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2013 DIGILAW 834 (KER)

Dream World Water Park represented by its Joint Managing Director Simon K. Francis v. Tahsildar Trichur

2013-09-24

A.M.SHAFFIQUE, MANJULA CHELLUR

body2013
Judgment : Manjula Chellur, C.J. 1. The party before us being one and the same in both the appeal and the writ petition, these matters are clubbed together and disposed of by this judgment. Even otherwise, the issue involved is common to both the matters. 2. The writ petitioner-appellant is before us. So far as appeal is concerned, it is directed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.4149 of 2013 declining to quash Ext.P16, the rejection of claim of the appellant to extend building tax exemption to the appellant. W.P.(C)No.6154 of 2013 is filed challenging Ext.P18 dated 13.02.2013, orders passed by the original authority, i.e., the Tahsildar, Mukundapuram Taluk, Thrissur assessing the building tax. 3. It is necessary to narrate certain facts in order to understand the real issue of controversy involved in the above matters: M/s.Dream World Water Park, Athirappally Road, Chalakudy, Thrissur approached this Court challenging assessment of building tax as per Ext.P1 claiming an amount of Rs.8,38,800/- referring to total plinth area as 5124.64 square metres (4602.45 as commercial building and 522.19 as residential building). Ext.P1 assessment order dated 1.2.2005 came to be passed on account of Village Officer reporting about the construction of the building by the appellant-writ petitioner which requires assessment of tax under the Kerala Building Tax Act, 1975 (for short 'the Act'). Aggrieved by this assessment order, appeal came to be filed wherein some amount came to be deposited on account of conditional order. During the pendency of the appeal, re-measurement with the assistance of the Assistant Executive Engineer of P.W.D. came to be made as per the order dated 31.3.2005 of the R.D.O. After joint inspection and measurement of the building, to the misfortune of the appellant-writ petitioner, the area was found to be more than 5124.64 square metres as it was reported as 5500.45 square metres. The appeal came to be dismissed by the R.D.O. as per Ext.P6 order dated 1.11.2008. Pursuant to Ext.P6 order of the Appellate Authority, the assessing authority redetermined the building tax on the enhanced plinth area and fixed the tax at Rs.9,63,000/- instead of Rs.8,38,800/-as per Ext.P7 dated 21.11.2008. Aggrieved by Ext.P7 assessment order, the appellant preferred W.P.(C) No.37489 of 2008 before this Court. This writ petition came to be disposed of as per Ext.P8 judgment dated 23.7.2009. Aggrieved by Ext.P7 assessment order, the appellant preferred W.P.(C) No.37489 of 2008 before this Court. This writ petition came to be disposed of as per Ext.P8 judgment dated 23.7.2009. As per this judgment, directions were given to the 2nd respondent-Appellate Authority vide paragraph 4 of the judgment which reads as under: “In the above circumstances, Ext.P6 order passed by the second respondent in the appeal is set aside and the second respondent is hereby directed to consider the appeal dated 22.04.2005 preferred by the petitioner afresh and pass appropriate orders thereon in accordance with law, after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, which shall be perused and finalised as expeditiously as possible and at any rate within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment. It is also made clear that till such final orders are passed on the appeal as aforesaid, all further coercive steps stated as being pursued against the petitioner shall be kept in abeyance. It is further made clear that a copy of the report dated 17.09.2008 stated as filed before the second respondent pursuant to the re-measurement shall be made available to the petitioner, if applied for.” Apart from the earlier amount of Rs.2,09,700/-, further amount of Rs.2,51,100/- came to be deposited as per the orders of the learned Single Judge at the time of granting interim relief. Before disposal of the appeal by the R.D.O., the appellant filed a petition claiming exemption under Section 3(2) of the Act contending that since manufacturing process is involved in the amusement park run by him, it deserves to be exempted from paying the building tax. However, the appellant was directed to forward a copy of the application for exemption to the Tahsildar as per orders of the R.D.O. at Ext.P10 by rejecting the application on 28.05.2010. 4. The appellant-writ petitioner filed an application as per Ext.P11 for exemption addressing the same to the Government. The first respondent refused to entertain Ext.P11, therefore, said application was sent by registered post. Meanwhile, the R.D.O. passed another order Ext.P12. Challenging both Ext.P10 directing the appellant to forward a copy of the application to the Tahsildar and also refusing to receive Ext.P11, W.P.(C) No.21748/2010 came to be filed by the appellant. The first respondent refused to entertain Ext.P11, therefore, said application was sent by registered post. Meanwhile, the R.D.O. passed another order Ext.P12. Challenging both Ext.P10 directing the appellant to forward a copy of the application to the Tahsildar and also refusing to receive Ext.P11, W.P.(C) No.21748/2010 came to be filed by the appellant. As a matter of fact, Ext.P10 was the rejection of the appeal and Ext.P12 was only vacating earlier stay granted by the R.D.O. W.P.