JUDGMENT Hon’ble Krishna Murari, J.—This is a tenants’ petition challenging the judgment and order dated 7.8.2010 passed by the prescribed authority allowing the release application filed by the respondent-landlord under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (in short the ‘Act’) as well as the order dated 21.12.2012 passed by the appellate Court rejecting the appeal. 2. Heard Sri M.A. Qadeer, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri M.H.Qadeer for the petitioners and Sri Lalit Kumar for the respondent-landlord. 3. Respondent-landlord moved an application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act on the allegation that the shop wherein the petitioners were tenants at a monthly rent of Rs. 200/- was gifted to him by the erstwhile owner and landlady Smt.Gyanwati on 11.12.2008 and vide notice dated 7.1.2009 the tenants were given information of this fact. It was further pleaded that he had no other property and the shop in dispute was required for establishing his business. The proceedings were contested by the petitioner-tenants. The prescribed authority vide judgment and order dated 7.8.2010 allowed the release application and directed the petitioner-tenants to vacate the shop in dispute within one month. The Prescribed Authority after analyzing the evidence brought on record by the parties held that need of the landlord was bona fide and genuine. The question of comparative hardship was also answered in favour of the respondent-landlord inasmuch as he had no accommodation except for the disputed one available with him to establish the business. The findings recorded by the prescribed authority about the bona fide and genuine need of the landlord-respondent have been affirmed by the appellate Court. 4. It has been contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that the release application itself was not maintainable as six months notice was not given to the petitioners and the application was filed within three years of the transfer by way of gift as such, it was hit by proviso of Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. 5. In reply, it has been submitted that proviso to Section 21(1)(a) provides for six months notice and bar of moving application within 3 years in case of purchase and hence is not applicable in case of gift. 5. In reply, it has been submitted that proviso to Section 21(1)(a) provides for six months notice and bar of moving application within 3 years in case of purchase and hence is not applicable in case of gift. The proviso of Section 21(1)(a) of the Act reads as under : “Provided that where the building was in the occupation of a tenant since before its purchase by the landlord, such purchase being made after the commencement of this Act, no application shall be entertained on the grounds, mentioned in clause (a), unless a period of three years has elapsed since the date of such purchase and the landlord has given a notice in that behalf to the tenant not less than six months before such application, and such notice may be given even before the expiration of the aforesaid period of three year : A plain reading of the proviso goes to show that the legislature has used the word ‘purchase’ and not the general term ‘transfer’. The term ‘purchase’ has not been defined either in the Transfer of Property Act or under this Act. However, in common parlance the word ‘purchase’ has a definite connotation. Normal meaning of the ‘purchase’, according to the ‘Oxford English Dictionary’, is to buy something. According to ‘The Law Lexicon’ ‘Purchase’ means to acquire property whether movable or immovable by paying money or its equivalent. Thus in ordinary sense the word ‘purchase’ would mean transmission of property movable or immovable, from one person to another by their voluntarily act or agreement for a valuable consideration. ‘purchase’ is a transaction associated with sale. Under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, ‘Sale’ means of transfer of ownership in exchange of price paid or promised or part paid or part promised. Thus no transaction of sale can be made without payment of price i.e. monetary consideration. Section 2(10) of the Sales of Goods Act defines the word ‘Price’ as under : “Price means money consideration in a sale of goods”. 6. Thus no transaction of sale can be made without payment of price i.e. monetary consideration. Section 2(10) of the Sales of Goods Act defines the word ‘Price’ as under : “Price means money consideration in a sale of goods”. 6. The Apex Court in the case of Commissioner Income Tax v. M/s. Motor General Stores, AIR 1968 SC 200 , has held that in absence of any definition in the Transfer of Property Act the word ‘price’ used in Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, must be construed in the sense in which it is used in Section 4 read with Section 2(10) of the Sales of Goods Act. Thus monetary consideration is an essential element in a transaction of sale, in contradiction to a gift where no monetary consideration is passed and it is made in consideration of love and affection. 7. Cardinal Rule of Interpretation of Statutes is, the words should be read in their ordinary natural and grammatical meaning and when a word carries a definite meaning and is not equivocal and ambiguous, the Courts do not interpretate the word to give any other meaning to the said word beyond its ordinary meaning. 8. In the case of S.A. Venkataraman v. State, AIR 1958 SC 107 , it was held that “In construing the provisions of a Statute it is essential for a Court to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used therein, if the words are clear enough”. 9. Theory of “Popular meaning” has been approved and applied by the Hon’ble Apex Court in interpreting the words used in different Statutes in large number of cases. 10. In the case of Ramavtar Bhudaiprasad v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1325 , the question before the Apex Court was with respect to meaning of the word vegetables occurring in C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Act and whether the betel leaves would be included. It was held that “being a word of everyday use it must be construed in its popular sense, meaning that sense which people conversant with the subject-matter with which the Statute is dealing would attribute to it” and accordingly the word ‘vegetables’ was construed to mean those classes of vegetable matter which are grown in kitchen gardens and betel leaves was excluded from its purview. It is only in the case of any ambiguity that a Court is entitled to ascertain the intention of the legislature by construing the provisions of the Statute as a whole and taking into consideration other matters and circumstances which led to the enactment of the Statute. Reference may also be made to the decision rendered in case of Commissioner of Customs v. Parasrampuria, AIR 2001 SC 3501 . The only exception appears to be that if Rules or any Schedule under the Act prescribe any mode or manner which may aid to interpretation then the same has to be followed first. 