Judgment : 1. This appeal is filed against the judgment and decree dt.13.11.1992 in OS.No.103 of 1979 on the file of the Sub-Ordinate Judge, Chirala. 2. The appellants are defendant Nos.2 and 3 in the said suit. The 1st defendant filed the suit for recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property, past profits @ Rs.2,000/-for the year 1978-79, future profits and costs. The suit was filed on 16.10.1979. The subject matter of the suit is an extent of Ac.0.93 cents in Sy.No.185/3 and another extent of Acs.1.01 cents in Sy.No.199/3 of Deverapalli Village, Chirala Taluq, Prakasham District (hereinafter referred to as the ‘plaint schedule property’). 3. The plaintiff contended that the plaint schedule property belonged to plaintiff and his family and the plaintiff’s father late D. Sayanacharyulu purchased the said property from one Mutyala Venkateswarlu (PW.2) and others under registered sale deed Ex.A.1 dt.19.06.1933 for a consideration of Rs.100/-; ever since the said purchase, plaintiff’s father was in possession of plaint schedule property and after his death in the year 1950, plaintiff succeeded to the said property and that mutation was also effected in the year 1932 itself in the name of plaintiff’s father in the Revenue records. He further contended that his father was a private medical practitioner practicing at Jandrapeta and therefore, the plaint schedule property which is located at Devarapalli Village was entrusted to one Late Ganeshula Subbaiah (for short, ‘Subbiah’) in or about 1941 and the latter used to cultivate the plaint schedule property. It was contended that out of the income derived, Subbaiah used to pay the cist on behalf of plaintiff’s father and if any amount remained, he used to pay the same to plaintiff’s father towards Maktha; that the lands are dry lands and no substantial income was derived by plaintiff’s father and he did not even insist regularly for payment of rent on account of mutual confidence in those years; after plaintiff’s father died in 1950, plaintiff and his brother Lakshmanudu inherited the said property. At the time of the death of plaintiff’s father, plaintiff was aged about 10 years and so the management of the properties was entrusted to plaintiff’s maternal uncle Pusuluri Ramacharyulu and he attended to the management of the property. At the time of the death of plaintiff’s father, plaintiff was aged about 10 years and so the management of the properties was entrusted to plaintiff’s maternal uncle Pusuluri Ramacharyulu and he attended to the management of the property. The plaintiff contended that during that time also Subbaiah cultivated the said land as tenant; that Ramacharyulu used to go to the suit village and collect the rents yearly during the season; that Subbaiah died in 1966; and that 1st defendant is his daughter and 2nd defendant is his son-in-law. He alleged that the plaintiff was also practicing doctor in Jandrapeta, that after the death of Subbaiah, defendants approached plaintiff’s maternal uncle and plaintiff for lease of the land and it was granted to defendants @ Rs.200/- p.a. on condition that defendants would have to pay cist due each year but due to mutual confidence no written document was executed in that regard. He alleged that every year, defendant Nos.1 and 2 used to pay amounts regularly up to 1977 and considering the loyalty and poverty of defendant Nos.1 and 2, plaintiff did not make any claim for enhanced rent as he was himself a reputed medical practitioner. The plaintiff contended that his maternal uncle Ramacharyulu died on 14.04.1977 and thereafter defendant Nos.1 and 2 did not pay rents for the year 19781979 in spite of demands. As Revenue officials were implementing provisions of Andhra Pradesh Rights in Land and Pattadar Passbooks Act, 1971, plaintiff approached the Dy. Tahsildar at Devarapalli and submitted a declaration on 13.09.1979. At that time he came to know that defendant Nos.1 and 2 have left the Devarapalli village and that the 3rd defendant was cultivating the land and that he obtained a sale deed dt.30.09.1977 (Ex.B.5) from defendant Nos.1 and 2 in respect of plaint schedule property. The plaintiff contended that the said sale deed is sham and not binding on him and that 3rd defendant is only a trespasser and is in wrongful possession of plaint schedule property. He also contended that defendant Nos.1 and 2 have no title to the plaint schedule property in order to sell it to the 3rd defendant. The plaintiff contended that the said sale deed is sham and not binding on him and that 3rd defendant is only a trespasser and is in wrongful possession of plaint schedule property. He also contended that defendant Nos.1 and 2 have no title to the plaint schedule property in order to sell it to the 3rd defendant. He alleged that anticipating legal action by the plaintiff, the 3rd defendant filed OS.No.505 of 1979 on 19.09.1979 for permanent injunction before the District Munsif Court, Chirala, against the plaintiff and one T. Sivarama Krishna, henchmen of 3rd defendant and as the plaintiff was residing at Jandrapeta, the plaintiff cannot take possession except by process of law and therefore, he was constrained to file the suit for recovery of possession. 