Annamkutty v. Manager, United India Insurance Co. Ltd
2013-09-24
K.RAMAKRISHNAN, S.SIRI JAGAN
body2013
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment : Ramakrishnan, J. 1. The first claimant in O.P.(M.V).No.1204/05 on the files of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Perumbavoor, is the appellant herein. The appellant, along with her children, filed the application for compensation for the death of her son-Shibu, who died in a motor vehicle accident, caused on account of the rash and negligent driving of the vehicle by the driver of the vehicle, insured with the respondent-Insurance Company. After considering the evidence on record, the Tribunal found that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the vehicle by the driver of the vehicle, insured with the respondent and awarded a total compensation of Rs.1,69,750/- under various heads as follows : Head Amount Rs. Loss of dependency 144,000.00 Transportation expenses 2,500.00 Damage to clothings 250.00 Pain and sufferings 5,000.00 Loss of love and affection 15,000.00 Funeral expenses 3,000.00 Total 169,750.00 Dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation awarded, the appellant has come before this Court, with the above appeal. 2. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Standing Counsel for the Insurance Company. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the deceased-Shibu was working as an Electrician abroad and he was earning Rs.15,000/- per month, but the Tribunal has taken only Rs.3,000/-as notional income of the deceased, which is on the lower side. Further, the Tribunal has taken only 8 as the multiplier, reckoning the age of the dependant as the criterion for ascertaining the multiplier to award compensation under the head loss of dependency, which is incorrect, as the age of the deceased has to be reckoned for that purpose, in view of the dictum laid down in the decision reported in Amrit Bhanu Shali and others v. National Insurance Company Limited and others (2012 ACJ 2002). Further, the amounts awarded under the heads pain and suffering, transportation expenses, loss of love and affection, funeral expenses etc. are also on the lower side and no amount has been awarded under the head loss of estate. So, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, the appellant is entitled to get enhancement of compensation under all heads. 4.
Further, the amounts awarded under the heads pain and suffering, transportation expenses, loss of love and affection, funeral expenses etc. are also on the lower side and no amount has been awarded under the head loss of estate. So, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, the appellant is entitled to get enhancement of compensation under all heads. 4. On the other hand, the learned Standing Counsel for the Insurance Company submitted that for the purpose of awarding compensation under the head loss of dependency, the age of the deceased or the age of the dependants, whichever is higher, has to be adopted and in this case, the dependant being the mother, the Tribunal was perfectly justified in taking the age of the mother of the deceased for adopting the multiplier and there is no illegality committed by the Tribunal in this regard. The learned Standing Counsel relied on the decisions reported in K.S.R.T.C. v. Susamma Thomas (1994(1) KLT 67 (SC), UP State Road Transport Corporation v. Trilok Chandra (1996(2) KLT 218 (SC) and Mariyumma v. Govinda (2013(3) KLT 595), in support of his contentions. 5. We have considered the rival contentions of both parties in detail. 6. Since there are conflicting decisions regarding the question as to whether the age of the deceased or the age of the parents in the case of death of a bachelor, has to be considered, we thought that it is necessary to clarify the position, in the light of the subsequent decisions in this regard. 7. Normally, in an action on tort, while awarding compensation for death, what is to be reckoned, is the loss sustained by the dependants/legal representatives/legal heirs, on account of the death of the deceased. Further, the principle says that the amount awarded under the head loss of dependency will exhaust during the life time of the dependants and it should not go beyond that period. Further, in tort, the payment of compensation depends upon proof of negligence as well.
