JUDGMENT S.N. Hussain & Ahsanuddin Amanullah, JJ. 1. Both these two letters patent appeals have been heard together and are being decided by this common order as both of them have been filed against order dated 19.9.2006, by which the learned Single Judge of this Court disposed of the writ petition with certain directions. The first L.P.A. has been filed by the State of Bihar and its authorities, whereas, the second L.P.A. has been filed by the Superintending Engineer, Public Health Engineering Department, Chapra (District-Saran). 2. The said writ petition bearing C.W.J.C. No. 9414 of 2006 was filed by M/s. Amlory Construction Private Limited, who is respondent no. 1 in both these appeals for the following reliefs:- (i) To issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ/order/direction commanding the respondent no. 2 to open the tender of the petitioner submitted on 20.6.2006 in response to tender notice 2/2006-07 issued by respondent no. 2 which has been arbitrarily and illegally excluded from the bid for extraneous consideration to favour a particular person at the cost of State revenue. (ii) To direct and command the respondents further that if the rate of the petitioner is found to be lowest on opening of the tender he should be allotted the work in question subject to other conditions having been fulfilled. (iii) To grant any other appropriate relief for which the petitioner is entitled to under the facts of the case. 3. In the said writ petition, counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the State of Bihar and its authorities i.e. respondents no. 1 to 4 and after hearing learned counsel for the parties, the learned Single Judge by the impugned order dated 19.9.2006 disposed of the writ petition after arriving at clear findings and giving specific directions as follows:- "From the aforesaid facts what emerges is that there was no specific condition in the notice inviting tender of filing experience certificate of construction of water tower much less as an eligibility condition. The authorities, at the initial stage, also understood the same in the same manner but suddenly when the matter reaches the Superintending Engineer, he apparently refers to an innocuous provision of Clause 31 and further wrongly holding that no such certificate is filed by the petitioner, directs that the petitioner's technical bid be rejected, thus, disqualifying him from consideration of his financial bid. The reason for disqualification is wholly extraneous and unsupported by tender documents. It has resulted in a loss to the State as well. Secondly, he has permitted other tenderer who was ineligible on the face of the records to continue in the tender process instead of rejecting it. It was a clear case of deliberately ignoring relevant fact. Even at the stage of filing counter affidavit, both these decisions are justified. This only leads this Court to believe that the manner in which the respondent Superintending Engineer conducted himself was far above bona fide action. It was clearly mala fide and for extraneous considerations. It was clearly to mala fide exclude the petitioner and confer wrongful benefit on others for consideration which cannot be considered lawfully. In the aforesaid facts, I have no option but to hold that the entire process as adopted for finalizing the tender is vitiated in fact and in law and apparently actuated by mala fide. The normal consequence whereof would be to set aside the tenders already allotted but considering the fact that it is a public interest project which, if delayed, would harm public, the Court is not inclined to take such action. Because of a mala fide action of the respondent Superintending Engineer, the public cannot be made to suffer but surely the Court is duty bound to ensure accountability for such mala fide action. In such glaring cases of mala fide and abuse of administrative powers, the accountability comes not merely by holding that it is an appropriate case where the respondent Superintending Engineer should be departmentally proceeded with but the appropriate officers of the Government would be reminded of the Bihar Prevention of Specified Corrupt Practices Act, 1983 which could be invoked in the present case against the .respondent Superintending Engineer and others, because if such illegal actions are not controlled, it will only lead to rampant corruption at public cost. In view of the facts stated above, I may mention that it was not a case of a bona fide error or a bona fide misjudgment or a bona fide wrong decision. It was a calculated and well thought move on part of the respondent Superintending Engineer and he cannot escape his liability. He was made a party to the writ petition by designation and in his personal capacity. It was a calculated and well thought move on part of the respondent Superintending Engineer and he cannot escape his liability. He was made a party to the writ petition by designation and in his personal capacity. He chose to file a counter affidavit sworn by himself personally and, as such, cannot be said to have been ignorant of the consequences to this writ petition. In this view of the fact, I direct that a copy of this order may be sent to the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar and the Secretary, Public Health and Engineering Department, Government of Bihar, Patna for necessary action against the erring officials and any other person in this regard." 