Anil Kumar, J.— Heard Sri G.S. Nigam and Sri Abhishit Saran Nigam, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Pankaj Patel, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel and perused the record. Petitioner/Dedaur Inter College, Dedaur, Raebareli ( hereinafter referred to as an ' Institution') is a recognized educational institution governed by the provisions as provided under U.P. Intermediate Act, 1921, imparting education upto intermediate classes in various subjects including Science, Commerce and Arts. In order to impart education in Botany subject, a request has been made by the Management Committee of the institution to opposite party no.5/Bhoodan Yagya Samiti, Raebareli for allotment of a land. Accordingly in the year 1968 a patta/lease granted in favour of the institution in respect to plots no. 39/0.041 Hec., 434/0.481 hectare, 435/0.275 hectare, 449/0.278 hectare, 451/0.041 hectare and 452/0.461 hectare ( hereinafter referred to as ' land in question'). In the mutation case on 24.2.1998 an order was passed in favour of the petitioner recording the said land in the name of institution in the revenue record ( Khatauni of fasli years 1375-1377), as Bhumidhar with transferable rights . On 18.4.1996, the petitioner by way of rumour in the village, came to know that land in question has been allotted to some other person by opposite party no.4/Gram Panchyat, Nagdilpur, District Raebareli . So after engaging a Counsel, petitioner inspected the revenue record in the office of the Collector, Rae bareli and it came to knowledge that the lease/patta granted in favour of the petitioner/institution, has been canceled on 29.6.1991 by opposite party no.1/Additional Collector( Administration), Raebarli. Accordingly as per the legal advise given to the institution, an application dated 26.9.1991 was moved for setting aside the ex parte order dated 29.6.1991 alongwith an application for condonation of delay, before opposite party no.2/Collector, Rae bareli. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as District Government Counsel, opposite party no.2/Collector Rae Bareil rejected the said application by order dated 8.12.1997 ( Annexure no.7) . In view of the above said factual background, present writ petition has been filed for quashing the orders dated 29.6.1991 and 8.12.1997 passed by opposite party nos. 1 and 2 respectively. In view of the above said factual background, present writ petition has been filed for quashing the orders dated 29.6.1991 and 8.12.1997 passed by opposite party nos. 1 and 2 respectively. SUBMISSION OF LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER (a) Learned counsel for the petitioner while challenging the impugned orders submits that the land in question has been granted by way of patta/lease in favour of the petitioner by opposite party no.5/Bhoodan Yagya Samiti, Rae bareli in the year 1968 treating the institution as ' landless person' as per the provisions as provided under Section 14 of the Uttar Pradesh Boodan Yagna Act, 1952 ( hereinafter referred to as an 'Act') subsequently, it was recorded in the revenue record as Bhumidhari land with transferable rights of the institution . Power to cancel the grant of patta/lease has been introduced in Act by way of Section 15-A through U.P. Act no.10 of 1975 with effect from 21.1.1975 by which the Collector has been given powers to cancel the grant after making an inquiry on the ground that grant was irregular and was obtained by grantee by misrepresentation or fraud . Further, sub Section (2) of Section 15-A provides that notice of every proceeding under sub section (1) shall be given to the Committee and sub section (3) provides that no order shall be passed under sub section (1) except after giving an opportunity of being heard to the grantee. In the instant case, no opportunity of hearing has been provided to the petitioner before passing the order of cancellation dated 29.6.1991. For the first time the said order came to the knowledge of the petitioner on 18.4.1996 thereafter on inspection it also came to the knowledge of the petitioner that prior to the passing of the order of cancellation, a notice has allegedly said to be served on 23.7.1990 upon the Pradhan Adhyapak of the institution. For the first time the said order came to the knowledge of the petitioner on 18.4.1996 thereafter on inspection it also came to the knowledge of the petitioner that prior to the passing of the order of cancellation, a notice has allegedly said to be served on 23.7.1990 upon the Pradhan Adhyapak of the institution. The said facts are totally incorrect, so with application for recall of the said order, an affidavit of Sri Ram Manohar, the then Manager of the Institution, has been filed stating therein that the service of the notice prior to passing of the order dated 29.6.1991 has been made on the Pradhan Adhyapak of the institution, is incorrect fact and his signature on the notice is forged as he has already retired from service but ignoring the said facts opposite party no.2 passed the order dated 8.12.1997 rejecting the application for recall of the ex parte order dated 29.6.1991, so the impugned order on the part of opposite party no.2 is arbitrary in nature. Further, the opposite party no.1 in the order dated 29.6.1991 has not mentioned that any notice has been served on Bhoodan Yagna Samiti which is mandatory under sub section (2) of Section 15-A of the Act so the action on the part of opposite party no.1 thereby passing the order of cancellation dated 29.6.1991 without hearing the Bhoodan Yagna Samiti as well as the petitioner and declaring that the land in question shall vest with opposite party no.4/Gram Panchayat, Nagdilpur, Pargana Tehsil and District Rae bareli after cancellation of patta, is an action in contravention of principles of natural justice, contrary to law, cannot sustain, so the impugned orders dated 29.6.1991 and 8.12.1997 passed by opposite party nos. 1 and 2 liable to be set aside in view of the law as laid down by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Ramji Das and others Vs. Mohan Singh, 1978, ARC, 496 as well as the decision of this Court in the case of Ram Dhani Singh Vs. State of U.P. and others, 1996 RD 374. Further, during the course of arguments a question has been put to the learned counsel for the petitioner that whether the institution is