JUDGMENT N. KUMAR, J.-This is a plaintiff's appeal against the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court which declined to grant the decree for specific performance and which set aside the decree for specific performance granted by the trial Court. 2. For the purpose of convenience, the parties are referred to as they are referred to in the plaint. 3. The subject matter of the suit is plot No. 75 in New Extension Area, Chikodi, Belgaum District. The first defendant was the owner of the said plot. He entered into an agreement of sale with the plaintiff on 31.7.1972 to sell the same for a consideration of Rs. 1,000/-. A sum of Rs. 250/- was paid under the agreement of sale as earnest money. The balance amount of Rs. 750/- was agreed to be paid at the time of execution and registration of the sale deed. The sale deed was to be executed within one month of obtaining the permission to transfer from the Assistant Commissioner, Chikodi. Incidentally it is to be mentioned the plaintiff was 6 years on the date of the suit, was a minor and he was represented by his guardian-mother Smt. Urmila. After the agreement was entered into in terms thereof both the plaintiff and first defendant made an application to the Assistant Commissioner for grant of the requisite permission. The said application was numbered as LBP/CR/1604/75. It is the case of the plaintiff that defendant No. 1 stated before the Revenue Inspector that he did not desire to sell the plot. Hence, the above application was ordered to be filed by the Assistant Commissioner, Chikodi. The said intimation was communicated to the plaintiff. Thereafter, an application for permission to sell the said plot in favour of the second defendant was filed by them jointly on 6.1.1973. Permission was granted on 30.4.1973. First defendant executed a sale deed in favour of the second defendant on 3.5.1973 for a consideration of Rs. 1,500/-. The second defendant was aware of the agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff. The agreement of sale in favour of the second defendant is subsequent to the earlier agreement. Therefore, the second defendant is not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the original suit contract. He did not pay the money in good faith. 1,500/-. The second defendant was aware of the agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff. The agreement of sale in favour of the second defendant is subsequent to the earlier agreement. Therefore, the second defendant is not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the original suit contract. He did not pay the money in good faith. He offered to pay higher consideration and induced defendant No. 1 to sell the plot to him. The writer of the suit agreement and the sale deed are one and the same. Defendant No. 1 out of a desire to get higher price has avoided to obtain permission from the Assistant Commissioner. Both the defendants in collusion with each other have brought up the existence of the sale deed dated 3.5.1973 to defeat the legal claim of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is ever willing to pay the balance of the sale price to defendant No. 1 and is ready to purchase the suit plot from him. Prior to the suit, shoeffered to pay the sale price to defendant No. 1 and requested several times to execute the sale deed and to get it registered. Defendant No. 1 did not heed to the request of the plaintiff as he wanted to back out of the suit agreement and sell it to a higher price to defendant No. 2. Defendant No. 1 has thus committed a breach of contract to sell. Defendant No. 2 has purchased the suit property with notice and knowledge of the prior sale agreement. Therefore, the plaintiff was constrained to file the suit for specific performance and for a decree directing defendants 1 and 2 to execute the sale deed and to receive the balance sale consideration and get the sale deed registered. 4. After service of summons, the first defendant entered appearance. He filed a detailed written statement. The specific case pleaded by the first defendant is plot No. 75 and 76 were originally purchased for construction of houses for the defendant's father and brother. As the father and brother of the defendant No. 1 were not then residing at Chikkodi, these plots were purchased in the name of this defendant; but they were meant for father and brother of this defendant. The father and brother of this defendant, however, could not construct the buildings on these plots early as per the terms of the grant. The father and brother of this defendant, however, could not construct the buildings on these plots early as per the terms of the grant. The Government forfeited the plots. But in appeal, this defendant had to pay heavy penalty and to spend heavy amounts in litigation against the Government and the Government was pleased to regularize the delay in constructing the buildings on the plots after levying heavy fines. Still it was not possible for the defendants' father and brother to construct the buildings thereon early as per the fresh grant also. In the meanwhile, Sri Balavant Ramachandra Kulkarni who is the friend of this defendant requested to arrange to transfer these two plots to him, as he wanted to construct buildings for leasing the building on rental basis and for making apermanent source of income. This defendant who had already incurred heavy expenditure in the litigation and in paying the penalty, etc. to the Government, showed inclination to concede to the request of the said Sri Balavant Ramachandra Kulkarni and agreed to transfer the suit plot and another plot to him for a nominal consideration which would compensate this defendant for the expenditure incurred by him in the litigation and in payment of fines to the Government. Hence this defendant agreed to transfer the