JUDGMENT : Basi Reddy, J. The appellant, Cherku Sathiah, who figured as the 1st accused in the court below, was tried along with one Deverpalli Ramiah, who figured as the 2nd accused, on a charge under Sec. 302 read with Sec. 34 I. P. C., which was framed in the following terms ; "That you the said Cherku Sathiah along with Deverpalli Ramiah on the 21st day of September. 1957, at 5 p m with the common intention to do away with Deverpalli Malliah. as there was long standing land dispute between Deverpalli Ramiah and Malliah administered poison to Deverpalli Malliah mixed with sugar, saying that it is prasad', as a result Malliah died in the hospital at Ramannapet after, 15 days, and that you have thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 3oz read with Sec. 31 I P. C. and within the cognizance of this Court And I hereby direct that you be tried by this Court on the said charge." A similar charge was framed against the 2nd accused. The learned Sessions Judge has acquitted the 2nd accused and convicted the appellant of an offence under Sec. 302 I. P. C. and sentenced him to imprisonment for life. The result of the finding of the learned Sessions Judge is that the prosecution had failed to prove the existence of a common intention between the two accused and had also failed to prove that the appellant had administered posion to the deceased Malliah in furtherance of such a common intention. The facts of the prosecution case lie within a narrow compass and are as follows :-The 2nd accused and the deceased were first cousins and at the time of the occurrente a civil suit between them with regard to certain lands, was pending in the Court of the Munsif-Magistrate, Bhongir. The 2nd accused hoped to get the entire property if he succeeded in doing away with the deceased. The appellant had no motive whatever to do any harm to the deceased but it was alleged by the prosecution that he and the 2nd accused were close friends and that the 2nd accused had procured poison and induced the appellant to administer it to the deceased through the medium of 'prasad'. It may be mentioned at once that the learned Sessions Judge, after a scrutiny of the evidence adduced by the prosecution. It may be mentioned at once that the learned Sessions Judge, after a scrutiny of the evidence adduced by the prosecution. to establish the alleged friendship between the two accused, has found the evidence to be unconvincing and has held that the prosecution has failed to prove that there was any particular friendship between the appellant and the 2nd accused. The learned Sessions Judge has, however, found that the 2nd accused had a strong motive to do away with the deceased. It is alleged that just befiire sun-set on the 21st September, 1957, the deceased Malliah who had gone to his field to tend his cattle, left the cattle in the field and returned home in a critical condition with his face all swollen up and complaining of giddiness and burning sensation in the stomach. When questioned by his sister Siddamma (P. W. 1) and his grandmother Mallamma (P. W. 3), he told them about what had happened in the field ; and since his statement forms the bed-rock of the prosecution's case against the appellant, the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 3 with regard to that statement may be reproduced verbatim. This is what P. W. I deposed : "Devarapalli Malliah was my elder brother. He was posioned by these two accused persons about 5 months back at our chalka, Banda Kadi, just before sun-set. The chalka is 150 yards from our house My brother told me in the house. When he came home his face was swollen. I asked him the reason. He said that Sathiah had given him sugar while Ramiah was standing by his side. Sathiah had told my brother that it was 'prasad', then again he gave some other thing just like sugar and my brother had eaten this. There was some sensation in his mouth. He vomitted. His head was heavy and he felt giddy. He left the cattle there and came home. The deceased had told me all these things. My grandmother was with me who had also heard all these things. I left my grandmother at home and went to bring the cattle home and I had seen there vomitting substance which was lying at the kadabi field which belongs to my uncle." P. W. 3's version is as follows : "I was living with Deverpalli Malliah at Areguda. Malliah died. I left my grandmother at home and went to bring the cattle home and I had seen there vomitting substance which was lying at the kadabi field which belongs to my uncle." P. W. 3's version is as follows : "I was living with Deverpalli Malliah at Areguda. Malliah died. He was poisoned by the son of his uncle, Deverpalli Ramiah and Sakai Sathiah. The witness identified both the accused). They had poisoned him about 5 months back in the chalka. My grandson, the deceased, told me when he returned to the house before sun-set at the time myself and Siddamma were in the house. When he came he was feeling giddy and had reeling sensation. His lips were swollen and some fluid substance was coming out of his mouth We asked him what the matter was. He said `Sakai Sathiah had given twice sugar saying that it was 'prasad'; then asked to bring leaf; on bringing the leaf he had put some sugar on the leaf- Ramiah was there who was grazing his sheep The sugar which was on the leaf was eaten by me and there was at once some sort of sensation in the head, then I vomitted " Then the witness added this significant assertion as having been made by the deceased : "Sakal Satiah thinking that this was due to biliousness (`Pitham') gave some grains of rice. I had eaten those; then I came home " It will be seen from the narration of the story by P. W. 3 that when the deceased complained of an uneasy feeling after having eaten the 'prasad', the appellant thought that it was due to biliousness and so gave some grains of rice to be taken by the deceased, which the latter did. As the condition of the deceased did not improve, P. Ws. 1 and 3 took him that night to a 'hakim' at Motkur. The 'hakim' (P. W. 4) found the lips and throat of the deceased swollen and some fluid, was coming out of his mouth, He was not in a condition to speak. P. W. 4 suspected that the deceased had been poisoned and so gave him injections of sodium theo-sulphate as also coconut-water as an