entitled to get patta/lease as per the provisions of Section 14 of the Act ( as stood at the relevant time) on the ground that the institution is a 'landless person'. Further, during the course of arguments a question has been put to the learned counsel for the petitioner that whether the institution is entitled to get patta/lease as per the provisions of Section 14 of the Act ( as stood at the relevant time) on the ground that the institution is a 'landless person'. Submission which has been made by the learned counsel for the petitioner to the said query that in the present case patta/lease granted to the petitioner/institution in the year 1968 under Section 14 of the Act by the Bhoodan Yagya Simiti, authorized to grant the same treating as 'landless person'. And 'landless person' has not been defined in the Act. So as per the provisions of Section 2(f) (i to iii) of the Act quoted below:- "Section 2(f) words and expressions not defined in this Act shall have the meaning assigned to them- (i) in areas referred to in sub clause (I) of clause (c) in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (ii) in areas referred to in sub- clause(ii) of the said clause in the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939; (iii) in other areas, in the law relating to land tenure applicable to the land." The meaning of ' landless person' shall be the same as given under Section 198 of U.P. Zimindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 by way of amendment in corporated by U.P. Act no. 1 of 1951, the relevant provisions quoted as under:- " Amendment of Section 198 of U.P. Act I of 1951- In section 198 of the Principal Act- (I) in sub-section (i)- (a) the word and figures" or 237" shall be deleted", (b) before clause (a) the following shall be added as a new clause (i-a) - "(i-a) a recognized Educational Institution for the purpose connected with instruction in agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry;" In view of above said facts, it is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that taking into consideration the provisions as provided under Section 195 and 198 (i-a) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 as well as the provisions of Section 14 of the Act, the lease/patta in favour of the petitioner has rightly been rightly by opposite party no.5 treating it as ' landless person'. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that as there is no limitation provided for cancellation/grant of patta under the Act so keeping in view the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act as well as Section 198(6) of the U.P. Z.A.& L.R. Act after expiry of 23 years from the date of grant of patta/lease in favour of the petitioner by opposite party no.5/Boodan Yagya Samiti, Raebareli, the said patta cannot be cancelled by order dated 29.6.1991 by opposite party no.1 as such the said order passed by opposite party no.1 is without jurisdiction, contrary to law, liable to be set aside and the writ petition may be allowed. SUBMISSION OF LEARNED STATE COUNSEL Sri Pankaj Patel, learned State counsel while supporting the impugned orders under challenge in the writ petition, submits that as per the provisions of Section 14 of the Act, patta/lease can be granted only to landless person so initially granted in favour of the petitioner by opposite party no.5/Bhoodan Yagya Samiti, Rae bareli in the year 1968, is void ab initio, as the petitioner is not entitled for the same for imparting education to the students in Botany subject, in addition to the subjects already taught by the institution up to intermediate classes . In this regard he placed reliance on the following judgments:- 1. Yog Sansthan Vs.Collector, Moradabad and others, 2002(1) AWC 84 . 2. Dayanand Sury Englo Sanskrat Higher Secondary School Vs. State of U.P. and others, 2012 (6) ADJ 21 . 3. State of Uttarakhand and others Vs. Guru Ram Das Educational Trust Society, 2012(11) SC 321. Sri Pankaj Patel, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel argued that in view of the provisions of Section 198 (i-a) of the U.P.Z.A.& L.R. Act( as stood at the relevant point of time) the petitioner/institution is not entitled for grant of patta as it is not a Educational Institution for a purpose connected with instructions in agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry so initially grant of lease/patta in favour of the petitioner by opposite party no.5 is void initio act under Section 14 of the Act as such there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order dated 29.6.1991 passed by opposite party no.1 canceling the lease/patta.. Learned State Counsel further submits that so far as the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner that opposite party no.1 has got no jurisdiction to cancel the patta as per Section 15 of the Act, has got no force in view of the law as laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Samiti, U.P. Vs. Braj Kishore and others, AIR 1988 SC 2239 . Lastly, it has been submitted on behalf of the respondents that so far as the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner that after lapse of period of 23 years from the date of grant of patta/lease in favour of the petitioner by opposite party no.5, cannot be cancelled in view of the provisions as provided under Section 198(6) of the U.P.Z.A.& L.R. Act and Article 137 of the Limitation Act, is misconceived arguments because there is no limitation provided for cancellation of the same under Section 15 of the Act keeping in view the said fact as well as the fact that the petitioner is not entitled to get the patta under Section 14 of the Act as it does not fall within the definition of 'landless person', so initial grant of patta in the year 1968 by opposite party no.5 is void initio, hence there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned orders under challenge in the present writ petition,accordingly the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. Aim and object for enacting the Act 1952 as as under:- "In the last cold weather Acharya Vinoba Bhave started the Bhoodan Yagna movement with a view to obtain land so that it could be distributed among the landless person of the State. The response of the people of the State very encouraging. The Zamindars as well as the tenants donated their land to Acharyaji. There were, however, certain