4. The defendants filed a common written statement denying the plaint averments. They contended that the plaint schedule property did not belong to the plaintiff or his family. They pleaded that the plaint schedule property originally belonged to Subbaiah himself, the father of 1st defendant and he was in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property along with other properties as a real owner. They contended that on the death of Subbaiah, they succeeded to his property including the plaint schedule property and for more than twelve years they enjoyed the plaint schedule property along with other properties of the said Subbaiah. They also pleaded that they have been in continuous and peaceful possession and enjoyment of plaint schedule property without any interruption, to the knowledge of one and all, as real owners and thus perfected their title by adverse possession also. They contended that defendant Nos.1 and 2, being owners of the plaint schedule property, they alone paid the cist for the plaint schedule property after the death of Subbaiah. They denied that Subbaiah managed the plaint schedule property on behalf of the plaintiff’s father or that he was a cultivating tenant of the land either under the plaintiff’s father or the plaintiff’s maternal uncle. They also denied that Subbaiah paid any Maktha to the plaintiff’s father or his maternal uncle at any time. They further pleaded that even defendant Nos.1 and 2 never approached plaintiff or his maternal uncle at any time to cultivate the land as tenants. They denied that there was any lease between the plaintiffs and the defendant Nos.1 and 2 at any point of time. They further pleaded that even defendant Nos.1 and 2 never approached plaintiff or his maternal uncle at any time to cultivate the land as tenants. They denied that there was any lease between the plaintiffs and the defendant Nos.1 and 2 at any point of time. They pleaded that they sold the suit land to 3rd defendant on 21.04.1977 under Ex.B.2 – a receipt/agreement-of-sale for consideration of Rs.20,000/- and delivered possession to 3rd defendant and thereafter executed registered sale deed Ex.B.5 dt.30.09.1977 in favor of 3rd defendant. They also pleaded that the alleged sale deed Ex.A.1 in favor of plaintiff’s father was only a fictitious document and that the vendor of the plaintiff’s father under the said document M. Venkateshwarlu, neither had title nor possession of the plaint schedule properties at any time, and he cannot convey any title under the said sale deed. They therefore prayed that the suit be dismissed. 3. On the basis of these pleadings, the Court below framed the following issues : “1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for possession of the suit property? 2. Whether the plaintiff or his father’s vendor’s has got title to the suit property? 3. Whether the plaintiff’s father’s vendor M. Venkateswarlu has got title and possession over the suit land at any time?” 4. OS.No.505 of 1979 on the file of the District Munsif, Chirala, filed by 3rd defendant against plaintiff was transferred to the Court of Sub-Ordinate Judge, Chirala, and renumbered as OS.No.91 of 1987. The said suit OS.No.91 of 1987 was also tried along with OS.No.103 of 1979 by the Sub-Ordinate Judge, Chirala. 5. The plaintiffs examined PW’s.1 to 3 and marked Exs.A.1 to A.17. The defendants examined DW’s.1 to 4 and marked Exs.D.1 to D.30. The Court marked Exs.C.1 and C.2. 6. By common judgment and decree dt.13.11.1992, the Trial Court dismissed O.S.91/1097 and decreed OS.No.103 of 1979 with costs and directed the defendants to vacate the plaint schedule property within three months and induct the plaintiff into possession of the plaint schedule property. If not, the plaintiff was given liberty to obtain possession through process of law. It also directed a separate enquiry into mesne profits claimed by plaintiff. 7. If not, the plaintiff was given liberty to obtain possession through process of law. It also directed a separate enquiry into mesne profits claimed by plaintiff. 7. In it’s common judgment dt.13.11.1992, the Court below held that the plaint schedule property originally belonged to one Ganeshuni Chandraiah and his sons Ammaiah, Subbaiah (father of 1st defendant) and Narayana Swamy; that as they were indebted to PW.2’s father by name Kotaiah, they executed Ex.A.14 sale deed dt.06.06.1928 in favor of Kotaiah and delivered possession of the plaint schedule property to him; and that Subbaiah and Narayana Swamy were minors at that time and were represented by their father Chandraiah. It held that subsequently, PW.2’s father died leaving behind a debt payable to the plaintiff’s father and in discharge of that debt, PW.2 and his minor sons sold the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff’s father under Ex.A.1 sale deed dt.19.06.1933; that PW.2 also stated that subsequent to the purchase of the property in the year 1928, Kotaiah enjoyed it till his death and after his death, PW.2 enjoyed it and ultimately sold it away to PW.1’s father. The Court below held that no evidence was placed before the Court to show that Kotaiah did not enjoy the property subsequent to the purchase under Ex.A.14 and that, notwithstanding the sale in favor of Kotaiah, the property continued to be in possession of Chandraiah and his sons; if Kotaiah was not in possession of the property subsequent to purchase by him under Ex.A.14, the plaintiff’s father, who was a registered medical practitioner at Jandrapeta, which is at a considerable distance from the plaint schedule property, would not have purchased the property from Kotaiah and his minor sons; there was no enmity between the father of the plaintiff and the heirs of Chandraiah so as to fabricate Ex.A.1 to wreak vengeance on him; no evidence is placed before the Court to show that to screen the properties from the relatives, Chandraiah nominally executed Ex.A.14 in favor of Kotaiah; if so, the Court has to accept the recitals in Ex.A.14 as true; and therefore, the heirs of Chandraiah, including Subbaiah lost their rights in the plaint schedule property with the execution of Ex.A.14; that as Subbaiah was also a party to Ex.A.14, it is not open to defendant Nos.1 and 2 to contend that the vendor of the plaintiff’s father had no title to the property and that Ex.A.1 is nominal document and was never acted upon. It also relied on the fact that Ex.A.14 and Ex.A.1 are more than thirty years old and therefore presumption under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is liable to be drawn that they are true sale transactions supported by consideration. It also noted that subsequent to the purchase by the father of plaintiff under Ex.A.1, cists were paid up to 1945 in his name under Ex.A.12 Cist Receipt Book and his name was also mutated in Revenue records as was evident from Ex.A.2-No.10(1) Account. It also referred to Exs.A.3 to A.11 