JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ran Vijai Singh, J.—Heard Sri Chaudhary Subhash Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel. 2. Through this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for issuing a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 7.9.2012 passed by the Consolidation Officer, Handiya District Allahabad in case No. 15/76 (Phuljhariya v. State) as well as order dated 21.11.2012 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation (in short, ‘the DDC’) in revision No. 1730/12 (Smt. Phuljhariya v. Jagannath and others). vide order dated 7.9.2012, the Consolidation Officer has allowed the restoration application of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 by recalling the orders dated 3.7.2003 and 30.1.2008, whereas by the subsequent order dated 21.11.2012, the revision filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the DDC, holding it as not maintainable. 3. It appears, in a proceeding under Rule 109 A (1) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Rules, 1954 (in short, ‘the Rules’), which was registered as case No. 15/76, the petitioner’s name was ordered to be recorded by the orders dated 3.7.2003 and 30.1.2008. For recall of the aforesaid orders, an application was filed by the respondents on the ground that on the land in dispute, a lease was granted in their favour and by virtue of Section 131 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (in short, ‘the Act of 1950’) they became Bhumidhars of the land and were necessary parties to the proceedings, but the petitioner, without getting them impleaded, has got ex parte orders dated 3.7.2003 and 30.1.2008. The Consolidation Officer found that the respondents were necessary party to the proceedings and they were required to be heard as a valuable right had accrued in their favour by grant of lease and their name was also recorded. Taking note of that, he has recalled the orders dated 3.7.2003 and 30.1.2008 vide impugned order dated 7.9.2012. The petitioner’s revision has been dismissed by the DDC, holding it as not maintainable. 4. Sri Chaudhary contends that the land belongs to the Gaon Sabha and the Gaon Sabha was the party and the petitioner’s right, if any, was dependent upon the right of the Gaon Sabha, therefore, they were rightly not impleaded in the proceeding under Rule 109A of the Rules and the Consolidation authorities have erred in passing the impugned orders. 5. Sri Chaudhary contends that the land belongs to the Gaon Sabha and the Gaon Sabha was the party and the petitioner’s right, if any, was dependent upon the right of the Gaon Sabha, therefore, they were rightly not impleaded in the proceeding under Rule 109A of the Rules and the Consolidation authorities have erred in passing the impugned orders. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record of writ petition. 6. From the perusal of the impugned orders, it appears that the lease was granted in favour of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and by virtue of the lease, their names were also recorded. There is no prohibition under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (in short, ‘the Act’) with respect to grant of lease over a bachat land. It is not in dispute that the lease was granted to the respondents. What has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that since the land was vested in the Gaon Sabha and the Gaon Sabha was the party, therefore, the petitioner was not the necessary party. 7. I am of the view that after grant of lease and after recording the name of the respondents and after expiry of considerable period of 10 years, a valuable right has accrued in their favour and they were aggrieved party, therefore, they were required to be heard. 8. The issue as to who could be said to be the “person aggrieved” is no more res integra as the Apex Court as well as this Court in a catena of decisions, while considering as to who could be said to be the “person aggrieved”, held that although the meaning of expression “person aggrieved” may vary according to the context of the Statute and facts of the case nevertheless normally, a person aggrieved must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance; a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongly deprived him of something or wrongfully refused something, or wrongfully affected his title to someone. 9. The term “person aggrieved” was also considered and defined in Re: Sidebotham, (1880) 14 Ch D 458, wherein it has been observed as under : “The words ‘person aggrieved’ do not really mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made. 9. The term “person aggrieved” was also considered and defined in Re: Sidebotham, (1880) 14 Ch D 458, wherein it has been observed as under : “The words ‘person aggrieved’ do not really mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made. A ‘person aggrieved’ must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something.” 10. The “person aggrieved” means a person who is wrongfully deprived of his entitlement which he is legally entitled to receive and it does not include any kind of disappointment or personal inconvenience. “Person aggrieved” means a person who is injured or he is adversely affected in a legal sense. (Vide K.N. Lakshminarasimaiah v. Secretary, Mysore S.T.A.T., (1966) 2 Mys LJ 199). Whether a person is injured in strict legal sense, must be determined by the nature of the injury considering the facts and circumstances involving in each case. 11. A fanciful or sentimental grievance may not be sufficient to confer a standi to sue upon the individual. There must be injuria or a legal grievance, as the law can appreciate and not a stat pro ratione valuntas reasons. 12. In Messrs. Swami Motor Transport (Private) Ltd. v. Messrs. Raman & Raman (Private) Ltd. and others, AIR 1961 Mad 180 , a Full Bench of Madras High Court, while considering the provisions of Madras Motor Vehicles Act, considered the issue and approved the law laid down in the King v. Richmond Confirming Authority, (1921) 1 KB 248; and the King v. Groom and others, 1901 (2) KB 157, and laid down the principle as under : “The true principle is to determine whether the applicant has an interest distinct from the general inconvenience which may be suffered by the law being wrongly administered.” 13. In view of the various pronouncements of the Apex Court, it is clear that person aggrieved must be a person who has suffered a legal grievance against whom a decision has been pronounced, which is wrongly deprived him of something of his entitlement, which he is legally entitled to receive. In view of the various pronouncements of the Apex Court, it is clear that person aggrieved must be a person who has suffered a legal grievance against whom a decision has been pronounced, which is wrongly deprived him of something of his entitlement, which he is legally entitled to receive. Here in this case, the restoration application was filed on the ground that the respondents were granted lease of the aforesaid land and on the basis of that lease, their names were recorded in the revenue records and after expiry of 10 years, in view of Section 131 of the Act of 1950, they became Bhumidhars of the land. Therefore, the respondents will fall in the ambit of the person aggrieved and they were necessary party to the proceedings and the Consolidation Officer treating them as a necessary party has rightly recalled the order. 14. So far as the dismissal of the revision by the DDC is concerned, it is not in dispute that the revision was filed under Section 48(1) of the Act and sub-section (1) of Section 48 of the Act provides a right to a tenure holder to file a revision against any order, except the interlocutory order. Explanation (2) of the aforesaid section explains the interlocutory order, which mean such order deciding any matter arising in such case or proceeding or collateral thereto as does not have the effect to finally disposing of such case or proceeding. This Court in the case of Lalji v. DDC and others (Writ B No. 44754 of 2012, decided on 5.9.2012) has held that an order restoring the case on its original number will fall in the ambit of interlocutory order and revision would not maintainable. 15. In view of the foregoing discussions, I am of the considered opinion that no illegality can be attached with the view taken by the DDC in dismissing the revision as not maintainable. 16. The writ petition lacks merit and it is hereby dismissed. However, it is observed that the pending restoration application be decided on its own merit in accordance with law as per the direction given by the Consolidation Officer himself expeditiously, but not later than six months from the date of receipt of certified copy of the order of this Court. ——————