Judgment : 1. The petitioners in these interlocutory applications were the respondents in A.S.No.254/1991. The suit was instituted by the appellants for recovery of possession on the strength of title. They contended in the suit that initially rent control proceedings had been initiated in which it was found that the denial of title by the tenant of the title of the landlord was bonafide and they had been relegated to a suit. 2. In the plaint they pointed out that the defendants are tenants under them and it was on that basis the eviction was sought for. Out of the several defendants the 1st defendant alone contested the suit. The others remained ex parte. The 1st defendant contended that he alone had rights over suit property and he disputed the tenancy arrangement pleaded in the plaint and set up title in himself. To be more precise he contended that he had perfected his titled by adverse possession and limitation and plaintiff no longer had any subsisting title. It is significant to notice that even in the rent control petition, the case se up by the 1st defendant/tenant who was characterised as a tenant by the landlord was not that though he was a tenant, the petitioner was not his landlord but the title vested in somebody else. His definite stand was that he had absolute title over the property and nobody else had any right over the suit property and he was not a tenant at all under anybody. 3. In the suit again the 1st defendant reiterated his claim of title in his favour and denied title of the plaintiff. Even though the plaintiffs in the suit alleged that the contesting defendant as the tenant the 1st defendant who alone had contested did not accept that allegation and contended that he was not a tenant at all under anybody and the suit property belonged exclusively to him. He maintained the same stand as in rent control proceedings. 4. It is seen that the trial court did not raise an issue as to whether the 1st defendant was the tenant of the suit property. 5. The trial court on an appreciation of evidence in the suit found that even though the plaintiffs had title to the suit property, that has been lost by adverse possession and limitation and accordingly dismissed the suit. 6. 5. The trial court on an appreciation of evidence in the suit found that even though the plaintiffs had title to the suit property, that has been lost by adverse possession and limitation and accordingly dismissed the suit. 6. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree, the plaintiffs filed A.S.No.254/1991 before this Hon’ble court. This Court found that the lower appellate court had erred in applying Article 64 to the suit and that the Article that was applicable is Article 65 of the Limitation Act. If that be so this court held that once the plaintiffs proved their title to the suit property, burden shifts to the defendants to prove that the plaintiffs have lost title by adverse possession and limitation. On a consideration of the evidence it was found that the predecessor-in-interest of the 1st defendant through whom he claimed title at best could be only a licensee and the possession of the 1st defendant could not be better. Finding that the plea of adverse possession had not been established this court decreed the suit. 7. Long thereafter I.A.No.2360/2012 was filed by respondents 2 to 5 pointing out that after the death of the 1st defendant the legal heirs who were sought to be impleaded had engaged a counsel and their counsel was not heard in the appeal and the matter needs to be re-heard. The petition was opposed by the respondents who pointed out several facts which according to them would show that there was no bonafides in the claim. After considering the rival contentions this court accepted the plea put forwarded by the respondents in the petition and found that a re-hearing was not called for. However this court felt that in the light of the legal issue raised before this court, an opportunity ought to be given to the petitioners herein to agitate the said issue. 8. Though this court refused to treat I.A.No.2360/2012 as a re-hearing petition this court considered it as a petition for review to a limited extent of considering the question whether this court had erred in decreeing the suit over looking the second proviso to Section 11(1) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. 9. Referring to the plaint in the suit and to various documents the learned senior counsel Adv. Sri. 9. Referring to the plaint in the suit and to various documents the learned senior counsel Adv. Sri. Balakrishna Iyer appearing for the petitioners in I.A.No.2360/2012 referring the plaint, documents and definition of title contended that the very case of the plaintiffs was that the defendants were tenants and if that be so on finding that the plaintiffs had title to the suit property, it follows that the second proviso to Section 11 (1) is attracted and eviction could have been ordered only on one of the grounds enumerated under the Rent Control Act namely Act of 2 of 1965. The learned senior counsel pointed out that even in the plaint it was specifically stated that suit was a result of the finding in the rent control proceedings that denial of title of the landlord is bonafide. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners Act 2 of 1965 is a complete Code in itself and admits of no exception. If that be so the decree passed by this court granting eviction purely on the basis of title without referring to any of the ground enumerated under the Act 2 of 1965 for eviction cannot be sustained and that constitutes an error apparent on the face of record. In support of his contention the learned counsel relied on the decisions reported in Appukuttan v. Vasu [1978 KLT 776], Puwada Venkateswara Rao v. Chidamana Venkata Ramana [AIR 1976 SC 869], Ibrayan v. Balan [1985 KLT 896], M/s East India Corporation Ltd. v. Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. [AIR 1991 SC 1094]. 10. It was also very vehemently contended that the findings of the court that the predecessors in interest of the 1st defendant and 1st defendant could be at best be treated only as licensee is a case which none of the parties had, and that finding was not warranted. 11. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners also pointed out that, by way of abundant caution he has moved an application for amendment of the written statement incorporating that the defendants admitted tenancy arrangement pleaded in the plaint in fact they accept the claim put forward by the plaintiffs and it is pointed out that for the proper decision in the suit the amendment sought for in this case is necessary. Mere delay by itself is not a ground to reject the amendment application. Mere delay by itself is not a ground to reject the amendment application. For the said proposition the learned counsel relied on a decision reported in State Bank of Hyderabad v. Town Municipal Council [(2007) 1 SCC 765]. It was also contended that by the amendment sought for, no prejudice is caused to the plaintiffs since the defendants are only admitting the allegation and praying for a decree be passed in terms thereof. 12. Adv. Sri. Kurian George Kannanthanam learned senior counsel on the other hand contended that there is absolutely no merit in any of the contentions raised by the petitioners. According to the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents it is noteworthy that the 1st defendant alone had contested the suit and he alone had contested the appeal also. His definite case both in the rent control petition as well as suit was that except him none else had any manner of rights over the suit property. He had not filed the written statement for and on behalf of the other defendants also. His specific case was that he was not a tenant at all under anybody and that he had exclusive title to the suit property. The learned counsel also pointed out that in fact the trial court did raise an issue regarding the status of the 1st defendant and came to the conclusion that he has perfected his title by adverse possession and limitation as against the plaintiffs and thereby the suit was dismissed. The learned counsel pointed out that one cannot be a title holder and the tenant of the property at the same time. 13. The learned senior counsel then pointed out that, throughout the rent control proceedings the stand of the 1st defendant who was the only contesting party in the rent control petition and on whose contention the respondents herein were relegated to the suit was that he was not a tenant under anybody and there was no landlord – tenant relationship between him or with anybody much less than the petitioners in the rent control petition. He was the owner of the property. It was not a plea of jus tertii in the rent control proceedings as well as in the suit but the 1st defendant claimed exclusive title to suit property. It was that contention which was considered both in rent control proceedings and also in the suit. 14. He was the owner of the property. It was not a plea of jus tertii in the rent control proceedings as well as in the suit but the 1st defendant claimed exclusive title to suit property. It was that contention which was considered both in rent control proceedings and also in the suit. 14. Though the trial court found in favour of the 1st defendant this Court in appeal accepted the case of the plaintiffs and decreed the suit. Attention was drawn by the learned senior counsel to the fact that the present attempt to show that this court had omitted to notice the second proviso to Section 11(1) of the Act 2 of 1965 cannot stand scrutiny for the simple reason that at no point of time it was either admitted or found that the 1st defendant was a tenant. The position would have been different according to the learned counsel had the 1st defendant set up a case that though he is a tenant, the petitioners in the rent control petition were not the landlord or in other words he could have set up title in somebody else but instead he set up a title in himself whereby he has shed his character as a tenant if at all he had any such character earlier and adorned the mantle of owner of the property. Having adopted such a stand and persisted with the same throughout, it is too late in the day for the petitioners to contend now that in the suit eviction could have been ordered only on any of the grounds in Act 2 of 1965. 15. As regards the amendment application it is contended that the amendment application is misconceived and ill advised. The learned counsel pointed out that what is sought to be amended is the written statement filed by the 1st defendant who at no point of time had a case that he was a tenant of that building or that there was any landlord-tenant relationship between him and any person. It is also pointed out by the learned senior counsel that the petitioners before this court are in the capacity of legal heirs of the 1st defendant and if that be so they cannot take an inconsistent and holding contradictory defence to the one taken by the 1st defendant and they are bound by the stand taken by the 1st defendant. The learned senior counsel emphasised that the written statement filed by the 1st defendant was not on behalf of other defendants also but agitating his individual rights in derogation of the right of other defendants. Viewed in that angle the amendment application has to fail apart from the long delay in seeking this amendment. According to the learned counsel the amendment is not so innocuous as is sought to be projected but changes the very character of the defence and the petitioners attempting are attempting to set up entirely a new defence. 