legal difficulties. The donations made by the Zimindars were defective according to the provisions of Section 28 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and land Reforms Act, 1950. The tenants did not possess any right to transfer their land by gift. The Bill is intended to remove these and certain other legal difficulties and to ensure the achievement of the object of this movement. The tenants did not possess any right to transfer their land by gift. The Bill is intended to remove these and certain other legal difficulties and to ensure the achievement of the object of this movement. Both in regard to the donations of land to the Bhoodan Yagna and its distribution to the landless person." Thus, the intention of the legislature in framing the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1952 is to grant land to landless person who are bedded to the soil or who have attachment with the soil in any form and who have know about the soil. Philosophy that the land must go to the tiller has been implemented in so many countries and reasonably in India to implement preamble of the Constitution i.e. to achieve social justice and to secure distributive justice under Article 38 of the Constitution of India. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Samiti Vs. Graj Kishore and others, 1988 RD 363 has held as under:- " It is now well settled that in order to interpret a law one must understand the background and the purpose for which the law was enacted. And in this context as indicated earlier if one has bothered to understand the common phrase use in the Bhoodan Movement as 'Bhomihin Kissan' which has been translated into English to mean ' landless persons' there would have been no difficultly but apart from it even as contended by learned counsel that it was clearly indicated by Section 15 that the allotment could only be made in accordance with the scheme of Bhoodan and the movement of Sri Vinoba Bhave, it would be worthwhile to quote from 'Vinoba and His Mission' by Suresh Ram Printed with an introduction by Sri Jaya Prakash Narain and foreword by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan. In this work, statement of annual Sarvodaya conference at Sevapuri has been quoted as under:- " The fundamental principle of the Bhoodan Yagna Movement is that all children of the soil have an equal right over the Mother Earth, in the same way as those born of a mother have over her. It is, therefore, essential that the entire land of the country should be equitably redistributed a new providing roughly at least five acre of dry land or one acre of wet land to every family. It is, therefore, essential that the entire land of the country should be equitably redistributed a new providing roughly at least five acre of dry land or one acre of wet land to every family. The Sarvodaya Samaj, by appealing to the good sense of people, should prepare their minds for this equitable distribution and acquire within the next two years at least 25 lakhs of acres of land from about five acres per village. This land will be distributed to those landless labourers who are versed in agriculture, want to take to it, and have no other means of subsistence." In order to decide the controversy involved in the present case, the necessary of Section 14, 15 and 15-A of the Act are as under:- "14. Grant of land to landless person.- [(1)] The Committee or such other authority or person as the Committee with the approval of the State Government, specify either generally or in respect to any area, may, in the manner prescribed, grant lands which have vested in it to the [landless agricultural labourers] and the grantee of the land shall- (I)where the land is situate in any state which has vested in the State Government under and in accordance with section 4 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, acquire in such land the right and the liabilities of a [bhumidhar with non-transferable rights] and the grantee of the land shall (II)where it is situate in any other area, acquire therein such rights and liabilities and subject to such conditions, restrictions and limitations as may be prescribed and shall have effect, any law to the contrary notwithstanding. [(2)] Where the committee or other authority or person as aforesaid fails to grant any land in accordance with sub-section (1) within a period of three years from the date of vesting of such land in the committee or from the date of commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna (Amendment) Act, 1975, whichever is later, the Collector may himself grant such land to the landless agricultural labourers in the manner prescribed, and thereupon the grantee shall acquire the rights and liabilities mentioned in sub-section (1) as if the grant were made by the committee itself. (3)[***] (4) In making grant of land under this section, the committee or other authority or person as aforesaid or the Collector, as the case may be, shall observe the following principles: (a) At least fifty percent of the land available for grant shall be granted to persons belonging to the Scheduled Casts, Scheduled Tribes and persons belonging to the Kol, Pathari, Khairwar, Baiga, Dharikar, Panika and Gond Tribes and such other tribes as the State Government on the recommendation of the committee may notify in this behalf; (b) The land situate in one village shall, as for as possible, be granted to persons residing in that very village. 15. Grant to be made in accordance with Bhoodan Yagna Scheme.- All grants shall be made as for as may be in accordance with the Scheme of Bhoodan Yagna. 15-A.Cancellation of certain grants.