certified copies of No.2 Adangal to hold that cultivation was recorded in his name and held that if Ex.A.1 was not really acted upon, his name would not have been mutated in the Revenue records mentioned above or shown in the column relating to cultivation in the adangals and he would not have paid any cist for the land. It also held that if Ex.A.1 was a nominal document, there was no necessity for him to obtain mutation and pay cist for the land. It therefore, rejected the plea of the defendants that Ex.A.14 was executed nominally and was not acted upon. Although the defendants contended that PW.2 had executed Ex.B.1 – Power of Attorney dt.08.08.1977 in favor of Thokala Singaiah empowering him to execute a registered sale deed for his house-site in Devarapalli village in favor of one Butchaiah and the said house-site was part of the property covered by Ex.A.14 and Ex.A.1, the Court held that this is not sufficient to disbelieve the correctness of Exs.A.1 and A.14. It held that the plaintiff was not a party to Ex.B.1 and it will not bind him. It also rejected the plea of adverse possession raised by the defendants. It held that defendant Nos.1 and 2 cultivated the land on behalf of plaintiff’s family alone, and that taking advantage of the fact that the plaintiff was only aged 10 years when his father died in 1950 and there was none to look after his family affairs, the defendants claimed absolute rights over the plaint schedule property and that their possession is only permissive possession. It therefore held that the sale deed Ex.B.5 in favor of 3rd defendant did not confer any title on 3rd defendant as defendant Nos.1 and 2 had no authority to sell the property. 8. Aggrieved thereby, this appeal was preferred by defendant Nos.2 and 3. 9. Pending appeal, the 1st appellant/2nd defendant died and appellant Nos.3 and 4 were brought on record as his legal representatives. 10. Heard Sri N. Sri Ram Murthy, counsel for the appellants and Sri N. Subba Rao, counsel for respondent. 8. Aggrieved thereby, this appeal was preferred by defendant Nos.2 and 3. 9. Pending appeal, the 1st appellant/2nd defendant died and appellant Nos.3 and 4 were brought on record as his legal representatives. 10. Heard Sri N. Sri Ram Murthy, counsel for the appellants and Sri N. Subba Rao, counsel for respondent. The counsel for appellants submitted that the judgment and decree of the Trial Court is contrary to law and the evidence on record and is unsustainable; the Trial Court on the basis of assumptions and presumptions decreed the suit; it erred in holding that the presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act, 1872 applies to Ex.A.14, which is only a certified copy of the sale deed dt.06.06.1928; when PW.2 claims that his father Kotaiah purchased the plaint schedule property and a vacant site for Rs.300/- under Ex.A.14 dt.06.06.1928, it is unnatural for PW.2 and his brothers and son to sell the same to the plaintiff’s father for Rs.100/- under Ex.A.1 dt.19.06.1933 for discharge of an alleged promissory note debt claimed by plaintiff’s father to be due to him by PW.2’s father; Ex.A.14 was only a sham and nominal transaction; So PW.2 had no title to convey the plaint schedule property to plaintiff’s father under Ex.A.1; the evidence of PW.2 itself would show that Ex.A.1 is a fictitious document and an inference that there was no such promissory note as mentioned in Ex.A.1 has to be drawn particularly when PW.2 did not produce it; PW.1 had stated that the plaint schedule property was purchased by his father for cash consideration which was paid in the Sub-Registrar’s Office but the recitals in Ex.A.1 show otherwise; while Ex.A.14 was registered before the Sub-Registrar, Chilakaluripeta, Ex.A.1 was registered in the Sub-Registrar’s Office, Chirala and this also shows that Ex.A.1 is a fraudulent transaction; the plea of the plaintiff that the property was managed by Subbaiah or that it was leased by him or his father or maternal uncle to Subbaiah or defendant Nos.1 and 2 has not been established; the plaintiff never issued any notice to defendants to deliver possession of the plaint schedule property to him prior to the filing of the suit and this is also fatal to his case; plaintiff’s father having died in 1950, No.2 Adangals - Exs.A.3 to A.11 which were for the period 1967 to 1975 could not have shown the name of the plaintiff’s father as he was not alive. He also contended that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to seek a declaration of title also in addition to the relief of recovery of possession and as such a relief has not been sought, the plaintiff’s suit should have been dismissed. He cited the following decisions : Sri Lakhi Baruah and others v. Sri Padma Kanta Kalita and others ( AIR 1996 SC 1253 ); Kalidindi Venkata Subbaraju and others v. Chintalapati Subbaraju and others ( AIR 1968 SC 947 ); Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (dead) by LRs. and others ( (2008) 4 SCC 594 ) ; Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. v. Hede and Company ( (2007) 5 SCC 614 ) ; Bondar Singh and others v. Nihal Singh and others ( (2003) 4 SCC 161 = AIR 2003 SC 1905 ) ; Mulakalapalli Pullayya v. Shalamala Guravayya (1969 – 1 – An.W.R. – 209); Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd, Madurai v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras ( AIR 1957 SC 49 ); Shaik Abdul Khader and another v. Vakantham Nagabhushana Rao and others;( 2000 (1) ALD 458 ) and Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal and others. ( AIR 2009 SC 1103 ) 11. Pending appeal, the 1st appellant/2nd defendant died and appellant Nos.3 and 4 were brought on record as his legal representatives. 