Pradeep Kumar Singh Baghel, J.— The petitioners have preferred this writ petition for the issuance of a writ of Certiorari to quash the order dated 21.9.1995 passed by the District Inspector of Schools, Agra, whereby, the approval of the petitioners' appointment as assistant teachers in L.T. Grade has been cancelled. Brief facts pertinent to the issue involved in the present writ petition are that Gandhi Smarak Kisan Inter college, Kirawali, Agra ( for short the institution) is a recognized institution under the provisions of the Intermediate Education Act 1921. It is established by a Society and administered by the respondent no.2, the Committee of Management. The institution receives financial aid out of State fund. The provisions of U.P. High School and Intermediate College (payment of salaries of the teachers and other employees) Act, 1971 and U.P. Secondary Education Service Selection Board Act, 1982 govern the affairs of the institution with respect to the salary and the recruitment of the Principal and the teachers. It is stated that one Siyaram Singh, who was working as a permanent assistant teacher in C.T.Grade in the institution, was promoted on ad hoc basis in the next higher grade i.e. L.T. Grade with effect from 1.7.1994 by the Committee of Management. On account of the said ad hoc promotion, a short term vacancy occurred in C.T. Grade. The Committee of Management initiated process of recruitment in terms of the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) (Second) Order 1981. It is stated that an advertisement was inserted in the Newspaper. The petitioner no. 1, who possesses essential qualifications for the appointment as an assistant teacher having B.Sc and B.Ed. degree made an application against the said post. On the basis of quality point marks, the petitioner was found suitable and the Committee of Management issued an appointment letter on 8.7.1994 to the petitioner. The petitioner placed on record his appointment letter as annexure-1 to the writ petition. It is stated that the Committee of Management forwarded the requisite papers to the office of the District Inspector of Schools on 8.7.1994. The District Inspector of Schools by a communication dated 17.6.1995 approved the ad-hoc appointment of the petitioner no.1. A copy of the approval order has been placed on record as annexure -2 to the writ petition. Likewise, the petitioner no. The District Inspector of Schools by a communication dated 17.6.1995 approved the ad-hoc appointment of the petitioner no.1. A copy of the approval order has been placed on record as annexure -2 to the writ petition. Likewise, the petitioner no. 2 was also appointed against a vacancy which occurred on account of an ad-hoc promotion of Sri Devendra Singh in the higher grade i.e. L.T. Grade on 1.7.1994. The Committee of Management advertised the said vacancy on 20.8.1994 in a daily Newspapers ' Kumud Times'. The petitioner no. 2 was also found suitable on the quality point marking and the appointment letter was issued to him on 5.9.1994. He joined his duty on 15.9.1994 and the papers were sent to the District Inspector of Schools on 5.9.1994. The District Inspector of Schools accorded his approval on 17.6.1995. It is stated that both the petitioners were performing their duties and their salaries have been paid to them from March, 1995. The District Inspector of Schools by the impugned order dated 21.9.1995 cancelled the approval of the petitioners on the basis of a communication of the Additional Director of Education (Secondary) Allahabad dated 9.6.1995 wherein, certain directions was issued in pursuance of the order of the State Government, whereby, a ban was imposed in respect of the recruitment in the aided institutions. It is mentioned in the impugned order that in compliance of the circular /communication, the approval of the petitioners was cancelled. The communication of the Director of Education dated 9.6.1995, which has been followed by the District Inspector of Schools is a part of record of annexure-6 to the writ petition. Suffice would it be to mention that at the time moving of this writ petition, this Court stayed the operation of the impugned order dated 21.9.1995. It is stated at the bar that in compliance of the said order, both the petitioners were continued to work and they received their salaries. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondents, wherein, the stand taken by them is that when the present District Inspector of Schools came to know about the illegal approval order passed by his predecessor, the District Inspector of Schools, he cancelled the said approval order on 21.9.1995. It is also mentioned that the earlier approval order was obtained by misrepresentation of fact therefore, no opportunity of hearing was required. It is also mentioned that the earlier approval order was obtained by misrepresentation of fact therefore, no opportunity of hearing was required. I have heard Sri Adarsh Bhushan, learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Standing Counsel and perused the record. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners were appointed following the prescribed procedure under the the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) (Second) Order, 1981 against a short term vacancy and the District Inspector of Schools accorded the approval for their appointment. By the impugned order, without giving any notice or opportunity, the District Inspector of Schools cancelled the approval order. He further submits that the District Inspector of Schools has purported to cancel the approval of the petitioners in compliance of the general directions of the Addl. Director of Education (Secondary) dated 9.6.1995, wherein, it was mentioned that in inspite of the ban imposed by the State Government in 1991, the Committee of Management made illegal appointment. Amplifying his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that for a short term vacancy under the the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) ( Second) Order, 1981, the Committee of Management has power to make ad hoc appointment and in any view of the matter, the said ban which was imposed by the State Government on 29.6.1991 was withdrawn by the State Government on 26.9.1991. The appointments of the petitioners are much after the said date, therefore, the order of the District Inspector of Schools is totally misdirected and erroneous. Sri Bhushan placed reliance on a