suit plot to the said Sri Balavant Ramachandra Kulkarni. But the said Sri Balavant Ramachandra Kulkarni for the reasons best known to himself, got the agreement written in the name of the present plaintiff. This defendant had never seen the plaintiff and had never agreed to transfer the suit property to the plaintiff, but as Sri Venkatesh Kulkarni wanted this benami transaction executed in the name of the plaintiff, the defendant executed the agreement dated 31.7.72 and this defendant and the plaintiff applied to the Assistant Commissioner, Chikkodi for permission to transfer this plot to the plaintiff. The said application for transfer was sent to the Revenue Inspector for enquiry and report. It is the policy of the Government to allot plots to those persons who have no houses or plots of their own, i.e., houseless persons. The Revenue Inspector to whom the application was sent for enquiry was required to make enquiry on these lands. The said application for transfer was sent to the Revenue Inspector for enquiry and report. It is the policy of the Government to allot plots to those persons who have no houses or plots of their own, i.e., houseless persons. The Revenue Inspector to whom the application was sent for enquiry was required to make enquiry on these lands. But during the course of his enquiry, it transpires that the said Sri Venkatesh Ramachandra Kulkarni had already purchased a handsome plot in the extention area and was already constructing the beautiful twin quarters. Besides this twin quarters, he had also got houses within the Chikkodi town area. It also transpires, in the enquiry, that the present plaintiff in whose name the agreement of sale was written, was no other person than the son of the said Venkatesh. The transfer of the suit plot in the name of the plaintiff was itself a transfer in the name of the said Venkatesh, who has already got twin quarters in the extension area and also houses in the town limits. The Revenue Inspector, Chikkodi expressed that, in view of these facts, he could not recommend for grant of permission to the plaintiff as the plaintiff's father had already got new buildings and old buildings which were sufficient for his personal use. When the above said Venkatesh Ramachandra Kulkarni came to know about the difficulties in the way of his securing the permission, he gave up the idea of purchasing the suit plot and expressed his inability to proceed with the matter. He requested the defendant No. 1 to repay the amount advanced at the time of execution of the suit agreement of sale. The defendant No. 1 repaid the amount of Rs. 250/- to the said Venkatesh, who promised to return the original agreement of sale in his possession or to pass receipt. But he did not return it or passed a receipt. This defendant also did not pursue it returned as he had faith in the said Venkatesh and he had never dreamt that said Venkatesh would take advantage of the circumstances by committing breach of confidence. Besides this plot was ear marked for construction of a building for defendants' father, the consent of the father of the defendant was still to be obtained and included in the enquiry papers with the Revenue Inspector. Besides this plot was ear marked for construction of a building for defendants' father, the consent of the father of the defendant was still to be obtained and included in the enquiry papers with the Revenue Inspector. This defendant had requested the said Venkatesh many times to see his father and to obtain a consent letter for transfer of this plot to the plaintiff. Since no such consent of defendants' father was obtained, the plot would not be transferred. The defendants' father is also a necessary party to the suit but the said Venkatesh was not at all interested in the transfer of the plot as he had become aware that no permission would be granted to him and to the plaintiffs as they had buildings which were more than sufficient for them. Hence consent of the defendants' father which was essential for the transfer of the suit plot in the name of the plaintiff was not obtained. The circumstances being such, the said Venkatesh was advised by the Revenue Inspector, Chikkodi, not to pursue the grant of permission of the Assistant Commissioner for transfer of the plot as no permission would be granted to him. The said Venkatesh did not also pursue his application for transfer and also in turn advised the defendant not to press for the application for transfer of the plot to the plaintiff. In view of these facts, the application given to the Assistant Commissioner for permission to transfer the suit plot to the plaintiff came to be filed. The suit agreement of sale, therefore stood revoked at the instance of the plaintiff and his father. 5. This defendant or his father or his brother could not keep the plot vacant as they could not keep them vacant for years as per the terms of the grant. This defendant has also learnt a lesson. When the plots were forfeited once and this defendant had to pay fines, this defendant therefore had to dispose of the plots to some persons having no houses or plots of their own as their further litigation would entail further danger and loss to them. The defendant No. 2 was ready and willing to have the suit plot for his personal use and he has no house or plot or houses in Chikkodi. The defendant No. 2 was ready and willing to have the suit plot for his personal use and he has no house or plot or houses in Chikkodi. Hence after obtaining the permission of the Assistant Commissioner, Chikkodi, the suit plot has been transferred to him under a registered Sale Deed dated 03.05.1973 and the defendant No. 2 is now in possession of the same as owner. As permission was refused as set out earlier and the agreement stood revoked, this defendant had no occasion but to inform the defendant No. 