Judgment : K.C. Bhanu, J. 1. This Criminal Appeal, under Section 374 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’), is directed against the judgment dated 20.03.2009 in Sessions Case No.102 of 2008 on the file of the IX Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Guntur, whereunder and whereby the appellants/A.1 to A.4 were found guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’), accordingly convicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/- each in default to undergo simple imprisonment for three months. 2. The case of prosecution, in brief, may be stated as follows: One Bynaboina Srinivasarao (hereinafter referred to as ‘the deceased’) was resident of Yanamadala village. P.W.2 and Bynaboina Mangamma (L.W.2) are parents, P.W.1 is the elder brother and P.W.3 is the wife, of the deceased. A.1 is father of A.2 to A.4. The accused and the deceased are inter-related. Their lands were situated side by side in Yanamadala village and there was a long standing boundary dispute in the fields between them. In the month of February, 2006, the matter was brought to the notice of elders, who settled the issue amicably, for the time being, but the settlement was not to the satisfaction of both the parties. On 12.06.2006 at about 7.00 AM, the deceased and P.W.1 attacked A.2 with a knife and attempted to kill him, and on a complaint lodged by A.3, case in crime no.45 of 2006 of Prathipadu police station was registered, and after filing of charge sheet, it was numbered as Sessions Case No.92 of 2007 on the file of the Principal Assistant Sessions Judge, Guntur. Thereafter, relations between the accused and the deceased were strained. A.1, being father of victim in the above case, bore grudge against the deceased and P.W.1, and hatched a plan with A.2 to A.4 to do away with the life of the deceased and P.W.1, and the accused were waiting for an opportunity to kill them. On 21.08.2007, the deceased and P.W.1 came out of their house before dawn for answering calls of nature and as usual, went towards tank bund in Madigapalle village. At about 6.30 AM, they were returning to their house after attending calls of nature in the fields. On 21.08.2007, the deceased and P.W.1 came out of their house before dawn for answering calls of nature and as usual, went towards tank bund in Madigapalle village. At about 6.30 AM, they were returning to their house after attending calls of nature in the fields. Pursuant to their conspiracy and keeping watch over their movements, the accused with their premeditated plan, noticed them in the fields answering calls of nature, and came running into the fields towards them. Having seen the accused coming towards them, they frightened and started running towards Madigapalle beyond the stream. P.W.1, who was ahead, crossed the stream first while the deceased as lagging behind, and at this point of time, all the accused, who were armed with knives (veta kodavallu) surrounded the deceased, A.2 dealt blows at first on his head and the deceased fell down in the fields of P.W.9 and was raising hands. The other accused also knifed him all over the body and in particular on his head. Seeing the incident, P.W.1 raised cries which drew attention of P.Ws.4, 9 and 5 (L.Ws.5 to 7), and P.Ws.6 and 7 (L.Ws.8 and 9) who were attending the work in their fields, rushed there and saw the accused fleeing away with the weapons. They all saw the dead body of the deceased in a pool of blood in the field of P.W.9 with multiple injuries on head. On a report lodged by P.W.1 on 21.8.2007 at 9.00 AM, police registered a case in crime no.52 of 2007 of Prathipadu police station for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with 34 IPC. During the course of investigation, P.W.15-Inspector of Police visited the scene of occurrence, prepared observation report in the presence of mediators, held inquest on the dead body of the deceased and sent the dead body to Postmortem examination. P.W.13-Assistant Professor, Guntur Medical College, Guntur conducted autopsy on the dead body of the deceased. After receiving relevant documents and completion of investigation, police laid the charge sheet. 3. The trial Court framed the following charge against the accused. P.W.13-Assistant Professor, Guntur Medical College, Guntur conducted autopsy on the dead body of the deceased. After receiving relevant documents and completion of investigation, police laid the charge sheet. 3. The trial Court framed the following charge against the accused. “That A.1 to A.4 of you, due to long standing boundary dispute in the fields of you and Bynaboina Srinivasa Rao (deceased), hatched up a plan to settle the disputes once for all and entered into a criminal conspiracy to do away the lives of Bynaboina Srinivasa Rao (deceased) and Bynaboina China Veeraiah (L.W.3) and that A.1 to A.4 of you, on 21.08.2007 at about 6.30 A.M., at Madigapalle beyond the stream, intentionally and having knowledge committed murder by causing death of Bynaboina Srinivasarao (deceased); that A.1 to A.4 of you armed with knives (veta kodavallu) surrounded the deceased and that A.2 of you dealt blows at first on the deceased head, and that A.1, A.3 and A.4 of you also knifed all over the body and head of the deceased which resulted his death on the spot, and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 302 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance of this Court.” When the charge was read over and explained to the accused in telugu, they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. To substantiate the case of prosecution, on behalf of the prosecution, P.Ws. 1 to 15 were examined and Exs.P1 to P12 were got marked, besides case properties M.Os. 1 to 11. 5. After completion of the evidence on prosecution side, the accused were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. to explain the incriminating evidence appearing against them in the evidence of prosecution witnesses. They denied the same. No oral evidence was adduced on behalf of the accused, but Exs.D1 to D22-contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses, were got marked on their behalf. 6. After considering the material available on record, the learned Sessions Judge, vide the impugned judgment, found the appellants/A.1 to A.4 guilty of the charge levelled against them and accordingly convicted and sentenced them as stated above. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the present appeal has been preferred by accused. 7. 6. After considering the material available on record, the learned Sessions Judge, vide the impugned judgment, found the appellants/A.1 to A.4 guilty of the charge levelled against them and accordingly convicted and sentenced them as stated above. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the present appeal has been preferred by accused. 7. Now, the point for determination is whether the prosecution is able to bring home the guilt of the accused for the charge levelled against them beyond all reasonable doubt and whether the conviction and sentence recorded by the trial court is liable to be set aside or confirmed or modified ? 8. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that there was a delay in lodging of Ex.P1-complaint by P.W.1, for which no explanation has been given; that by the time Ex.P1 was received by police, P.W.1 was present at the scene of occurrence and therefore, the First Information Report is ante-timed and prepared after due deliberations in the afternoon before sending it to the Magistrate concerned. He further contended that there was a delay of 4 hours in sending Ex.P10-original First Information Report to the Magistrate, and the delay was taken with a view to introduce falsity into the case; that the time of offence as mentioned in Ex.P10 is not tallying with that of Ex.P9-postmortem examination report; that if the postmortem report is taken into consideration, the death must have taken place around 10.30 AM, but, according to the case of prosecution, the time of death is 6.30 AM, which is invented to project P.W.1 as an eye-witness to the incident. It is also contended that the place of occurrence as projected by the prosecution is not the actual scene of occurrence; that the deceased was attacked by some unknown persons at a different place and the dead body was taken to the place of occurrence; that if really the deceased was attached in maize field, he must have sustained abrasions or contusions, but the Doctor did not find any abrasions on the dead body; that none of the plants in the maize field was broken or was in a disturbed condition at the place of finding of the dead body of the deceased. It is his further contention that the statements of witnesses were not sent to the Court immediately after the incident; that as per the ocular testimony, the deceased was attacked by the assailants with hunting sickles whereas the earliest version would go to show that the assailants attacked the deceased with knives; that there was no scope or possibility for eye-witnesses to be present at the scene of occurrence because after raising hue and cry by P.W.1, people who were present in the neighbouring lands came to the scene of occurrence, and therefore, the evidence of P.Ws.4, 5, 6 and 7 cannot be believed; that P.W.4 has no lands of his own near the scene of occurrence; that P.W.5 is closely related to the deceased, who is inimical towards the accused and his name was not mentioned in the First Information Report and his evidence runs contrary to the evidence of PW.1; that P.Ws.6 and 7 are interested witnesses; that P.W.6 is not a resident of the village where the incident had allegedly taken place; that P.W.7 did not file any pattadar pass books to show that his land was given to P.W.6 for cultivation; that Exs.D9 to D22 are contradictions elicited which throw any amount of doubt so that no credence can be given to the evidence of eye-witnesses; that owner of the land where the incident is alleged to have taken place is the best person to speak about the alleged incident, but he did not support the case of prosecution; that the evidence of P.Ws.4, 5, 6 and 7 is contrary to the version of P.W.1 with regard to their witnessing the incident; that none of the witnesses spoke about the specific overt-acts of any one of the accused except against A.1; that none of the witnesses tried to rescue the deceased and therefore their conduct is quite unnatural; that P.Ws. 1, 4 to 7 did not speak as to the reason for their presence at the scene of occurrence; that name of P.W.5 is neither mentioned in the First Information Report nor stated by P.W.1 when he was examined by police; that the places where they were standing at the time of the occurrence have not been specifically mentioned in Ex.P11-rough sketch of the scene of occurrence; that the mediators with regard to arrest of the accused and seizure of certain property did not support the case of the prosecution and they have not identified the weapons M.O. 3 as used in commission of the offence and the evidence of P.W.15 with regard to arrest of the accused and seizure of the weapons cannot be believed as the documents are fabricated; that no specific overt-act is attributed against A.1, A.3 and A.4. It is further contention that the deceased had several enemies and the possibility of some enemies killing him at a different place cannot be ruled out; that when two views are possible, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted and that when there is a discrepancy with regard to inquest report and autopsy, benefit of doubt should be given to the accused; that as per the medical evidence, none of the injuries was possible by stabbing with knife; that the material contradictions and the omissions elicited in cross-examination of prosecution witnesses would clearly go to show that they were tutored and interested witnesses; that P.W.1 was sentenced to undergo 3 years’ imprisonment in a case filed against him by A.2 and therefore, he is inimical to the accused, and therefore, he submitted that the prosecution failed to establish its case against the appellants/accused beyond reasonable doubt and hence, prayed to set aside the conviction and sentence recorded against them by the trial court. Learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance on several decisions, which will be referred to, at appropriate time. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance on several decisions, which will be referred to, at appropriate time. 9. On the other hand, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor contended that P.Ws.1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are eye-witnesses to the incident, and their evidence would clearly go to show that all the accused shared common intention to commit murder of the deceased because of previous civil disputes; that though P.Ws.1, 4 and 5 are closely related to the deceased, the court has to appreciate their evidence like that of any other witnesses, to know whether they were really present at the time of the occurrence or not; that P.Ws.6 and 7 are independent witnesses who have categorically stated that all the accused indiscriminately caused injuries to the deceased with their respective weapons; that mere delay in lodging the First Information Report and further delay in sending the First Information Report to the Court, by itself is not a ground to reject the evidence of eye-witnesses whose evidence is true, trustworthy and believable; that the First Information Report was lodged immediately after the incident and thereafter it was sent to the Court; that the discrepancies in the evidence of prosecution witnesses and the contradictions elicited from the evidence of eye-witnesses, would not in any manner affect the main substratum of the prosecution case and they are trivial in nature; that those omissions or contradictions are bound to occur in case where a witness was made to depose about the occurrence after lapse of long time; that medical evidence is completely in corroboration with ocular testimony; that minor discrepancies with regard to weapons used in commission of the offence, cannot be shown to be fatal to the case of prosecution; that some witnesses may perceive hunting sickles used in commission of the offence as knives, as both the weapons are made of iron, and so that discrepancy is not a ground to reject the case of prosecution; that the rough sketch of the scene of occurrence coupled with the scene observation report would clearly go to show that the incident had taken in the land of P.W.9; that the evidence of P.Ws.1, 4 to 7 is very clear that the incident had taken place in the land of P.W.9; that simply because P.Ws.11 and 12 turned hostile with regard to arrest of the accused and seizure of M.O.3, it does not mean that the evidence of P.W.15 has to be disbelieved simply because he is a police officer in-charge of the investigation; that the trial court placed reliance on the evidence of P.Ws.1,4 to 7 and Exs.P3 and P11 and came to conclusion that it is the accused who caused injuries to the deceased; that after an elaborate consideration of the evidence on record, the trial court rightly found the appellants/accused guilty and accordingly convicted and sentenced them, and there are no grounds to interfere with the same. Hence, she prays to dismiss the Criminal Appeal. 10. Motive for the incident was that there was a long standing boundary dispute between the family of the deceased and the family of the accused. A criminal case was filed against P.W.1 and the deceased, and while the criminal case was pending before the Senior Civil Judge, Guntur, the deceased was murdered. In the criminal case instituted by the accused against P.W.1 and the deceased, P.W.1 was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for two years. There is no evidence with regard to immediate motive for the accused to attack the deceased in causing injuries. 