bain kaise pahunchi. Maine use yah bhi na puchha tha ki yah kaise giri aurkaise use choten aaei.Maine use yah bhina pucha ki vah kiske saath vahan aaie thi. Main doshi se yah na puchha tha ki vah police post Banikhet mein kaise pahuncha.” (Translation: I have heard the contents of Ext.PG. Portion A to A is correct. When I met the woman, she was not scared and was talking in normal tones. I did not ask her how she reached Sukrain Bain. I did not ask her how she had fallen down. I did not ask her as to with whom she had come. I did not ask the accused as to how he reached Police Post Banikhet.” 20. PW5 Tejinder Singh denies having been made the statement to the police. Rather, he goes to the extent of stating that the lady was perfectly normal, she was not in shock or depression and when she talked to him, she was talking normally, though he continues that he did not ask her how she had fallen down. 21. PW5 Tejinder Singh denies having been made the statement to the police. Rather, he goes to the extent of stating that the lady was perfectly normal, she was not in shock or depression and when she talked to him, she was talking normally, though he continues that he did not ask her how she had fallen down. 21. PW15 ASI Joga Singh (wrongly described as PW16 in vernacular) states that on 2.6.2000 at 1.30 in the night Tejinder Singh PW5, Inderjit Singh, Sanjay Kumar, injured-complainant Sharishtha Devi and her husband Baldev Singh came to Police Post, Banikhet. Statement of Tejin der Singh was recorded in daily diary at S r . No. 20. The statement was read over to him. He then says that rapat roznamch a Ext.P G was correctly record ed more especially portion ‘A’ to ‘A’ which gives the narration of the incident about Tejinder Singh stating about the accused standing on the road side , asking for a lift. The portion reads: “jab main Devi Dehra pahuncha to ek shakhash bag uthaye huae khada tha, jisne mujhe haath diya, maine van roki to usne Chamba jaane ke liye lift mangi jis par main oose sath lekar Goli pahuncha. Hotel mein khana khane ko ruka, to hamrahi vayakti ne mujhe batlaya ki yah ghar se akela aaya hai. Maine jab dhaba par aur logon ko aurat kee baat sunai to hamrahi vayakti ne apna naam Baldev Singh uprokat batlaya aur kahne laga ki vah aurat meri hai jiska naam Shreshta Devi hai. Mujhe uske pass chhod ke aaow jis par main apne sath Goli se tyre-man ko lekar Baldev Singh ko apni van mein lekar vaapis us aurat ke paas Bokhari moad aaya to vah aurat Shreshtha Devi Bokhari moad maujood na paai. Jo jis kee ta ash par Banikhet kee taraf aaye to Shreshtha Devi padel chal kar Sukrain Bain aa rahi thi. Maine van ko roka tatha Baldev gaadi se uttar kar Shreshtha Devi ko van mein bitha diya tatha khud side mein khada ho gaya. Main va tyre-man dar gaye. Gaddi van ko vahi chhod kar Banikhet se Inderjit va Sanjay Kumar ko lekar Sukrain Bain ki taraf jaa rahe the to Baldev Singh bataraf Banikhet Vakunthnagar aa raha tha. Jisko saath lekar Shreshtha Devi ko Sukrain Bain se hajir chowki aaya hai. Karayvahi kee jaaye. Sd/-Tejinder Singh. Main va tyre-man dar gaye. Gaddi van ko vahi chhod kar Banikhet se Inderjit va Sanjay Kumar ko lekar Sukrain Bain ki taraf jaa rahe the to Baldev Singh bataraf Banikhet Vakunthnagar aa raha tha. Jisko saath lekar Shreshtha Devi ko Sukrain Bain se hajir chowki aaya hai. Karayvahi kee jaaye. Sd/-Tejinder Singh. Karrarvai police-hasab aayda sayal ki report uske kahe anusar likhi jaakar majkura ko padkar sunai va samjhai gai. Jisne darusat maante hue jer report khud apne hastaakshar kiye hain.” (Translation:- When I reached Devi Dehra, I saw one person who was standing there with a bag and signaled me to stop. When I stopped the van, he asked me for a lift to go to Chamba and then I took him upto Goli. We stopped at a hotel for dinner. Then this person told me that he had come all alone. When I told the other people sitting in the hotel about the lady, then this person disclosed his name as Baldev Singh and stated that she is his wife, whose name is Sharishtha Devi. He asked me to be taken to her upon which I took a “tyre-man” from Goli and Baldev Singh in the van to the spot where I had seen the lady at Bokhari curve. I did not find her there. We then proceeded in her search towards Banikhet side and saw that Sharishtha was walking towards Sukrain Bain. I stopped the van and Baldev alighted from the van. He seated Sharishtha Devi in the van and stood by its side. I and tyre-man got scared. We left the van there and got Inderjit and Sanjay from Banikhet and returned the Sukrain Bain. We saw Baldev Singh coming towards Banikhet Vakunthnagar. We took him and Sharishtha Devi from Sukrain Bain to the police chowki. Action may be taken.” 22. He states that Baldev Singh did not give any satisfactory answer as to how he and his wife had sustained injuries. He proves Ext.PN application submitted by him for medical examination of the complainant and her husband-accused. He says that complainant Shrishtha Devi was not in a fit condition to give any statement. He states that Ext.PA was recorded by him according to what has been stated by Shrishtha Devi and that she signed it. Thereafter further proceedings were initiated. He proves Ext.PN application submitted by him for medical examination of the complainant and her husband-accused. He says that complainant Shrishtha Devi was not in a fit condition to give any statement. He states that Ext.PA was recorded by him according to what has been stated by Shrishtha Devi and that she signed it. Thereafter further proceedings were initiated. In cross examination, he admits that he did not record the statement of Sanjay Kumar, Inderjit and that it was not possible that statement of Shrishtha Devi could be recorded as she could not understand what she was saying. 23. The other witnesses are related to the recovery of motor cycle and articles etc. belonging to the injured-complainant. We advert to the submissions made on behalf of the parties, but before that, we will preface the judgments on the principles of law applicable in appreciation of evidence, the power of this Court in appeal and to assess the credibility of evidence. 24. In Sangappa and others vs. State of Karnataka AIR 2010 SC 977 the Supreme Court holds: “9. We must express our reservation for the manner in which the High Court disposed of the appeal under Section 378(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is true that in an appeal from acquittal the High Court has full power to re-appreciate and re-assess the entire evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded and then to come to its own conclusion. There is no limitation placed on that power of the High Court. The Code makes no difference in the power of the appellate court, between appeal filed by the State or by other person but the appellate court would not be justified merely because it, feels that a different view should be taken for reasons which are not so strong. This Court repeatedly held that the High Court in exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reaching its conclusion upon facts, it shall give always proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the view of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that they have been acquitted at trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt.” ( at pp.978 & 979) 25. This follows the principles/precedent of the Court in Kallu alias Masih and others vs. State of M.P. (2006)10 SCC 313 holding: “8. While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the appellate Court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals, the power exists to review the entire evidence. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible. The appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further, if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial court.” (at p. 317 & 318) In K. Prakashan vs. P.K. Surenderan, (2008)1 SCC 258 the Supreme Court further held: “22. It is now trite that if two views are possible, the appellate court shall not reverse a judgment of acquittal only because another view is possible to be taken. The appellate Court’s jurisdiction to interfere is limited. (See M.S. Narayana Menonand Mohadeo Laxman Sarane V. State of Maharashtra (2007)12 SCC 705 ). The High Court furthermore has not met the reasons of the learned trial Judge. It proceeded on the premise that the appellant had not been able to discharge his burden of proof in terms of Section 139 of the Act without posing unto itself a further question as to how the said burden of proof can be discharged. It furthermore did not take into consideration the legal principle that the standard of proof upon a prosecution and upon an accused is different.” (at p. 267) 26. We are aware of these limitations and would be proceeding on these lines. But at the same time, we are also conscious of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in a number of cases and we advert to the decision of Zahira Babibullah H. Sheikh and another vs. State of Gujarat 2004(4)SCC 158 holding: “35. We are aware of these limitations and would be proceeding on these lines. But at the same time, we are also conscious of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in a number of cases and we advert to the decision of Zahira Babibullah H. Sheikh and another vs. State of Gujarat 2004(4)SCC 158 holding: “35. This Court has often emphasized that in a criminal case the fate of the proceedings cannot always be left entirely in the hands of the parties, crimes being public wrongs in breach and violation of public rights and duties, which affect the whole community as a community and harmful to the society in general. The concept of fair trial entails familiar triangulation of interests of the accused, the victim and the society and it is the community that acts through the State and prosecuting agencies. Interests of society is not to be treated completely with disdain and as persona non grata. Courts have always been considered to have an over-riding duty to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice - often referred to as the duty to vindicate and uphold the 'majesty of the law'. Due administration of justice has always been viewed as a continuous process, not confined to determination of the particular case, protecting its ability to function as a Court of law in the future as in the case before it. If a criminal Court is to be an effective instrument in dispensing justice, the Presiding Judge must cease to be a spectator and a mere recording machine by becoming a participant in the trial evincing intelligence, active interest and elicit all relevant materials necessary for reaching the correct conclusion, to find out the truth, and administer justice with fairness and impartiality both to the parties and to the community it serves. Courts administering criminal justice cannot turn a blind eye to vexatious or oppressive conduct that has occurred in relation to proceedings, even if a fair trial is still possible, except at the risk of undermining the fair name and standing of the judges as impartial and independent adjudicators. 36…………………..There can be no analytical, all comprehensive or exhaustive definition of the concept of a fair trial, and it may have to be determined in seemingly infinite variety of actual situations with the ultimate object in mind viz. 36…………………..There can be no analytical, all comprehensive or exhaustive definition of the concept of a fair trial, and it may have to be determined in seemingly infinite variety of actual situations with the ultimate object in mind viz. whether something that was done or said either before or at the trial deprived the quality of fairness to a degree where a miscarriage of justice has resulted. It will not be correct to say that it is only the accused who must be fairly dealt with. That would be turning Nelson's eyes to the needs of the society at large and the victims or their family members and relatives. Each one has an inbuilt right to be dealt with fairly in a criminal trial. Denial of a fair trial is as much injustice to the accused as is to the victim and the society. Fair trial obviously would mean a trial before an impartial Judge, a fair prosecutor and atmosphere of judicial calm. Fair trial means a trial in which bias or prejudice for or against the accused, the witnesses, or the cause which is being tried is eliminated. If the witnesses get threatened or are forced to give false evidence that also would not result in a fair trial. The failure to hear material witnesses is certainly denial of fair trial. 68……………….Criminal trials should not be reduced to be mock trials or shadow-boxing or fixed trials. Judicial criminal administration system must be kept clean and beyond the reach of whimsical political wills or agendas and properly insulated from discriminatory standards or yardsticks of the type prohibited by the mandate of the Constitution.” (P.184 &197). At the same time, the Court also cautions: “61. In the case of a defective investigation the Court has to be circumspect in evaluating the evidence and may have to adopt an active and analytical role to ensure that truth is found by having recourse to Section 311 or at a later stage also resorting to Section 391 instead of throwing hands in the air in despair. It would not be right in acquirring an accused person solely on account of the defect; to do so would tantamount to playing into the hands of the investigating officer if the investigation is designedly defective. (See Karnel Singh v. State of M.P. ( 1995 (5) SCC 518 ). 62. In Paras Yadav and Ors. It would not be right in acquirring an accused person solely on account of the defect; to do so would tantamount to playing into the hands of the investigating officer if the investigation is designedly defective. (See Karnel Singh v. State of M.P. ( 1995 (5) SCC 518 ). 62. In Paras Yadav and Ors. v. State of Bihar ( 1999 (2) SCC 126 ) it was held that if the lapse or omission is committed by the investigating agency designedly or because of negligence the prosecution evidence is required to be examined de hors such omissions to find out whether the said evidence is reliable or not. The contaminated conduct of officials should not stand on the way of Courts getting at the truth by having recourse to Sections 311, 391 of the Code and Section 165 of the Evidence Act at the appropriate and relevant stages and evaluating the entire evidence; otherwise the designed mischief would be perpetuated with a premium to the offenders and justice would not only be denied to the complainant party but also made an ultimate casualty. 63. As was observed in Ram Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar and Ors. ( 1998 (4) SCC 517 ) if primacy is given to such designed or negligent investigation, to the omission or lapses by perfunctory investigation or omissions, the faith and confidence of the people would be shaken not only in the Law enforcing agency but also in the administration of justice in the hands of Courts. The view was again reiterated in Amar Singh v. Balwinder Singh and Ors. ( 2003 (2) SCC 518 ). 64. It is no doubt true that the accused persons have been acquitted by the trial Court and the acquittal has been upheld, but if the acquittal is unmerited and based on tainted evidence, tailored investigation, unprincipled prosecutor and perfunctory trial and evidence of threatened/terrorized witnesses, it is no acquittal in the eye of law and no sanctity or credibility can be attached and given to the so-called findings. It seems to be nothing but a travesty of truth, fraud on legal process and the resultant decisions of Courts -coram non judis and nonest. There is, therefore, every justification to call for interference in these appeals.” (Pp.195 & 196). 27. Adverting to the established principles in criminal jurisprudence, the Court rules:- “30. It seems to be nothing but a travesty of truth, fraud on legal process and the resultant decisions of Courts -coram non judis and nonest. There is, therefore, every justification to call for interference in these appeals.” (Pp.195 & 196). 