Madanapalle Cloth Merchants Association, rep. by its Secretary v. Madanapalle Municipality rep. by its Commissioner
2013-02-11
L.NARASIMHA REDDY
body2013
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : The appellant filed O.S.No.76 of 2001, in the Court of I Additional Junior Civil Judge, Madanapall, Chittoor District, for the relief of declaration and injunction, restraining the respondents from levying the market fee on shops dealing with the business of cloths and readymade garments. Through the notification dated 12-01-1999, issued by the Madanapalle Municipal Council, the 2nd respondent herein, and published in the Chittoor gazette, it proposed to levy licence fee on various establishments functioning within the limits of Municipality, the 1st respondent. The grievance of the appellant was in relation to item 24, of appendix to the notification, which dealt with the sale of the cloths and readymade dresses, made of nylon, polyester, cotton, terri cotton, terlene and handloom textiles. According to the appellant, the notification was issued in exercise of power under Section 263 read with Section 351 of the A.P. Municipalities Act, 1965 (for short ‘the Act’), and the first of the provision does not permit of such levy. The trial Court dismissed the suit through judgment dated 08-08-2005. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant filed A.S.No.50 of 2006 in the Court of VII Additional District Judge, (Fast Track Court), Madanapalle. The appeal was dismissed through judgment dated 29-09-2010. Hence, this Second Appeal. 2. Sri Mahadeva Kanthrigala, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the items on which, the 2nd respondent can levy the licence fee are enlisted in Schedule IV, referable to Section 263 of the Act, and a perusal of the same discloses that the trade in textiles, cloths or readymade dresses are not brought under its purview. He contends that the trial Court and the lower Appellate Court have proceeded on hyper-technicalities, and that the notification, marked as Ex.A-2, in so far as it prescribes the licence fee on shops, dealing with the cloths and readymade garments, cannot be sustained in law. 3. Learned Standing Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that the goods mentioned in item 24 of the notification are those, which are combustible and by their very nature, the synthetic fibres are highly combustible. He submits that neither the appellant had submitted any objection for the notification, nor the remedy of appeal, provided for under the gazette, was availed. He contends that the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below do not warrant interference.
He submits that neither the appellant had submitted any objection for the notification, nor the remedy of appeal, provided for under the gazette, was availed. He contends that the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below do not warrant interference. The appellant challenged the notification, Ex.A-2, mainly on the ground that it does not accord with Schedule IV of the Act. 4. On behalf of the respondents, a written-statement was filed, explaining their stand. The trial Court framed the following issues for its consideration: 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to seek for the declaration of the notification dated 12-1-1999 issued by the defendants? 2. If not whether the plaintiff can be given immunity from payment of licence fee and thereby the defendants can be restrained from collecting the fee by way of a permanent injunction? 5. On behalf of the appellant, PWs 1 and 2 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-6 were filed. No evidence, whatever was adduced by the respondents, obviously because it is a pure question of law. The suit was dismissed and in the appeal, the lower Appellate Court framed only one point for consideration, viz., whether the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court are sustained in law. The appeal was dismissed. 6. The 1st respondent issued the notification, in exercise of statutory power. The appellant does not dispute the competence of the 1st respondent to issue the notification. Its contention was that the cloth and readymade garments do not come within the purview of Section 263 and Schedule IV. The Act provides for different aspects, including the regulation of business within the limits of a Municipality. Schedule IV contains a list of activities, which can be undertaken only on the basis of a licence, to be by the Municipality. One such activity is manufacturing, or dealership in combustible items. The notification mentions that items like, the polyester, terlene and the like, which are obviously combustible. 7. A notification of the nature of Ex.A-2 can be challenged, mostly on procedural aspects. It is not in dispute that the 1st respondent invited objections before it published the notification, and in spite of that, the appellant did not raise any objection. This information was elicited in the course of evidence. Added to that, the notification itself provides for a remedy of appeal to the Municipal Council, the 2nd respondent herein.
It is not in dispute that the 1st respondent invited objections before it published the notification, and in spite of that, the appellant did not raise any objection. This information was elicited in the course of evidence. Added to that, the notification itself provides for a remedy of appeal to the Municipal Council, the 2nd respondent herein. The appellant did not avail the same. The scope of interference of the notifications of this nature, that too, by a Civil Court is very limited. 8. The trial Court and the lower Appellate Court have taken the correct view of the matter, and this Court is not inclined to admit the Second Appeal. It is accordingly dismissed. 9. The miscellaneous petition filed in this Second Appeal shall also stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.