11. It is not in dispute that the deceased is the younger brother of P.W.1. The evidence of PW.1 would go to show that on 21.08.2007, himself and the deceased went towards tank bund in the village to answer calls of nature and after attending calls of nature, they were returning to the house; then, all the accused armed with hunting sickles like knives, chased both of them; that P.W.1 was fleeing away ahead of the deceased and all the accused were chasing the deceased from behind; that when they were running into, they reached the field of P.W.9 and at that place, there was a canal in the field; that P.W.1 jumped over the canal and the deceased could not jump; that A.2 hacked the deceased with hunting sickle and on that the deceased fell down, and all other accused surrounded him and hacked him with hunting sickles indiscriminately, and as a result, the deceased sustained severe injuries over the head, back of chest, left thigh, over right cheek and testicles; that due to the head injury, brain matter came out; then P.W.1 raised cries and on hearing his cries, P.Ws.4, 6, 7 and 5 who were present in the neighbouring fields, came to the scene of occurrence. It is admitted by him that the accused and the material prosecution witnesses are relatives and P.W.4 is his junior paternal uncle and grand fathers of P.Ws.4 and 2 are brothers. He also stated that there was a maize crop in the field of P.W.9 (Sivaiah) where the incident had taken place, and to the south of the maize land of P.W.9, regu garden belonging to Bynaboina Sambaiah is located. He also stated that there was a maize crop in the field of P.W.9 (Sivaiah) where the incident had taken place, and to the south of the maize land of P.W.9, regu garden belonging to Bynaboina Sambaiah is located. It is also admitted that the villagers of Yanamadala use eastern tank bund of Chinna cheruvu to answer calls of nature within a radius of a furlong from the village, and the first 1/4th furlong was being used for women folk and the remaining extent was being used by men, to answer calls of nature; that the deceased and P.W.1 were not having any lands in the vicinity of Chinna cheruvu. According to him, he started from his house at about 6.10 PM to answer calls of nature and it took 10 minutes for him to go to the point where he answered calls of nature and five minutes to answer calls of nature, and thereafter he was returning from that place; that the did not receive any injury while he was running through the fields. Though he admitted that himself and his brother did not come together to answer calls of nature, by the time he saw the accused, they were going together. 12. Coming to the evidence of P.W.4, it is evident that he went to the fields on the date of the incident at about 6.30 AM to water his fields; that at that time, P.W.1 was running by raising hue and cry and the deceased was running behind P.W.1 in the field of P.W.9; that there was a water canal and P.W.1 jumped over it and the deceased could not; that the accused, who were chasing the deceased, attached him; that in the first instance, A.2 attached the deceased over his neck and head with hunting sickle and the remaining accused also hacked the deceased with hunting sickle, and as a result, the deceased died on the spot. He stated that at the time of the incident, he was present in the field; that P.W.2 and A.1 are cousins in relation, to him; Though he stated that he did not have any land of his own, but he was cultivating the land on lease, from Vanava Appanna and the leasehold land is situated adjacent to bund of Chutugunta vagu. It is suggested to him that the said Appanna has no lands, but the same is denied. It is suggested to him that the said Appanna has no lands, but the same is denied. His evidence would go to show that at the time of the incident, he was present at a distance of 10 yards. Certain omissions were elicited in his evidence to the effect that he did not state to the police that he was present in the fields to draw water, that he saw P.W.1 running by making hue and cry, that P.W.1 and the deceased were running in the fields of P.W.9, that P.W.9 jumped over the water canal and the deceased could not jump over the canal, that A.2 hacked on the neck of the deceased hunting sickle. It is specifically suggested to him that he was not in the fields and that he was not having any land taken on lease and that as tutored, he was giving false evidence. Omission amounts to contradiction if the same appears to be significant and otherwise relevant having regard to the context in which such omission occurs. It is well settled that an innocuous omission is in consequential. Omissions amounting to contradiction that had strong influence against the core of the prosecution case are alone material. 13. Coming to the evidence of P.W.5, his evidence is almost similar to the testimony as stated by P.W.4. The purpose of this witness to be present at the time of scene of occurrence was that he went to this fields at about 6.30 AM. No doubt, he admitted that A.1 is son of his senior paternal uncle, but at the same time, A.2 is also closely related to him as A.1. He admitted that wife and children of A.1 filed civil suit against this witness and also that he filed a counter case against wife of A.1 and his children, with regard to claim of passage of waste water passing through his field, and both the cases were pending. Similarly, it is admitted that A.1 filed criminal case against him alleging that he caused injury wherein he was sentenced to pay fine of Rs.500/-, and in that criminal case, A.1 and A.3 deposed against him. It is not in dispute that he was having Ac.5.00 of land in Yanamadala village. Case of the accused is that this witness was not cultivating the land, but his son was cultivating the land. But, the said fact is denied. It is not in dispute that he was having Ac.5.00 of land in Yanamadala village. Case of the accused is that this witness was not cultivating the land, but his son was cultivating the land. But, the said fact is denied. It is his evidence that he first saw the deceased and P.W.1 who were coming on to his boundary; that the boundary of his land is bund and small water tank; that while running, both the deceased and P.W.1 entered into his fields and ran for some distance and later entered into the field of P.W.9; that he did not try even to interfere. It is specifically stated by him that his land is adjacent to the land of P.W.9. Exs.D12 and 13 were elicited from his evidence. It is suggested to him that he is not a witness to the occurrence and deposing falsely as he was not having good relationship with A.1, but the same is denied. 14. P.W.6 was said to be present in the field of P.W.9 at the time of the occurrence. It is his evidence that at that time, P.W.1 and the deceased were running by making hue and cry; that P.W.1 was running ahead of the deceased and the accused were chasing them, and P.W.1 escaped by jumping over the canal whereas the deceased could not jump; that A.2 hacked the deceased with hunting sickle over the head as a result the deceased fell down on ground and the remaining accused surrounded him and hacked him with hunting sickle. He admitted that he along with his father and P.W.7 was accused in a murder case; that P.W.7 is his friend. Exs.D14 to 17 were elicited from his evidence. Omission is also elicited from his evidence that he did not state to police that on the date of the incident, he was present in the field of P.W.7, that the deceased was making hue and cry while running, that P.W.1 jumped the canal whereas the deceased could not jump. It is suggested to him that he was speaking false intentionally against the accused as he had no good relationship with the accused, but the same is denied. 15. The evidence of P.W.7 is also to the same effect as testified by P.W.6. He admitted that he was shown as one of the accused in Gollapudi Ramadasu murder case. It is suggested to him that he was speaking false intentionally against the accused as he had no good relationship with the accused, but the same is denied. 