27. Adverting to the established principles in criminal jurisprudence, the Court rules:- “30. Right from the inception of the judicial system it has been accepted that discovery, vindication and establishment of truth are the main purposes underlying existence of Courts of justice. The operating principles for a fair trial permeate the common law in both civil and criminal contexts. Application of these principles involve a delicate judicial balancing of competing interests in a criminal trial, the interests of the accused and the public and to a great extent that of the victim have to be weighed not losing sight of the public interest involved in the prosecution of persons who commit offences............ 38. A criminal trial is a judicial examination of the issues in the case and its purpose is to alive at a judgment on an issue as a fact or relevant facts which may lead to the discovery of the fact issue and obtain proof of such facts at which the prosecution and the accused have arrived by their pleadings; the controlling question being the guilt or innocence of the accused. Since the object is to mete out justice and to convict the guilty and protect the innocent, the trial should be a search for the truth and not a bout over technicalities, and must be conducted under such rules as will protect the innocent, and punish the guilty. The proof of charge which has to be beyond reasonable doubt must depend upon judicial evaluation of the totality of the evidence, oral and circumstantial and not by an isolated scrutiny. ............. 40. The fair trial for a criminal offence consists not only in technical observance of the frame and forms of law, but also in recognition and just application of its principles in substance, to find out the truth and prevent miscarriage of justice......... 43. The Courts have to take a participatory role in a trial. They are not expected to be tape recorders to record whatever is being stated by the witnesses. 43. The Courts have to take a participatory role in a trial. They are not expected to be tape recorders to record whatever is being stated by the witnesses. Section 311 of the Code and Section 165 of the Evidence Act confer vast and wide powers on Presiding Officers of Court to elicit all necessary materials by playing an active role in the evidence collecting process. They have to monitor the proceedings in aid of justice in a manner that something, which is not relevant, is not unnecessarily brought into record. Even if the prosecutor is remiss in some ways, it can control the proceedings effectively so that ultimate objective i.e. truth is arrived at. This becomes more necessary where the Court has reasons to believe that the prosecuting agency or the prosecutor is not acting in the requisite manner. The Court cannot afford to be wishfully or pretend to beblissfully ignorant or oblivious to such serious pitfalls or dereliction of duty on the part of the prosecuting agency. The prosecutor who does not act fairly and acts more like a counsel for the defence is a liability to the fair judicial system, and Courts could not also play into the hands of such prosecuting agency showing indifference or adopting an attitude of total aloofness. 44. The power of the Court under Section 165 of the Evidence Act is in a way complementary to its power under Section 311 of the Code. The section consists of two parts i.e (i) giving a discretion to the Court to examine the witness at any stage and (ii) the mandatory portion which compels the Court to examine a witness if his evidence appears to be essential to the just decision of the Court. Though the discretion given to the Court is very wide, the very width requires a corresponding caution. In Mohan Lal .v. Union of India (1991 Supp (1) SCC 271) this Court has observed, while considering the scope and ambit of Section 311, that the very usage of the word such as, 'any Court' 'at any stage', or 'any enquiry or trial or other proceedings' 'any person' and 'any such person' clearly spells out that the Section has expressed in the widest possible terms and do not limit the discretion of the Court in any way. However, as noted above, the very width requires a corresponding caution that the discretionary powers should be invoked as the exigencies of justice require and exercised judicially with circumspection and consistently with the provisions of the Code. The second part of the section does not allow any discretion but obligates and binds the Court to take necessary steps if the fresh evidence to be obtained is essential to the just decision of the case -'essential', to an active and alert mind and not to one which is bent to abandon or abdicate. Object of the Section is to enable the Court to arrive at the truth irrespective of the fact that the prosecution or the defence has failed to produce some evidence which is necessary for a just and proper disposal of the case. The power is exercised and the evidence is examined neither to help the prosecution nor the defence, if the Court feels that there is necessity to act in terms of Section 311 but only to subserve the cause of justice and public interest. It is done with an object of getting the evidence in aid of a just decision and to uphold the truth…… 46. Ultimately, as noted above, ad nauseam the duty of the Court is to arrive at the truth and subserve the ends of justice. Section 311 of the Code does not confer any party any right to examine, cross-examine and re-examine any witness. This is a power given to the Court not to be merely exercised at the bidding of any one party/person but the powers conferred and discretion vested are to prevent any irretrievable or immeasurable damage to the cause of society, public interest and miscarriage of justice. Recourse may be had by Courts to power under this section only for the purpose of discovering relevant facts or obtaining proper proof of such facts as are necessary to arrive at a just decision in the case………………. 54. Though justice is depicted to be blind-folded, as popularly said, it is only a veil not to see who the party before it is while pronouncing judgment on the cause brought before it by enforcing law and administer justice and not to ignore or turn the mind/attention of the Court away from the truth of the cause or lis before it, in disregard of its duty to prevent miscarriage of justice. When an ordinary citizen makes a grievance against the mighty administration, any indifference, inaction or lethargy shown in protecting his right guaranteed in law will tend to paralyse by such inaction or lethargic action of Courts and erode in stages faith inbuilt in judicial system ultimately destroying the very justice delivery system of the country itself. Doing justice is the paramount consideration and that duty cannot be abdicated or diluted and diverted by manipulative red herrings. 55. The Courts at the expense of repetition we may state, exist for doing justice to the persons who are affected. The Trial/First Appellate Courts cannot get swayed by abstract technicalities and close their eyes to factors which need to be positively probed and noticed. The Court is not merely to act as tape recorder recording evidence, overlooking the object of trial i.e. to get at the truth. It cannot be oblivious to the active role to be played for which there is not only ample scope, but sufficient powers conferred under the Code. It has a greater duty and responsibility i.e. to render justice, in a case where the role of the prosecuting agency itself is put in issue and is said to be hand in glove with the accused, parading a mock fight and making a mockery of the criminal justice administration itself.” (Pp.182, 187, 188, 189, 190 & 192) 28. We do no t wish to burden the judgment with more precedent on this point. On the question of appreciation of evidence in C. Magesh and others vs. State of Karnataka, 2010)5 SCC 645 the Court holds: “45. It may be mentioned herein that in criminal jurisprudence, evidence has to be evaluated on the touchstone of consistency. Needless to emphasise, consistency is the keyword for upholding the conviction of an accused. In this regard it is to be noted that this Court in the case titled Suraj Singh vs. State of U.P. (2008) 16 SCC 686 has held: (SCC p. 704, para 14) “14. ’21… The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be creditworthy; … the probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation.’” 