16. It must be said that there is considerable force in both the contentions raised by the learned senior counsel for the respondents in this petition. It is true that the respondents in this petition did prosecute rent control proceedings contending that the 1st defendant in the suit was a tenant. The specific contention taken by the 1st defendant in the rent control proceedings was that he was not a tenant under anybody and he was a title holder of the suit property in question. The rent control court found the denial of title to the bonafide and relegated the parties to the suit. That is how the suit came to be filed. 17. In the suit also the plaintiffs specifically alleged that the 1st defendant and others were tenants of the suit property and they are liable to be evicted. As already noticed the only 1st defendant contested the suit and in his written statement his specific averment was that he is not a tenant that the suit property belongs exclusively to him. It is significant to note that he did not admit any right in favour of other defendants and as rightly pointed out by the learned senior counsel for respondents herein be claimed right in derogation of right of other defendants. He also contended that the plaintiffs had no title over the suit property. The trial court did raise an issue as regards the status of the 1st defendant. After elaborate consideration of the materials the trial court came to the conclusion that though the plaintiffs had title to the suit property that had been lost by adverse possession and limitation taking the view that Article 64 applied to the facts of the case and it was for the plaintiffs to show that they were in possession within 12 years of the suit. The plaintiffs having failed to establish the said fact, the suit was dismissed. 18. This court in appeal found that Article 64 has no application and it was the Article 65 which applied to the facts of the case. In that view of the matter this court after finding title in favour of plaintiffs had occasion to consider whether the contesting defendant had established his claim for adverse possession and limitation and found that he had failed to do so. This Court concluded on the basis of evidence that predecessor in interest of 1st defendant was only in permissive occupation and the right if any of contesting defendants could be higher or better. After having found that the plaintiff had title to the suit property and the contesting 1st defendant failed to establish his claim of adverse possession and limitation, this court has necessarily to ascertain the nature of possession of the contesting defendant. It was in that context the court found the predecessors in interest of 1st defendant could at best be only a licensee and the character of the 1st defendant cannot be better. The learned senior counsel for the petitioners does not appear to be justified at all in criticising this court for observing so by stating that this court had created a new case which none of the parties had. It was also found that neither the contesting defendant or his predecessor had at any time indicated either actively or passively that they were holding the property in derogation of the rights of the plaintiffs to their knowledge. 19. Coming to the contentions now raised, on a reading of the second proviso to Section 11 (1) it can be seen that it applies only when it is either admitted or established that there is a landlord-tenant relationship between the parties. It reads as follows: “11. Eviction of tenants.- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract a tenant shall not be evicted, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this Act. It reads as follows: “11. Eviction of tenants.- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract a tenant shall not be evicted, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this Act. x x x x x x provided further that where the tenant denies the title of the landlord or claims right of permanent tenancy, the Rent Control Court shall decide whether the denial or claim is bona fide and if it records a finding to that effect, the landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a Civil Court and such Court may pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in this section, notwithstanding that the Court finds that such denial does not involve forfeiture of the lease or that the claim is unfounded.” 20. It may be useful at this point to consider the decisions referred to by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners. In the decision reported in M/s. East India Corporation Ltd. v. Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. [AIR 1991 SC 1094], it is no doubt true that it was held that rent control court is a complete Code in itself and that the eviction even in resultant suit can be ordered only on one of the grounds enumerated under the Rent Control Act. 21. A reading of the decision shows that it was a case where initially the building in question was exempted from the provisions of the Act. But during the pendency of the suit the Act was made applicable but in the meanwhile a decree for eviction had been passed in the suit over title. The decree was challenged before the apex court as null and void and as having no legal effect in view of the applicability of Rent Control Act that since the exception was found to be limited. It was contended on behalf of the respondents that they decree cannot be treated as null and void but it remained under an eclipse to revive the moment the rent control enactment is withdrawn from the area or cases to be applicable to the building or the area. 22. It was contended on behalf of the respondents that they decree cannot be treated as null and void but it remained under an eclipse to revive the moment the rent control enactment is withdrawn from the area or cases to be applicable to the building or the area. 22. Rejecting the contention raised by the respondents the Apex court held that once the Rent Control Act is made applicable to the area, the decree passed becomes null and void and it cannot survive. It was also held that once the Rent Control Act is made applicable then an eviction can be sought for by way of a suit only if the rent control court finds the denial of title as bonafide and relegates the parties to a suit. Without undergoing that course it was held by the apex court that a suit is not maintainable. In the decision reported in Ibrayan v. Balan [1985 KLT 896] it was held as follows: “6. The second proviso to S.11(1) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 2 of 1965 reads: “Provided further that where the tenant denies the title of the landlord or claims rights of permanent tenancy, the Rent Control Court shall decide whether the denial or claim is bonafide and if it records a finding to that effect, the landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a civil court and such court may pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in this section, notwithstanding that court finds that such denial does not involve forfeiture of the lease or that the claim is unfounded. The supreme court has held in Pawada Venkateswara v. C.V. Ramana, A.I.R. 1976 S.C.869 that the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 15 of 1960 which provides a procedure for eviction of tenants is a self-contained statute and the provisions of S.100 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 cannot be invoked. Following the above decision of the Supreme Court a Full Bench of this Court has held in Lalitha v. Ayisumma, 1977 K.L.T. 587 that the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 2 of 1965 is a complete Code in itself. Such a conclusion is inevitable because of the long title and the preamble of the Kerala Act 2 of 1965. Such a conclusion is inevitable because of the long title and the preamble of the Kerala Act 2 of 1965. Over and above this, the non obstante clause which forms the opening words of S.11(1) also insists that ‘a tenant shall not be evicted, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, except in accordance with the provisions of this Act.’ In the normal course the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for eviction of a tenant of a building to which Act 2 of 1965 applies, because that is a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Rent Control Court constituted under the Act. Only under the second proviso to S.11(1) of the Act the civil court gets jurisdiction to try and decide a case for eviction of a tenant from a building to which the provisions of Act 2 of 1965 apply. But in that case the clear interdiction in the proviso that ‘such court may pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in this Section’ cannot be given the goby by the civil court. So no question of granting an eviction on the strength of the title of the plaintiff-owner of the building arises as long as the tenant is a person inducted by the owner or somebody on his behalf on a rental arrangement. Such a person occupying a building on payment of rent cannot be thrown out on the lame excuse that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant with him and the actual owner. The position may be different if the occupant is a rank trespasser. In this case the appellants were inducted as tenants by the persons who were in possession of the building on behalf of the owner who was then serving in the army. In view of the fact that the Rent Control legislation is a complete code in itself S.111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act cannot be invoked to turn the tables on the appellants tenants because there will be no forfeiture of the lease to make the tenant liable to be thrown out as he can take shelter under the Kerala Act 2 of 1965.” 23. The facts of the case show that in the rent control petition filed against the tenant, the tenant though admitted the tenancy arrangement disputed the title of the petitioners in the petition and they set up title in a third person. That dispute of title was found to be valid and the parties were relegated to a suit. In the suit the petitioners in the rent control petition sought eviction on the strength of title. The trial court decreed the suit upholding the title and without applying the provisions of the Rent Control Act. It was in that context it was held that the decree cannot be sustained because the second proviso to Section 11 (1) applies. The facts of the case show the tenant in the rent control petition itself had admitted that he is a tenant but only disputed the title of the petitioners in that petition. It is not a case where the tenant had disowned landlord-tenant relationship and set up title in himself. 