(C) No.21748 of 2010 came to be disposed of by judgment dated 16.9.2010 and the relevant paragraphs are 4 and 5 which reads as under: “4. Under the above circumstances, I am of the opinion that the matter need be remanded to the appellate authority for fresh consideration and disposal. Exts.P10 and P12 orders are hereby quashed. The appellate authority is directed to restore the appeal on its files and to consider the appeal on the basis of Ext.P9 objections submitted. If the appellate authority is convinced that there exists any genuine claim the same can be allowed. On the other hand if he is of the opinion that the claim could not be allowed, the matter need be referred for decision of the Government as provided under Section 3(2) of the Act. However a decision in this regard shall be taken by the appellate authority as early as possible, after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, at any rate within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. 5. It is made clear that recovery of the balance amount due under the impugned assessment (Ext.P7) shall be kept in abeyance till a final decision is taken by the appellate authority or by the Government, as the case may be.” As per this judgment, the clarification was that the respondentappellate authority was not justified in directing the appellant to approach the Government directly and the R.D.O. was under an obligation to consider the defence raised by the appellantassessee and thereafter if he was not in agreement with the defence raised by the assessee to refer the matter to the Government for an opinion whether exemption as provided under Section 3(2) of the Act could be extended or not. Therefore, the matter was remitted back to the R.D.O. for disposal in the light of observations as stated above at paragraph 4 of the judgment. Therefore, the matter was remitted back to the R.D.O. for disposal in the light of observations as stated above at paragraph 4 of the judgment. Again on 4.3.2011 vide Ext.P14 order, the R.D.O. rejected appeal directing the appellant-assessee to file revision under Section 13 of the Act before the District Collector. Challenging this direction of the R.D.O. contending that the District Collector has no jurisdiction to entertain the matter and the revision was not the proper procedure to be adopted, W.P.(C) No.9817 of 2011 came to be filed. That writ petition was disposed of on 22.6.2011, finding the opinion of the R.D.O. as erroneous and confirming the exercise undertaken by the appellant-assessee by filing an appeal under Section 11 was the proper recourse open to him, vide Ext.P15 judgment, opining at paragraph 5 as under: “5. But on a perusal of Ext.P14 it is evident that the 2nd respondent had not even adverted to the directions contained in Ext.P13 judgment. On the other hand a highly cryptic order was seen issued without proper application of mind. It seems that the 2nd respondent, shirked in discharging her duties as an authority vested with the appellate powers conferred through a statute. The observation that, the petitioner can apply for exemption to the District Collector under Section 13 of the Act is totally beyond any reasonable comprehension of the issue involved and beyond the scope of all the relevant provisions of the statute. Such an order is passed without even looking into the directions contained in Ext.P13 judgment. It is evident that the 2nd respondent had take note of the observations contained herein, about the manner in which the statutory appellate authority in the Department had dealt with the matter, in which specific directions were issued from this Court. The said authorities may also to take note of the fact that in some cases the appellate authorities are exercising their statutory powers totally without comprehending to the relevant provisions in its real perspective. The said authorities may also to take note of the fact that in some cases the appellate authorities are exercising their statutory powers totally without comprehending to the relevant provisions in its real perspective. Hope that remedial steps will be taken by properly instructing the authorities of the Department who are dealing with such matters, in future.” In other words, learned Single Judge was of the opinion, the direction of the R.D.O. that the appellant-assessee has to approach the District Collector for exemption under Section 13 of the Act was totally beyond any reasonable comprehension of the issue involved and beyond the scope of all the relevant provisions of the statute. Hoping and opining that proper remedial steps will be taken by the authorities concerned, disposed of the writ petition. 5. What happened consequent to this judgment of the learned Single Judge at Ext.P15 is the subject matter of the writ appeal and the writ petition before us. Following the directions in the judgment at Ext.P15, the Government considered the matter and vide Ext.P16 rejected the claim of the assessee seeking building tax exemption by order dated 28.1.2013. Subsequently, on 13.2.2013 the Tahsildar on the basis of Ext.P16 Government Order, fresh assessment order was made which is under challenge in W.P. (C) No.6154 of 2013 before us. So far as the Government order rejecting the claim, it became subject matter of W.P.(C) No.4149 of 2013 which came to be dismissed on 15.02.2013 and the said judgment is impugned before us in W.A.No.896 of 2013. 6. The entire issue revolves round one issue, i.e., whether the establishment of the appellant-writ petitioner/assessee deserves to be exempted by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act. 7. 