Further, the principle says that the amount awarded under the head loss of dependency will exhaust during the life time of the dependants and it should not go beyond that period. Further, in tort, the payment of compensation depends upon proof of negligence as well. But, by passage of time, there was a new thought sprouted that the life of a person has to be valued in terms of money and the dependants should not be deprived of their entitlement to get compensation on the death of their breadwinner on the basis of negligence and the theory of nofault liability was introduced under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, which transformed the common law remedy for getting compensation under tort into a statutory remedy in the case of death or bodily injury caused in a motor vehicle accident. Accordingly, Section 92A was introduced first in the year 1982, providing a minimum amount of compensation for the death and permanent disability caused to a person in a motor vehicle accident, irrespective of the negligence on his part. Subsequently, this was replaced by Section 140 of the Act, when Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was enacted, fixing the amount payable for death and permanent disability to Rs.25,000/- and Rs.12,500/- respectively, which were further enhanced to Rs.50,000/-and Rs.25,000/- respectively by Amendment Act 54 of 1994, which came into effect from 14.11.1994. By Amendment Act, 51/94, a new section - Section 163A was also introduced with a structured formula prescribed in the Second Schedule to the Act, providing compensation for the income group falling in the category mentioned in the Schedule, irrespective of proof of negligence with a view to provide compensation to low income group without having to prove negligence on the basis of the age and income of the deceased, fastening the burden of proving negligence on the opposite side in contra distinction to the necessity to prove negligence as contemplated under Common Law or under Section 166 of the Act. This provision was introduced with the object of providing compensation to the category mentioned therein and on the principle that none should be denied compensation on the ground of negligence, involving a motor vehicle in the public place and option has been given to the parties to claim compensation either under Section 166 or under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, but not under both.
This is a major deviation made in the field of tort under the Motor Vehicles Act. 8. In the decision reported in Nance v. British Columbia Electric Railway Company Limited (1951 AC 601), the principle of awarding compensation has been explained by the House of Lords, as follows : “Under the first head - indeed, for the purposes of both heads, it is necessary first to estimate what was the deceased man's expectation of life if he had not been killed when he was ; (let this be “x” years) and next what sums during these x years he would probably have applied to the support of his wife. In fixing x, regard must be had not only to his age and bodily health, but to the possibility of a premature determination of his life by a later accident. In estimating future provision for his wife, the amounts he usually applied in this way before his death are obviously relevant, and often, the best evidence available, though not conclusive, since if he had survived, his means might have expanded or shrunk, and his lberality might have grown or wilted.” 9. In the decisions reported in Gobald Motor Service Limited and another v. R.M.K.Veluswami and others (AIR 1962 SC 1), the Honourable Supreme Court has enumerated the guidelines for assessing the pecuniary loss to the dependant and the factors to be considered for that purpose as follows : “In calculating the pecuniary loss to the dependants, many imponderables enter into the calculation. Therefore, the actual extent of the pecuniary loss to the dependants may depend upon data, which cannot be ascertained accurately, but must necessarily be an estimate, or even partly a conjecture. Shortly stated, the general principle is that the pecuniary loss can be ascertained only by balancing on the one hand, the loss to the claimants of the future pecuniary benefit and on the other, any pecuniary advantage, which from whatever source comes to them by reason of the death, that is, the balance of loss and gain to a dependant by the death must be ascertained. The burden is certainly on the plaintiffs to establish the extent of their loss. When the courts below have, on relevant material placed before them, ascertained the said amount as damages, the Supreme Court cannot, in second appeal disturb the said finding except for compelling reasons.” 10.
The burden is certainly on the plaintiffs to establish the extent of their loss. When the courts below have, on relevant material placed before them, ascertained the said amount as damages, the Supreme Court cannot, in second appeal disturb the said finding except for compelling reasons.” 10. In the decision reported in Trilok Chandra's case (supra), a three Judges' Bench of the Honourable Supreme Court considered the question of applying the multiplier provided under the Act under the second schedule and the anomalies in that schedule and said that the multiplier need not exceed 18, at any rate. In the same decision, it has been observed that the selection of multiplier cannot, in all cases, be solely dependent on the age of the deceased. For example, if the deceased, who is a bachelor, dies at the age of 45 and his dependants are his parents, the age of the parents is also relevant in the choice of the multiplier. 11. In the decision reported in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Subhagwanti (AIR 1966 SC 1750), the mode of assessment of damages in the case of fatal accidents, has been discussed in paragraph 6 of the judgment as follows : “6. The last question is regarding the quantum of damages which requires separate consideration in each case. Section 1 of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 (Act XIII of 1855) reads: "Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, the party who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action or suit for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony or other crime.