12. The counsel for the respondent on the other hand contended that the judgment and decree of the Trial Court are correct; the Trial Court gave cogent reasons why the plaintiff’s suit was liable to be decreed; he also contended that having pleaded that Subbaiah is the owner of the property, it was not open to defendants to also raise the plea of adverse possession and the said pleas are inconsistent with each other. He further contended that Ex.A.14 is a public document as it is a certified copy of a registered sale deed; under Section 77 of the Evidence Act, 1872, it is admissible in evidence without the necessity of calling any witness to prove it; the plaintiff was not even born at the time of execution of Ex.A.1 and his statement about the passing of consideration under the said document is liable to be ignored as he could not have any personal knowledge of the same. In any event, oral evidence cannot be taken into account to contradict the contents of the registered document like Ex.A.1. In any event, oral evidence cannot be taken into account to contradict the contents of the registered document like Ex.A.1. He also contended that no appeal was preferred by the plaintiff against the judgment in OS.No.91 of 1987 which was decided along with OS.No.103 of 1979; that in OS.No.91 of 1987 (OS.No.505 of 1979) filed by 3rd defendant in OS.No.103 of 1979, the 3rd defendant had pleaded title in himself and acquisition of the same from the defendant Nos.1 and 2 in OS.No.103 of 1979; and as a common judgment was delivered in both the suits, the judgment in the suit OS.No.91 of 1957 operates as res judicata in OS.No.103 of 1979 on the aspect of title of the plaintiff in OS.No.103 of 1979 and therefore, the appeal ought to be rejected. The counsel for respondent cited the following decisions, viz., R. Chandevarappa and others v. State of Karnataka and others; ( (1995) 6 SCC 309 ) Madamanchi Ramappa and another v. Muthaluru Bojjappa ( AIR 1963 SC 1633 ); State of Haryana v. Ram Singh ( (2001) 6 SCC 254 ); Pt. Shamboo Nath Tikoo and others v. S. Gian Singh and others (1995 Supp (3) SCC 266) 13. ; and S. Saktivel (Dead) by LRs. V. M. Venugopal Pillai and others.( (2000) 7 SCC 104 ) 14. I have noted the submissions of both sides. 15. In my opinion, the following points arise for consideration in the appeal: (i) Whether Ex. A14 sale deed executed by Chandriah and his sons in favor of Kotiah, father of PW2 is a nominal document ? (ii) Whether Ex.A1 sale deed executed by PW2 in favor of plaintiff’s father is true and valid ? (iii) Whether the suit filed for recovery of possession by the plaintiff is liable to dismissed for not seeking the relief of declaration of title also? (iv) Whether the defendants are entitled to plead adverse possession ? (v) Whether the judgment in O.S.91/1987 operates as resjudicata on the issue of title raised in O.S.103/1979? 16. The admitted facts are that the plaint schedule property originally belonged to Ganesula Chandraiah. He had three sons by name Ammaiah, Subbaiah and Narayana Swamy. Subbaiah is the father of the 1st defendant. As Chandraiah and his sons were indebted to Kotaiah, the father of PW.2, they sold away the plaint schedule property along with a vacant house-site to Kotaiah under Ex.A.14 dt.06.06.1928. He had three sons by name Ammaiah, Subbaiah and Narayana Swamy. Subbaiah is the father of the 1st defendant. As Chandraiah and his sons were indebted to Kotaiah, the father of PW.2, they sold away the plaint schedule property along with a vacant house-site to Kotaiah under Ex.A.14 dt.06.06.1928. Subbaiah and Narayanaswamy, who were minors then, were represented in the said transaction by Chandriah. Subsequently, the father of PW.2, i.e., Kotaiah died. To discharge a debt owed by Kotaiah to the plaintiff’s father under a promissory note, PW.2 and his minor sons executed Ex.A.1 dt.19.06.1933 in favor of plaintiff’s father. The consideration under the said document was Rs.100/-. The plaintiff’s father died in 1950. Later, the plaintiff’s brother relinquished his half share in the plaint schedule property in favor of the plaintiff under Ex.A.13 dt.31.12.1980 relinquishment deed. Point (i) : 17. In the written statement filed by the defendants they vaguely pleaded that Ex.A.14 is a fictitious document and that PW.2 had neither title nor possession of the suit land at any time and he cannot convey any title under it. There is no specific plea that Ex.A.14 was executed nominally by Chandraiah and others in favor of PW.2’s father Kotaiah. Therefore, it is not open to the defendants to now contend that Ex.A.14 was a nominal transaction and that the title to the plaint schedule property remained with Chandraiah and his sons including Subbaiah. 18. I am also of the view that even if the defendants were entitled to raise the said plea, still the evidence on record does not support it .A nominal transaction is one where ‘A’ purports to sell his property to ‘B’ without indicating that his title should cease or pass to ‘B’. In such a case, there is no operative transfer resulting in vesting of title in the transferee and the transferor continues to retain title notwithstanding the execution of the transfer deed [See Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. (7 supra)]. 19. Admittedly, Subbaiah was a party to Ex.A.14 executed by his father in favor of Kotaiah, father of PW.2. The recitals in Ex.A.14 show that to discharge a debt due under a mortgage, Subbaiah’s father Chandriah, on his behalf and on behalf of his minor sons executed Ex.A.14 in favor of Kotaiah. 19. Admittedly, Subbaiah was a party to Ex.A.14 executed by his father in favor of Kotaiah, father of PW.2. The recitals in Ex.A.14 show that to discharge a debt due under a mortgage, Subbaiah’s father Chandriah, on his behalf and on behalf of his minor sons executed Ex.A.14 in favor of Kotaiah. No evidence is placed on record to show that even subsequent to execution of Ex.A.14, Chandraiah, the father of Subbaiah continued to enjoy the property. The defendants did not also prove that the father of PW.2 did not enjoy the property subsequent to his purchase of the same under Ex.A.14. PW.2 specifically asserted that during the lifetime of his father Kotiah, he was in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property. The defendants did not state what could be the motive for execution of Ex.A.14 nominally by Chandraiah in favor of Kotaiah. It is not the case of defendants that it was done to protect the property from relatives/some other creditors. If really no transfer of title was intended by Chandraiah, Chandraiah would not have kept quiet when the property was mutated in the name of plaintiff’s father after the plaintiff’s father purchased it from Kotaiah under Ex.A.1. Therefore I reject the contention of the defendants that Ex.A.14 was only a nominal transaction. 