24. Even in the above decision is reported in Ibrayan v. Balan [1985 KLT 896] this court was cautious to say that even though second proviso to Section 11(2) is applicable to the facts of that case, that many not be so in case where the occupier of the property is a rank trespasser. In the decision reported in Puwada Venkateswara Rao v. Chidamanan Venkata Ramana [AIR 1976 SC 869], the issued raised was regarding the necessity to issue notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act for seeking eviction under the Rent Control Act. The apex court held that the Rent Control Act being a self contained Act, the requirements of the Transfer of Property Act cannot be imported in it for seeking eviction and held that notice under Section 106 was not necessary. In the decision reported in Appukuttan v. Vasu [1978 KLT 7761 it was held that if there is a landlord –tenant relationship either established or admitted by the parties then even in a suit, on title, eviction can be ordered only under one of the grounds under the Rent Control Act. In the decision reported in Lelitha v. Ayissumma [1977 KLT 587 (F.B.)] the main issue considered was the necessity for a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act to seek eviction under the Rent Control Act. In the decision reported in Lelitha v. Ayissumma [1977 KLT 587 (F.B.)] the main issue considered was the necessity for a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act to seek eviction under the Rent Control Act. This court also held that a Rent Control Act is a self contained Code and the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act cannot apply in seeking eviction under the Rent Control Act. 25. It could thus be seen that in cases where this court held that the second proviso to Section 11(1) applies were cases where the parties concerned admitted the tenancy relationship but disputed the title of the landlord petitioners in the rent control proceedings. The learned senior counsel for the petitioners herein did not cite any decision wherein it was held that inspite of the fact that tenants had set up title in themselves and had disputed any landlord-tenant relationship when the Rent Control Court relegated the parties to a suit finding denial of title to be bonafide in the suit thereafter eviction could be ordered only under one of the grounds under the Act 2 of 1965. 26. In fact the question as to what would be the position when the tenant disputes the very tenancy itself and set up title in his favour was considered in the decision reported in Nafeesu v. Hajrabi [1992 (1) KLT 554]. That was a case where the tenant disputed the landlord-tenant relationship and set up title in his favour. The tenant had not admitted at any point of time his occupation of the premises was as a tenant. This court after considering the various decisions held as follows: “12. In Kumaran Nair v. Mariyappan Pillai (1967 KLT 1077) the question of recovery from a tenant of the mortgagee came up for consideration when the mortgagor was being redeemed and possession recovered. There, the mortgagee’s tenant of a building contended that he is not liable to be dispossessed and he can only be dispossessed by recourse to the provisions of the Rent Control Act. That contention was repelled and this court held that:- “S.11(1) contemplates only the eviction of a tenant by his landlord and has had no application where there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the person evicting and the one sought to be evicted.” 13. That contention was repelled and this court held that:- “S.11(1) contemplates only the eviction of a tenant by his landlord and has had no application where there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the person evicting and the one sought to be evicted.” 13. The protection afforded from indiscriminate eviction is to the tenant and not to anybody else who is in occupation of the building. Here, the defendants have set up independent title and totally denied the landlord-tenant relationship. The courts below concurrently held that there is no rental arrangement between the parties. The suit is one based on title for possession. Even though the plaintiffs first of rental arrangement and in spite of the fact that the suit was instituted under the second proviso to S.11(1) of the Rent Control Act, when there is no admitted tenancy or proved tenancy the owner of the building need not prove any ground for eviction mentioned in S.11 of Act 2 of 1965 for getting recovery of the building. So that finding of the first appellate court that the plaintiff is entitled to get recovery on the strength of title irrespective of the fact that the plaintiffs have not proved any ground for eviction under S.11 of Act 2 of 1965 has only to be upheld.” 27. Coming back to the facts of the present case it can be seen that almost on similar to the facts of the decision reported in Nafeesu v. Hajrabi [1992 (1) KLT 554]. Hereto the 1st defendant not only disputed the title of the plaintiff but also contended that he was not a tenant of the property at all and that he was holding the property in his own individual independent right. Going by eh definition of landlord and tenant in the Rent Control Act, a tenant is a person who has paid the rent or is liable to pay rent and landlord is a person who receives or is entitled to receive rent asserts that he has neither paid any rent nor is liable to pay rent, he cannot be considered as a tenant for any purpose. Under such circumstances it is difficulty to accept the plea of the petitioners herein that once the title is found in favour of the plaintiffs in the suit merely because the plaintiffs had been driven to the necessity to file a suit because of the order of the rent control court, eviction can be ordered only on any one of the ground enumerated under the Rent Control Act irrespective of the nature of defence set up by the contesting party. The second proviso to Section 11 (1) of the Act 2 of 1965 can have application only when either it is admitted by the defendants in the suit that he is a tenant or that it is found by the court that there is a tenancy arrangement. Neither of two exist in the case on hand and therefore the plea that this court had omitted to take note of second proviso to Section 11(1) under the Rent Control Act while disposing of the first appeal and the granting of a decree based on title solely is not in accordance with law cannot be entertained. When the contesting defendants has no case that he was either a tenant under anybody but that he was the absolute owner in possession of the property and when the court finds it is not so and comes to the conclusion that the plaintiffs is the title holder of the property one fails to understand thereafter how could the court create a tenancy arrangement in favour of a contesting defendant and apply the provisions of Act 2 of 1965. 