Every such action or suit shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child, if any of the person whose death shall have been so caused and shall be brought by and in the name of the executor, administrator or representative of the person deceased; and in every such action the Court may give such damages as it may think proportioned to the loss resulting from such death to the parties respectively, for whom and for whose benefit such action shall be brought; and the amount so recovered, after deducting all costs and expenses, including the costs not recovered from the Defendant, shall be divided amongst the before mentioned parties, or any of them, in such shares as the Court by its judgment or decree shall direct.'' This section is in substance a reproduction of the English Fatal Accidents Acts, 9 and 10 Vict., Ch. 93, known as the Lord Campbell's Acts. The scope of the corresponding provisions of the English Fatal Accidents Acts has been discussed by the House of Lords in Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd., 1942 AC 601. At p. 617 of the Report, Lord Wright has stated the legal position as follows: "It is a hard matter of pounds, shillings and pence, subject to the element of reasonable future probabilities.The starting point is the amount of wages which the deceased was earning, the ascertainment of which to some extent may depend upon the regularity of his employment. Then there is an estimate of how much was required or expended for his own personal and living expenses. The balance will give a datum or basic figure which will generally be turned into lump sum by taking a certain number of years' purchase. That sum, however, has to be taxed down by having due regard to uncertainties, for instance, that the widow might have again married and thus ceased to be dependent, and other like matters of speculation and doubt.'' The same principle has been reiterated by Viscount Simon in Nance v. British Columbia Electric Railway Co. Ltd., 1951- AC 601.In the present case there is evidence that Ram Prakash deceased was 30 years old at the time of the accident, his widow Subhagwanti being aged about 28 and his son 14 and daughters 12 and 2 years old.
Ltd., 1951- AC 601.In the present case there is evidence that Ram Prakash deceased was 30 years old at the time of the accident, his widow Subhagwanti being aged about 28 and his son 14 and daughters 12 and 2 years old. The evidence adduced regarding the income of Ram Parkash and the amount of loss caused to his widow and children was not satisfactory but the High Court considered that the widow and children must have been receiving at least a monthly sum of Rs. 150 for their subsistence and for the education of the children from the deceased Ram Parkash. The income was capitalised for a period of 15 years and the amount of Rs. 27,000 which was arrived at was more than what the trial Court had awarded. The High Court accordingly saw no reason for reducing the amount of damages awarded by the trial Court. In the case of Tek Chand and his four children, the High Court has estimated that the pecuniary loss caused by the death of his wife should be taken to be Rs. 40 p.m. and if a period of 15 years is taken for the purpose of calculating the total sum, the amount will come to Rs. 7,200. Lastly, in the case of Kuldip Raj, the High Court has calculated the pecuniary loss at the rate of Rs. 50 p.m. and the amount of damages calculated for a period of 15 years would come to Rs. 9,000. In our opinion, the High Court has applied the correct principle in estimation of the damages in all the three appeals and learned Counsel has been unable to show that the judgment of the High Court on this aspect of the case is vitiated for any reason. 12. In the decision reported in Susamma Thomas's case (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court has held that the multiplier method is the best policy for assessing compensation and what is required to be awarded under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, is a just and reasonable compensation and multiplier method is the accepted method for ensuring a just compensation, which will make uniformity and certainty of the awards and laid down the following principles in paragraph 6 of the judgment, relying on the English decisions, as follows : “6.