20. As regards the contention of the counsel for appellants that Ex.A.14 not being an original and only a certified copy, and that the presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act could not have been drawn, is concerned, it is apt to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Sri Lakhi Baruah (1 supra) wherein the Supreme Court held : “15. Section 90 of the Evidence Act, 1872 is founded on necessity and convenience because it is extremely difficult and sometimes not possible to lead evidence to prove handwriting, signature or execution of old documents after lapse of thirty years. In order to obviate such difficulties or improbabilities to prove execution of an old document, Section 90 has been incorporated in the Evidence Act, 1872 which does away with the strict rule of proof of private documents. Presumption of genuineness may be raised if the document in question is produced from proper custody. It is, however, the discretion of the court to accept the presumption flowing from Section 90. Presumption of genuineness may be raised if the document in question is produced from proper custody. It is, however, the discretion of the court to accept the presumption flowing from Section 90. There is, however, no manner of doubt that judicial discretion under Section 90 should not be exercised arbitrarily and not being informed by reasons. … … … 17. The position since the aforesaid Privy Council decisions being followed by later decisions of different High Courts, is that presumption under Section 90 does not apply to a copy or a certified copy even though thirty years old; but if a foundation is laid for the admission of secondary evidence under Section 63 of the Evidence Act, 1872 by proof of loss or destruction of the original and the copy which is thirty years old is produced from proper custody, then only the signature authenticating the copy may under Section 90 be presumed to be genuine.” 21. The plaintiff stated in his re-examination that when he asked PW.2 to produce the original of Ex.A.14, PW.2 told him that the original of the sale deed was lost and that he would inform the Court accordingly. PW.2 stated in his evidence that he did not have the original of the said sale deed with him. Therefore, the plaintiff filed Ex.A.14 which is the registration extract of the sale deed dt.6.6.1928. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that foundation has been laid for admission of secondary evidence of the sale deed dt.06.06.1928 under Section 65 of the Evidence Act, 1872 by proof of loss of the original. Since the certified copy itself was produced from proper custody the signature authenticating the copy is under Section 90, accepted to be genuine. Moreover no objection was raised by the defendants at the time of marking and admitting of Ex.A.14 in the evidence. Therefore the said document is admissible in evidence in view of S.90 of the Evidence Act, 1872. 22. Also Ex.A.14, being a certified copy of a sale deed, is a public document, as it is a public record kept in the Registration Department of the State of a private document. Under Section 77 of the Evidence Act, 1872, the said certified copy may be produced in proof of contents of the said public document of which it purports to be a copy. Under Section 77 of the Evidence Act, 1872, the said certified copy may be produced in proof of contents of the said public document of which it purports to be a copy. In Madamanchi Ramappa and another (11 supra), the Supreme Court held that if a document is a certified copy of a public document, it need not be proved by calling a witness. Similar view was expressed in State of Haryana (12 supra). In view of this legal position, I hold that the transaction under Ex.A.14 dt.06.06.1928 has been proved by the plaintiff, more particularly through the evidence of PW2 also, as discussed below. 23. The transactions under Exs.A.14 and Ex.A.1 took place in 1928 and 1933 respectively whereas the suit was filed in the year 1979, four decades later. The plaintiff was born after the above transactions took place. He examined PW.2, whose father Kotiah purchased the plaint schedule property under Ex.A.14 from Chandraiah and his sons including Subbaiah (the father of the 1st defendant). PW.2 himself had sold the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff’s father under Ex.A.1. PW.2 was 86 years old at the time when he deposed in 1990 with regard to the transactions under Exs.A.14 and A.1 which took place more than 60 years prior thereto. He categorically asserted that his father lent money to Chandriah and for the said amount he purchased Ac.2.00 of land at Devarapalli Village. He also stated that during the lifetime of his father, he was in possession and enjoyment of the said land. He further stated that he inherited it later and sold it to father of plaintiff under Ex.A1/19.6.1933 towards debt due to him by his father. Merely because PW.2 could not state in what direction the suit land was situated in the village or state its boundaries in my opinion, his evidence cannot be rejected. If A14 were to be nominal transaction, plaintiff’s father who resided far away in Jandrapeta, would not have ventured to purchase the plaint schedule property from PW2’s father. 24. Therefore I hold on point (i) that Ex.A14 was not a nominal transaction, that it was a true, valid and genuine transaction and under it, PW2’s father obtained title and possession of the plaint schedule property. 