- (1) The Collector may of his own motion and shall on the report of the committee or on the application of any person aggrieved by the grant of any land made under Section 14, whether before or after the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna( Amendment) Act, 1975 inquire into such grant, and if he is satisfied that the grant was irregular or was obtained by the grantee by misrepresentation or fraud, he may- (I)cancel the grant, and on such cancellation, notwithstanding anything contained in Section 14 or in any other law for the time being in force, the rights, title and interest of the grantee or any person claiming through him in such land shall cease, and the land shall revert to the committee; and (ii) direct delivery of possession of such land to the committee after ejectment of every person holding or retaining possession thereof, and may for that purpose use or cause to the used such force as may be necessary. (2) Notice of every proceeding under sub-section(1) shall be given to the committee, and any representation made by the committee in relation thereto shall be taken into consideration by the Collector. (3) No order shall be passed under sub-section (1) except after giving an opportunity of being heard to the grantee or any person known to the Collector to be claiming under him. (3) No order shall be passed under sub-section (1) except after giving an opportunity of being heard to the grantee or any person known to the Collector to be claiming under him. (4) The order of the Collector passed under sub-section (1) shall be final and conclusive." Before amendment of Section 14 by the Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna( Amendment) Act, 1975 the word which existed therein was "landless person" but by way of said amendment same has been substituted by " landless agricultural labourers" . Rule 14 of the Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna Rules, 1953 provides as under:- "14 Rights to liabilities of persons to whom land is granted.-(1) The Bhoodan Yagna Committee shall execute a donation deed which may be in the form as in Appendix VII. (2) The grantee of land in the areas to which the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, does not apply shall acquire such right and liabilities as the committee may confer under the law. The grantee shall be subject to the following conditions, restrictions, and limitations: (a) the grantee shall pay the rent to the Committee in such installments and on such dates as the Committee may specify; (b) the grantee shall not be entitled to sublet or transfer the land; and (c) the grantee shall not be entitled to use the land for any purpose other than for which it was granted." In the instant matter, the core question to be decided is whether the institution (Dedaur Inter College, Dadaur, Rae Bareli) imparting education upto Intermediate classes as per the provisions as provided under U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, can be granted the land for extension of Botany classes by opposite party no.5 under Section 14 of the Act by way of lease/patta treating it as 'landless person'. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Samiti, U.P. (supra) in respect to grant of patta/lease under Section 14 of the Act held as under:- "It was contended by learned counsel appearing for the petitioner (Bhoodan Yagna Samiti) that although Sec. 14 quoted above does not clearly indicate what the law meant by landless persons but in view of the scheme of Bhooden Yagna the movement which Acharya Vinoba Bhave and later Jaya Prakash Narain carried out and the purpose of the movement clearly indicated that when in Sec. 14 allotment was contemplated in favour of landless persons it only meant those landless persons whose main source of livelihood was agriculture and who were agriculturists residing in the village where the land is situated and who has no land in their name at that time. It never meant that all those rich persons who are residing in the cities and have properties in their possession but who are technically landless persons as they did not have any agricultural land in their name in the tehsil or the village where the land was situated or acquired by the Bhoodan Samiti that it could be allotted in their favour. This was not the purpose or the philosophy of Bhoodan Yagna and therefore it was contended that such a view which has been taken by the learned Judges of the High Court is contrary to law and the interpretation put by the High Court on the language of Sec 14 could not be justified. It was contended that landless person has to be interpreted in the background of the law which was enacted and the movement and the philosophy behind the movement which was the basis of the enactment of this law and it is only in that background that these words landless persons could be properly interpreted. At the time when Acharya Vinoba Bhave started his movement of Bhoodan Yagna our rural society had a peculiar diversity. There were some who owned or had leasehold rights in vast tracks of agricultural lands whereas on the other hand there were those who were working on agriculture as labourers in the fields and depending on what little they got from their masters. Sometimes they were even bound down to their masters and therefore had to lead miserable life. There were some who owned or had leasehold rights in vast tracks of agricultural lands whereas on the other hand there were those who were working on agriculture as labourers in the fields and depending on what little they got from their masters. Sometimes they were even bound down to their masters and therefore had to lead miserable life. It was this problem in rural India which attracted the attention of Acharya Vinoba Bhave followed by Shri Jaya Prakash Narain and they secured large donations of land from big land holders and the scheme of the Bhoodan Yagna movement was to distribute this land to those Bhoomihin Kissan who were living on agriculture but had no land of their own and it was to make this effective and statutory that this law was enacted and in this context it is clear that if one had noticed even the slogan of the Acharya Vinoba Bhave s movement or its basis and the purpose it would have clearly indicated the problem which was to be remedied by this enactment and if this was looked into for the purpose of interpretation of the term landless persons no Court could have come to the conclusion which has been arrived at in the impugned judgment. This principle of interpretation was not enunciated only for interpretation of law but it was enunciated for interpretating any piece of literature and it meant that when you have to give meaning to anything in writing then you must understand the real meaning. You can only understand the real meaning by understanding the reference, context, the circumstances in which it was stated and the problems or the situations which were intended to be met by what was said and it is only when you take into consideration all this background, circumstances and the problems which have to be