11. As long back as 1955 in Kirkness v. John Hudson & Company Limited, (1955) 2 All ER 345, it was observed by Viscount Simonds as under : “So far as the ordinary use of language is concerned it is difficult to avoid being dogmatic, but for my part, I can echo what Singelton L.J. Said ‘what would any one accustomed to the use of words Sale or Sold answer ? It seems to me that everyone must say the tax payers did no sell’. I am content to march in step with everyone and say Tax payer did not sell”. 12. The test, therefore, to be applied while interpreting a particular word used in the Statute is how it is understood by everyone conversant with the word and subject-matter of Statute, to whom legislation is addressed, unless the Statutes itself, or the Rules or Schedule thereunder require the word to be assigned a particular meaning. 13. Applying the above tests the word ‘purchase’ used in the provisio is to be assigned the meaning which is understood by one and all generally i.e. transfer by sale for a price and cannot be interpreted to mean any transfer intervivos so as to include gift within its ambit. 14. In view of above, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners that ‘purchase’ would include within itself a gift also is without any merits and the mischief of ‘provisio’ shall not stand attracted in case of a gift. 15. It has next been contended that findings on bona fide need and comparative hardship has been recorded by the Prescribed Authority in a cursory manner without taking into consideration the evidence and various other relevant factors and the appellate authority failed to consider this aspect of the matter. 16. 15. It has next been contended that findings on bona fide need and comparative hardship has been recorded by the Prescribed Authority in a cursory manner without taking into consideration the evidence and various other relevant factors and the appellate authority failed to consider this aspect of the matter. 16. In reply, it has been submitted that findings have been recorded by the Prescribed Authority on consideration of entire material and evidence on record and have rightly been affirmed by the Appellate Authority. The findings being findings of fact recorded after appreciation of evidence are not open to be interferred by the writ Court. 17. A perusal of the judgment of the Prescribed Authority goes to show that after considering the entire evidence brought on record by the parties, Findings have been recorded that need of the landlord to establish his business was bona fide and genuine as he has no other place available. The issue of comparative hardship has also been held to be in favour of the landlord. 18. The only defence set up by the tenant petitioners was that they were running the business of sale and purchase of jewellery and have earned a goodwill and if evicted shall suffer greater hardship. 19. No doubt whenever a decree of eviction is passed against a tenant he shall suffer hardship but the same by itself cannot constitute hardship of greater degree so as to refuse the landlord a decree for eviction. The owner of a property cannot be denied eviction and compelled to live poorly and without a decent livelihood merely to enable the tenant to carry on his flourishing business activity. 20. Apart from above, there is another factor. Landlord respondent filed an affidavit before the prescribed authority giving details of various vacant shops available within the vicinity which was not denied or countered by the tenant-petitioners nor any evidence was led to demonstrate that any effort was ever made to find any alternative accommodation. This fact is in itself sufficient to tilt the balance of hardship in favour of the landlord respondent. The issue stands settled by various pronouncements. This fact is in itself sufficient to tilt the balance of hardship in favour of the landlord respondent. The issue stands settled by various pronouncements. Reference may be made to the decision of this Court in the case of Fahimuddin v. XIth Additional District Judge, Meerut and others, ARC 1995(2) 306; Arvind Kumar v. IInd Additional Judge, Etawah and others, ALR 1997(2) 63, Faiaz Khan v. Additional District Judge, Jhansi, 2006(24) L.C.D. 929. 21. Thus the findings on the issue of bona fide need and comparative hardship have been recorded by the Prescribed Authority taking into consideration material on record and other relevant consideration and the same have rightly been affirmed by the appellate Court. 22. It is well established that findings on twin issues of bona fide need and comparative hardship are findings of fact. Equally well-settled is the proposition that this Court in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not interfere with the findings of fact unless it is demonstrated that the same is vitiated by manifest error of law or is patently perverse or based on non consideration or misreading of any material piece of evidence. 23. Learned counsel for the petitioners, during the course of arguments, has failed to point out that findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority and affirmed by appellate authority are vitiated for any of the aforementioned reasons. 24. In view of aforesaid facts and discussions, this petition is devoid of any merits and accordingly stands dismissed. 25. During the course of hearing an affidavit has been filed to grant one year time to vacate the premises. Considering the facts and circumstances, petitioners are allowed six months time to vacate the shop in dispute provided they give an undertaking within one month from today before the trial Court to the effect that they shall vacate and handover the vacant possession of the disputed premises peacefully to the landlord within six months from today and shall deposit a sum of Rs. 12,000- (Twelve thousand) in lump sum calculated at the rate of rent of Rs. 2000/- per month for use and occupation of the premises for six months with the trial Court within the same period. 26. In case the petitioners fail to comply with the aforesaid conditions, the decree shall be liable to be executed forthwith through process of Court. ——————