4. Against the aforesaid order, both these letters patent appeals have been filed by two sets of the respondents of the writ petition, but the arguments of both sets of appellants were exactly common and same. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants stated that no relief was sought against respondent no. 2 in the writ petition and there was no whisper of any allegation of illegal gratification against respondent no. 5 and no notice of the writ petition was given to respondent no. 5 in his personal capacity. Hence, the learned Single Judge could not have legally arrived at the aforesaid findings without giving any opportunity to respondent no. 5, who was impleaded by name. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants further stated that the reliefs in the writ petition were limited to non-opening of tender of the writ petitioner and allotment of work to him. It was further stated that Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) was published in the newspaper on 5.6.2006 and on 6.6.2006 Bill of Quantity (BOQ) was issued, whereafter, technical as well as financial tenders were submitted by the candidates. Technical bids were opened on 20.6.2006 and Comparative Sheet was prepared by the Executive Engineer on 26.6.2006 and was sent to the Superintending Engineer for approval, whereafter, the Superintending Engineer vide letter dated 3.7.2006 asked the Executive Engineer to send fresh Comparative Sheet of technical bid. Thereafter, the Executive Engineer prepared fresh comparative sheet specifying that the writ petitioner's tender was without experience certificate and hence the Superintending Engineer approved the• said fresh Comparative Sheet of technical bid on 10.7.2006, whereafter, the Estimator also approved the same on 18.7.2006. 7. Thereafter, the Executive Engineer prepared fresh comparative sheet specifying that the writ petitioner's tender was without experience certificate and hence the Superintending Engineer approved the• said fresh Comparative Sheet of technical bid on 10.7.2006, whereafter, the Estimator also approved the same on 18.7.2006. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants averred that by the end of July, 2006, financial bids were also opened and M/s. J.P. Enterprises, which fulfilled all the criteria, was found to be the lowest bidder and, accordingly, Letter of Intent dated 1.8.2006 was issued awarding tender to M/s. J.P. Enterprises, with whom agreement dated 9.8.2006 was executed for completing the work within twelve months. It was also averred that in spite of the aforesaid developments neither M/s. J.P. Enterprises was impleaded nor Letter of Intent or Agreement was challenged in the writ petition nor Clause 18 of N.I.T. or Methodology of BOQ or even Comparative Chart were considered in the order of the writ case. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants claimed that writ petitioner's letter dated 24.7.2006, which is Annexure-2 to the writ petition, clearly showed that the writ petitioner was fully aware of every step and was also given the reason, due to which his financial bid was not opened, but he took no step in that regard before the authorities concerned. Furthermore, there is no material to support the writ petitioner's allegation that respondent no. 5 of the writ petition had taken illegal gratification and hence the entire claim of the writ petitioner was frivolous, more so because respondent no. 5 to the writ petition was not the custodian of records nor there was anything to show his implication as even bid was not opened by him nor the Comparative Sheet was prepared by him nor even he was the Estimator. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that experience certificate was necessary for the purpose of the bid, but it was neither attached to the technical bid nor it was even produced by the writ petitioner in this case and hence there was no question of opening of the financial bid of the petitioner. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that experience certificate was necessary for the purpose of the bid, but it was neither attached to the technical bid nor it was even produced by the writ petitioner in this case and hence there was no question of opening of the financial bid of the petitioner. Hence even if the writ petitioner's tender was lowest, it was not fit to be opened due to non-production of any experience certificate in the Department as per Clause 18 of the N.I.T. In this connection, learned counsel for the appellants relied upon two decisions; one of the Apex Court and the other of this High Court, namely, in case of Raunaq International Ltd. vs. I.V.R. Construction Ltd. and Others, reported in (1999)1 S.C.C. 492 and in case of M/s. Continental Pump and Motors Ltd., Gaziabad vs. State of Bihar, reported in A.I.R. 1995 Patna 183 (para 6). 10. On the other hand, learned counsel for the writ petitioner, who is one of the respondents in both the appeals, opposed the contentions of learned counsel for the appellants and placed reliance upon the findings of the learned Single Judge stating that the same were legal and proper requiring no interference. He also relied upon various paragraphs of his counter affidavit. 