2 about the suit agreement in favour of the plaintiff at the time of entering into a fresh agreement of sale with the defendant No. 2 he is not aware of the suit agreement. The defendant No. 2 has paid the full consideration for the sale of the suit plot in good faith. The plaintiff or his father Venkatesh were not ready and willing to act upon the suit agreement as they were convinced that they could not secure the permission of the Assistant Commissioner for the transfer of the suit plot in their names as they have got their buildings more than sufficient for their use. Therefore, it is at the instance of the plaintiff and his father the application for transfer was not pressed. Therefore, all other allegations in the plaint contrary to these facts were denied. As already the application filed for permission to sell in favour of the plaintiff is rejected, the first defendant cannot file one more application for the same relief. Therefore it was contended there is no cause of action for the suit and sought for dismissal of the suit. 6. The second defendant also filed a detailed written statement. It is his specific case that he had no notice or knowledge of the alleged agreement of sale dated 31.7.1972 by defendant No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff. Only after the suit summons was served he got the contents of the copy of the plaint accompanying the suit summons read over and explained to him and came to know about the same. The allegation that he was aware of the pendency of an application for permission to sell in favour of the plaintiff is denied. The allegation that he has purchased the property with notice and knowledge of the alleged prior agreement of sale is denied as false. The allegation that he was aware of the pendency of an application for permission to sell in favour of the plaintiff is denied. The allegation that he has purchased the property with notice and knowledge of the alleged prior agreement of sale is denied as false. It is his specific case defendant No. 1 agreed to sell the suit plot to defendant No. 2, he made enquiry about the ownership and possession of the suit plot and was convinced about his title and possession. Therefore he agreed to purchase the suit plot from defendant No. 1 for Rs. 1,500/-. He paid Rs. 1,000/- at the time of the agreement of sale as defendant No. 1 was in immediate need of money, then made an application on 8.1.73 for permission. After enquiry permission was granted on 30.4.73. Thereafter the defendant No. 1 put defendant No. 2 in actual possession of the suit plot and executed a registered Sale Deed in his favour on 3.5.73. He paid the balance sale consideration of Rs. 500/- at the time of registration before the Sub Registrar. Thus, the second defendant has become lawful owner of the suit plot and he is in actual possession of the said plot as owner. He is a bona fide purchaser of the suit plot for value and without notice of the suit agreement of sale he has paid the entire sale consideration in good faith. He is under no obligation to join the first defendant in executing the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the suit plot. Therefore he sought for dismissal of the suit. 7. An amendment was filed to the statement for introduction of paragraph 9(a). What was sought to be pleaded by way of amendment was, the suit plot and other plots in the extension area of Chikkodi town were acquired by the Government for grant of the same to the houseless and needy persons of Chikkodi. The plot was therefore of Government ownership and the allotment of the same entirely within the competence of the Government only. The grant, forfeiture and resumption of the Government plot is entirely within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Courts and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is specifically barred. Consequently, this Court will not have jurisdiction to try and decide regarding grant / forfeiture of the suit land. The grant, forfeiture and resumption of the Government plot is entirely within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Courts and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is specifically barred. Consequently, this Court will not have jurisdiction to try and decide regarding grant / forfeiture of the suit land. The suit plot has been forfeited to the Government for contravening the terms and conditions of the grants by the grantee under Order No. LBP/SR-4032 dated 13.9.76 of the Assistant Commissioner, Chikkodi. Hence the original grantee-the defendant No. 1 has lost all right, title and interest in the suit property. So also by the said order, the defendant No. 2 has also lost his right, title and interest in the said plot. By the said order the Government has become the owner of the suit property. The plaintiff therefore cannot file the suit against the defendants who have lost their right, title and interest in the suit property by the said order. By a subsequent order of grant the grantee acquires fresh right, title and interest over the suit property. It is also outside the scope of this suit and outside the jurisdiction of this Court, consequently, the suit is not maintainable and it desires to be dismissed on that account also. 8. On the aforesaid pleadings the trial Court initially framed four issues. As per the order on I.A. No. 1, dated 16.9.74 one more issue was framed as additional issue. Issues: 1. Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendant No. 1 has executed an agreement, deed of sale of the suit plot in his favour as contended? 2. Does defendant No. 2 proves that he is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the prior sale agreement in favour of the plaintiff? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the decree for specific performance of the suit agreement? 