15. The evidence of P.W.7 is also to the same effect as testified by P.W.6. He admitted that he was shown as one of the accused in Gollapudi Ramadasu murder case. It is suggested to him that himself and P.Ws.1 to 6 belong to Congress party whereas the accused belong to Telugu Desam party. Admittedly, Ex.P1 was scribed by this witness to the narration of P.w.1. He stated that his land is situated adjacent to the land of P.W.9. He also stated that P.W.5 has got half acre of land by the side of the land of P.W.9, and that before the incident, he observed P.Ws.5, 6 and 9 in their respective fields. Exs.D19 to 22 were elicited in his cross-examination. It is suggested to him that the deceased was having several enemies and at the hands of unknown persons, the deceased died, but the same is denied. 16. P.Ws. 1, 4 and 5, who are closely related to the deceased, can be said to be termed as interested witnesses. Merely because an eye-witness is an interested witness, his evidence cannot be thrown away or discarded on that ground. The court has to scrutinize his evidence scrupulously before accepting the same. It is not the law that evidence of interested persons should be rejected. Desirability of the testimony being subject to close and severe scrutiny arises when it is shown that there is likelihood of an attempt to falsely implicate the accused. If the testimony of an interested witness is otherwise found to be reliable in the sense that he could be expected to be near the place of occurrence and could have seen what happened, his evidence could not be rejected on the ground of interestedness. 17. P.Ws.6 and 7 are independent witnesses. A witness is normally be considered independent unless he springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless a witness has cause such as enmity against the accused to wish to implicate him falsely. When a witness has no motive or enmity to falsely implicate the accused and he is not shown to have any ill-will against the accused nor any affinity or relationship with the deceased, he is an independent witness. When a witness has no motive or enmity to falsely implicate the accused and he is not shown to have any ill-will against the accused nor any affinity or relationship with the deceased, he is an independent witness. Strong grounds must exist to disbelieve the testimony of an independent witness. The evidence of an independent witness has to pass the test of being trustworthy and in consonance with the attending circumstances. 18. First and foremost ground urged by the learned counsel for the appellants is that Ex.P1-complaint was a suspicious document and that there was a delay in lodging of First Information Report and further delay in sending it to the Court. The principal object of a First Information Report, from the point of view of the informant, is to set the criminal law into motion and from the point of view of the investigating authorities, is to obtain information about the alleged criminal activity so as to be able to take suitable steps for tracing and bringing to book the guilty person. First Information Report is never treated as a substantive piece of evidence. It can only be used to corroborate the statement of the maker as contemplated under Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 19. The incident is alleged to have taken place at about 6.30 AM on 21.08.2007 beyond a stream in Madigapalle area of Yanamadala village within the limits of Prathipadu police station. According to P.W.1, he rushed to the police station within half-an-hour thereafter and for drafting Ex.P1 through P.W.7, it took 45 minutes, and after handing over Ex.P1, he returned back to the scene of occurrence, and that the distance between the police station and the scene of occurrence would be covered within 10 minutes. Basing on the admission made by P.W.1, it is contended that it would not be possible for P.W.1 to present Ex.P1-report at 9.00 AM in the police station and when P.W.1 was present at the scene of occurrence at 9.00 AM, it is not possible for P.W.1 to lodge the report. The witness was deposing in the court nearly 1 year 3 months after the incident. He is an illiterate witness. Therefore, his evidence that he returned back to the scene of occurrence prior to 9.00 AM on the fateful day, cannot be given much importance. Rustic witness will not have timesense. The witness was deposing in the court nearly 1 year 3 months after the incident. He is an illiterate witness. Therefore, his evidence that he returned back to the scene of occurrence prior to 9.00 AM on the fateful day, cannot be given much importance. Rustic witness will not have timesense. P.W.14, the then Sub Inspector of Police, has categorically stated that while he was present in police station on 21.08.2007 at 9.00 AM, P.W.1 of Yanamadala village came to police station and presented Ex.P1-report and then he registered the case. He admitted that one can reach from the village Yanamadala to police station within 10 minutes. It is suggested to him that P.W.1 did not come to the police station at 9.00 AM and he registered the case in the afternoon, but the same is denied. It is not in dispute that printed copy of original First Information Report (Ex.P10) reached the Court at about 1.20 PM. It is suggested to him that Ex.P1 is ante-timed and brought into existence at about 12.00 noon to suit the case of the prosecution after due deliberations. Except hurling suggestions, which are denied, there is nothing on record to show that it was not given at the time as mentioned in Ex.P10. There are only four accused and it is not a dispute between two factions in the village so as to infer that time is taken to implicate as many number of accused as possible belonging to opposite group. As seen from the evidence on record, it appears that it is a case of personal rivalry between the accused and the deceased with regard to boundary dispute. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that delay has occurred for the purpose of making due deliberations so as to implicate the accused falsely. 20. Learned counsel for the appellants relied on a decision reported in the case of Meharaj Singh v. State of U.P.,( (1994) 5 SCC 188 ) wherein it is held thus: “FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence for the purpose of appreciating the evidence led at the trial. Learned counsel for the appellants relied on a decision reported in the case of Meharaj Singh v. State of U.P.,( (1994) 5 SCC 188 ) wherein it is held thus: “FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence for the purpose of appreciating the evidence led at the trial. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the Fir is to obtain the earliest information regarding the circumstance in which the crime was committed, including the names of the actual culprits and the parts played by them, the weapons, if any, used, as also the names of the eyewitnesses, if any. Delay in lodging the Fir often results in embellishment, which is a a creature of an afterthought. On account of delay, the Fir not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, danger also creeps in of the introduction of a coloured version or exaggerated story. With a view to determine whether the Fir was lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, the courts generally look for certain external checks. One of the checks is the receipt of the copy of the Fir, called a special report in a murder case, by the local Magistrate. If this report is received by the Magistrate late it can give rise to an inference that the Fir was not lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, unless, of course the prosecution can offer a satisfactory explanation for the delay in despatching or receipt of the copy of the Fir by the local Magistrate. Prosecution has led no evidence at all in this behalf. The second external check equally important is the sending of the copy of the Fir along with the dead body and its reference in the inquest report. Even though the inquest report, prepared under Section 174 CrPC, is aimed at serving a statutory function, to lend credence to the prosecution case, the details of the Fir and the gist of statements recorded during inquest