tackled that you could really understand the real meaning of the words. This exactly is the principle which deserves to be considered. When we are dealing with the phrase landless persons these words are from English language and therefore I am reminded of what Lord Denning said about it. This exactly is the principle which deserves to be considered. When we are dealing with the phrase landless persons these words are from English language and therefore I am reminded of what Lord Denning said about it. Lord Denning in The Discipline of Law at Page No. 12 observed as under: Whenever a statute comes up for consideration it must be remembered that it is not within human powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which may arise, and, even if it were, it is not possible to provide for them in terms free from all ambiguity. The English language is not an instrument of mathematical precision. Our literature would be much the poorer if it were. This is where the draftsmen of Acts of Parliament have often been unfairly criticized. A Judge, believing himself to be fettered by the supposed rule that he must look to the language and nothing else, laments that the draftsmen have not provided for this or that, or have been guilty of some or other ambiguity. It would certainly save the judges trouble if Acts of Parliament were PG NO 868 drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity. In the absence of it, when a defect appears a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsmen. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament. And it is clear that when one has to look to the intention of the Legislature, one has to look to the circumstances under which the law was enacted. The Preamble of the law, the mischief which was intended to be remedied by the enactment of the statute and in this context, Lord Denning, in the same book at Page No. 10, observed as under: At one time the Judges used to limit themselves to the bare reading of the Statute itself-to go simply by the words, giving them their grammatical meaning and that was all. That view was prevalent in the l9th century and still has some supporters today. But it is wrong in principle. The Statute as it appears to those who have to obey it--and to those who have to advise them what to do about it; in short, to lawyers like yourselves. Now the eccentrics cut off from all that is happening around them. But it is wrong in principle. The Statute as it appears to those who have to obey it--and to those who have to advise them what to do about it; in short, to lawyers like yourselves. Now the eccentrics cut off from all that is happening around them. The Statute comes to them as men of affairs--who have their own feeling for the meaning of the words and know the reason why the Act was passed--just as if it had been fully set out in a preamble. So it has been held very rightly that you can enquire into the mischief which gave rise to the Statute--to see what was the evil which it was sought to remedy." It is now well settled that in order to interpret a law one must under-stand the background and the purpose for which the law was enacted. And in this context as indicated earlier if one has bothered to under-stand the common phrase used in the Bhoodan Movement as Bhoomihin Kissan which has been translated into English to mean landless persons there would have been no difficulty but apart from it even as contended by learned counsel that it was clearly indicated by Sec. 15 that the allotments could only be made in accordance with the scheme of Bhoodan Yagna. In order to understand the scheme of Bhoodan and the movement of Shri Vinoba Bhave, it would be worthwhile to quote from Vinoba And His Mission by Suresh Ram printed with an introduction by Shri Jaya Prakash Narain and foreword by Dr. S. RadhaKrishnan. In this work, statement of annual Sarvodya Conference at Sevapuri has been quoted as under: PG NO 869 The fundamental principle of the Bhoodan Yagna movement is that all children of the soil have an equal right over the Mother Earth, in the same way as those born of a mother have over her. It is, therefore, essential that the entire land of the country should be equitably redistributed anew, providing roughly at least five acres of dry land or one acre of wet land to every family. The Sarvodaya Samaj, by appealing to the good sense of the people, should prepare their minds for this equitable distribution and acquire within the next two years at least 25 lakhs of acres of land from about five lakhs of our villages on the rough basis of five acres per village. The Sarvodaya Samaj, by appealing to the good sense of the people, should prepare their minds for this equitable distribution and acquire within the next two years at least 25 lakhs of acres of land from about five lakhs of our villages on the rough basis of five acres per village. This land will be distributed to those landless labourers who are versed in agriculture, want to take to it, and have no other means of subsistence. " This would clearly indicate the purpose of the scheme of Bhoodan Yagna and it is clear that Sec. 15 provided that all allotments in accordance with Sec. 14 could only be done under the scheme of the Bhoodan Yagna. This Court in the case of Dayanand Sury Sanskrat High Secondary School ( supra) where that facts of the case were that the land has been allotted under Section 14 of the Act to the institution known as Dayanand Sury Sanskrat High Secondary School, a recognized institution under U.P. Intermediate Education Act, imparting education including the subject of agriculture and is not earning livelihood through agriculture under the capacity of 'landless person' the Apex Court held that the land cannot be allotted, the relevant portion is quoted as under:- "Section 14 of the Act empowers the Bhoodan Yagna Committee for Uttar Pradesh, a body corporate having a perpetual succession (hereinafter referred as Committee) established and constituted under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act to grant lands vested in it to the "landless persons" now replaced by word "landless agricultural labourers" vide U.P. Act No.10 of 1975 with the approval of the State Government. In Matoley Vs. State of U.P. and another 1986 ALJ 645 a Division Bench of this Court held that "in order to find whether a particular grant made in