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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 829 (MP)

Surendra Kumar Jaggi v. State of M. P.

2013-07-18

SUJOY PAUL

body2013
JUDGMENT The petitioner by filing this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has challenged the charge sheet, Annexure P-1, dated 8.7.2003. It is challenged on the ground that the allegation of the charge sheet pertains to the year 1985, when the petitioner passed an order on 13.4.1985 while working as Tahsildar. A charge sheet is issued after 18 years and, therefore, it is liable to be set aside on the ground of inordinate delay. In addition, it is stated that against the order passed by the petitioner dated 30.4.1985 the revisional authority in exercise of its suo motu powers passed the order dated 24.10.2000 (Annexure R-2), whereby the petitioner's order was set aside. Against this order dated 24.10.2000, the non-applicants of Case No. 111/97/98/suo motu revision, have filed second revision before the Board of Revenue, which is pending and there is an interim order prevailing and, therefore, this order Annexure R-2 cannot be pressed into service nor can be a reason for issuance of charge sheet against the petitioner. Lastly, it is stated that as per circular of the State Government, Annexure P-4, dated 3.4.1996, action against the employee can be taken by way of disciplinary action only after the decision in the revision. Shri D.S. 1] (State of MP vs. Chamanlal Goyal). 2. Per Contra, Smt. Sangita Pachauri, learned Deputy Government Advocate, supported the charge sheet and submits that at this stage no interference is warranted by this Court. She further submits that in the revisional order dated 24.10.2000 there is a finding by the revisional court that the petitioner has not conducted proper enquiry and made an effort to give improper benefits to the non-applicants therein. Thereafter, the charge sheet is issued on 8.7.2003. The allegations against the petitioner are very serious and include the allegation of acting with ulterior motive to give benefit to Shripad and Amar singh. Thus, it is not a case of merely passing a wrong order but a case which contains an allegation of passing wrong order with oblique motive. Lastly, she relied on the judgment in the case of Union of India and others Vs. K.K.Dhawan, reported in (1993) 2 SCC 56 . 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 4. The petitioner has challenged the charge sheet solely on the ground of delay. Lastly, she relied on the judgment in the case of Union of India and others Vs. K.K.Dhawan, reported in (1993) 2 SCC 56 . 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 4. The petitioner has challenged the charge sheet solely on the ground of delay. Additional ground is that against the revisional order the matter is pending before the Board of Revenue. The pivotal question is whether a charge sheet can be set aside merely on the ground of delay. In my opinion, this question is no more res Integra. In catena of judgments the Apex Court held that inordinate delay is a ground on which interference can be made. For this also the employee has to show the prejudice caused to him. However, in cases where allegations are very grave, the charge sheet cannot be quashed mechanically on the ground of delay. It is apt to quote recent judgment of Supreme Court in (2012) 11 SCC 565 (Secretary, Ministry of Defence and others vs. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha). The Apex Court after taking stock of earlier judgments of Supreme Court opined as under:- "Proceedings are not liable to be quashed on the grounds that the same had been initiated at a belated stage or could not be concluded in a reasonable period unless the delay creates prejudice to the delinquent employee. In case the charge-sheet is challenged before a court/tribunal on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings or delay in concluding the proceedings, the court/ tribunal may quash the chargesheet after considering the gravity of the charge and all relevant factors involved in the case weighing all the facts both for and against the delinquent employee and must reach the conclusion which is just and proper in the circumstance. Gravity of alleged misconduct is a relevant factor to be taken into consideration while quashing the proceedings." (Emphasis Supplied) A bare perusal of this judgment shows that gravity of charge is one relevant consideration and in such cases only on the ground of delay charge sheet cannot be quashed. 5. In K.K.Dhawan (supra), the Apex Court has laid down the principles on which charge sheet can be issued against an officer exercising quasi-judicial powers. 5. In K.K.Dhawan (supra), the Apex Court has laid down the principles on which charge sheet can be issued against an officer exercising quasi-judicial powers. In other words, the order passed in quasi- judicial capacity can also become a subject matter of disciplinary proceedings if the following is alleged :- (i) Where the officer had acted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation for integrity or good faith or devotion to duty; (ii) if there is prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of his duty; (iii) if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a Government servant; (iv) if he had acted negligently or that he omitted the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory powers; (v) if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party; (vi) if he had been actuated by corrupt motive, however small the bribe may be because Lord Coke said long ago "though the bribe may be small, yet the fault is great". (These illustrations are given by Supreme Court in K.K.Dhawan's case (supra). 6. If on the basis of aforesaid litmus test the present charge sheet is examined, it will be clear that it is alleged against the petitioner that he has not followed the prescribed procedure in the Land Revenue Code, the orders in vogue and thereby directly or indirectly with ulterior motive benefited the applicants of revenue matters. The allegations regarding applicant's integrity and negligence are also made in the charge sheet. 7. The Supreme Court in a later judgment reported in (2006) 12 SCC 28 (Union of India and another Vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana) opined as under: "It is well settled that ordinarily no writ lies against a charge-sheet or show cause notice. A writ petition lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of anyone. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance. Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show cause notice or chargesheet. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance. Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show cause notice or chargesheet. Albeit, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal." 8. In the light of aforesaid legal position, I am unable to hold that charge sheet does not constitute misconduct and no disciplinary proceedings can be initiated and permitted to continue against the petitioner because the orders which became subject matter of charge sheet were passed in quasijudicial exercise of powers. When serious allegations of negligence, violating the fixed procedure and integrity are made coupled with the allegation of ulterior motive, no interference is warranted at this stage in the charge sheet. Correctness of charges cannot be gone into at this stage. As held by Supreme Court, in view of serious allegations delay alone cannot be a ground to set aside the disciplinary proceedings. 9. On the basis of aforesaid cumulative reasons, I find no reason to interfere in the charge sheet. Petition is bereft of merits and is hereby dismissed. No costs.