Judgment U.C. Dhyani, J. 1. The applicants, by means of present petition moved under Section 482 Cr.P.C., seek to quash the impugned summoning order dated 15.05.2009 (annexure-8) passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, Haridwar, in Criminal Complaint Case No. 537 of 2008, captioned as Asha vs. Shrawan and others, under Section 406 IPC as well as the proceedings of the said case. 2. A criminal complaint case was filed by the complainant (respondent herein) against six accused persons including the present applicants in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Haridwar. After recording the statements under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C., accused persons were summoned to face the trial for the offence punishable under Section 406 IPC, vide order dated 15.05.2009. Aggrieved against the same, present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was filed. 3. Earlier an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed by the complainant with the request to direct the PS concerned to register the case under appropriate Section (s) and investigate the case, but such an application [under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.] was dismissed by the selfsame Court vide order dated 16.09.2009. The contents of the later complaint and the former application were at variance, although the subject matter was the same (marriage dispute). 4. According to the complaint filed by the complainant (respondent herein) against the accused persons including the applicants, she was married to applicant no. 1 according to Hindu rites and ritual at Kankhal, Haridwar. Her parents and relatives spent Rs. 3 lacs in the marriage. After the marriage, accused persons started harassing her for want of bringing sufficient dowry. On 21.11.2007 also, the accused persons abused and assaulted her. Although, she continued to tolerate the cruelty meted out to her at earlier points of time, but on 21.11.2007, she was ousted from her matrimonial home. Respondent was again sent to her matrimonial home (by her parents) with some gifts/articles. On 25.12.2008, she was again asked to bring Rs. 2 lacs from her parental home and was assaulted, as a consequence of which, she sustained grievous injuries on her abdomen. Applicants threatened that the articles brought by respondent shall be sold, she will be given divorce and the applicant no. 1 (husband) will marry to another woman, and therefore, the complaint under Section 406 IPC was filed. 5. 2 lacs from her parental home and was assaulted, as a consequence of which, she sustained grievous injuries on her abdomen. Applicants threatened that the articles brought by respondent shall be sold, she will be given divorce and the applicant no. 1 (husband) will marry to another woman, and therefore, the complaint under Section 406 IPC was filed. 5. She supported the complaint case in her statement under Section 200 Cr.P.C. Her witnesses, namely, Surendra Singh and Premwati also supported her case in their statements under Section 202 Cr.P.C. Having found a prima facie case and giving adequate reasoning, applicants were summoned to face the trial for the offence punishable under Section 406 IPC, which order is under challenge before this Court. 6. None is present for the complainant/respondent either in person or through her counsel despite service of notice upon her counsel. 7. Learned counsel for the applicants submitted that the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. filed by the complainant (respondent herein) was rejected by the same court on 16.02.2009. It may be noted here that the said complaint was regarding dowry harassment, causing miscarriage, torture and assault etc. Learned Magistrate did not direct the police station concerned to lodge the first information report on his earlier application primarily because the report of woman helpline/reconciliation centre dispelled the allegation of demand of dowry. Order dated 16.02.2009 is not under challenge before this Court. If one application was given regarding certain offences and the same was rejected, it was not possible for the complainant to have given application regarding those very offences. Here she filed criminal complaint case in respect of a different offence, i.e., Section 406 IPC. 8. Learned counsel for the applicants also placed reliance upon Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia and others vs. State of Punjab and others, (2009) 7 Supreme Court Cases 712, in which it was held that for the purpose of constituting an offence for criminal breach of trust and/or cheating, the ingredients thereof as contained in Sections 405 and 415 respectively must be borne out from the records. Upon taking a holistic view of the matter vis-à-vis statutory provisions, it was held that the appellants made out an exceptional case to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 of the Code. Upon taking a holistic view of the matter vis-à-vis statutory provisions, it was held that the appellants made out an exceptional case to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 of the Code. It was held that it was obligatory on the part of the High Court to exercise it’s jurisdiction to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Larger part of the offence in Harmanpreet’s case (supra) was committed only in Canada. It was difficult to comprehend why respondent’s father had come from Canada to Jalandhar to lodge the first information report. Hon’ble Apex Court observed that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the allegations contained in the first information report were made with an ulterior motive to harass the applicants. Continuation of criminal proceeding therefore, would amount to abuse of the process of the Court. 9. In an almost identical case listed before this Court today, a few judgments rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court were cited. These pronouncements are also of great use in deciding present petition properly. These rulings are- Kushal Kumar Gupta and another vs. Mala Gupta, (2011) 12 Supreme Court Cases 434; Pratibha Rani vs. Suraj Kumar and another, (1985) 2 Supreme Court Cases 370; Madhu Sudan Malhotra vs. Kishore Chand Bhandari and others, 1988 (supp.) Supreme Court Case 424 and Bhaskar Lal Sharma and another vs. Monica, (2009) 10 Supreme Court Cases 604. 10. It was held by Hon’ble Apex Court in Kushal Kumar Gupta and another vs. Mala Gupta (supra) that: “8. In Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia vs. State of Punjab (supra), this Court held that when on investigation it was found that no case of cheating or criminal breach of trust had been made out against the accused, the High Court should have exercised its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and quashed the proceedings. In the said case the issue was whether a prima facie case had been made out against the accused. The situation in this case is different, since the complaint itself makes out a prima facie case to go to trial. The petitioners’ case does not fall within any of the circumstances indicated by this Court in para 102 of its judgment in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335. The other judgments cited are on the same lines and do not require our attention separately.” 11. The petitioners’ case does not fall within any of the circumstances indicated by this Court in para 102 of its judgment in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335. The other judgments cited are on the same lines and do not require our attention separately.” 11. It was observed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Madhu Sudan Malhotra vs. Kishore Chand Bhandari and others (supra) that: “we are prima facie inclined to the view that the furnishing of a list of ornaments and other household articles such as refrigerator, furniture, electric appliances etc. at the time of the settlement of the marriage amounts to demand of dowry within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1981.” 