46. In a criminal trial, evidence of the eyewitness requires a careful assessment and must be evaluated for its creditability. In a criminal trial, evidence of the eyewitness requires a careful assessment and must be evaluated for its creditability. Since the fundamental aspect of criminal jurisprudence rests upon the stated principle that “no man is guilty until proven so”. Hence utmost caution is required to be exercised in dealing with situations where there are multiple testimonies and equally large number of witnesses testifying before the court. There must be a string that should join the evidence of all the witnesses and thereby satisfying the test of consistency in evidence amongst all the witnesses.” (p.655) 29. We also refer to the decision in Paramjeet Singh alias Pamma vs. State of Uttarakhand, (2010)10 SCC 439 holding: “Standard of Proof: 10. A criminal trial is not a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of an interplay between different human emotions. In arriving at a conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case, in the final analysis, would have to depend upon its own facts. The court must bear in mind that "human nature is too willing, when faced with brutal crimes, to spin stories out of strong suspicions." Though an offence may be gruesome and revolt the human conscience, an accused can be convicted only on legal evidence and not on surmises and conjecture. The law does not permit the court to punish the accused on the basis of a moral conviction or suspicion alone. "The burden of proof in a criminal trial never shifts and it is always the burden of the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of acceptable evidence." In fact, it is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the more serious the offence, the stricter the degree of proof required, since a higher degree of assurance is required to convict the accused. The fact that the offence was committed in a very cruel and revolting manner may in itself be a reason for scrutinizing the evidence more closely, lest the shocking nature of the crime induces an instinctive reaction against dispassionate judicial scrutiny of the facts and law.(Vide : Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P., AIR 1952 SC 159 ; State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, AIR 1973 SC 2407 ; Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 SC 765 ; Mousam Singha Roy & Ors. v. State of W.B, (2003) 12 SCC 377 ; and Aloke Nath Dutta & Ors. v. State of W.B., (2007) 12 SCC 230 ). 11. In Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 637 , this Court observed : (AIR p.645,para-12) "12. … … … …Considered as a whole the prosecution story may be true; but between `may be true' and ‘must be true' there is inevitably a long distance to travel and the whole of this distance must be covered by legal, reliable and unimpeachable evidence [before an accused can be convicted]." 12. Thus, the law on the point may be summarised to the effect that in a criminal trial involving a serious offence of a brutal nature, the court should be wary of the fact that it is human instinct to react adversely to the commission of the offence and make an effort to see that such an instinctive reaction does not prejudice the accused in any way. In a case where the offence alleged to have been committed is a serious one, the prosecution must provide greater assurance to the court that its case has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.” (pp-445-446) 30. The law settles the principles for evaluation of evidence. In Sanjiv Kumar vs. State of Punjab, (2009)16 SCC 487 the Court directs: “20. We cannot lose sight of the principle that while the prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the defence of the accused has to be tested on the touchstone of probability. The burden of proof lies on the prosecution in a criminal trials, though the onus may shift to the accused in given circumstances, and if so provided by law. Therefore, the evidence has to be appreciated to find out whether the defence set up by the appellant is probable and true.” (p-493) 31. The burden of proof lies on the prosecution in a criminal trials, though the onus may shift to the accused in given circumstances, and if so provided by law. Therefore, the evidence has to be appreciated to find out whether the defence set up by the appellant is probable and true.” (p-493) 31. The principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Aher Raja Khima vs. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1956 SC 217 holding: “9. Now it may be possible to take two views of this statement but there are two important factors in every criminal trial that weight heavily in favour of an accused person: one is that the accused is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt and the other, an off-shoot of the same principle, that when an accused person offers a reasonable explanation of his conduct, then, even though he cannot prove his assertions they should ordinarily be accepted unless the circumstances indicate that they are false. What the appellant said in this case is not impossible; such things do happen and it is understandable that the police, frustrated in their endeavour to find the culprit among three other persons, should make an all out endeavour to make sure of the fourth. We do not say that that happened here. But that it might have happened is obvious, and when the police absent themselves from the witness box and forestall attempts at cross-examination, we find it impossible to hold that a judge acting judicially, and bearing in mind the important principles that we have outlined above, can be said to have reached an unreasonable or an unfair conclusion when he deduces from these circumstances that there is a reasonable probability that the appellant's story is true and that therefore the confession was not voluntary.” (p-221) 32. We need not burden the judgment with precedent any further. We advert to the second circumstance, which says that there is delay of more than 17 hours in recording the FIR which has not been satisfactorily explained. N o doubt, the law requires prompt initiation of action against the accused in order to eliminate all possibilities of manipulation and false implication. The principle of de lay in lodging the FIR is well established in Sahebrao and another vs. State of Maharashtra, (2006)9 SCC 794 and Budh Singh and others vs. State of U.P. (2006)9 SCC 731 . N o doubt, the law requires prompt initiation of action against the accused in order to eliminate all possibilities of manipulation and false implication. The principle of de lay in lodging the FIR is well established in Sahebrao and another vs. State of Maharashtra, (2006)9 SCC 794 and Budh Singh and others vs. State of U.P. (2006)9 SCC 731 . In Sahebrao’s case the Supreme Court holds: “6. The settled principle of law of this Court is that delay in filing FIR by itself cannot be a ground to doubt the prosecution case and discard it. The delay in lodging the FIR would put the Court on its guard to search if any plausible explanation has been offered and if offered whether it is satisfactory. 