24. Therefore I hold on point (i) that Ex.A14 was not a nominal transaction, that it was a true, valid and genuine transaction and under it, PW2’s father obtained title and possession of the plaint schedule property. If so, PW.2, having succeeded to the property on the death of his father was competent to execute Ex.A.1, on his behalf and also on behalf of his minor sons in favor of the plaintiff. Point (ii): 25. Ex.A.1/sale deed was executed on 19.6.1933. Since it is a thirty year old document, presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act, 1872 operates and it has to be accepted as a genuine document also. In view of the evidence of PW.2 that he did sell the plaint schedule property to plaintiff’s father under Ex.A.1, I have no hesitation to hold that plaintiff proved the execution of Ex.A.1. Admittedly, Ex.A.2, the No.10 Account (settlement register) indicated that the name of the plaintiff’s father was mutated in the revenue records, as the owner of the land. If Ex.A.1 were to be only a nominal sale deed, there was no necessity for father of plaintiff to obtain any mutation of the same in the Revenue records in his name. 26. The counsel for the appellants/defendants contended that Ex.A.1 was registered in the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Chirala and this creates a doubt about its validity as Ex.A.14, in respect of the same property, was registered before the Sub-Registrar, Chilakaluripet. The defendants have not examined any officer of the Registration Department of the State to show that the Sub-Registrar at Chirala had no authority to register Ex.A.1 and that it ought to have been registered in the Office of the Sub-Registrar at Chilakaluripet. If the Sub-Registrar at Chirala had no authority to register Ex.A.1, he would have returned it to the plaintiff’s father to present it before the Sub-Registrar at Chilakaluripet. Since this has not happened, it has to be presumed that the Sub-Registrar at Chirala had the authority to register Ex.A.1. Therefore I reject this contention. 27. It is true that plaintiff in his evidence stated that consideration for Ex.A.1 purchased was paid by his father in the form of cash in the presence of the Sub-Registrar and this contradicts the recital in Ex.A.1 that the sale consideration was an adjustment towards the promissory note debt. Therefore I reject this contention. 27. It is true that plaintiff in his evidence stated that consideration for Ex.A.1 purchased was paid by his father in the form of cash in the presence of the Sub-Registrar and this contradicts the recital in Ex.A.1 that the sale consideration was an adjustment towards the promissory note debt. There is no dispute that the plaintiff was not even born by the time Ex.A.1 transaction took place. Therefore, he would not have knowledge of the said transaction. Even otherwise, once the contents of the document are clear, oral evidence to contradict the same cannot be adduced and the law prohibits the same. 28. In S. Saktivel (14 supra), the Supreme Court held: “6. … … … Where under law a contract or disposition is required to be in writing and the same has been reduced to writing, its terms cannot be modified or altered or substituted by oral contract or disposition. No parol evidence will be admissible to substantiate such an oral contract or disposition. A document for its validity or effectiveness is required by law to be in writing and, therefore, no modification or alteration or substitution of such written document is permissible by parol evidence and it is only by another written document the terms of earlier written document can be altered, rescinded or substituted. … … … The second part of proviso (4) to Section 92 does not permit leading of parol evidence for proving a subsequent oral agreement modifying or rescinding the registered instrument. … … …” 29. The counsel for the appellants contended that the consideration for the transfer of the plaint schedule property from Chandraiah and his three sons in favor of Kotaiah under Ex.A.14 was Rs.300/-, that the consideration for the transfer of the same property by PW.2, the son of Kotaiah in favor of the plaintiff’s father was Rs.100/-, and therefore, this also throws a doubt on the genuineness of the transaction. This contention is not tenable since, in my view, it is for the parties to agree about the quantum of consideration for a transfer of property and it is not for a third party to question the adequacy of consideration, particularly when the transfer is through a registered instrument. 30. This contention is not tenable since, in my view, it is for the parties to agree about the quantum of consideration for a transfer of property and it is not for a third party to question the adequacy of consideration, particularly when the transfer is through a registered instrument. 30. The fact that PW2 executed Ex.B.1, a power of Attorney on 08.08.1977 in favor of Thokala Singaiah in respect of the site which had been already sold in favor of the plaintiff’s father under Ex.A.1, probably forgetting that he had already sold it to plaintiff’s father under Ex.A.1, also, in my opinion, does not throw any doubt on the genuineness of Ex.A.1. 31. There is equally no basis for the plea raised by counsel for the appellants that unless a notice is issued by plaintiff prior to filing of the suit, his suit ought to have been dismissed. No authority is cited in support of this plea. 32. I therefore hold on point (ii) that Ex.A1 is true and valid and that plaintiff’s father acquired title under it. Point (iii): 33. As regards the contention of the counsel for the appellant that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to also seek the relief of declaration of title in addition to seeking the relief of recovery of possession is concerned, the decision of the apex court in Anathula Sudhakar (3 supra) is clear. In the said case, the Supreme Court declared : “13. The general principles as to when a mere suit for permanent injunction will lie, and when it is necessary to file a suit for declaration and/or possession with injunction as a consequential relief, are well settled. We may refer to them briefly. 