28. A strange contention was raised by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that the terms of tenancy arrangement in such case should be directed to be determined by the rent control court. This court is unable to understand how it could be done in law. Therefore that plea has necessarily to fail. 29. Coming to the amendment application it is equally without substance. It must be remembered that what is sought to be amended is the written statement filed by the 1st defendant. Probably he could have taken up a contention which is now sought to be incorporated by way of amendment to the written statement. 29. Coming to the amendment application it is equally without substance. It must be remembered that what is sought to be amended is the written statement filed by the 1st defendant. Probably he could have taken up a contention which is now sought to be incorporated by way of amendment to the written statement. But wisely or unwisely he did not do so and he maintained the stand that he was not a tenant at all and that he was the owner of the property. The legal heirs stepped into the shoes of the deceased whose estate they seek to represent and they are bound by the stand taken by the deceased. They cannot take a totally inconsistent and contradictory stand of the one adopted by the deceased. Authority in this regard if any required is furnished by the decision reported in Krishnan Sathyadas v. Lakshmikutty Amma [1990 (2) KLT 795] “2. Fourth respondent was impleaded in the appeal after the death of the first respondent only as his legal representative. Under Order XXII R.4(2), he can make his defence only appropriate to his character as legal representative of the first respondent. He cannot set up new or individual rights not set up by or not available to the first respondent or in consistent with the defence taken up by the first respondent. It is open to the court to allow a legal representative to be impleaded in his own personal capacity, in which case he could set up his own independent title. That is not the case here. The agreement was executed and the suit was contested by the first defendant as if the suit property belonged exclusively to him on partition. Now the fourth respondent says that the first respondent had no such rights and it is joint family property. In this suit, he cannot be heard to say so. For that, he must seek independent reliefs, if so advised.” 30. It is not disputed that currently the issue is being agitated by the petitioners in the capacity as legal heirs of the 1st defendant. The 1st defendant had taken a definite stand that he was the absolute owner of the property and he had at no point of time a case that he was a tenant. It is not disputed that currently the issue is being agitated by the petitioners in the capacity as legal heirs of the 1st defendant. The 1st defendant had taken a definite stand that he was the absolute owner of the property and he had at no point of time a case that he was a tenant. At the risk of repetition one may observe that 1st defendant both in rent control proceedings as well as in the suit set up title in himself and not prepared to admit any right in favour of other defendants in respect of the suit property. He succeeded in the trial court on trial plea but suffered a decree at the hands of the appellate court. Thereafter the legal heirs cannot come forward and take a totally inconsistent and mutually exclusive plea that they now admit the allegation of tenancy arrangement pleaded in the plaint and appeal be decided accordingly. As rightly pointed out by the learned senior counsel for the respondents if the amendment is allowed it totally changes the character of the defence and not only it is totally unwarranted but also totally inconsistent and contradictory stand taken by the predecessors in interest of the petitioners. As legal heirs they are bound by the stand taken by their predecessor in interest. The amendment sought for has necessarily to fail. 31. The result is that the petitions treated as the review petition as well as the amendment application are devoid of merits and they are liable to be dismissed. I do so confirming the judgment and decree in the first appeal. Faced with the above situation, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners made a fervent plea for some time for the petitioners to vacate the premises. They sought for six months time to do so. Mr.Kurian George Kannanthanam the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents was gracious enough to accept the request made but on condition that the petitioners file an affidavit unconditionally undertaking to vacate the premises on or before the expiry of six months period from today. In the light of the acceptance of the proposal made by the learned counsel it is ordered that the petitioners shall file an unconditional affidavit within four weeks from today before the execution court undertaking to vacate the premises on or before the expiry of six months period from today.