In a fatal action, the accepted measure of damages awarded to the dependants is the pecuniary loss suffered by them as a result of the death. “How much has the widow and family lost by the father's death?”. The answer to this lies in the oft-quoted passage from the opinion of Lord Wright in Davies and anr. v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd. (1942) Appeal Cases 601 at 617 which says : “The starting point is the amount of wages which the deceased was earning, the ascertainment of which, to some extent may depend on the regularity of his employment. Then, there is an estimate of how much was required or expended for his own personal and living expenses. The balance will give a datum or basic figure which will generally be turned into a lump sum by taking a certain number of years' purchase. That sum, however, has to be taxed down by having due regard to uncertainties, for instance, that the widow might have again married and thus ceased to be dependant and other like matters of speculation and doubt.” The measure of damage is the pecuniary loss suffered and is likely to be suffered by each dependant. Thus “except where there is express statutory direction to the contrary, the damages to be awarded to a dependant of a deceased person under the Fatal Accidents Acts must take into account any pecuniary benefit accruing to that dependant in consequence of the death of the deceased. It is the net loss on balance which constitutes the measure of damages.” (Per Lord Macmillan in Davies v. Powell [(1942) AC 601 AT 509]). Lord Wright in the same case said : “The actual pecuniary loss of each individual entitled to sue can only be ascertained by balancing on the one hand, the loss to him of the future pecuniary benefit, and on the other, any pecuniary advantage which from whatever source comes to him by reason of the death”. These words of Lord Wright were adopted as the principle applicable also under the Indian Act in Gobald Motor Service Ltd & Anr., Allahabad v. R.M.K.Veluswami & Ors.
These words of Lord Wright were adopted as the principle applicable also under the Indian Act in Gobald Motor Service Ltd & Anr., Allahabad v. R.M.K.Veluswami & Ors. (AIR 1962 SC 1) where the Supreme Court stated that the general principle is that the actual pecuniary loss can be ascertained only by balancing on the one hand the loss to the claimants of the future pecuniary benefit and on the other any pecuniary advantage which from whatever source comes to them by reason of the death, that is, the balance of loss and gain to a dependant by the death, must be ascertained.” 13. In the decision reported in Sarla Varma v. Delhi Transport Corporation (2010(2) KLT 802 (SC), the Honourable Supreme Court had considered all the decisions, including the one in Susamma Thomas's and Trilok Chandra's cases (supra) and evolved a formula for adopting the multiplier for each age group. The Honourable Supreme Court has considered in that decision, three criteria for assessing the compensation in the case of death as (1) the age of the deceased, (2) the income of the deceased and (3) the number of dependants of the deceased and while arriving at the compensation for loss of dependency, (1) additions/deductions to be made for arriving at the income, (2) the deduction to be made towards personal living of the deceased and (3) the multiplier to be adopted with reference to the age of the deceased as the formula to be adopted for assessing compensation in the case of death under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. While considering the loss of monthly dependency, the Honourable Supreme Court has considered the age of the deceased, the status of the deceased as to whether he is a bachelor or married and the character of the dependants such as parents, wife and children etc and on that basis, observed that in the case of bachelors where parents are the only dependants claiming compensation, then, 50% of the income of the deceased has to be deducted for his personal expenses and the balance alone can be treated as the loss of dependency as far as the dependants are concerned.
Further, in the same decision, the Honourable Supreme Court has also considered as to how the multiplier has to be adopted in the case of children below 15 years and the persons between the age of 15 and 25 years. So, the Honourable Supreme Court, in this decision, on the basis of assessment of all these things and after taking into consideration the method by which the multiplier was adopted in several previous decisions including Trilok Chandra's and Susamma's cases (supra), evolved a formula for assessing the compensation, taking into consideration the age of the deceased alone as the criterion for assessing the compensation irrespective of the status of the dependants, viz., whether only the parents are the dependants or the dependants consist of the parents, wife and children as well. 14. For the purpose of assessing compensation, three steps were provided under paragraph 19 of that decision as follows : “19. To have uniformity and consistency, Tribunals should determine compensation in cases of death, by the following well settled steps : Step 1 (Ascertaining the multiplicand) The income of the deceased per annum should be determined. Out of the said income, a deduction should be made in regard to the amount which the deceased would have spent on himself by way of personal and living expenses. The balance, which is considered to be the contribution to the dependant family, constitutes the multiplicand. Step 2 (Ascertaining the multiplier) Having regard to the age of the deceased and period of active career, the appropriate multiplier should be selected. This does not mean ascertaining the number of years he would have lived or worked but for the accident. Having regard to several imponderables in life and economic factors, a table of multipliers with reference to the age has been identified by this Court. The multiplier should be chosen from the said table with reference to the age of the deceased. Step 3 (Actual calculation) The annual contribution to the family (multiplicand) when multiplied by such multiplier gives the 'loss of dependency' to the family.” Further, a table has been given in the same decision, showing the multiplier to be adopted for a particular age group, taking into consideration the age of the deceased as the criterion for assessing compensation.