7. At this juncture, we would like to quote the following passage from State of Himachal Pradesh v. Gian Chand, (2001) 6 SCC 71 , wherein this Court observed: (SCC p.79. para 12) “12. Delay in lodging the FIR cannot be used as a ritualistic formula for doubting the prosecution case and discarding the same solely on the ground of delay in lodging the first information report. Delay has the effect of putting the court on its guard to search if any plausible explanation has been offered for the delay, and if offered, whether it is satisfactory or not. If the prosecution fails to satisfactorily explain the delay and there is a possibility of embellishment in the prosecution version on account of such delay, the delay would be fatal to the prosecution. However, if the delay is explained to the satisfaction of the court, the delay cannot by itself be a ground for disbelieving and discarding the entire prosecution case. " 8. In Ravinder Kumar and Another v. State of Punjab, (2001) 7 SCC 690 , this Court observed: (SCC p.696, paras 14-15) "14. When there is criticism on the ground that FIR in a case was delayed the court has to look at the reason why there was such a delay. There can be a variety of genuine causes for FIR lodgment to get delayed. Rural people might be ignorant of the need for informing the police of a crime without any lapse of time. This kind of unconversantness is not too uncommon among urban people also. They might not immediately think of going to the police station. There can be a variety of genuine causes for FIR lodgment to get delayed. Rural people might be ignorant of the need for informing the police of a crime without any lapse of time. This kind of unconversantness is not too uncommon among urban people also. They might not immediately think of going to the police station. Another possibility is due to lack to adequate transport facilities for the informers to reach the police station. The third, which is a quite common bearing, is that the kith and kin of the deceased might take some appreciable time to regain a certain level of tranquility of mind or sedativeness of temper for moving to the police station for the purpose of furnishing the requisite information. Yet another cause is, the persons who are supposed to give such information themselves could be so physically impaired that the police had to reach them on getting some nebulous information about the incident. 15. We are not providing an exhaustive catalogue of instances which could cause delay in lodging the FIR. Our effort is to try to point out that the stale demand made in the criminal courts to treat the FIR vitiated merely on the ground of delay in its lodgment cannot be approved as a legal corollary. In any case, where there is delay in making the FIR the court is to look at the cause for it and if such causes are not attributable to any effort to concoct a version no consequence shall be attached to the mere delay in lodging the FIR. (Vide Zahoor v. State of U.P. 1991 Supp.(1) SCC 372; Tara Singh v. State of Punjab 1991 Supp.(1) SCC 536; Jamna v. State of U.P., 1994 Supp.(1) SCC 185. In Tara Singh, the Court made the following observations: (SCC p.541, para 4) "4. It is well settled that the delay in giving the FIR by itself cannot be a ground to doubt the prosecution case. Knowing the Indian conditions as they are we cannot expect these villagers to rush to the police station immediately after the occurrence. Human nature as it is, the kith and kin who have witnessed the occurrence cannot be expected to act mechanically with all the promptitude in giving the report to the police. Knowing the Indian conditions as they are we cannot expect these villagers to rush to the police station immediately after the occurrence. Human nature as it is, the kith and kin who have witnessed the occurrence cannot be expected to act mechanically with all the promptitude in giving the report to the police. At times being grief-stricken because of the calamity it may not immediately occur to them that they should give a report. After a it is but natural in these circumstances for them to take some time to go to the police station for giving the report. 9. In Amar Singh v. Balwinder Singh, (2003)2 SCC 518 , this Court held that: (SCC pp.527-28, para 10) "There is no hard and fast rule that any delay in lodging the FIR would automatically render the prosecution case doubtful. It necessarily depends upon facts and circumstances of each case whether there has been any such delay in lodging the FIR which may cast doubt about the veracity of the prosecution case and for this a host of circumstances like the condition of the first informant, the nature of injuries sustained, the number of victims, the efforts made to provide medical aid to them, the distance of the hospital and the police station, etc. have to be taken into consideration. There is no mathematical formula by which an inference may be drawn either way merely on account of delay in lodging of the FIR." (pp.797-798) In Ramdas and others vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007)2 SCC 170 , the Court holds that no doubt mere delay in lodging the FIR is not fatal to the prosecution case but the fact that the re port was lodged belatedly would be a relevant fact of which the Court is required to take notice and to assess the totality of the evidence on record. No strait jacket formula can be laid down if the matter is left at the discretion of the Court. This precedent follows the ruling of the Supreme Court in Venkategowda and others Vs. State of Karnataka, (2006)13 SCC 203 holding that the settled law is that delay in lodging the FIR will not fatal the every case if the version of the eye witnesses is re liable and trustworthy and this is what w e have to assess. This precedent follows the ruling of the Supreme Court in Venkategowda and others Vs. State of Karnataka, (2006)13 SCC 203 holding that the settled law is that delay in lodging the FIR will not fatal the every case if the version of the eye witnesses is re liable and trustworthy and this is what w e have to assess. Lastly in Jai Praksh Singh vs. State of Bihar and another (2012)4 SCC 379 the Supreme Court holds:- “12. The FIR in a criminal case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence though may not be substantive piece of evidence. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the FIR in respect of the commission of an offence is to obtain early information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed, the names of the actual culprits and the part played by them as well as the names of the eyewitnesses present at the scene of occurrence. If there is a delay in lodging the FIR, it loses the advantage of spontaneity, danger creeps in of the introduction of coloured version, exaggerated account or concocted story as a result of large number of consultations/deliberations. Undoubtedly, the promptness in lodging the FIR is an assurance regarding truth of the informant’s version. A promptly lodged FIR reflects the first hand account of what has actually happened and who was responsible for the offence in question. (Vide Thulia Kali v. State of T.N. (1972)3 SCC 393 , State of Punjab v. Surja Ram 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 419, Girish Yadav v. State of M.P. (1996)8 SCC 186 and Takdir Samsuddin Sheikh v. State of Gujarat (2011)10 SCC 158 .” (at pp.383-384) 33. We advert to the circumstances of the present case. The complainant and the accused had proceeded to Dalhousie travelling first by motor cycle upto Pathan kot bus stand and thereafter by bus. The case is that the complain ant was asked to get down from the bus by the accused on the pretext that they should walk upto Chamba and she was persuaded to accompany him to a nallah (stream) below the culvert. We are conscious of the fact that this was done in the evening hours. The case is that the complain ant was asked to get down from the bus by the accused on the pretext that they should walk upto Chamba and she was persuaded to accompany him to a nallah (stream) below the culvert. We are conscious of the fact that this was done in the evening hours. What follows thereafter, according to the comp lain ant, is a brutal assault in which she sustain ed in juries which left her half de ad and unconscious because of an attempt having been made to throttle her. Thereafter, she regained consciousness, crawled upto the road side, tried to signal every passing vehicle to stop, but her request was not heeded to. She was soaked with blood, it was late at night and she was mistaken for a Churel (female ghost). It was Tejinder Singh PW5 who helped her at first even he was scared. He drove down