4. What decree or order? Additional issue: 1. Whether the defendant No. 2 proves that this Court has no jurisdiction to try this suit as alleged in the written statement? 9. The plaintiff in order to substantiate his claim, examined his father as P.W.1 and also a witness-Mukund Shankar Rao Hublikar as P.W.2. He produced four documents which are marked as Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.4. The first defendant was examined as D.W.1, second defendant was examined as D.W.2 and yet another purchaser from the first defendant was examined as D.W.3. 9. The plaintiff in order to substantiate his claim, examined his father as P.W.1 and also a witness-Mukund Shankar Rao Hublikar as P.W.2. He produced four documents which are marked as Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.4. The first defendant was examined as D.W.1, second defendant was examined as D.W.2 and yet another purchaser from the first defendant was examined as D.W.3. They also produced four documents which are marked as Ex.D.1 to 4. 10. The trial Court on consideration of the aforesaid oral and documentary evidence on record held the plaintiff has established the due execution of the agreement of sale, he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, it is the first defendant who committed breach of the terms of the agreement of sale, the second defendant is not a bona fide purchaser without notice of the earlier agreement of sale and therefore it decreed the suit of the plaintiff for specific performance. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 28.08.1982 both the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 preferred independent appeals before the Civil Judge (Sr. Dn.). Both the appeals were heard together and disposed of by a common order dated 13.11.1991. The lower appellate Court held that the second defendant is a bona fide purchaser without notice of the agreement of sale and for valuable consideration and thus set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff for specific performance. Against the said judgment and decree, the plaintiff has preferred this appeal. 11. Earlier by an order dated 15.07.1998 the appeal was allowed and the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court was set aside restoring the decree of the trial Court on the ground when the trial Court has recorded a finding of fact after observing the demeanor of the witnesses, the lower appellate Court was not justified in interfering with the said judgment and decree. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree of this Court, the second defendant preferred a Special Leave Petition before the Apex Court. The Apex Court set aside the judgment of this Court holding that merely because the trial Court has the benefit of observing the demeanor of the witnesses, it cannot be said that the lower appellate Court cannot interfere with such findings. The Apex Court set aside the judgment of this Court holding that merely because the trial Court has the benefit of observing the demeanor of the witnesses, it cannot be said that the lower appellate Court cannot interfere with such findings. Therefore the order of this Court was set aside and the matter is remanded for fresh consideration. That is how the matter is now listed before me. 12. I have heard the learned counsel for both the parties. 13. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant assailing the impugned judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court contends though prior permission of the Assistant Commissioner is a must, for execution of the sale deed, the responsibility of obtaining such permission was on the first defendant. After applying for permission he gave a statement before the Revenue Inspector saying that he is not interested in selling the property and thus got the application for permission rejected. Therefore the breach is committed by the first defendant. On the part of the plaintiff the agreement of sale is not in dispute. The total consideration agreed upon is not in dispute. A sum of Rs. 250/- was paid in terms of the agreement of sale on the date of agreement itself he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Therefore the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for specific performance. Within two days of the rejection of the application for permission to sell in favour of the plaintiff, the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 filed an application for permission. Therefore the second defendant was aware of the earlier agreement of sale. In fact, the scribe of the agreement of sale and the sale deed in favour of defendant No. 2 is one and the same. Therefore the findings recorded by the first appellate Court that the defendant No. 2 is a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice of the earlier agreement of sale is patently illegal and requires to be set aside. Therefore he seeks for setting aside the impugned judgment and decree and for a decree in favour of the plaintiff. 14. Therefore the findings recorded by the first appellate Court that the defendant No. 2 is a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice of the earlier agreement of sale is patently illegal and requires to be set aside. Therefore he seeks for setting aside the impugned judgment and decree and for a decree in favour of the plaintiff. 14. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the second defendant submitted, the material on record discloses as the plaintiff's father was owning a big plot of land in the vicinity of the suit plot where he had undertaken to put up substantial construction and he was owning two storied building. The Assistant Commissioner could not have granted permission. In those circumstances, the application was not pressed. However, the second defendant was not aware of all these facts. When the property was offered to him by the first defendant, he agreed to purchase, he paid Rs. 1500/- and after obtaining requisite permission from the Assistant Commissioner, Sale Deed is executed. In fact, subsequently the land was forfeited for selling the land contrary to the terms of the grant. It is thereafter he was able to get it regranted in his favour. Therefore he submits the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court cannot be found fault with and he sought for dismissal of the suit. 15. In the light of the aforesaid facts, this appeal was admitted on 03.08.1992 to consider the following substantial question of law. "Whether the Court below was just in placing reliance on the order of the Assistant Commissioner, who rejected the permission of sale of the land and thus hold against the appellant?" Learned counsel appearing for the appellant requested the Court to frame one more substantial question of law to the effect as under: "Whether the lower appellate Court was justified in setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and dismissing the suit of the plaintiff only on the ground that the second defendant is a bona fide purchaser without notice of the earlier agreement of sale, without answering the other points which arise for consideration in the suit?" 16. The facts are not in dispute in this case. The first defendant is the absolute owner of the suit plot. The facts are not in dispute in this case. The first defendant is the absolute owner of the suit plot. He entered into an agreement to sell the suit plot on 31.07.1972 in favour of the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. 1,000/-. The agreement was reduced into writing. The execution of the agreement is not in dispute. A sum of Rs. 250/- was paid as earnest money at the time of execution of agreement of sale. The balance sale consideration of Rs. 750/- was agreed to be paid at the time of execution of the Sale Deed and registration of the Sale Deed. The sale is to be completed within one month from the date of permission to sell the granted land by the Assistant Commissioner. Therefore it is clear, grant of permission to sell is a condition precedent for completing the sale transaction. Promptly both the plaintiff and the first defendant filed an application to the Assistant Commissioner for grant of such permission. 17. It is also not in dispute that application for permission was ordered to be filed. In other words, the permission was not granted. The controversy is the reasons for refusal to grant for permission. According to the plaintiff, the defendant having executed the agreement of sale and having filed application for grant of permission; in the course of enquiry made it clear to the Revenue Inspector that he is not interested in selling the property. On such representation the permission was refused. But the case of the defendant is, during the enquiry it transpires the plaintiff's father owned two plots of lands, over which he had put up constructions. These plots originally belong to the Government, they were granted to siteless persons; it is the policy of the Government not to grant such sites to persons who own plots or buildings. When the said fact was brought to the notice of the father of the plaintiff by the Revenue Inspector, he in turn made it clear that he is not interested in proceeding further with the said transaction and he requested the first defendant not to press the application. It is in those circumstances the first defendant got the application rejected. It is in this background we have to see the conduct of both the parties. 18. It is in those circumstances the first defendant got the application rejected. It is in this background we have to see the conduct of both the parties. 18. If the version of the plaintiff is correct and the version of the defendant No. 1 is false, it is on record the Assistant Commissioner communicated his order of filing the application to the plaintiff, if what they are saying is true and what the first defendant has pleaded is correct, the minimum that is expected is to challenge the said order, which is not done. At least they should have got a legal notice issued to the first defendant bringing to his notice that his conduct is not proper and they should have called upon him to obtain a fresh permission and they should have showed their readiness and willingness to subscribe their signature to any such application, which is not done. 19. It is on record, two days after the order of filing an application for permission, the first defendant and second defendant filed application for permission to sell it in favour of the second defendant, a fact which was well within the knowledge of the plaintiff's father. If the agreement of sale in his favour was subsisting, if still he had an intention of purchasing the property, if he had a grouse against the first defendant, the normal human conduct was to file objections to that application, oppose grant of permission to sell the property to the second defendant, which admittedly he has not done. If he had an apprehension that the first defendant is selling the property to the second defendant in order to deny his rights, he should have issued notice to the defendant No. 2 bring to his notice that there is an agreement in his favour and he should not purchase the property, which he has not done. At least he could have given a paper publication informing the general public about the existence of the agreement of sale in his favour. Such a conduct is not forthcoming. It is only after the permission was granted to sell the property to the second defendant, second defendant paid balance sale consideration of Rs. 500/- and got the Sale Deed executed and registered in his name, the present suit is filed seeking for specific performance. Such a conduct is not forthcoming. It is only after the permission was granted to sell the property to the second defendant, second defendant paid balance sale consideration of Rs. 500/- and got the Sale Deed executed and registered in his name, the present suit is filed seeking for specific performance. Under these circumstances, the conduct of the parties, the circumstances coupled with these undisputed facts, such as refusal to grant permission to sell in favour of the plaintiff, granting permission to sell in favour of the defendant non issue of legal notice, non filing of objections before the authorities, non issue of public notice, clearly demonstrates that what the first defendant is saying is more probable. When the permission was refused the plaintiff gave up his idea of pursuing the matter further and did not take any action. 