6. The entire issue revolves round one issue, i.e., whether the establishment of the appellant-writ petitioner/assessee deserves to be exempted by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act. 7. The main contention of the appellant/writ petitioner seems to be, exemption is given to a building principally used for purposes of 'factory' as the rides involved in the amusement park of the assessee involves pumping of water which is a manufacturing process, therefore, by virtue of definition of 'factory' and 'manufacturing process' as defined under the Factories Act, 1948, the benefit given to factories under subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Act deserves to be extended to him, therefore, refusal of the same by the Government vide Ext.P16 is erroneous, therefore, he contends that the learned Single Judge was not justified in dismissing W.P.(C) No.4149 of 2013 and seeks for allowing the writ petition accepting the defence raised by the assessee that the establishment in question is a factory, therefore, it qualifies for exemption as contemplated under the enactment. 8. So far as W.P.(C) No.6154 of 2013 is concerned, according to learned counsel, by virtue of judgment at Ext.P15 dated 22.6.2011, the appellate authority had to positively consider the appeal, taking into consideration the objections raised by him before R.D.O. as per Exts.P9 and P11, therefore, when such exercise was not adhered to by R.D.O., there is procedural lapse on the part of the assessing authority in coming out with the assessment order at Ext.P18, therefore, apart from procedural irregularity, there is also denial of opportunity to the appellant/writ petitioner-assessee to bring on record the relevant facts before the Appellate Authority-R.D.O., hence, Ext.P18 deserves to be quashed. In other words, according to the writ petitioner, when the appeal is still pending before R.D.O. by virtue of judgment at Ext.P15, the assessing authority ought not have proceeded to pass an order at Ext.P18. 9. During the course of arguments, learned counsel appearing for the appellant/writ petitioner-assessee took us through the various provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 and the Kerala Building Tax Act, 1975. 10. 9. During the course of arguments, learned counsel appearing for the appellant/writ petitioner-assessee took us through the various provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 and the Kerala Building Tax Act, 1975. 10. As against this, learned Government Pleader representing respondent-authorities strenuously contends and submits that both the appeal and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed as the exercise adopted by the appellant/writ petitioner is only to drag on the matter on one ground or the other postponing payment of revenue to the State, though on facts, he is not entitled for any exemption as contemplated under the Act in the light of specific words used for granting exemption under Section 3(1)(b). According to learned Government Pleader, unless the building which is subject to assessment of building tax is used for manufacturing process to consider it as a 'factory', no establishment could be considered as a 'factory', though some part of the activity could be brought under the definition of 'manufacturing process'. In other words, even if the activity of the establishment were to come within the 'manufacturing process', there is nothing on record to show that the building in question is principally used for the activities which would fall under the definition of factory, such exemption under Section 3 (1)(b) cannot be extended to the assessee. Learned Government Pleader has also raised a contention that the establishment of the assessee is not registered by obtaining a licence under the Factories Act, therefore, it is not a 'factory' as claimed by him. According to learned Government Pleader, the establishment in question, if at all, is attracted to any of the statute, is attracted to Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act and not the Factories Act. 11. On perusal of the entire records we note, copy of the returns filed for assessment is not placed before us. This, necessarily be mentioned because of the argument of the writ petitioner. According to assessee, there is enhancement of the area from time to time and now the area as assessed by the competent authority, i.e., the Tahsildar, is about 5500.45 square metres as against initial measurement of 4602.45 square metres. This, necessarily be mentioned because of the argument of the writ petitioner. According to assessee, there is enhancement of the area from time to time and now the area as assessed by the competent authority, i.e., the Tahsildar, is about 5500.45 square metres as against initial measurement of 4602.45 square metres. It is noticed from records placed before us that, during the pendency of the matter before the Appellate Authority-R.D.O., an application came to be filed by the assessee himself for measurement of the property by Assistant Executive Engineer of P.W.D. As per the directions of the authority, Assistant Executive Engineer submitted a report giving the measurement as 5500.45 square metres. This report of the R.D.O. was though challenged and was considered at Ext.P8, we do not find any particular discussion by the Appellate Authority regarding this report in the subsequent orders of the R.D.O. and so also judgment of this Court. The fact remains, the Tahsildar by virtue of Ext.P8 has considered the total measurement as 5500.45 square metres as per Ext.P18 in W.P.(C) No.6154/13. 12. The reason for clubbing of the appeal and the writ petition is the defence being total exemption from payment of building tax under Section 3 of the Act. Once we agree with the defence raised by the appellant-assessee, question of assessment and payment of building tax would not arise at all. Only if we do not agree with the claim of exemption raised by the appellant/writ petitioner, then the question of actual measurement comes into play. If the measurement of the area under Ext.P18 order (in W.P.