the road, got a “tyre-man” to ascertain as to who was that lady and returned to the spot for verification. Thereafter another episode followed which was that the complainant was taken by these people to the police post and in the intervening period, she was again assaulted by the accused who was seated in the van when PW5 Tejinder and “tyre-man” returned to verify whether the complainant was for real. We are also conscious that it was that time when the information has been conveyed to the police as submitted by PW5 Tejinder. Statement Ext.PA was recorded by the police and Ext.PG statement made by PW5 Tajinder was also recorded. She was thereafter taken to the Primary Health Centre, Banikhet and then to hospital at Dalhousie and at both places it was found that she was not in a fit condition to make any statement. The reason was obvious and that is she was in an injured condition unable to communicate coherently as she had sustained injuries on her jaws and face and thereafter sedated with Fortwin. If that be so, how it can be said that there was delay in lodging the FIR? Where was the opportunity for the complainant to manipulate facts or for PW5 Tejinder who later on turned hostile, to implicate the accused more especially when we find that he admitted Ext.PG portion ‘A’ to ‘A’ having been correctly recorded that the accused had also travelled to the police post. Where was the opportunity for the complainant to manipulate facts or for PW5 Tejinder who later on turned hostile, to implicate the accused more especially when we find that he admitted Ext.PG portion ‘A’ to ‘A’ having been correctly recorded that the accused had also travelled to the police post. The complainant states before the police as corroborated by PW15 Joga Singh that the accused had not caused any harm to her but the explanation furnished by her was that at that time she was mortally scared of her husband. We find no motive with the complainant to falsely implicate her husband. As an adjunct to this fact, we also find that the accused was present in the police post but he did not raise any finger to help the complainant. We hold that the learned Sessions Judge was in grave error and theoretical in relying upon the principle of delay in lodging the FIR as one of the grounds for acquittal. 34. We now advert to the other point urged on behalf of the accused which is that there are infirmities in the evidence of the prosecution which are fundamental to the entire case and do not at all implicate the respondent-accused. The settled principle of law under Section 3 of the Evidence Act is that the case must be proved beyond all reasonable doubts. In Vadivelu Thevar vs. The State of Madras, AIR1957 SC614, the Supreme Court states that the evidence of the witnesses may be “(a) wholly reliable, (b) Wholly unreliable,(c) Neither wholly reliance nor wholly unreliable”. The Court holds: “12. In the first category of proof, the court should have no difficulty incoming to its conclusion either way – it may convict or may acquit on the testimony of a single witness, if it is found to be above reproach or suspicion of interestedness, incompetence or subornation. In the second category, the court equally has no difficulty in coming to its conclusion. It is in the third category of cases, that the court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial. There is another danger in insisting on plurality of witnesses. Irrespective of the quality of the oral evidence of a single witness, if courts were to insist on plurality of witnesses in proof of any fact, they will be indirectly encouraging subornation of witnesses. There is another danger in insisting on plurality of witnesses. Irrespective of the quality of the oral evidence of a single witness, if courts were to insist on plurality of witnesses in proof of any fact, they will be indirectly encouraging subornation of witnesses. Situations may arise and do arise where only a single person is available to give evidence in support of a disputed fact. The court naturally has to weigh carefully such a testimony and if it is satisfied that the evidence is reliable and free from a taints which tend to render oral testimony open to suspicion, it becomes its duty to act upon such testimony. The law reports contain many precedents where the court had to depend and act upon the testimony of a single witness in support of the prosecution. There are exceptions to this rule, for example, in cases of sexual offences or of the testimony of an approver; both these are cases in which the oral testimony is, by its very nature, suspect, being that of a participator in crime. But, where there are no such exceptional reasons operating, it becomes the duty of the court to convict, if it is satisfied that the testimony of a single witness is entirely reliable. We have therefore, no reasons to refuse to act upon the testimony of the first witness, which is the only reliable evidence in support of the prosecution. (p.619) The principle has been reiterated in R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder vs. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple and another, (2003)8 SCC 752 holding: “28. Whether a civil or a criminal case, the anvil for testing of “proved”, “disproved” and “not proved”, as defined in Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is one and the same. A fact is said to be “proved” when, if considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of a particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. It is the evaluation of the result drawn by the applicability of the rule, which makes the difference. It is the evaluation of the result drawn by the applicability of the rule, which makes the difference. “The probative effects of evidence in civil and criminal cases are not, however, always the same and it has been laid down that a fact may be regarded as proved for purposes of a civil suit, though the evidence may not be considered sufficient for a conviction in a criminal case. Best says: ‘There is a strong and marked different as to the effect of evidence in civil and criminal proceedings. In the former a mere preponderance of probability, due regard being had to the burden of proof, is a sufficient basis of decision: but in the latter, especially when the offence charged amounts to treason or felony, a much higher degree of assurance is required.’ (Best,$ 95) While civil cases may be proved by a mere preponderance of evidence, in criminal cases the prosecution must prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt.” (See Sarkar on Evidence, 15th Edn., pp 580-59) In the words of Denning, L.J. (Bater v. Bater (1950)2 A ER 458 at P.459 B-C): It is true that by our law there is a higher standard of proof in criminal cases than in civil cases, but this is subject to the qualification that there is no absolute standard in either case. In criminal cases the charge must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but there may be degrees of proof within that standard. So also in civil cases there may be degrees of probability. Agreeing with this statement of Law, Hodson, L.J. said: “Just as in civil cases the balance of probability may be more readily titled in one case than in another, so in criminal cases proof beyond reasonable doubt may more readily be attained in some cases than in others.” (HOrnal v. Neuberger Products Ltd. (1956)3 All ER 970 at p. 977 D).”” (pp.767) 35. We will now advert to the fact as to whether the sole testimony of the complainant can be relied upon or whether the contradictions in evidence of the prosecution are to the extent, which destroy the very edifice of the case. We will now advert to the fact as to whether the sole testimony of the complainant can be relied upon or whether the contradictions in evidence of the prosecution are to the extent, which destroy the very edifice of the case. We have considered the evidence of the complainant in detail from the moment when she left home with the respondent-accused, travelled to Pathankot bus stand on his motor cycle, boarded the bus for