judgment reported in 1995(1) AWC 402, Ramesh Mohan Pandey Vs. District Inspector of Schools and others, the another order passed in Writ Petition No. 32742 of 1995, Vinod Kumar and another Vs. District Inspector of Schools and another and the attention of the court has also been drawn by the learned counsel for the petitioners to a judgment reported in 2010 (4) ADJ 829, Daya Shanker Mishra Vs. District Inspector of Schools and others to buttress his submissions. Learned Standing Counsel submits that the State Government has power to impose the ban and the said power has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of Ramji Dwivedi Vs. State of U.P. and others, 1983 U.P.L.B.E.C. 426. District Inspector of Schools and others to buttress his submissions. Learned Standing Counsel submits that the State Government has power to impose the ban and the said power has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of Ramji Dwivedi Vs. State of U.P. and others, 1983 U.P.L.B.E.C. 426. He further submits that the appointment of the petitioners was made inspite of the ban imposed by the State Government, therefore, the District Inspector of Schools was well within his jurisdiction to cancel the earlier approval order. The short question which arises for determination in this case and in the connected writ petitions is whether the State Government has power to impose the ban and if the answer is in affirmative, what would be the effect of such ban on the appointments of the present petitioners. I have considered the respective submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. I find it helpful to start with Section 9 (4) of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921. The subsection (4) of Section 9 of the said Act reads as under; "(4). Whenever, in the opinion of the State Government, it is necessary or expedient to take immediate action, it may, without making any reference to the Board under the foregoing provisions, pass such order or to take such other action consistent with the provisions of this Act as it deems necessary, and in particular, may, by such order modify or rescind or make any regulation in respect of any matter and shall forthwith inform the board accordingly." Learned counsel for the petitioners conceded very fairly that the State Government has power to impose a ban by invoking its power under Sub-section 4 of Section 9 of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921. However, this issue has no more res-integra in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court passed in the case of Ramji Dwivedi Vs. State of U.P. and others, 1983 U.P.L.B.E.C. 426. The State Government issued radiogram dated 29.6.1991 whereby, it put a ban on all kinds of the appointments in all the departments of the Uttar Pradesh except, U.P. Public Service Commission and the High Court. State of U.P. and others, 1983 U.P.L.B.E.C. 426. The State Government issued radiogram dated 29.6.1991 whereby, it put a ban on all kinds of the appointments in all the departments of the Uttar Pradesh except, U.P. Public Service Commission and the High Court. By a subsequent order dated 30.7.1991, it was made clear that the ban was also applicable with regard to the appointment of the Principals, lecturers and assistant teachers in L.T.Grade in the recognized institutions which are governed under the provisions of the U.P. Secondary Education (Service Selection Board), Act 1982. By a subsequent Government Order dated 31.8.1991, the said ban was made applicable to the ad -hoc appointments also in the recognized institutions. The said Telex-message was challenged in this Court. It was carried to the Supreme Court in the case of Ramji Dwivedi Vs. State of U.P. The Supreme Court opined that the State Government has power under Sub Section 4 of Section 9 of the Act to issue such radiogram or orders to put ban on all types of appointments including the ad-hoc appointments. Relevant, would it be to mention that the said ban was lifted on 26.9.1991. Thus, it remained operative from 29.6.1991 to 26.9.1991 for a brief period of three months. Learned Single Judge in the case of Km. Prabhavati Dikshit Vs. Uttar Pradesh Madhyanik Shiksha Seva Ayog and another reported in 1992 (1) U.P.L.B.E.C 582 held that " the State Government has no power to issue such ban in case of educational institutions. However, in the case of Durgesh Kumari Vs. State of U.P. & others in Writ -A No. 17308 of 1992, a Coordinate Bench found it difficult to agree with the law laid down in the case of Prabhavati Dikshit ( supra) and referred the matter to the larger Bench. Pursuant thereto, the Division Bench in the case of Durgesh Kumari Vs. State of U.P. & others reported in 1995 (3) U.P.L.B.E.C 1387 came to hold that the State Government has power to issue such directions. The Division Bench went into details regarding the object of the issuance of the said orders/radiogram and found that action of the State Government was justified and in its opinion, the view taken by learned Single Judge in the case of Km. Prabhawati Dikshit (supra) did not lay down the correct law. The Division Bench went into details regarding the object of the issuance of the said orders/radiogram and found that action of the State Government was justified and in its opinion, the view taken by learned Single Judge in the case of Km. Prabhawati Dikshit (supra) did not lay down the correct law. The judgment of Durgesh Kumari has again been considered by learned Single Judge in the case of Rajni Chowdhary Vs. State of U.P. (2001) 44 ALR 857. The learned Single Judge after a detail analysis of the provisions as well as the judgments of this court held that the ban was imposed by the State Government to stop the management from making illegal appointments. In view of the said intention of the Legislature, permitting the selection and appointment made during the ban period to revive after lifting the ban will be defeating the object for which the ban was imposed. The Court also noticed that subsequently, the provision was amended to take away the power of the Management to fulfill the post of ad hoc vacancy against the substantive vacancy. The validity of the impugned order may be examined on the principle of law emanates from above judgments. In the impugned order, the District Inspector of Schools relied on a communication of the Additional Director (Madhyamik) dated 9.6.1995. It is mentioned in the order that in view of the