proceedings get reflected in the report. Even though the inquest report, prepared under Section 174 CrPC, is aimed at serving a statutory function, to lend credence to the prosecution case, the details of the Fir and the gist of statements recorded during inquest proceedings get reflected in the report. The absence of those details is indicative of the fact that the prosecution story was still in an embryo state and had not been given any shape and that the Fir came to be recorded later on after due deliberations and consultations and was then ante-timed to give it the colour of a promptly lodged Fir. In our opinion, on account of the infirmities as noticed above, the Fir has lost its value and authenticity and it appears to us that the same has been ante-timed and had not been recorded till the inquest proceedings were over at the spot by PW 8.” There is no dispute about the proposition of law laid down in the above decision. But, ultimately, when there is a delay, it cannot be a sole ground to doubt the case of the prosecution. No doubt, in this case, there is a delay of 2 ½ hours in giving the First Information Report. The distance between police station and the village is about 7 KM. In view of the fact that P.W.1 is none other than brother of the deceased, it is not expected from him at that stage of suffering from mental agony or anxiety to rush to the police station to lodge the report. Further, there is delay of 4 ½ hours in reaching the First Information Report to the Court. The court is located at a distance of 20 KMs from the police station. Therefore, the delay cannot be taken as a ground to doubt the case of the prosecution. 21. Learned counsel for the appellants relied on a decision reported in the case of Budh Singh & others v. State of Uttar Pradesh,( . (2006) 9 SCC 731 ) wherein it is held thus: (para 15) “It is not in dispute that the written report, although, is said to have been lodged at 00.25 hours on 13-4-1992, the same was received in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate as late as on 18-4-1992. (2006) 9 SCC 731 ) wherein it is held thus: (para 15) “It is not in dispute that the written report, although, is said to have been lodged at 00.25 hours on 13-4-1992, the same was received in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate as late as on 18-4-1992. The only explanation offered by P.W. 5 was that although the same has been sent at 6.25 in the evening, it could not be sent directly, as in view of the provisions, the same was to be sent through the Circle Officer. The State has not offered any explanation as to why the Circle Officer, a post held by an officer of the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, would not act responsibly. Section 157 Cr. P.C. as also Article 21 of the Constitution of India provide for a safeguard in such a manner directing that FIR should be sent to the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate within a period of 24 hours.” In the above case, there is abnormal delay of 5 days. In the present case, the delay is only 4 hours. Considering the distance between the police station and Court, it cannot be said to be intentional delay with a view to fabricate a case. 22. It is also contended by learned counsel for the appellants that it came in the evidence that the prosecution introduced falsity in the case and therefore the accused cannot be convicted. In support of his contention, he relied on a decision reported in the case of Barakati Veerabhadra Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh,( 1997 (2) ALT (CRI) 945 (A.P.)) wherein it is held thus: (para 24) “Once the element of falsehood enters in the prosecution case, then such type of evidence has to be disbelieved while convicting the accused.” 23. It is contended that there is discrepancy with regard to injuries in post mortem report and inquest report. On this aspect, learned counsel for the appellants relied on a decision in Maula Bux and others v. State of Rajasthan,( (1983) 1 SCC 379 ) wherein it is held thus: “… The Police Officer who prepared the Inquest Panchanama was not an expert in medical jurisprudence. The possibility of his having mistaken the post-mortem staining marks on the waist and shoulder of the deceased, for ante-mortem bruises, cannot be ruled out. The possibility of his having mistaken the post-mortem staining marks on the waist and shoulder of the deceased, for ante-mortem bruises, cannot be ruled out. In any case, in such a situation, as a matter of judicial caution, the benefit of this discrepancy between medical evidence and the inquest report, on this point in issue, ought to have been given to the appellants…” In this case, almost all the injuries as noted in the inquest report are tallying with the injuries as mentioned in the portmortem certificate. 24. Coming to the time of offence, Ex.P1, which is the earliest report, would go to show that the incident had taken place at about 6.30 AM. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that time of occurrence is not tallying with the changes occurred in the dead body. According to him, when the Doctor conducted autopsy, rigor mortis was present only in the upper parts and not in the lower parts. According to the counsel for the appellants, as per medical jurisprudence, for development of rigor mortis in the entire body, it takes 4 to 7 hours, and 2 to 3 ½ hours for half portion of the body. Inquest commenced on the same day at about 2.10 PM. So, according to him, the death must have taken place around 10.30 AM and in such a case, case of the prosecution has to be falsified as it runs contrary to the medical evidence. The learned counsel for the appellants relied on a decision in Kunju Mohammed v. State of Kerala,( (2004) 9 SCC 193) wherein it is held thus: “.. We further notice that the doctor PW-13 who conducted the postmortem examination had noted that the rigor mortis had formed and was found all over the dead body at the time when he conducted the postmortem. He in his evidence had stated that in his opinion the rigor mortis sets in within about 4 to 7 hours of the death. We further notice that the doctor PW-13 who conducted the postmortem examination had noted that the rigor mortis had formed and was found all over the dead body at the time when he conducted the postmortem. He in his evidence had stated that in his opinion the rigor mortis sets in within about 4 to 7 hours of the death. If we apply the yardstick as spoken to by PW-13 of the starting of rigor mortis to the facts of this case then we notice that in the instant case the death must have occurred prior to 8 a.m., because if the rigor mortis starts within 4 to 7 hours of death then it would taken some time to reach all parts of body and in the instant case, rigor mortis was found in the entire body of the deceased, therefore, to reach this stage if we take 4 hours as the starting point, it would have taken some more time to reach different parts of the body, therefore, we think it is reasonable to take the upper limit of rigor mortis reaching the entire body as 7 hours and if we work backwards then we notice that the death in question must have occurred before 6.30 a.m. on 3-11-1991 which actually fits into the other facts noticed by us hereinabove while discussing the time of death.” Relying upon the facts of the case, it was held as above. There cannot be any dispute that hypothetical medical evidence as to the time of death cannot be made basis to reject the evidence of eye-witnesses. 