Dalhousie, she was made to get down before Chamba and the assault which followed thereafter. This is one part of narration of her story for which obviously there is no eye witness except her as the site was under a culvert in the late hours when she was alone with the accused who actually assaulted. The second part is after the assault and here the contradictions have been highlighted by the defence as also considered by the learned Judge holding them to be of a nature where the entire story of prosecution becomes shaky. On the first part of the testimony of the complainant, we have no doubt in our mind that the complainant was assaulted by the respondent. There is no earthly reason as to why the complainant would be standing in the middle of the road soaked with blood in the late hours frantically signaling for help to other passing motorists. If the defence case is accepted that she sustained injuries by way of fall, we are intrigued by the fact that the respondent-accused, who accompanied the complainant, was not in her company at the spot to procure help/medical aid for her. He then reappears in the police post but does nothing to explain the injuries on her person. Why he did not take her to a hospital is a fact which has not been explained by him. A person who leaves his wife in an injured condition in the middle of the night in a strange place is a question which requires consideration. 36. We proceed further. Undoubtedly, Tejinder Singh PW5 has been declared hostile. He states in his evidence that he saw the complainant in the late hours of the night standing on the road side thumbing a lift, she was soaked with blood at that time. He fled from the spot thinking her to be a ghost or a spirit and returned with one “tyre-man” to find out who she was. He states in his evidence that he saw the complainant in the late hours of the night standing on the road side thumbing a lift, she was soaked with blood at that time. He fled from the spot thinking her to be a ghost or a spirit and returned with one “tyre-man” to find out who she was. She boarded the taxi when he and tyre-man again fled, whereupon he again came back and took the injured to the police post which he says is the hospital in the first instance. Either way, the injured condition of the complainant in an abandoned situation stands established on record. This witness becomes hostile but subsequently, he starts parroting the fact that the complainant did not say that she had been assaulted but she had sustained injuries by a fall. But he corroborates the presence of the accused at the police station at that time. In cross examination portion A to A of Ext.PG as noted by us is admitted by him to be correct narration of facts. It is now established beyond any doubt that the testimony of the hostile witness cannot be rejected outright. The principle of falsus in uno and falsus in omnibusis not applicable to the criminal trials in India and the principle now stands established beyond any reasonable doubt. In Shakila Abdul Gafar Khan (Smt) vs. Vasant Raghunath Dhoble and another, 2003(7) SCC 749 .The Court holds: “25. It is the duty of the court to separate the grain from the chaff. Falsity of a particular material witness or a material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim “falsus in uno falsus in omnibus” has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liars. The maxim “falsus in unofalsus in omnibus” has not received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. A that it amounts to is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called “a mandatory rule of evidence”. (See Nisar Ali v.State of U.P.). 26. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called “a mandatory rule of evidence”. (See Nisar Ali v.State of U.P.). 26. The doctrine is a dangerous on especially in India for if a whole body of the testimony were to be rejected, because the witness was evidently speaking an untruth in some aspect, it is to be feared that administration of criminal justice would come to a dead stop. Witnesses just cannot help in giving embroidery to a story, however true in the main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as to what extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance, and merely because in some respects the court considers the same to be insufficient for placing reliance on the testimony of a witness, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must be disregarded in all respects as well. The evidence has to be sifted with care. The aforesaid dictum is not a sound rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate an exaggeration, embroideries or embellishment. (See Sohrab v. State of M.P. and Ugar Ahir v. State of Bihar.) An attempt has to be made to, as noted above, in terms of felicitous metaphor, separate the grain from the chaff, truth from falsehood. Where it is not feasible to separate the truth from falsehood, because grain and cha are inextricably mixed up, and in the process of separation an absolutely new case has to be reconstructed by divorcing essential details presented by the prosecution completely from the context and the background against which they are made, the only available course to be made is to discard the evidence in toto. (See Zwinglee Ariel v. State of M.P. and Balaka Singh v. State of Punjab.) As observed by this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Kalki normal discrepancies in the evidence are those which are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence and those are always there, however, honest and truthful a witness may be Material discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not expected of a normal person. Courts have to label the category to which a discrepancy may be categorized. While normal discrepancies do not corrode the credibility of a party’s case, material discrepancies do so. These aspects were highlighted recently in Krishna Mochi v. State of Bihar, (2002)2 SCC 381 and Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa (2002)8 SCC 381 and Rizan vs. State of Chhatisgarh (2003)2 SCC 661 .” (at pp.764-765) In Sayed Akbar vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 1979 SC 1848 , the Court holds: “12. As a legal proposition, it is now settled by the decisions of this Court, that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected wholesale, merely on the ground that the prosecution had dubbed him 'hostile' and had cross-examined him. We need say no more than reiterate what this Court said on this point in Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration (1976) 2 SCR 11 : AIR 1976 SC 294 : "Even in a criminal prosecution when a witness is cross-examined and contradicted with the leave of the Court, by the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of law, be treated as washed off the record altogether. It is for the Judge of fact to consider in each case whether as a result of such cross-examination and contradiction, the witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be believed in regard to a part of his testimony. If the Judge finds that in the process, the credit of the witness has not been completely shaken, he may, after reading and considering the evidence of the witness, as a whole, with due caution and care, accept, in the light of the other evidence on the record, that part of his testimony which he finds to be credit-worthy and act upon it. If in a given case, the whole of the testimony of the witness is impugned, and in the process, the witness stands squarely and totally discredited, the Judge should, as a matter of prudence, discard his evidence in toto." 13. The instant case is not one where the whole of the testimony of these witnesses was impugned in cross-examination by the prosecution. Their credit, on material points, was hardly shaken. The courts below, therefore, were not justified in brushing aside their testimony. “ (at p.1851) This principles h a s been further reiterated in Balu Sonba Shinde vs. State of Maharashtra, (2002)7 SCC 543 affirming that the evidence of hostile witness could not be to tally rejected if supported in favour of the prosecution or the accused but has to be subjected to close scrutiny. In Radha Mohan Singh vs. State of U.P. 2006 Cri.L.J., 1121 the Supreme Court has emphatic ally laid down: “7………it is we se led that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him. The evidence of such witness cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether but the same can be accepted to the extent his version is found to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof.(See Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1976SC 202; Rabinder Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa, AIR 1977 SC 170 , Syed Akbar v. State of Karanataka AIR 1979 SC 1848 and Khujji @ Surendra Tiwari Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh 1991 AIR SCW 2038, AIR 1991 SC 1853 )………” (at pp 1124 & 1125) (Emphasis supplied)” 37. Lastly, we also take into consideration the caution of the Supreme Court in Vikramjit Singh alias Vicky vs. State of Punjab 2007 Cri.L.J. 1000 holding: “21. Furthermore, as noticed hereinbefore, the prosecution witnesses have turned hostile. It may be an act of dishonesty on their part as contended by Mrs. Kochar but by reason thereof only we cannot hold the appellant guilt of commission of a heinous offence. In view of their statements in the cross-examination giving a complete go bye to what had been stated in the examination-in-chief, it is not possible to rely even upon a part of their statement.” (at p.1006) 38. Kochar but by reason thereof only we cannot hold the appellant guilt of commission of a heinous offence. In view of their statements in the cross-examination giving a complete go bye to what had been stated in the examination-in-chief, it is not possible to rely even upon a part of their statement.” (at p.1006) 38. This principle finds reiteration in Paramjeet Singh alias Pamma vs. State of Uttarakhand, (2010)10 SCC 439 and in C. Maniappan and others vs. State of Tamil Nadu (2010)9 SCC 567 . In these circumstances, we cannot reject the testimony of PW5 Tejinder Singh outright as he corroborated the complainant on her injured and abandoned condition and the fact that she was found alone seeking help in the late hours of the night on a State Highway. It is the incident of the manner in which the injuries have been inflicted, which would be relevant for consideration. At this stage we notice an absolute lackadaisical, careless and inhuman attitude adopted by the medical officer PW10 Dr. Vinay Patial. He seems to be a more of witness of the defence who in the careless manner recorded the injuries on MLC of the complainant. Having admitted that two injuries have not been recorded by him at the time of examination and were added later on and further that some injuries have been mentioned on the carbon copy but not on the original copy, we are aghast at the manner in which he conducted himself as also that of the prosecution in not going further to clarify from him as to what was the nature of injury. But the subsequent treatment received by her at Dalhousie where she had also been administered a sedative, leaves no doubt in our mind that she was in considerable pain from the injuries which she had received. We do not hold that this is a ground on which the respondent can claim exoneration. The investigation may be botched up but we do not find that it is not to the extent which completely effaces the criminality of the acts of the respondent. At best, what can be said in favour of the accused is that those two injuries which were later on added in the MLC cannot be held to have been caused by him but not the fact put up that she sustained injuries by falling down. At best, what can be said in favour of the accused is that those two injuries which were later on added in the MLC cannot be held to have been caused by him but not the fact put up that she sustained injuries by falling down. It is for that purpose that the evidence has to be scrutinized with principles as noticed by us. We do find contradictions in the evidence but not in the nature which exonerates the respondent completely. 39. At this juncture, we must also notice the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent. Learned counsel relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Rehmat vs. State of Haryana (1996)10 SCC 346 holding that failure to explain the injuries on the accused by the prosecution probablises the defence. Secondly that delay in lodging the FIR where the complainant was first taken to the Primary Health Centre and where the name of the assailant was also not disclosed, no case was made out. Learned counsel then relies upon the decision of this Court in Anil Kumar Vs. State of h.P. 2005(1) Shim.L.C. 66 in which it is held that when a witness makes different statement at different times, his statement cannot be relied upon. Learned counsel also relies upon the judgment in Jagdish Murav vs. State of U.P. and ors. 2006(8) Scale 433 to urge that the precedent of that case is squarely attracted to the facts of the present case and it is also urged that in case of acquittal, if two views are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere in the judgment of acquittal and in the present case, since the investigation was fudged up and carried out in a slip shod manner, acquittal can be the only result. Lastly he relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bishan Singh & Anr. Vs. The State 2007(11) Scale 726 to urge that before an accused can be held to be guilty, the necessary ingredients namely intention and knowledge are needed to be proved. These are fundamentals of law well settled. We do not find that this precedent is attracted to the facts of the present case. It is established beyond all doubt that in criminal jurisprudence there can be no conviction merely on moral grounds. These are fundamentals of law well settled. We do not find that this precedent is attracted to the facts of the present case. It is established beyond all doubt that in criminal jurisprudence there can be no conviction merely on moral grounds. We again advert to the fact that there is no material on record to establish that the complainant was conspiring against the accused to convict him on false allegations. Two factors are required to be explained, one is that at the time when the accused and injured were in the police station, the injured did not make any statement. It is obvious because at that time she was in an injured condition and was scared of the respondent. We are also alive to the fact that at that time, the respondent did not raise any helping finger for his wife. We also notice the contradictions in the statements of PW15 ASI Joga Singh and PW10 Dr. Vinay Patial, but these contradictions are not of a nature which efface the entire occurrence. 40. We now advert to the decision of the Court in Prem Prakash alias lillu and another vs. State of Haryana (2011)11SCC 687 holding: “19. The evidence, essentially, must be viewed collectively. The statement of a witness must be read as a whole. Reliance on a mere line in the statement of the witness, out of context, would not serve the ends of justice and the conclusion of the court based on such appreciation of evidence could be faulted.” (at p. 693) 41. The evidence leads to the conclusion that (a) the accused and the complainant had in fact proceeded from Pathankot to Dalhousie; (b) the complainant was in fact assaulted by the accused; (c) the accused was present in the police post when the complainant was taken there; (d) she was in considerable amount of pain and was put under sedation for medical treatment; (e) the accused was also examined at the hospital with certain injuries which proved on his body. The totality of these circumstances leaves no doubt in our mind that the accused is guilt for offences but not for the offences as charged. 42. We accordingly hold the guilt of the accused-respondent for offences under Sections 323 and 506 of IPC. 43. Before proceeding on sentence, let report of the Probation Officer, Gurdaspur be called for.