11. Considering the averments made by learned counsel for the parties and the materials on record, it is quite apparent, that respondent no. 2 of the writ petition was the Superintending Engineer, Public Health Engineering Circle, At + P.O. Chapra, District-Saran, who was also impleaded as respondent no. 5 in the writ petition by name i.e. Shri A.K. Srivastava. Furthermore, counter affidavit in the writ petition had been sworn by the same person, namely, Arun Kumar Srivastava, Superintending Engineer, Public Health Engineering Department, Circle Officer, At & P.O. Chapra, District-Saran. Hence, objection of the appellants that in the writ petition no notice was given to respondent no. 5 of the writ petition, is not correct. Furthermore, from the writ petition it is quite apparent that the entire relief sought is against respondent no. 2, who was also impleaded as respondent no. 5 by name and specific allegations had been leveled against him in several paragraphs of the writ petition itself. Hence, the claim of the appellants in that regard does not appear to be correct and justified. 12. 2, who was also impleaded as respondent no. 5 by name and specific allegations had been leveled against him in several paragraphs of the writ petition itself. Hence, the claim of the appellants in that regard does not appear to be correct and justified. 12. From the record, it also transpires that initially the Comparative Sheet prepared by the Executive Engineer included the name of the writ petitioner and was sent to the Superintending Engineer (respondent nos. 2 and 5), but the Superintending Engineer returned the same to the Executive Engineer demanding fresh Comparative Sheet and only when the Executive Engineer prepared a fresh Comparative Sheet of technical bids on 5.7.2006 excluding the name of the writ petitioner on the ground of non-submission of experience certificate, the said fresh Comparative Sheet was approved by the Superintending Engineer (respondent nos. 2 and 5 of the writ petition). 13. Clause 18 of Tender Notice No. 2/2006-07 inviting tenders clearly provided that only those tenderers shall be recognized for technical bid, who had worked in the Department for more than 50% of the tender amount in the instant N.I.T. and if no document in proof thereof was provided, his second envelope with respect to financial bid would not be opened. In the said circumstances, according to the said clause, the authorities concerned were quite justified in not opening the second envelope of writ petitioner's financial bid because there was no experience certificate given in the first envelope of the technical bid. 14. Since the required and prescribed experience qualification was not shown by the writ petitioner, any judicial relief at the instance of a party, which does not fulfill the requisite criteria, seems to be misplaced. It is on this ground that the authorities had rejected the claim of the writ petitioner and we fail to see how the financial bid of the writ petitioner could have been opened and tender would have been awarded to him without even fulfilling the requisite criteria itself. 15. Learned counsel for the appellants had raised serious objection claiming that the interest of the State should be highest in the mind of the authorities. The same is true, but at the same time, the interest of the State is not limited only in financial terms, rather the interest of the State specially a welfare State is the proper completion of its projects by experienced persons. The same is true, but at the same time, the interest of the State is not limited only in financial terms, rather the interest of the State specially a welfare State is the proper completion of its projects by experienced persons. Hence the term Interest of the State has to be seen on long term basis and not by any short sighted view• for small and temporary gains. 16. Furthermore, the methodology of tender given in BOQ (Annexure-N1) clearly showed that envelope of technical bid should also contain certified copy of up to date sales tax clearance certificate, which is now equivalent to VAT certificate, but the same was also not given by the writ petitioner. On that score also the technical bid of the writ petitioner was defective and due to that reason the financial bid of the writ petitioner was also not fit to be opened and the authorities were justified in not opening the second envelope of the writ petitioner regarding financial bid. 17. It further transpires from the undisputed fact that in July the financial bids of the competent persons were opened and the bid of M/s. J.P. Enterprises being the lowest one was selected and Letter of Intent was awarded to M/s. J.P. Enterprises, with whom an agreement was also executed on 9.8.2006 for execution of work within twelve months. Inspite of the aforesaid fact, M/s. J.P. Enterprises was• not impleaded in the writ petition by the writ petitioner at any stage although the writ petition was disposed of on 19.9.2006. 18. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances and on the basis of the aforesaid findings, both the above said Letters Patent Appeals are allowed, the impugned order of the learned Single Judge dated 19.9.2006 is set aside and the reliefs claimed by the writ petitioner in C.W.J.C. No. 9414 of 2006 are hereby rejected.