favour of a person under the provisions of Bhoodan Yagna Act is regular or not, the provisions of the Act as they stood at the time of making of the grant have to be looked into." The grant made to a person fulfilling conditions required at the relevant time, cannot be cancelled on account of introduction of new conditions in the Act subsequently. The aforesaid decision has been followed by this court in the Case of Bhagwati Prasad and others Vs. Additional Collector 2003 (95) RD 278 and Ram Swarup Vs. Collector, Fatehpur and others 2003 (95) RD 320 . The aforesaid decision has been followed by this court in the Case of Bhagwati Prasad and others Vs. Additional Collector 2003 (95) RD 278 and Ram Swarup Vs. Collector, Fatehpur and others 2003 (95) RD 320 . At the relevant time, committee was authorized to make grants in favour of "landless persons." The primary question which falls for consideration therefore, is whether the petitioner as an Institution was a 'person' eligible for allotment of land under the Act. Sri P.N. Saxena, learned counsel for the petitioner on the strength of the definition of the person contained in the General Clauses Act/U.P. General Clauses Act and on the basis of illustrations of the U.P. Imposition of Land Holdings Act, 1953 and the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act, 1950 contended that the meaning of the 'person' has to be construed in a wider sense so as to include a juristic person and as such petitioner was entitle to receive grant under the Act. The illustrations cited by the counsel for the petitioner to support his argument that the word 'person' in the Act refers to a legal person or that it include within its fold even a juristic person cannot be accepted as under different Acts different meanings have been assigned to the word 'person'. As for example The Citizenship Act, 1955 in Section 2(f) defines the 'person' so as not to include any company or association or body of individuals. Similarly according to Section 2(g) of the Representation of People Act, 1950 person does not include a body of persons. Therefore, the definition of a 'person' in one Act cannot be straight away applied to another Acts as it may carry a different meaning. Accordingly, the definition or the meaning assigned to the word 'person' either under the U.P. Imposition of Holdings Act, 1953 or under the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, 1950 cannot be imported and applied in context with the present Act. The word 'person' has not been defined in the Act. In general usage, a human being is a person which usually refers to a natural person. According to Chambers 12th Century Discretionary person is an individual; a living soul; a human being. Concise Oxford English Dictionary (Indian Edition) defines 'person' as a human being regarded as an individual. Usually, the word 'person' canotes a natural person, a human being who has the capacity for rights and duties. According to Chambers 12th Century Discretionary person is an individual; a living soul; a human being. Concise Oxford English Dictionary (Indian Edition) defines 'person' as a human being regarded as an individual. Usually, the word 'person' canotes a natural person, a human being who has the capacity for rights and duties. This is a narrower and a simple dictionary meaning of the word 'person.' Legally the word 'person' includes both a natural person and an artificial person that is an individual who is a citizen of India, a company, or a body of individuals and includes even the government departments, organizations established or constituted by government, local authority, cooperative societies or any other society under the Societies Registrations Act, a firm, a Hindu Undivided Family and every artificial judicial person. Section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 defines the 'person' in a wider legal sense and provides that person shall include any company or artificial, or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. A similar and identical definition of a person exists under Section 4(33) of the U.P. General Clauses Act, 1994. Section 4-A(1) of the General Clauses Act provides that definitions given in Section 3 of the said Act shall apply to all Indian Laws unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context. In other words, the definitions contained in the General Clauses Act, 1897 are applicable generally unless a contrary intention or a different meaning in context thereto is provided in a particular enactment. Similarly Section 4-A of the U.P. General Clauses Act provides that the definitions given in the said Act shall apply unless the context otherwise require. In view of above provisions of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and U.P. General Clauses Act, 1994 though ordinarily the definitions contained in the aforesaid Acts would be applicable but where the Act which necessitates the interpretation provides a different meaning either specifically or impliedly the meaning so assigned in the Act shall be followed. This court in the case of Yog Sansthan Vs. This court in the case of Yog Sansthan Vs. Collector, Moradabad and others 2002 (93) RD 13 in considering the meaning of the word 'person' for the purposes of allotment of land for housing sites under Section 122-C of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R., Act 1950 concluded that the definition of the 'person' given in U.P. General Clauses Act, 1904 cannot be applied as the word 'person' used in context refers only to a natural person. Now before applying the definition of the 'person' contained in the above two Acts it is relevant and important to examine the context in which the word 'person' has been used in Section 14 of the Act. Section 15 of the Act lays down that all grants shall be made as far as may be in accordance with the Bhoodan Yagna Scheme. Further Section 14 of the Act vest the committee with the power of making grants in accordance with the Bhoodan Yagna Scheme to landless person (now landless agricultural labourers). Thus grants/allotments of land under the Act are to be made only in accordance with Bhoodan Yagna Scheme to landless persons. Bhoodan movement or the land donation movement is a voluntary land reform movement which was started by Acharya Vinoba Bhave in 1951. The movement was started in Pochampally village in