25. Setting in, or passing of, of rigor mortis depends upon constitution of body, age of the victim and the climatic conditions prevailing in the area. P.W.13 is the Doctor who conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased. He is the best person to rule out possibility of taking place of the incident at about 6.30 AM in view of the presence of rigor mortis on the upper parts of the body. According to the Doctor, approximate time of death is 6 to 8 hours prior to his examination. It is not suggested to him that the death might have taken place after 9.00 AM. According to the Doctor, approximate time of death is 6 to 8 hours prior to his examination. It is not suggested to him that the death might have taken place after 9.00 AM. It is admitted by him that 3 to 4 hours after the death, rigor mortis would start externally and it will be passed on to, external organs in half-an-hour, and in internal organs, rigor mortis starts half-an-hour and one hour of the death. There cannot be any dispute that expert evidence is opinion evidence. Medical Science has not developed so as to fix the exact time of death. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants cannot be accepted as setting in, or passing of, of the rigor mortis will depend upon various factors and climatic conditions and the position of the body, and it is devoid of merit and untenable. 26. Learned counsel for the appellants is seriously disputing about the place of occurrence. According to him, the place projected by the prosecution is not the place of occurrence. The counsel contended that in the charge sheet, it is stated that P.W.1 and the deceased went towards tank bund in the village beyond Madigapalle, but the tank bund is not in between the village and Madigapalle and there are three water tanks in the village and the same has not been mentioned either in Ex.P1 or in Ex.P11, and that there was no mention in the crime observation report with regard to existence of tank, and that similarly, existence of Kalinga is not mentioned in Ex.P11. Observation report also does not show about the existence of blood stains. It is also stated that none of the plants in the maize field of P.W.9 was broken or in disturbed condition. That aspect has not been mentioned in the rough sketch. According to P.W.15, tank bund was beyond Madigapalle village. 27. In the first instance, both P.W.1 and the deceased were chased by the accused to some distance, and after crossing the small canal, the deceased was unable to cross the canal and therefore at that point of time, he was attacked. P.Ws.1, 4 to 7 have categorically stated that the scene of occurrence is in the land of P.W.9. There is no other reason to doubt the testimony of these witnesses especially P.Ws.6 and 7 who are totally independent witnesses. P.Ws.1, 4 to 7 have categorically stated that the scene of occurrence is in the land of P.W.9. There is no other reason to doubt the testimony of these witnesses especially P.Ws.6 and 7 who are totally independent witnesses. P.W.15, who is the investigating officer, has categorically stated that he observed the scene of occurrence and during observation, blood stained earth and control earth were taken and he got the scene of occurrence photographed. P.W.10 is the photographer who took Ex.P5-photographs along with C.D. Except suggesting that he did not take the photographs, nothing has been elicited from his evidence. Human blood was detected on the earth seized from the scene of occurrence, as per Ex.P12-report of the Forensic Science Laboratory. No doubt, the mediators for the scene of occurrence report did not support the case of the prosecution. But, at the same time, evidence of P.W.10-photographer and P.W.15-investigating officer would clearly go to show that the scene of occurrence is land of P.W.9. On this aspect, learned counsel for the appellants relied on a decision in reported in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kriparam, ((2003) 12 SCC 675) wherein it is held thus: “As noticed above the prosecution has also relied on certain recoveries made at the instance of A-1. Firstly it is stated that the blood stained clothes worn by the accused at the time of arrest were seized by the police. In regard to the place from where these were seized, there is contradiction as to whether it was taken off from the person of A-1 or was taken from a place where the clothes were kept in his house. Be that as it may, the prosecution case is that these clothes were blood stained though washed, still the stains were visible hence was sent to chemical examination which has established the stains were of blood. Therefore the same was sent to serologist who opined that he could not give an opinion as to the origin of the blood meaning thereby the blood stain that was noticed by him on the clothes cannot be said to be that of human origin. In such situation this circumstance of recovery of blood stained clothes will be of no assistance to the prosecution.” It is a case where no opinion of the Seroligist as to the origin of the blood was found. In such situation this circumstance of recovery of blood stained clothes will be of no assistance to the prosecution.” It is a case where no opinion of the Seroligist as to the origin of the blood was found. Hence, the said decision has no application to the facts of the present case. 28. With regard to weapon of offence used in commission of the offence, learned counsel for the appellants contended that in the First Information Report, it is stated that knives were used where in the evidence, eye-witnesses stated that the accused were armed with hunting sickles. On this aspect, he relied on a decision reported in the case of Rambilas v. State of M.P.( 1997 SCC (Cri.) 1222) It is not relevant to the facts of this case. In a decision reported in the case of Jasbir & others v. State of Haryana,( (2002) 10 SCC 324 ) it is held thus: (para 10) “WE have been taken through the FIR and the statement made by Satpal when the inquest was held. He stated that he noticed that Randhir, Jagdish, Rohtash, Satbir, Jasbir, Rani and Banwari were armed with halberds and climbed up the roof of the house. Halberd is described to be a kind of battle-axe which can be used as spear as well. In other words; it is a combination of spear and battle-axe with a long handle. When the statement made by him in the FIR and at the inquest is clearly to the effect that they had the halberd, to say that they were armed with lathis would not be correct or accurate at all. In such cases when there has been long enmity between the parties it is not unusual to lug in persons who are innocent as well. When there were no injuries caused by lathis, it cannot be explained away in the manner as has been done by the trial court and by the High Court, particularly when the witnesses are specific that large number of blows on the person of the injured and the deceased have been inflicted with lathis. When there were no injuries caused by lathis, it cannot be explained away in the manner as has been done by the trial court and by the High Court, particularly when the witnesses are specific that large number of blows on the person of the injured and the deceased have been inflicted with lathis. The High Court should not have assumed that pharsa may look like lathi whereas it was nobody's case that the pharsa was used by Randhir and Jagdish or none of the witnesses stated that Randhir and Jagdish had some weapon which looked like a lathi but was really a pharsa or a halberd. Therefore, it will not be safe to rely upon the evidence tendered by these persons as to the presence of either Randhir or Jagdish.” In this case, there is no such glaring discrepancy. The Doctor opined that the injuries found on the deceased would not have been caused with knives, but they would have been caused by hacking with hunting sickles. P.W.1 is no other than brother of the deceased, who was murdered in his presence. In that situation, it is not expected from him to give the exact details of the weapons used in commission of the offence. Therefore, on that ground, it cannot be said that it is a serious discrepancy to doubt the case of prosecution. 