(C) No.6154/13) while assessing the building in question for tax is factually incorrect, it is always open to the assessee to question the same before the Appellate Authority, i.e., R.D.O. In that view of the matter, we have to first consider whether the defence raised by the assessee that the building is exempted from tax is justified or not. 13. Section 3 of the Act consists of three sub-sections. Section 3(1) refers to application/non-application of the Act to those buildings described at (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3. Explanation includes the relief of poor and free medical relief so far as charitable purposes, one of the activity which would go to the benefit of the assessee, however, if the building is used for charitable purposes. Section 3(1) refers to application/non-application of the Act to those buildings described at (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of Section 3. Explanation includes the relief of poor and free medical relief so far as charitable purposes, one of the activity which would go to the benefit of the assessee, however, if the building is used for charitable purposes. Sub-section (2) deals with the authority, i.e., who should decide whether such exemption is to be granted to a particular building or not. Whenever the assessee raised benefit of exemption under Section 3(1)(a) or 3(1)(b), if it is accepted by the assessing authority, there is no room for further clarification. If there is any disagreement between the assessing authority and the assessee, then the question whether a building falls under sub-section (1) or Section 3A (Omitted by the Kerala Finance Act, 199 (Act 13 of 1993) with effect from 01.03.1993) had to be referred to the Government and the Government is the sole authority to decide the said question after giving interested parties an opportunity to present their stand in respect of the contentions raised by them. Sub-section (3) further says, the decision arrived by the Government after reference for its consideration under sub-section (2) shall be final. Therefore, so far as filing the writ petition questioning Ext.P16, the writ petition is maintainable. 14. Now, we have to consider whether the Government was justified in declining the claim of exemption putforth by the assessee in this case. Sub-section 3(1)(b) of the Act is relevant so far as the present case is concerned which reads as under: 3. Exemptions - (1) Nothing in this Act shall apply to - (a) xxxxxxx (b) buildings used principally for religious, charitable or educational purposes or as factories or workshops. Explanation- For the purposes of this subsection, “charitable purpose” includes relief of the poor and free medical relief. Exemptions - (1) Nothing in this Act shall apply to - (a) xxxxxxx (b) buildings used principally for religious, charitable or educational purposes or as factories or workshops. Explanation- For the purposes of this subsection, “charitable purpose” includes relief of the poor and free medical relief. Section 2(m) of the Factories Act defines what a 'factory' would mean, which reads as under: “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof- (i) whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on, or (ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on, - but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), or a mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, a railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant or eating place. Explanation I: - For computing the number of workers for the purposes of this clause all the workers in different groups and relays in a day shall be taken into account. Explanation II: - For the purposes of this clause, the mere fact that an Electronic Data Processing Unit or a Computer Unit is installed in any premises or part thereof, shall not be construed to make it a factory if no manufacturing process is being carried on in such premises or part thereof. Reading definition of 'factory', the establishment is with reference to premises including the precincts thereof. Therefore, so far as the definition of 'factory' under the Factories Act, it is not restricted just to the building and any portion of the premises as it would include not only the building but other parts of the premises would also come within the meaning of 'factory' provided the activity conducted therein involves manufacturing process with certain number of workers with power connection and without power connection. Any activity even carried out in the precincts could be termed as 'manufacturing process' involving number of workers can also come under the definition of 'factory' under Section 2(m) of the Factories Act. 15. Any activity even carried out in the precincts could be termed as 'manufacturing process' involving number of workers can also come under the definition of 'factory' under Section 2(m) of the Factories Act. 15. The relevant factual issue raised by the assessee in this case claiming exemption of building tax is that the process involved in the amusement park run by the assessee is a 'manufacturing process' as there is pumping of water involved in the amusement park by making use of the water from the river as the river is situated next to the amusement park run by the appellant-assessee/writ petitioner. Pumping of the water definitely is a process which can come under 'manufacturing process' as defined under Section 2(k) of the Factories Act. Under Section 2(k) of the Factories Act, several processes are described thereunder would fall within the meaning of 'manufacturing process'. Here, we