Andhra Pradesh where Vedre Ramachandra Reddy was the first person to donate part of his land. The mission of the movement was to persuade wealthy land owners to voluntary give part of their land to lower caste persons. Acharya Vinoba Bhave walked across India on foot, to persuade landowners to give up a piece of their land. Later the emphasis was to persuade land owners/landlords to give some land to their poor and downtrodden neighbours. The movement was a part of a comprehensive bigger movement 'Sarvodaya' that is rise of all socio economic and political order. It was in the nature of a experiment towards social, economic and justice. So from the nature of the scheme of the Bhoodan Movement the emphasis was to get land in donation from rich landlords and to distribute it amongst the poor and downtrodden landless persons in order to establish a socio economic order. In U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Samiti Vs. It was in the nature of a experiment towards social, economic and justice. So from the nature of the scheme of the Bhoodan Movement the emphasis was to get land in donation from rich landlords and to distribute it amongst the poor and downtrodden landless persons in order to establish a socio economic order. In U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Samiti Vs. Braj Kishore 1988 RD 363 (SC) a similar controversy whether the grant made by the committee in favour of the respondents was in accordance with law had arisen before the Supreme Court. Their lordships of the Supreme Court by applying the principle that in interpreting the intention of the legislature the entire writing/document be read from beginning to end in drawing conclusion considered the entire Bhoodan Yagna scheme and came to the conclusion that the fundamental principal of the Bhoodan movement is that all children of the soil have an equal right over the mother earth, in the same way as those born of a mother have over her. The Apex Court quoting from 'Vinoba And His Mission, a book by Suresh Ram went on to say that the object of the Bhoodan Movement is to distribute land received in donation to those landless louberers who are versed in agriculture, want to take it, and have no other means of subsistence." In short, the scheme of Bhoodan and the Act postulates distribution of land only to natural persons or human beings and not to any institution society or any other juristic person. The meaning to the word 'person' used therein has to be assigned as per the above purpose only. In the context the word 'person' has been used in the Act, makes the definition of the person given in the General Clauses Act impliedly in applicable. The word 'person' in the Act has been used in a narrower sense and not in its broader or legal sense. The use of the word 'person' in the legal sense would actually frustrate/the laudable object of the Act and would deprive the actual tillers from receiving land. Thus, by necessary implication in reference to the context of the Act the word 'person' is differently used and the definition as contained in the two General Clauses Act would not be applicable. The use of the word 'person' in the legal sense would actually frustrate/the laudable object of the Act and would deprive the actual tillers from receiving land. Thus, by necessary implication in reference to the context of the Act the word 'person' is differently used and the definition as contained in the two General Clauses Act would not be applicable. In view of above, I am of the opinion that the meaning of the word 'person' used in Section 14 of the Act has to be construed in a narrower sense in the context of the Bhoodan scheme which envisaged for giving land to the tillers of the soil excluding all juristic persons from its ambit. Petitioner is not a natural 'person' and is not the tiller of the land versed in agriculture or dependent upon it. In view of above, order of Collector dated 21.10.2011 apart from other grounds, rightly cancels the grant made to the petitioner in exercise of powers under Section 15 of the Act. The writ petition as such lacks merit and is dismissed." Recently in the case of State of Uttarakhand and others Vs. Guru Ram Das Educational Society (Supra) the Apex Court held as under:- "It may be immediately noticed that the expression used in Section 154(1) is "....to any person where the transferee shall, as a result of such sale or gift, become entitled to land which together with land, if any, held by his family will in the aggregate, exceed 5.0586 hectares (12.50 acres) in Uttar Pradesh." (emphasis supplied) A close look at the above expression would show that the Legislature intended to cover only natural person. It is so because the words 'any person' are followed in the sentence by the words 'his family'. 'Family' is explained in the explanation appended to Section 154 which means the transferee, his or her wife or husband, as the case may be, and minor children and where transferee is a minor, his or her parents. This makes it clear that a legal person is not intended to be included in the expression 'any person'. The word 'person', in law, may include both a natural person and a legal person. Sometimes it is restricted to the former. This makes it clear that a legal person is not intended to be included in the expression 'any person'. The word 'person', in law, may include both a natural person and a legal person. Sometimes it is restricted to the former. Having regard to the text of Section 154(1) and also the scheme of that provision, there remains no doubt that the expression 'any person' refers to a natural person and not an artificial person. This is fortified by the fact that in 1997 the Legislature inserted Explanation by U.P. Act No. 20 of 1997 declaring that in Sub-section (1) the expression 'person' shall include and be deemed to have been included on June 15, 1976 a 'Co-operative Society. Had the expression 'person' included artificial person, no explanation was necessary. Since the expression 'person' in Section 154 did not include legal or artificial person, the Legislature brought in Co-operative society by way of an Explanation. The Explanation came to be added in 1997 in a declaratory form to retrospectively bring 'Co-operative society' within the meaning of expression 'any person'.