13.1. Where a plaintiff is in lawful or peaceful possession of a property and such possession is interfered or threatened by the defendant, a suit for an injunction simpliciter will lie. A person has a right to protect his possession against any person who does not prove a better title by seeking a prohibitory injunction. But a person in wrongful possession is not entitled to an injunction against the rightful owner. 13.2. Where the title of the plaintiff is not disputed, but he is not in possession, his remedy is to file a suit for possession and seek in addition, if necessary, an injunction. But a person in wrongful possession is not entitled to an injunction against the rightful owner. 13.2. Where the title of the plaintiff is not disputed, but he is not in possession, his remedy is to file a suit for possession and seek in addition, if necessary, an injunction. A person out of possession, cannot seek the relief of injunction simpliciter, without claiming the relief of possession. 13.3. Where the plaintiff is in possession, but his title to the property is in dispute, or under a cloud, or where the defendant asserts title thereto and there is also a threat of dispossession from the defendant, the plaintiff will have to sue for declaration of title and the consequential relief of injunction. Where the title of the plaintiff is under a cloud or in dispute and he is not in possession or not able to establish possession, necessarily the plaintiff will have to file a suit for declaration, possession and injunction. 14. We may, however, clarify that a prayer for declaration will be necessary only if the denial of title by the defendant or challenge to the plaintiff’s title raises a cloud on the title of the plaintiff to the property. A cloud is said to raise over a person’s title, when some apparent defect in his title to a property, or when some prima facie right of a third party over it, is made out or shown. An action for declaration, is the remedy to remove the cloud on the title to the property. On the other hand, where the plaintiff has clear title supported by documents, if a trespasser without any claim to title or an interloper without any apparent title, merely denies the plaintiff’s title, it does not amount to raising a cloud over the title of the plaintiff and it will not be necessary for the plaintiff to sue for declaration and a suit for injunction may be sufficient. Where the plaintiff, believing that the defendant is only a trespasser or a wrongful claimant without title, files a mere suit for injunction, and in such a suit, the defendant discloses in his defence the details of the right or title claimed by him, which raise a serious dispute or cloud over the plaintiff’s title, then there is a need for the plaintiff, to amend the plaint and convert the suit into one for declaration. Alternatively, he may withdraw the suit for bare injunction, with permission of the court to file a comprehensive suit for declaration and injunction. He may file the suit for declaration with consequential relief, even after the suit for injunction is dismissed, where the suit raised only the issue of possession and not any issue of title.” (emphasis supplied) 34. I have already held that the plaintiff has clear title supported by Ex.A.1 and its link document Ex.A.14. On the other hand, the defendant Nos.1 and 2 have not been able to establish that Ex.A.14 is only a nominal document executed by Subbaih’s father, Chandraiah in favor of Kotaiah, the father of PW.2. I also reject the contention of the defendants that Subbaiah was the owner of the plaint schedule property as admittedly the property was initially owned by Subbaiah, his two brothers Ammaiah and Narayana Swamy and also their father Chandraiah and all of them executed Ex.A.14 in favor of PW.2’s father Kotaiah. After the death of Kotaiah, PW.2 executed Ex.A.1 in favor of the plaintiff’s father. Nothing is placed on record by the defendants to establish that Subbaiah was the exclusive owner of the plaint schedule property and if so, how he became such exclusive owner. When Subbaiah, being a party to Ex.A14, during his lifetime did not question Ex.A.14 or Ex.A1, the claim of the defendants that Subbaiah continued to be the owner of the plaint schedule property, notwithstanding the execution of Ex.A.14 and later Ex.A.1, cannot be accepted. The fact that the No.2 accounts Ex.A.2 to A.11 mention the name of the 1st defendant as cultivator of the plaint schedule property does not prove that she is the owner of the plaint schedule property. Obviously, without any apparent title, the defendants merely denied the plaintiff’s title. In my considered opinion, there is no cloud on the title of the plaintiff in respect of the plaint schedule property and therefore it was not necessary for the plaintiff to seek the relief of declaration of his title to the plaint schedule property in addition to the relief of recovery of possession. 35. The decision in Hardesh Ores (4 supra) cited by the counsel for the appellant is clearly distinguishable. 35. The decision in Hardesh Ores (4 supra) cited by the counsel for the appellant is clearly distinguishable. In the said case, a suit for injunction was filed by the appellant before the Supreme Court restraining the respondent from interfering with its mining activity alleging that it had sought a renewal of a mining lease from the respondent. The respondent denied the right of the appellant to claim renewal in express terms and unequivocally stated that the agreement did not stand renewed as contended by the appellant. The Supreme Court held that renewal of an agreement or lease requires execution of a document in accordance with law evidencing the renewal and that the grant of renewal is also a fresh grant. In the absence of a document renewing the original agreement for a further period of five years and in the absence of any declaration from a Court of Law that the original agreement stood renewed automatically upon the appellants exercising their auction for grant of renewal, the appellant was not entitled to the relief of injunction in the suit as there was no subsisting agreement