20. It is in those circumstances as already once these properties were forfeited to the Government for not putting up construction and the first defendant has to fight a litigation and get those lands restored and he had got three plots granted in his favour, he was afraid, again he may be forced to face very some situation. Therefore when he found the second defendant who was willing to pay Rs. 500/- more than what the plaintiff had to pay, he entered into an agreement, filed an application for permission, obtained the permission immediately and sold the property. This is the conduct of a normal person who is very badly in need of money, who wants to avoid forfeiture once again and therefore it is probable that the defence set up by the defendants in the facts of this case represents the truth. 21. In so far as the second defendant is concerned, he applied for permission, he followed it up in getting the permission and he would pay Rs. 500/-, more than what was the amount to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendant; paid money and got the site registered in his favour. Under these circumstances, though the agreement of sale is established, even if the plaintiff was ready and willing to pay the balance sale consideration, he was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract of taking the Sale Deed after obtaining the permission from the competent authorities. Under these circumstances, though the agreement of sale is established, even if the plaintiff was ready and willing to pay the balance sale consideration, he was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract of taking the Sale Deed after obtaining the permission from the competent authorities. When the permission was refused he accepted the position thereafter he has not shown readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract and it is only when the second defendant purchased the property, probably he has come up with the suit. 22. In those circumstances, I am satisfied by the material on record, the refusal to grant permission to sell the property to the plaintiff by the Assistant Commissioner had the effect of putting an end to the agreement of sale executed between plaintiff and defendants and question of enforcing the specific performance of that agreement was impossible. When the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree for specific performance the question of going into the question as to whether the second defendant is a bona fide purchaser or not would not arise in the facts of this case. 23. The argument that the lower appellate Court has not gone into any other question except that question may not be correct. May be he has not gone in the way in which the plaintiff wants him. But a cumulative effect to the entire order makes it clear the lower appellate Court has applied its mind, taken note of the undisputed facts and when it was convinced a case for specific performance is not made out, it rightly set aside the order passed by the trial Court and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. Therefore, both the substantial questions are accordingly answered and no ground is made out for interfering with the judgment of the lower appellate Court, which is based on legal evidence and after taking into consideration the entire material on record. 24. The specific defence taken by the first defendant is, after the permission was refused by the Assistant Commissioner when the father of the plaintiff advised the first defendant not to proceed in the matter he repaid Rs. 250/- which was paid as earnest money and then he requested the father of the plaintiff to return the agreement of sale, it was not done. In good faith, he did not pursue the matter. 250/- which was paid as earnest money and then he requested the father of the plaintiff to return the agreement of sale, it was not done. In good faith, he did not pursue the matter. It is only when the suit is filed on the basis of the suit agreement he came to know that breach of trust. But the fact that he paid Rs. 250/- is specifically denied by P.W. 1 in his evidence. The factum of payment of Rs. 250/- by the first defendant to the plaintiff/his father is not established by any evidence on record. When once the receipt of Rs. 250/- under the agreement is admitted and when there is a plea of discharge and that plea is not proved, the consequence is the first defendant has to pay the said amount. However, the lower appellate Court did not order for refund of the amount because there was no specific prayer. Statutory provisions as they stand prevented the Court from ordering refund of money in the absence of a specific prayer. In the facts of this case, I do not find any justification to pass any such order after a period of nearly 40 years. In that view of matter there is no merit in the appeal. Appeal is dismissed. No costs. Perused the office note. Office is directed to show the classification of the case as Specific Performance.