(see: State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Aanjaney Organic Harbel Pvt. Limited, 2012 AIOL 406)" In view of the above said fact and taking into consideration the provisions in respect to grant of patta/lease under Section 14 of the Act, the petitioner does not falls within the ambit and scope of the definition of 'landless person' to whom patta/lease can be granted under the said section, initial grant of patta/lease in favour of the petitioner by Bhoodan Yagya Samiti treating it as 'landless person' is an act which is void ab initio because the petitioner is not eligible for the same under Section 14 of the Act in view of the movement started by Acharya Vinoba Bahave known as "Bhoodan Yagya Movement" in which the Zamindars etc. donated their lands to Acharyaji and thereafter the said lands came with Bhoodan Yagaya Simiti, and the same was to be granted as per the mandate provided by the legislature under Section 14 of the Act, so keeping in view the said facts the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner and taking into aid the provisions of Section 195 read with Section 198 (i-a) of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, the said argument has got no force, hence rejected. The next arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner that without providing any opportunity to the petitioner by means of order dated 29.6.1991 passed by opposite party no.1, patta/lease granted in favour of the institution/petitioner has been canceled, hence the action on the part of opposite party no.1 is in violation of principles of natural justice, thus liable to be set aside as also got no force because the petitioner is not eligible/entitled to get lease/patta under Section 14 of the Act as it does not fall under the category of landless person so keeping in view the said facts and the aim and object of the rule of audi alteram partem which ensure that there would not be failure of justice. While applying this rule which is the primary principle of natural justice the court or the authority must always bear in mind the ultimate and overriding objective underlying the said rule, namely: (a) to ensure a fair hearing and (b) to ensure that there is no failure of justice. However, There may be situations where the interest of State or public interest may call for a curtailing of the rule for audi alteram partem. In such situations the court may have to place public/State interest with the requirement of natural justice and arrive at an appropriate decision as the rule of natural justice, namely, nemo judex in causa sua and audi alteram partem, have now a definite meaning and connotation in law, and their content and implications are well-understood and firmly established, they are nonetheless not statutory rules. Further, each of these rules yields to a changes with the exigencies of different situations. They do not apply in the same manner to situations which are not alike. These rules are not cast in a rigid mould nor can they be put in a legal strait-jacket. They are not immutable but flexible. These rules can be adopted and modified by statues and statutory rules and also by the Courts/Tribunal/Administrative Authorities etc. to decide a particular matter. These rules are not cast in a rigid mould nor can they be put in a legal strait-jacket. They are not immutable but flexible. These rules can be adopted and modified by statues and statutory rules and also by the Courts/Tribunal/Administrative Authorities etc. to decide a particular matter. Some of the situations which demand the exclusion of the rules of natural justice by reason of diverse factors like time, place, the apprehended danger and so on are as under:- (1)Where a statue either expressly or by necessary implication excludes application of natural justice; (2)Where the action is legislative in character, plenary or subordinate; (3)Where the doctrine of necessity applies; (4)Where the facts are admitted or undisputed; (5)Where the inquiry is of a confidential nature; (6)Where preventive action is to be taken; (7)Where prompt and urgent action is necessary; (8)Where nothing unfair can be inferred by non-observance of natural justice. The arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner that prior to passing of the impugned order, no opportunity of hearing has been given to the petitioner, so the said action on the part of respondents is in violation of principles of natural justice, has got no force in view of the facts stated herein above specially on two conditions; (a) where the facts are admitted/undisputed or (b) nothing unfair can be inferred by non-observance of natural justice, lease/patta cannot be granted to the petitioner/institution under Section 14 of the Act, because it does not fall under the category of landless person, hence the petitioner cannot derive any benefit on the arguments in question and on the basis of judgments rendered in the case of Ramji Dass and others ( supra) and Ram Dhani Singh (supra). So far as the arguments which advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner that opposite party no.1 has got not authority whatsoever to cancel the patta/lease in favour of the petitioner in view of the provisions as provided under Section 15 of the Act, is also misconceived rather contrary to law as laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Case of U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Samiti, U.P. ( Supra). Last arguments which advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner that after expiry of a period of 23 years from the date of grant of patta in favour of the petitioner, the same cannot be canceled by way of order dated 29.6.1991 passed by opposite party no.1 in view of the provisions as provided under Section 198(6) of the U.P.Z.A.& L.R. Act or Article 137 of the Limitation Act, has got no force because admittedly in the present case there is no limitation in respect to cancellation of patta as provided under Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna Act and once it is established that initial grant of patta/lease of the petitioner by opposite party no.5 is passed is void ab initio then it can be cancelled by invoking the provisions as provided under the Act, so the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner has also got no force and is rejected. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed accordingly. _____________