evidenced by a written document or declared by a court. It was held that the appellant ought to have prayed for a declaration that its agreement stood renewed automatically on the exercise of option for renewal and only on that basis they could have sought an injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with their possession and operation. In the case on hand, I have already held that the plaintiff had clear title and the defendants did not have even apparent title. Point (iii) is therefore answered accordingly. Point (iv) : 36. In the plaint, the plaintiff alleged that his father was a medical practitioner at Jandrapeta and he entrusted the plaint schedule property to Subbaiah for management in 1941 and Subbaiah used to cultivate the plaint schedule property; that plaintiff’s father died in the year 1950 and he and his brother Laxmanudu succeeded their father; at the time of his father’s death, plaintiff was aged only about 10 years and therefore his maternal uncle late Pusuluri Ramacharyulu was attending to the management of the property. The plaintiff specifically contended that till 1966 when Subbaiah died, Subbaiah cultivated the plaint schedule property as a tenant. The plaintiff specifically contended that till 1966 when Subbaiah died, Subbaiah cultivated the plaint schedule property as a tenant. The counsel for the appellants contended that in the plaint, the plaintiff pleaded only that the management of the property was entrusted to Subbaiah and there was no plea of tenancy. I do not agree as in Para.(c) of the plaint there is a specific allegation by plaintiff that till 1966 Subbaiah cultivated the plaint schedule property as a tenant. This is also probabilised by the fact that Jandrapeta, where plaintiff’s father was practicing medicine, was admittedly far away from Deverapalli, where the plaint schedule lands were located and as Subbaiah was an agriculturist, it is quite probable that at his request he was allowed to cultivate the land as a tenant. It is true that there is no documentary evidence of the lease. It has come on record in the evidence of the plaintiff as PW.1 that prior to 1978, the value of the plaint schedule land was very low and it increased from 1978 due to advent of the cotton crop. He also stated that prior to 1978 the schedule land was used as pasture land and yielded very little. Maybe for this reason, no written lease was executed. But the absence of a written lease cannot rule out the fact that Subbiah was a tenant and after him, the defendants 1 and 2 were tenants. I am also of the opinion that the defendants having pleaded that the plaint schedule property was the property of Subbaiah and from him, the 1st defendant, his daughter inherited it, are precluded from raising the plea of adverse possession. It is settled law that a person who claims possession under color of title from an original owner, cannot plead adverse possession, as both pleas are inconsistent with each other. (see Arundhati Mishra v. Sri Ram Charitra Pandey ( (1994) 2 SCC 29 ) and Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt. of India).( (2004) 10 SCC 779 ) 37. Therefore, the plea of adverse possession raised by the defendants cannot be entertained. 38. (see Arundhati Mishra v. Sri Ram Charitra Pandey ( (1994) 2 SCC 29 ) and Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt. of India).( (2004) 10 SCC 779 ) 37. Therefore, the plea of adverse possession raised by the defendants cannot be entertained. 38. In this view of the matter, the mere fact that Subbaiah was in possession of the plaint schedule property up to his death in 1966 and thereafter, the defendants continued in possession of the plaint schedule property till the filing of the present suit, cannot confer any title on the defendant Nos.1 and 2 to enable them to transfer it to defendant No.3. Possession however long, if it is not adverse, cannot divest the title of the plaintiff in respect of the plaint schedule property. This point is answered accordingly. Point (v): 39. Another important factor to hold against the defendants/appellants in this appeal is the fact that OS.No.103 of 1979 out of which the present appeal arises, was decided along with OS.No.91 of 1987 (OS.No.505 of 1979 on the file DMC, Chirala) filed by the 3rd defendant against the plaintiff herein for injunction. Both the suits OS.No.103 of 1979 and OS.No.91 of 1987 were decided by a common judgment dt.13.11.1992 by the Sub-ordinate Judge, Chirala, who decreed OS.No.103 of 1979 and dismissed OS.No.91 of 1987. No appeal was preferred by the 3rd defendant challenging the judgment and decree in OS.No.91 of 1987. In OS.No.91 of 1987, the 3rd defendant specifically pleaded that he acquired title from defendant Nos.1 and 2 under an agreement of sale dt.21.04.1977 and later under a registered sale deed dt.30.09.1977 and sought injunction against the plaintiff on the said basis. In its common judgment, the trial court held that the plaintiff in O.S.103/1979 established his title and the defendants did not do so. As the title to the property was the basis of the 3rd defendant’s right to continue in possession by seeking injunction in OS.No.91 of 1987, the decision therein on the question of possession is res judicata on the question of title, to the extent that adjudication of title was essential to the judgment. As the question of title was directly and substantially in issue in OS.No.91 of 1987 and was necessary for grant of injunction, the decision therein would bar the defendants from agitating the question of their title in this appeal. [see Sajjadanashin Sayed Md. B.E. Edr. As the question of title was directly and substantially in issue in OS.No.91 of 1987 and was necessary for grant of injunction, the decision therein would bar the defendants from agitating the question of their title in this appeal. [see Sajjadanashin Sayed Md. B.E. Edr. V. Musa Dadabhai Ummer ( (2000) 3 SCC 350 ) and Anathula Sudhakar (3 supra)] 40. For all the above reasons, I do not find any merit in the appeal and accordingly the same is dismissed. No costs.