29. (a) Learned counsel for the appellants also contended that ocular testimony is inconsistent with the medical evidence, and relied on a decision reported in the case of State of Bihar v. Bishwanath Rai, (1997 SCC (CRI) 1148) wherein it is held thus: “The medical evidence shows that there was blackening around the wounds. This circumstance indicates that in all probability, the injuries were caused to the deceased with a different type of weapon. As regards the injuries of PW 4 Chandra Mohan, the eyewitnesses have stated that they were caused by three of the accused with pharsas and lathis but the medical evidence discloses that he had not received a single injury which could have been caused by a pharsa.” (b) He also relied on another decision reported in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Bhanwar Singh, ( (2004) 13 SCC 147 ) wherein it is held thus: “Finally, the medical evidence was at total variance with the ocular evidence. Though ocular evidence has to be given importance over medical evidence, where the medical evidence totally improbabilises the ocular version that can be taken to be a factor to affect credibility of the prosecution version. Theview taken by the High Court is a possible view.” (c) The learned counsel also relied on another decision reported in the case of Devatha Venkataswamy v. P.P. of High Court of Andhra Pradesh,( (2003) 10 SCC 700 ) wherein it is held thus: “First of all, it should be noticed that in the above extracted portion of the judgment, the High Court has observed that the evidence of PW-1 is supported by the medical evidence but when we perused the evidence of the doctor, PW-16 as also the injury memo and post mortem report, we notice there is a direct conflict between the evidence of PW-1 and the medical evidence. While PW-1 in his evidence before the court stated that the appellant pierced the forehead of the deceased Krishnaiah once. The medical report shows that the injury caused to the forehead of the deceased was by the use of a blunt weapon and that too by repeated blows. Therefore, the High Court was totally wrong in coming to the conclusion that the medical evidence supported the oral evidence of PW-1.” There is no dispute about the ratio laid down in the aforesaid decisions. Ocular testimony is the substantive evidence and even if a slight discrepancy between the ocular testimony and the medical evidence, ocular testimony cannot be rejected. Unless medical evidence completely rules out the possibility of causing injuries in the manner spoken to, by the witnesses, ocular testimony has to be preferred. It is not a case where the medical evidence completely rules out the possibility of causing injuries as stated by eye-witnesses. 30. Certain omissions and contradictions were elicited from the evidence of P.Ws.1, 4 to 7. Contradictions were marked as Exs.D1 to D22. A perusal of these contradictions would go to show that they are minor and innocuous and they are not relating to the main incident. No doubt, a contradiction could be used as it impeaches the credit or discredit of a witness or to bring down the reliability of a witness. A material contradiction merits careful consideration in determining whether a witness is truthful and reliance can be placed on his evidence. No doubt, a contradiction could be used as it impeaches the credit or discredit of a witness or to bring down the reliability of a witness. A material contradiction merits careful consideration in determining whether a witness is truthful and reliance can be placed on his evidence. The discrepancies in minor details and the contradictions in narration, improvements do not militate against the veracity and the testimony of the witness provided there is impress of truth and conformity to the probability in substantial fabric of the testimony delivered. There is neither discrepancy nor omission in the evidence of P.Ws.1, 4 to 7 with regard to the actual incident is concerned. Their evidence would go to show that in the first instance, A.2 hacked over the head of the deceased in the field of P.W.9 and thereafter all the accused hacked the deceased with hunting sickles all over the body, and as a result, the deceased died on the spot. When these witnesses went to the place where the dead body was lying, all the accused threatened them not to come to the scene of occurrence by showing their knives and fled away from the scene of occurrence. Therefore, the discrepancies and contradictions, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants, are not so serious to disbelieve the evidence of eye-witnesses whose evidence can be accepted as true and trustworthy. Further, some discrepancies are bound to occur even in the case of truthful witnesses when they were made to depose about the incident after lapse of more than one year. On this aspect, learned counsel for the appellants relied upon a decision reported in the case of Kalyan & others v. State of Uttar Pradesh, ( (2001) 9 SCC 632 ) wherein it is held thus: “It is true that the statements of PWs 1, 4, 5 and 6, cannot be thrown out merely on the ground that they are partisan witnesses or have any enmity with some of the accused persons. However, the testimony of such witnesses requires to be judged with more circumspection. The case of the prosecution, as sought to be proved at the trial, appears to be different than the one as narrated in the FIR. However, the testimony of such witnesses requires to be judged with more circumspection. The case of the prosecution, as sought to be proved at the trial, appears to be different than the one as narrated in the FIR. When the testimony of eyewitnesses is totally different from the story set out in the FIR, the trial court cannot be held to have taken a view which was not at all possible.” He also relied on a decision reported in the case of Golla Peramasani Sivaiah @ Sivanna & others v. State of A.P.,( 2007 (1) ALD (Crl.) 255) wherein it is held thus: “As seen from the above narrated evidence of PWs 1 to 3, all of them have stated in a parrot like manner consistently with minute particulars. Mere because their evidence is inconsistent in all the particulars including the minute particulars, that by itself is not sufficient to hold that it is reliable and trustworthy. It is the common phenomenon in faction cases that the witnesses would be tutored thoroughly before putting them into the witness box. In this case PWs 1 to 3 are examined nearly seven years after the occurrence. Yet they gave minute particulars also consistently. It is not possible to give such consistent evidence unless they are tutored. So their evidence has to be scrutinized with reference to probabilities, medical evidence and other circumstances of the case.” Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the respective cases, it is held in the above cases that discrepancies therein were material. Therefore, the above two decisions have no application to the facts of the present case. 31. On the other hand, learned Additional Public Prosecutor relied upon a decision reported in the case of Gurunath Donkappa Keri & others v. State of Karnataka,( (2009) 13 SCC 34 ) wherein it is held thus: “All the prosecution witnesses are natural witnesses. The essential ingredients to prove the crime against the accused have categorically been stated by them. Both the courts below have placed implicit reliance on their testimonies. Our attention has not been drawn to any major contradiction in the, deposition of the witnesses so as to disbelieve the entire prosecution case. The essential ingredients to prove the crime against the accused have categorically been stated by them. Both the courts below have placed implicit reliance on their testimonies. Our attention has not been drawn to any major contradiction in the, deposition of the witnesses so as to disbelieve the entire prosecution case. The very fact that they had been taking the deceased who were grievously injured at mat point of time from hospital to hospital is itself a pointer to show the state of mind they were having at the relevant time. It is, therefore, too much to expect that they would not only state the details of the manner in which the occurrence had taken place but also the names of all the persons who witnessed the same.” 32. It is also contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the witnesses’ conduct is quite unnatural and none of them tried to rescue the deceased nor chased the accused to catch them. All the eye-witnesses were not armed with any weapons, whereas all the accused were armed with hunting sickles. In such a situation, ordinary prudent man would not venture either to intervene or chase the assailants. Therefore, the behaviour and conduct of these witnesses cannot be said to be unnatural. 