circular issued by the Additional Director dated 9.6.1995 no ad-hoc appointment can be made against the short term vacancy and in case, such appointment is made it shall be illegal. It is also mentioned that all the District Inspector of Schools were directed that if their offices receives any papers pertaining to the selection of the ad hoc appointments against the short term vacancy, no financial approval/approval should be granted. Thus, in compliance of the said communication, the District Inspector of Schools cancelled the approval of the appointment of the petitioners which was already granted by him. From perusal of the counter affidavit, the submissions of learned Standing Counsel and the material brought on record, it is established that the State Government has not issued any order under Sub section (4) of Section 9 of the Intermediate Education Act. There is only a communication from the office of the Assistant Director on 9.6.1965 putting a ban on the appointments and the approvals against the short term vacancies. There is only a communication from the office of the Assistant Director on 9.6.1965 putting a ban on the appointments and the approvals against the short term vacancies. The communication dated 9.6.1995 from the office of Additional Director (Secondary) came to be considered by a learned Single Judge in the case of Mukesh Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & others reported in 1996 AWC 556 . In the said case, the District Inspector of Schools, in compliance of the circular/communication dated 9.6.1995 refused to grant approval on the ad hoc appointment made against the short term vacancy. The issue raised before the learned Single Judge was that Secondary Education Board has not been vested with the power to make selection to fulfill the short term vacancy. Learned Single Judge relied upon the Full Bench judgment in the case of Radha Raizada Vs. Committee of Management reported in 1994 (3) U.P.L.B.E.C. 1551 and the case of Krishna Nand Dwivedi Vs. District Inspector of Schools, Ghazipur & others, 1994 (1) ESC 365 and held that the circular dated 9.6.1995 is not applicable in respect of the short term vacancy. The said judgment was followed by a coordinate bench in the case of Vinod Kumar and another in Writ -A No. 32742 of 1995 and Dharmesh Kumar Sharma Vs. Director of Education and others in Writ -A No. 28633 of 1995. After careful consideration of the facts and submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that State Government, in fact, did not issue any execution order. The Supreme Court has considered similar issue in the case of Pancham Chand Vs. State of Himanchal Pradesh, (2008) 7 SCC 117 , held as under; "18. The Act is a self-contained code. All the authorities mentioned therein are statutory authorities. They are bound by the provisions of the Act. They must act within the four corners thereof. The State, although, has a general control but such control must be exercised strictly in terms of Article 162 of the Constitution of India. Having regard to the nature and the manner of the control specified therein, it may lay down a policy. Statutory authorities are bound to act in terms thereof, but per se the same does not authorise any Minister including the Chief Minister to act in derogation of the statutory provisions. Having regard to the nature and the manner of the control specified therein, it may lay down a policy. Statutory authorities are bound to act in terms thereof, but per se the same does not authorise any Minister including the Chief Minister to act in derogation of the statutory provisions. The Constitution of India does not envisage functioning of the Government through the Chief Minister alone. It speaks of a Council of Ministers. The duties or functions of the Council of Ministers are ordinarily governed by the provisions contained in the Rules of Business framed under Article 166 of the Constitution of India. All governmental orders must comply with the requirements of a statute as also the constitutional provisions. Our Constitution envisages a rule of law and not rule of men. It recognizes that, howsoever high one may be, he is under law and the Constitution. All the constitutional functionaries must, therefore, function within the constitutional limits." In the case of State of M.P. Vs. Keshav, (1996) 2 SCC 21 the Supreme Court has held as under; "4. It is settled law that the Governor exercises the executive power of the Government with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The executive power of the Government is carried on by Article 162 in accordance with the Rules of Business made by the Governor under Article 166(3). The Business Rules and Instructions issued thereunder allocate various subjects to the Ministers and cases be appropriately dealt with at different levels of the Government. All the decisions need not be circulated nor is the Governor saddled with matters of administrative routine except where the Constitution enjoins him to exercise his personal discretion. Since the action was initiated according to the Business Rules the competent authority, therefore, is within its power to proceed with the enquiry as contemplated under the Pension Rules. The enquiry would be conducted according to Rules as expeditiously as possible and orders would be passed soon thereafter. It may be done within one year from the date of receipt of the order." In the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court has laid down the difference between the Government Order and Circular or Notification. The communication dated 9.6.1995 has not been issued in terms of the Article 162 of the Constitution. It may be done within one year from the date of receipt of the order." In the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court has laid down the difference between the Government Order and Circular or Notification. The communication dated 9.6.1995 has not been issued in terms of the Article 162 of the Constitution. Thus, it can not be said that the State Government had issued any direction exercising its power sub Section (4) of the Section 9 of the Intermediate Education Act. The said circular has no binding force. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case for the afore stated reasons, I am of the view that the impugned order needs to be set aside and it is accordingly set aside. The writ petition succeeds and is allowed. No order as to costs. _____________