antidote ; but that had no effect. P. W. 4 suspected that the deceased had been poisoned and so gave him injections of sodium theo-sulphate as also coconut-water as an antidote ; but that had no effect. The next morning the Police Patel on information went to .he house of P. W. 4 and sent the deceased to the Police Station. From there the deceased was sent to the hospital at Ramannapet where he was admitted on the 24th. The Doctor (P. W. 2) found the patient in a semi-conscious condition and his face was swollen and saliva was dribbling from his mouth and blood also was coming ort. He had also purging with blood. The doctor gave him white of an egg, milk and some alkaline mixture. The man, ho ever, expired on the 6th October. P.W. 2 conducted the post-mortem and found that the intestines and stomach were dark in colour due to poison. He reserved his opinion as to the cause of death and sent the internal organs namely, stomach, a portion of the intestine and liver to the Cheimcal Examiner. After receiving the Chemical Examiner's report, P.W. 2 opined that the deceased had died of mercuric poisoning. The Chemical Examiner's report showed that there were traces of mercury in the stomach, kidney and liver of the deceased. There can thus be no doubt that the deceased had died of mercuric poisoning. Some attempt was made by the prosecution to trace possession of poison to the two accused; but from the possession of the appellant a packet containing copper and sulphate was recovered. The appellant had kept it with him for treating his bullock for some skin disease According to the prosecution's case, however, what had been administered to the deceased was mercuric chloride. In fact a packet of merouric chloride was traced to the possession of the 2nd accused; but that can have no bearing the guilt of the appellant inasmuch as a prior concert and a common design have been negative by the trial Court by reason of the acquittal of the 2nd accused. So that all that has been proved against the appellant is that he had given some 'prasad' to the deceased which had been supplied by the 2nd accused, that it contained poison and that it had proved fatal. So that all that has been proved against the appellant is that he had given some 'prasad' to the deceased which had been supplied by the 2nd accused, that it contained poison and that it had proved fatal. But a vital link is missing in the prosecution evidence seeking to bring home the guilt to the appellant in that there is no proof direct or circumstantial that the appellant knew that what he had given to the deceased was in fact a poisonous substance. There are no circumstances from which such knowledge may reasonably be inferred. It will be remembered that the case for the prosecution was that the 2nd accused alone had the motive to get rid of the deceased and it was he who had induced the appellant to give the 'prasad' which must have contained the poisonous substance. Unless there is proof of a guilty mind, an essential ingredient of the offence of murder would not have been established; and that is the position here. In other words, there is no prof of 'mens rea' in this case. As pointedout by the Lord Chief Juqtice of England in Brend v. Wood, 110 J.P. 317: `It is in my opinion of the utmost importance for the protection of the liberty of the subject that the Court should always bear in mind that unless the statute either clearly or by necessary implication, rules out mens rea' as a constituent part of a crime, the defendant should not be found guilty of an offence against the criminal law unless he has got a guilty mind." In this case the prosecution has failed to prove the of a guilty mind in the appellant. Here the definition of culpable homidice may be adverted to. Section 299 of the Indian Penal Code lays down: "Whoever, causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide." Likewise Section 300 I. P. C. makes culpable homicide murder if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention or knowledge specified in that section. Thus it is not enough to prove that death had been caused by an act of the accused but it must also be established that the act had been committed with the requisite intention or knowledge. It is a common-place of the law that the burden of proving such intention or knowledge is on the prosecution ; and the contention of the learned Public Prosecutor that the burden is on the accused of showing absence of knowledge that the substance which he had given to the deceased contained poison, is rather startling. In support of his contention the learned Public Prosecutor sought to rely on Section 106 of the Evidence Act which provides: "When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him." We are clearly of opinion that that provision of law has no relevance to the facts of this case. It does not absolve the prosecution from proving all the essential ingredients of an offence, nor does it cast upon an accused the burden of proving that no crime has been committed. (See Stephen Seniviratne v. The King, 1936 AIR (PC) 289 and Allyagalie v. The King, 1939 AIR (PC) 169. In this context it is useful to refer to the well-known passage in the judgment of the Lord Chancellor (Viscount Sankey) in the case of Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1935 AC 462. "Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law, one golden thread is always to be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt subject to what I have already said as to the defence of insanity and subject also to any statutory exception. If at the end of and on the whole of the case, there is a reasonable doubt created by the evidence given by either the prosecution or the prisoner, as to whether the prisoner killed the deceased with a malicious intention, the prosecution has not made out the case and the prisoner is entitled to an acquittal." That is the law in England and that is the law in India too; and no attempt to whittle it down can be entertained ; no inroad on its integrity can be countenanced. In the present case we have no hesitation in holding that the prosecution has signally failed to establish that the appellant had a guilty mind. The appeal is accordingly allowed ; the conviction and sentence are quashed and the appellant is directed to be set at liberty.