1. In this proceeding, the order dated 14.3.2011, passed by the respondent No.2, whereby and whereunder, the pay of the President of Board of School Education, Mara Autonomous District Council CMADC') was fixed at Rs.30,000 p.m. w.e.f. 1.3.2011, has been called into question. 2. Heard Mr. Zochhuana, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. N. Sailo, learned senior counsel assisted by Mrs. Dinari T. Azyu, learned counsel for the respondent No.1. 3. The facts necessary for disposal of this present proceeding, in short, are that by the order dated 8.11.2010, the respondent No.2 had appointed the petitioner as the President of Board of School Education, MADC on contract basis as per the terms and conditions agreed between the petitioner and the Executive Committee, MADC for a period of three years w.e.f. 1.11.2010. As per clause 5 of the aforesaid agreement, the petitioner ought to have been paid a fixed salary @ of Rs. 14,300 p.m. plus all usual allowances as admissible to officer drawing pay in the scale of Rs. 14,300 p.m. for his service to the MADC. For ready reference, the relevant portion is quoted below : "5. The person in the agreement shall be paid a fixed salary at the rate of Rs. 14,300 plus all usual allowance as admissible to officer drawing pay of Rs.14,300 p.m for his service to the M'ara Autonomous District Council." 4. However, after sometime, the petitioner, to his surprise, received the order dated 14.3.2011 issued by the respondent No.2, wherein it has been stated that the pay of the petitioner was again fixed and he was to get Rs.30,000 p.m. w.e.f. 1.3.2011. For ready reference, the aforesaid Notification is reproduced below : "No. MADC.8/GAD/2009-2010/ MARAAUTONOMOUS DISTRICT COUNCIL GENERAL ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT. Dated Siaha, the 14th March, 2011 NOTIFICATION No.MADC.81 GAD 12009-2011: dated 14.3.2011. As provided by sub-rule (i) rule 5 of Mara Autonomous District Council (BSE) Rules, 2010. The Executive Committee of the Mara Autonomous District Council is pleased to fix the pay of President, Board of School Education, Mara Autonomous District Council @ Rs.30,000 p.m. w.e.f. 1.3.2011. This Notification cancels Agreement signed between the parties, Board of School Education and Mara Autonomous District Council under L.No.MADC.8/GAD/2009-2010 on 8.11.2010. Sd T.A. Chhohu, Executive Secretary, Mara Autonomous District Council." 5. This Notification cancels Agreement signed between the parties, Board of School Education and Mara Autonomous District Council under L.No.MADC.8/GAD/2009-2010 on 8.11.2010. Sd T.A. Chhohu, Executive Secretary, Mara Autonomous District Council." 5. It has been stated that the agreement dated 8.11.2010 was entered into between the parties after a threadbare discussion, pursuant to which the petitioner agreed to served the MADC on the terms and conditions incorporated therein, more particularly, clause 5 of the agreement dated 8.11.2010. Therefore, trimming his salary to Rs.30,000 is not only illegal but is arbitrary and capricious and has been done in violation of all the principles of natural justice. This is more so, since the aforesaid order was passed without the consent of the petitioner. He, therefore, approached this court praying for a direction to set aside the order impugned with a further direction to pay him the current as well his arrear dues w.e.f. 1.3.2010 at the rate stated in clause 5 of the agreement dated 8.11.2010. 6. Notice of this proceeding was served on the respondents. They entered appearance and having filed counter affidavit, they resisted the petition submitted by the petitioner. One of the contentions, raised by the respondents, was that MADC, Siaha (Board of School Education) Rules, 2010 ('Rules of 2010') was issued by the Government of Mizoram in exercise of provisions of para 6(1) of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India and as such, it has the force of law. 7. The Rules of 2010 aim at to provide rules for control and management of Primary and Middle Schools in the MADC. According to rule 15 of Rules of 2010, the President of the Board is to be a whole-time officer and engaged on fixed salary. Further, such appointed is made on contract basis by the Executive Committee on the terms and conditions agreed to between such person and the Executive Committee. The period for appointment is for three years initially which can be extended by another three years by mutual agreement. 8. Since the aforesaid Rules of 2010 have the force of Act and since it has come into operation on and from 26.5.2010, no appointment contrary to the Rules of 2010 can be made, otherwise, same would not only be illegal but unenforceable as well. 8. Since the aforesaid Rules of 2010 have the force of Act and since it has come into operation on and from 26.5.2010, no appointment contrary to the Rules of 2010 can be made, otherwise, same would not only be illegal but unenforceable as well. The agreement dated 8.11.2010, more particularly, clause 15 being not inconformity with rule 15 of Rules of 2010 cannot be allowed to stand and as such, the respondent No.2 had rightly cancelled the aforesaid appointment of the petitioner on issuing the letter impugned. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the respondents, there is no infirmity or illegality whatsoever in the order, impugned. 