Step 3 (Actual calculation) The annual contribution to the family (multiplicand) when multiplied by such multiplier gives the 'loss of dependency' to the family.” Further, a table has been given in the same decision, showing the multiplier to be adopted for a particular age group, taking into consideration the age of the deceased as the criterion for assessing compensation. So, it cannot be said that the Honourable Supreme Court in Sarla Varma's case has not considered the decision in Trilok Chandra's case (supra) for evolving the formula for assessing the compensation by providing a table showing the multiplier to be adopted in the case of death of persons in motor vehicle accidents. That was done with a view to synchronise the anomaly in the pattern of compensation provided in the second schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act for awarding compensation under Sections 163A and 166 of the Act. Further, in the said decision, the Honourable Supreme Court has considered the amount to be added for future prospects and given a formula as to whom such formula can be applied and the percentage to be added for that purpose. 15. The formula adopted by the Honourable Supreme Court in Sarla Varma's case (supra) was considered by a Three Judges' Bench of the Honourable Supreme Court in Reshmakumari v. Madan Mohan (2013(2) KLT 304 (SC) and approved the same, summarising the formula to be adopted, in paragraph 40 of the decision as follows : “40. In what we have discussed above, we sum up our conclusions as follows : (i) In the applications for compensation made under S.166 of the 1988 Act in death cases, where the age the deceased is 15 years and above, the Claims Tribunals shall select the multiplier as indicated in Column (4) of the table prepared in Sarla Varma (2010 (2) KLT 802 (SC) = (2009) 6 SCC 121) read with para 42 of that judgment. (ii) In cases where the age of the deceased is upto 15 years, irrespective of the S.166 or S.163A under which the claim for compensation has been made, multiplier of 15 and the assessment as indicated in the Second Schedule subject to correction as pointed out in Column (6) of the table in Sarla Varma (2010 (2) KLT 802 (SC) = (2009) 6 SCC 121) should be followed.
(iii) As a result of the above, while considering the claim applications made under S.166 in death cases where the age of the deceased is above 15 years, there is no necessity for the Claims Tribunals to seek guidance or for placing reliance on the Second Schedule in the 1988 Act. (iv) The Claims Tribunals shall follow the steps and guidelines stated in para 19 of Sarla Varma (2010 (2) KLT 802 (SC) = (2009) 6 SCC 121) for determination of compensation in cases of death. (v) While making addition to income for future prospects, the Tribunals shall follow paragraph 24 of the judgment in Sarla Varma (2010 (2) KLT 802 (SC) = (2009) 6 SCC 121) (vi) While making addition to income for future prospects, the Tribunals shall follow paragraph 24 of the Judgment in Sarla Varma (2010 (2) KLT 802 (SC) = (2009) 6 SCC 121) subject to the observations made by us in para 38 above. (vii) The above propositions mutatis mutandis shall apply to all pending matters where above aspects are under consideration.” 16. In this case also, the Honourable Supreme Court has considered the decisions reported in Susamma Thomas's and Trilok Chandra's cases (supra) and approved the method adopted by the Honourable Supreme Court in Sarla Varma's case (supra). So, it cannot be said that the principles laid down in Trilok Chandra's case were not considered by the subsequent three Judges' Bench decision of the Honourable Supreme Court while evolving the formula for awarding compensation in the case of death under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. When the age of the deceased was taken into consideration, for the purpose of adopting the multiplier, it cannot be said that the Honourable Supreme Court has not considered the longevity of the dependants also as a criterion for fixing the compensation. It is after taking all those aspects into consideration that the Honourable Supreme Court, in Sarla Varma's case, as approved in Reshmakumari's case, found that in order to have a uniformity in awarding the compensation, the age of the deceased is the only criterion to be considered for assessing the compensation and all other aspects can be considered including the contribution to the family etc, taking into consideration, the status of the dependants namely, whether the dependants are only the parents or they consist of parents, wife and children or other dependants etc.