are concerned with sub-section (ii) of Section 2(k) reads as under: “(ii) pumping oil, water, sewage or any other substance; or” In order to understand whether the process to run the amusement park involves 'manufacturing process' as contemplated under the Factories Act, one has to see what is the main activity of the establishment of the writ petitioner/assessee with reference to sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act. So far as definition of 'factory' and 'manufacturing process', the Kerala Building Tax Act is silent, therefore, in the absence of any definition so far as 'factory' is concerned, necessarily one has to go by the definition of factory as contemplated under the Factories Act which is already referred to above. In order to understand whether a particular establishment would come within the meaning of 'factory', one has to see what is the manufacturing process involved as contemplated under the Factories Act in the absence of any definition of 'manufacturing process' under the Kerala Building Tax Act. But so far as extending the benefit of exemption to a building owned by an assessee, the exemption has to be understood with reference to sub-section (1) either (a) or (b) of Section 3 of the Act. Unless and until there is strict compliance of Section 3(1) either (a) or (b), no exemption could be extended to any building. The question of concession or exemption deserves to be applied to claim benefit of non-payment of revenue to the State. Unless and until there is strict compliance of Section 3(1) either (a) or (b), no exemption could be extended to any building. The question of concession or exemption deserves to be applied to claim benefit of non-payment of revenue to the State. Therefore, there has to be strict compliance of the provision. Even though establishment of the appellant/assessee can be brought under the definition of 'factory' because of pumping of water is involved in the process of amusement park, one has to see necessarily whether this pumping of water is carried on and whether precincts of factory is included so far as benefit of exemption as per Kerala Building Tax Act. In this context, we state that there has to be strict compliance of the procedure contemplated. Therefore, unless Section 3(1)(b) of the Act applies to the factual situation so far as the establishment of the appellant-assessee, he cannot claim any exemption of payment of building tax. Section 3(1)(b) referred to above clearly indicates, unless the building involved used principally for the purpose which could be termed as 'factory', no exemption could be extended to the assessee. Definitely the river from where the water is pumped for the purpose of running amusement park by the appellant/assessee does not belong to the assessee's establishment though he might have a permission to pump the water from the river. In the absence of the manufacturing process being carried on in the building used principally as factory, we fail to understand how the exemption claimed by the appellant/assessee could be extended to the case on hand. In that view of the matter, none of the grounds raised by the appellant/assessee would come to the aid of the appellant/assessee so far as challenge made against Ext.P16 and we are of the opinion, his amusement park would not come under the purview of exemption contemplated under sub-section (1) (b) of Section 3 of the Act. 16. So far as the writ petition, the challenge against Ext.P18 is concerned, once the claim of exemption is denied to the assessee, the consequence is to subject the building in question for assessment and collect the balance amount of building tax from the assessee. 16. So far as the writ petition, the challenge against Ext.P18 is concerned, once the claim of exemption is denied to the assessee, the consequence is to subject the building in question for assessment and collect the balance amount of building tax from the assessee. The argument of the writ petitioner that unless R.D.O has decided the issue in the appeal subsequent to disposal of the writ petition as per Ext.P15, there was no justification for the Tahsildar to pass assessment at Ext.P18, we are of the opinion, such argument is not sustainable in view of the fact that at his instance and on his application exemption claimed by him when refused by the Appellate Authority, the matter was taken up by the Government as a reference by virtue of judgment at Ext.P15, therefore, it is nothing but an empty formality so far as the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner. 17. Ultimately, once the Government had rejected the exemption, the assessment has to be made by the assessing authority, therefore, orders at Ext.P18 is a consequential order of Ext.P16 by the Government. So far as the measurement is concerned, as there is no finality whether the area to be assessed is 4602.45 square metres or 5500.45 square metres, it is open to the assessee to question the same and seek proper remedy, which has to be disposed of by the authorities concerned based on the report of Assistant Executive Engineer of the Public Works Department only after hearing the assessee, if the appellant/assessee raises such dispute by filing an appeal challenging Ext.P18. However, the learned Government Pleader brought to our notice that subsequent to Ext.P18, another revised assessment order was passed as per Ext.P19 as there was some arithmetical error. It is needless to say, amounts already deposited by the assessee have to be given deduction while making a fresh demand. 18. In the light of above discussion and reasoning, both the Writ Appeal and the Writ Petition are dismissed. Parties are to bear their own costs.