12. It will be of great use to reproduce herein the observations made in majority view of Hon’ble Apex Court in Pratibha Rani vs. Suraj Kumar and others (supra): “11. A perusal of the allegations made in the complaint undoubtedly makes out a positive case of the accused having dishonestly misappropriated the articles handed over to them in a fiduciary capacity. To characterise such an entrustment as a joint custody or property given to the husband and the parents is wholly unintelligible to us. All the ingredients of an offence under Section 405 IPC were pleaded and a prima face case for summoning the accused was made out. In such circumstances, the complainant should have been given an opportunity by the High Court to prove her case rather than quashing the complaint. Such an exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is totally unwarranted by law. 16. In a later decision in Bhai Sher Jang Singh vs. Virinder Kaur, 1979 Cri LJ 493, it was very rightly pointed out by the same High Court that Section 27 of the Marriage Act merely provides an alternative remedy to the wife to bring a properly constituted suit in respect of the stridhan property which the husband refused to return. Thus, it is clear that Section 27 merely provides for an alternate remedy and does not touch or affect in any way the criminal liability of the husband in case it is proved that he has dishonestly misappropriated the stridhan of his wife. Thus, it is clear that Section 27 merely provides for an alternate remedy and does not touch or affect in any way the criminal liability of the husband in case it is proved that he has dishonestly misappropriated the stridhan of his wife. It cannot also be spelt out from any textbook or the sastric law of the Hindus that the two Acts- at the most these Acts merely modify the concept of stridhan. It may be useful to refer to certain pertinent observations in the aforesaid case. The aforementioned passage shows that a female has an absolute right to use her stridhan in any way she likes and even if her husband can take this property at the time of distress, this right is personal to him. The allegations made in the instant complaint are not that the husband of the respondent has placed her ornaments and jewellery etc. out of her way. What has been alleged therein is that the petitioners who are the parents-in-law of the respondent have converted the ornaments and clothes, etc. presented to the respondent at the time of her marriage to their own use. Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act empowers a court while deciding a matrimonial dispute to also pass a adcree in respect of property which may jointly belong to both the husband and the wife. This section at best provides a civil remedy to an aggrieved wife and does not in any way take away her right to file a criminal complaint if the property belonging to her is criminally misappropriated by her husband.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court also gave guidelines to the High Court’s in Pratibha Rani vs. Suraj Kumar and others (supra) as under: “59. We now come to the question as to whether or not a clear allegation of entrustment and misappropriation of properties was made by the appellant in her complaint and, if so, was the High Court justified in quashing the complaint at that stage. It is well settled by a long course of decisions of this Court that for the purpose of exercising its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash a FIR or a complaint the High Court would have to proceed entirely on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint or the documents accompanying the same per se. It is well settled by a long course of decisions of this Court that for the purpose of exercising its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash a FIR or a complaint the High Court would have to proceed entirely on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint or the documents accompanying the same per se. It has no jurisdiction to examine the correctness or otherwise of the allegations. In case no offence is committed on the allegation and the ingredients of Sections 405 and 406 IPC, are not made out, the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceedings. In the present case, we shall show that the allegations are both clear, specific and unambiguous and, therefore, the complainant should have been given a chance to prove her case. It is, of course, open to the accused at the trial to take whatever defences that were open to him but that stage had not yet come and therefore, the High Court was totally ill-advised to speculate on the merits of the case ate that stage and quash the proceedings.” 13. When an offence of criminal breach of trust will be held to be committed? Hon’ble Apex Court in Bhaskar Lal Sharma and another vs. Monica (supra), elaborated the same: “53. The offence of criminal breach of trust as defined in section 405 IPC may be held to have been committed when a person who had been entrusted in any manner with the property or has otherwise dominion over it, dishonestly misappropriates it or converts it to h is own use, or dishonestly uses it, or disposes it of, in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which the rut is to be discharged, or of any lawful contract, express or implied, made by him touching such discharge, or willfully suffers any other person so to do.” 14. In the instant case, on a perusal of statements under Sections 200, 202 Cr.P.C. and documents thus filed, a prima facie case under Section 406 IPC was made out against the applicants. Foundation of criminal offence is, laid against them. It cannot, therefore, be said that there was any illegality in the summoning order dated 15.05.2009. 15. In the instant case, on a perusal of statements under Sections 200, 202 Cr.P.C. and documents thus filed, a prima facie case under Section 406 IPC was made out against the applicants. Foundation of criminal offence is, laid against them. It cannot, therefore, be said that there was any illegality in the summoning order dated 15.05.2009. 15. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander and another, (2013) 1 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 986, has laid down certain principles in respect of exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Some of those principles, which are relevant to the facts of this case, can be summarized as below: i. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. ii. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. iii. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence. iv. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. v. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loathe to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers. 16. v. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loathe to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers. 16. Thus it was held that where the factual foundation for any offence has been laid down, the Court should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not, but if the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of an offence are not satisfied then the court may interfere. 17. Inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid in the Section itself. The applicants, in the instant case, are unable to pass those tests. 18. Prima facie there was wrongful retention of the articles given in the marriage on the part of the applicants and therefore, the summoning order against the applicants does not call for any interference by this Court in exercise of it’s inherent jurisdiction. 19. As a consequence thereof, the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is dismissed, but with the direction upon learned Judicial Magistrate, Haridwar, that if the accused persons (applicants) surrender before him and seek bail, their bail application(s) shall be decided (by him) in this criminal complaint case on the same day.