So, balance has been struck for assessing the loss of dependency, without considering the status of dependants by taking the age of the deceased for adopting the multiplier without considering the age of the dependants, so as to give a uniformity in assessing the compensation. 17. Though, in the decision reported in National Insurance Company v. Shyam Singh (2011 SC 3231), the Honourable Supreme Court has held that for determining the multiplier, the age of the dependants has to be considered and not the age of the deceased, this decision has not considered the principles laid down in Sarla Varma's case (supra). Subsequent to this decision, a three Judges' Bench of the Honourable Supreme Court and Reshmakumari's case (supra) approved the method of determining the multiplier in the case of death as evolved in Sarla Verma's case. Further, in the decision reported in Amrit Bhanu Shali's case, another two Bench decision of the Honourable Supreme Court has, after considering the decision reported in Trilok Chandra's case (supra) has stated that the age of the deceased has to be considered for determining the multiplier, irrespective of the age of the dependants. The reason for the same has been explained in paragraph 17 of the decision in Amrit Bhanu Shali's case (supra) as follows : “17. The selection of multiplier is based on the age of the deceased and not on the basis of the age of the dependant. There may be a number of dependants of the deceased whose age may be different and, therefore, the age of dependants has no nexus with the computation of compensation.” 18. It is true that in Mariyumma's case (supra), a Division Bench of this Court has stated that the age of the dependant also has relevance in deciding the quantum of compensation and in that decision, it has been reiterated that for fixing the multiplier, the age of the deceased or that of the dependants, whichever is higher, has to be considered and the decision in Sarla Varma's case (supra) has not watered down the principle enunciated in Trilok Chandra's case on this aspect.
In that decision, though Sarla Varma's case was referred to, it has not considered the decisions reported in Reshmakumari and Amrit Bhanu Shali (supra), in which, it has been categorically held that the age of the deceased alone need be considered for determining the multiplier, after considering the decision reported in Trilok Chandra's case and approved the principles laid down in Sarla Verma's case (supra) in this regard. 19. The binding nature of conflicting views rendered by different Benches of the Supreme Court has been considered in the decision reported in Raman Gopi v. Kunju Raman Uthaman (2011(4) 458 KLT (FB), wherein, it has been observed as follows : “When confronted with a like situation wherein the decisions of co-equal benches are of conflicting nature on a legal issue, the law laid down by the Full Bench in Joseph's case (2001(1) KLT 958(FB) will have to be followed. The later decision will prevail. A decision of the Apex Court on a declaration of law is binding on all High Courts and subordinate courts, in the light of Art.141 of the Constitution. Of course, what is relevant is the ratio decidendi. The judgments of the Apex Court which have followed the binding decisions of the Constitution Bench or other Benches will thus be binding on other courts. The only exception pointed out is wherein a Bench of smaller strength did not follow an earlier binding decision in a situation wherein the binding decisions of the earlier benches of the Apex Court are not brought to its notice. It is apparent that in such cases, the decision of the Bench of smaller strength will be without the colour of a binding precedent under Art.141 of the Constitution. It may not be proper for the High Courts or subordinate courts to criticise and characterise a decision of the Apex Court which has laid down a point of law as per incurium. Such is not the function of the High Court or subordinate courts.” 20.