9. It has also been contended that the agreement dated 8.11.2010, amongst other things contains a clause whereby and whereunder any dispute between the parties are first to be referred to the arbitrator for adjudication. Since, the dispute in question ought to have been referred to the arbitrators in the terms and conditions of the agreement, aforementioned, this court have no jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding in question as desired by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 10. For ready reference, the relevant clause is reproduced hereinbclow : "In case of any dispute arising out of any terms and conditions of this agreement or compliance or executive thereof, the matter shall be referred for arbitration to the Chief Executive Member, Mara Autonomous District Council or any other person to be nominated by him. At the instance of either party to these agreement all s.uch award as may passed by such Arbiter after hearing both the parties and after giving them reasonable opportunity to be so heard shall be exclusively and finally binding on both the parties of these agreement." 11. Since this court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute under consideration, the learned counsel for the respondents urge this court to direct the petitioner to approach the forum, as indicated in the agreement dated 8.11.2010 for adjudication of the dispute between the parties in accordance with law. 12. In support of his contention, my attention has been drawn to the decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. and Ors. v. Bridge and Roof Company (India) Ltd., (1996) 6 SCC 22 . The relevant portion is reproduced below : "21.There is yet another substantial reason for not entertaining the writ petition. 12. In support of his contention, my attention has been drawn to the decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. and Ors. v. Bridge and Roof Company (India) Ltd., (1996) 6 SCC 22 . The relevant portion is reproduced below : "21.There is yet another substantial reason for not entertaining the writ petition. The contract in question contains a clause providing, inter alia, for settlement of disputes by reference to arbitration (clause 67 of the contract). The arbitrators can decide both questions of facts as well as questions of law. When the contract itself provides for a mode of settlement of disputes arising from the contract, there is no reason why the parties should not follow and adopt that remedy and invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226. The existence of an effective alternative remedy......in this case, provided in the contract itself...... is good ground for the court to decline to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under article 226. The said article was not meant to supplant the existing remedies at law but only to supplement them in certain well-recognized situations. As pointed out above, the prayer for issuance of a writ of mandamus was wholly misconceived in this case since the respondent was not seeking to enforce any statutory right of theirs nor was it seeking to enforce any statutory obligation cast upon the appellants. Indeed, the very resort to article 226......whether for issuance of mandamus or any other writ, order or direction......was misconceived for the reasons, mentioned supra." 13. In that connection, my attention has also been drawn to the decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar, and Ors. v. Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd., (2002) 1 SCC 216 , wherein their lordships held as follows : "3. Settled law — writ is not the remedy for enforcing contractual obligations, it is to be reiterated that writ petition under article 226 is not the proper proceedings for adjudicating such disputes. Under the law, it was open to the respondent to approach the court of competent jurisdiction for appropriate relief for breach of contract. It is a settled law that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to the litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Under the law, it was open to the respondent to approach the court of competent jurisdiction for appropriate relief for breach of contract. It is a settled law that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to the litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Equally, the existence of alternative remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the court to issue writ, but ordinarily that would be a good ground in refusing to exercise the discretion under article 226." 14. On hearing the learned counsel for the parties and on going through the pleadings and the relevant documents, I am of the opinion that it is an appropriate case where the petitioner ought to have approached the arbitrator first to have the dispute between the parties herein adjudicated. Since, the petitioner did not act in the terms and conditions contains in agreement dated 8.11.2010, this court has no other option but to dismiss the proceeding with a direction to approach the arbitrator as indicated in the agreement above. 15. In view of above, I find it necessary to direct the petitioner to approach the Chief Executive Member, MADC, the arbitrator, named in the agreement aforementioned to have the matter adjudicated by him or any other person nominated by him in the terms and conditions contains in the agreement dated 8.11.2010. On being so approached, the Chief Executive Member, MADC would enable the parties to place their respective cases before it and thereafter, on hearing the parties and doing other needful in accordance with law, the arbitrator will dispose of the matter at the earliest preferably within a period of six months from the date of receipt of this order. 16. With the above observations and directions, this writ petition stands disposed of.