33. It is also contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that names of eyewitnesses have not been mentioned in the inquest report nor in Ex.P1. The purpose of holding inquest is to ascertain the apparent cause of death of the deceased. Similarly, First Information Report is not an encyclopedia to contain all the minute details. 33. It is also contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that names of eyewitnesses have not been mentioned in the inquest report nor in Ex.P1. The purpose of holding inquest is to ascertain the apparent cause of death of the deceased. Similarly, First Information Report is not an encyclopedia to contain all the minute details. On this aspect, learned counsel for the appellants relied on a decision reported in case of Pratap Singh & another v. State of Madhya Pradesh,( (2005) 13 SCC 624 ) wherein it is held thus: “Even if in the first information report their names were not disclosed but if during investigation materials came to the notice of the investigating officer that apart from Mangal Singh two other witnesses had also witnessed the occurrence, he was duty-bound to show the places wherefrom they had witnessed the occurrence in the site plan prepared by him and also record their statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” Considering the facts and circumstances of those cases, it was held that names of the witnesses have to be mentioned in the First Information Report. 34. It is also contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that mediators P.Ws. 11 and 12, who were present at the time of arrest of the accused and seizure of weapons, did not support the case of the prosecution. Similarly, the witnesses did not identify the weapons M.O.3 (4 hunting sickles) as used by the accused. Some inadvertence mistakes committed by the Public Prosecutor, who is in-charge of the case, in not showing the weapons, cannot be taken as a ground to discredit their testimony especially when their evidence is very clear that all the accused armed with hunting sickles caused injuries to the deceased. 35. It is also contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that except A.2, no specific overt-acts are attributed against A.1, A.3 and A.4. In order to bring home the charge of common intention, prosecution has to establish by evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that there was a plan or meeting of minds of all the accused persons to commit the offence for which they are charged, with the aid of Section 34 IPC, be it prearranged or developed on the spur of moment. But, it must necessarily be before commission of the offence. But, it must necessarily be before commission of the offence. It is only a rule of evidence and does not create any substantial evidence. Direct proof of common intention is rarely and hardly available and therefore such intention can also be inferred from the circumstances appearing from the proved facts of the cases and proved circumstances. In the case on hand, all the accused were armed with hunting sickles, chased the deceased for a considerable length distance and at the place of the incident, A.2 caused injury on the head of the deceased, and as a result, the deceased fell down, and thereafter, remaining accused viz. A.1, A.3 and A.4, indiscriminately caused injuries with their hunting sickles. The criminal act was done in furtherance of common intention. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants on this aspect is devoid of merit and wholly untenable. 36. (a) Learned counsel for the appellants relied on a decision reported in the case of Kalyan Singh v. State of M.P. ((2006) 13 SCC 303) wherein it is held thus: “THE High Court while dealing with the matter, in our considered opinion, failed to apply the proper tests in deciding a case where a judgment of acquittal has been recorded. THE views of the learned Trial Judge cannot be said to be wholly unsustainable. It is now well known that if two views are possible, the Appellate Court shall not ordinarily interfere with the judgment of acquittal. THE views of the learned Trial Judge cannot be said to be wholly unsustainable. It is now well known that if two views are possible, the Appellate Court shall not ordinarily interfere with the judgment of acquittal. We do not, however, mean to lay down the law that the High Court, in a case where a judgment of acquittal is in question, would not go into the evidences brought on records by the prosecution or by the State but we would like to point out that even if the High Court reversed the judgment of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court, it is incumbent on the High Court to arrive at the conclusion that no two views are possible.” (b) In a decision reported in the case of Pohalya Motya Valvi v. State of Maharashtra, ( (1980) 1 SCC 530 ) it is held thus: “..To make such circumstance incriminating it must be shown that the appellant himself had concealed the blood stained spear which was the weapon of offence and on this point the language used in the contemporaneous record Ex.28 is not free from doubt and when two constructions are possible in a criminal trial, the one beneficial to the accused will have to be adopted. Therefore, the linchpin of the prosecution case ceases to provide any incriminating evidence against the appellant.” There is no dispute about the law laid down in the aforesaid decision. But, in the case on hand, only one view is possible i.e. all the accused indiscriminately hacked the deceased with hunting sickles. There is no second view with regard to death of the deceased. 37. On the aspect of motive, learned counsel for the appellants relied on a decision reported in the case of Mohinder Singh & another v. State of Punjab & others,( (2004) 12 SCC 311 ) wherein it is held thus: “It is an admitted fact that the original 10 accused persons are all closely related except A-8 and they include all the male members of the two families of A-7 and A-9 who were residing in the village concerned, while A-8 is supposed to be a follower of the family members of A-7 and A-9. The motive suggested in this case pertains to an attack on A10 about two years prior to the present incident. The motive suggested in this case pertains to an attack on A10 about two years prior to the present incident. There is no evidence on record that during this period there was any such incident or occasion where any of the accused persons tried to take revenge for the attack on A-10. The prosecution has not come out with any special reason why the accused planned such a brutal attack on the deceased so long after the attack on A-10, nor has it produced any material to show any proximate cause. In this background, we are inclined to agree with the defence that the motive suggested, on facts of this case, seems to be very weak and stale. But then the existence or otherwise of motive in a case of this nature would only be a link evidence.” No doubt, there is no immediate motive for the accused to cause death of the deceased. Motive is not one of the ingredients for the offence of murder. It can only be taken as an aid in assessment of criminality. Absence of motive by itself is not a ground to acquit the accused. Further, motive looses significance when there is direct evidence which is truthful and acceptable. The trial Court, upon proper appreciation of the evidence on record, rightly convicted and sentenced the appellants and there are no grounds to interfere with the same. The appeal is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. 38. The Criminal Appeal is, accordingly, dismissed, confirming the judgment dated 20.03.2009 in Sessions Case No.102 of 2008 on the file of the IX Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Guntur.