It may not be proper for the High Courts or subordinate courts to criticise and characterise a decision of the Apex Court which has laid down a point of law as per incurium. Such is not the function of the High Court or subordinate courts.” 20. It is clear from the above dicta that when conflicting decisions have been rendered by the co-equal Benches of the Supreme Court and if the decision of the earlier Bench has been considered in the later decision, then, the later decision will prevail and the subordinate court including the High Court, while relying on the decision of the Apex Court, is not competent to say that any one of the decisions is not correct as it will affect the judicial discipline in the hierarchy of courts. 21. So, when a subsequent decision of the Apex Court has considered all the aspects including the principles laid down in the earlier decisions of the same Court including the larger bench decisions on this aspect and evolved a new principle, then, they are binding on the subordinate courts. The decision in Reshmakumari's case (supra), is a three Bench decision of the Supreme Court, which approved the principle evolved in Sarla Varma's case (supra) where Trilok Chandra's case was considered and later, the two Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Amrit Bhanu Shali's case also considered Trilok Chandra's case and following Sarla Varma's case, held that the age of the deceased alone has to be taken for adopting the multiplier for compensation in the case of death. These two subsequent decisions of the Apex Court were not considered by the Division Bench of this Court in Mariyumma's case (supra). Under such circumstances and in view of the discussions made above and also in view of the authoritative pronouncement made by the Honourable Supreme Court regarding the multiplier to be adopted in the case of death under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, it is the age of the deceased that has to be taken into consideration and not that of the dependants for determining the multiplier.
So, the submission made by the learned counsel for the Insurance Company that when the age of the dependant is higher than the age of the deceased, then, the former has to be taken into consideration for determining the multiplier, has no substance and the same is liable to be rejected. 22. Then, the next question to be considered is whether the appellant is entitled to get enhancement of compensation under any of the heads as claimed by the counsel for the appellant. Though the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Tribunal went wrong in fixing the monthly income of the deceased as Rs.3,000/-, on going through the discussions of the Tribunal in this regard, it is clear that the Tribunal has considered all the aspects, while arriving at such a conclusion. Though it was alleged that the deceased was working in Bahrain and getting Rs.9,000/- per month, there is no acceptable evidence adduced to prove this fact. Further, it is an accepted principle that the income of a person working in a foreign country, cannot be taken as such for the purpose of calculating the monthly income of the deceased as he will have to incur more expenses for his personal purpose there as the cost of living is more. Further, we will have to consider the Indian conditions and what would have been the wages payable to such a person, if he had worked in India in similar job for the purpose of assessing compensation, in the case of death of such persons. Further, the uncertainties in their employment in foreign countries, is also one of the factors to be considered for not taking the income of the deceased in foreign countries for assessing the monthly income of the deceased. Under such circumstances, the Tribunal was perfectly justified in notionally fixing Rs.3,000/- as the monthly income of the deceased. But, the Tribunal has taken 8 as the multiplier, considering the age of the dependant, who is the mother of the deceased, for determining the multiplier, which is not correct in view of the discussions made above.
Under such circumstances, the Tribunal was perfectly justified in notionally fixing Rs.3,000/- as the monthly income of the deceased. But, the Tribunal has taken 8 as the multiplier, considering the age of the dependant, who is the mother of the deceased, for determining the multiplier, which is not correct in view of the discussions made above. For the age group of 31 years, as per the decision in Sarla Varma's case (supra), as approved in Reshmakumari's case (supra), the proper multiplier to be applied is 16 and if 16 is taken as the multiplier, then, the appellant will be entitled to get Rs.2,88,000/- (3000 x 12 x 16 x ½) as compensation under the head loss of dependency instead of Rs.1,44,000/- awarded by the Tribunal under that head and we award the said amount under that head. No amount is awarded under the head loss of estate and we award a conventional amount of Rs.5,000/- under that head. Since the amounts awarded under other heads appear to be just and reasonable, we are not inclined to enhance any amounts under other heads. 23. In all, the appellant will be entitled to get an additional compensation of Rs.1,49,000/-, over and above what has been awarded by the Tribunal, which, the respondent- Insurance Company is liable to pay with 9% interest per annum from the date of the claim petition till the date of payment. Two months' time is granted to the Insurance Company to make the payment. We make it clear that we are not interfering with the finding of the court below that the Insurance Company is entitled to recover the amount from the 2nd respondent under Section 149(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act and they are entitled to recover this amount also from the insured-2nd respondent. With the above modification of the impugned award, the appeal is disposed of.