JUDGMENT L. Narasimha Reddy, J. This Writ Petition is filed challenging the order, dated 08.10.2012, passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench (for short ‘the Tribunal), in O.A.No.875 of 2012. The 1st respondent herein (for short ‘the respondent’) filed the O.A., challenging the order of suspension, dated 23.07.2012. The O.A. was allowed and the order of suspension was set aside. 2. The facts, in brief, are that the respondent was appointed as Assistant Divisional Engineer (Telecommunications) in the Indian Telecommunication Service in the year 1988. Thereafter, he was promoted as Divisional Engineer in 1992, Deputy General Manager in 1998, and General Manager in 2008. He was on deputation to the Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (for short ‘the BSNL’) as General Manager and was working at Rajahmundry. On 01.06.2012, the CBI raided the house of a close relation of the respondent and submitted a report to the petitioners, stating that the material recovered in the search has disclosed that the respondent is holding assets disproportionate to the known source of his income. Taking the same into account, the 1st petitioner passed an order, dated 23.07.2012, placing the respondent under suspension. Two days thereafter, the 2nd respondent passed orders on 25.07.2012, canceling the deputation and ordering repatriation of the respondent to his parent department. 3. In the O.A., the respondent pleaded that the order of suspension was not served upon him, the CBI did not have the jurisdiction to conduct search upon him, without obtaining prior permission of the appointing authority, and the order of suspension, even if one goes by its contents, cannot be sustained in law, since an unrelated provision was cited. The O.A. was opposed by the petitioners and the respondents 2 and 3. The Tribunal allowed the O.A. through order, dated 08.10.2012. 4. Sri Wilson, learned Additional Solicitor General of India, appearing for the petitioners, submits that the plea raised by the respondent, as regards the communication of the order of suspension, is self contradictory. It is urged that the order of suspension or for that matter, an order imposing penalty comes into effect, from the time it is passed and the delay in communication would not have any impact thereon. It is urged that the order of suspension or for that matter, an order imposing penalty comes into effect, from the time it is passed and the delay in communication would not have any impact thereon. He submits that being the employer of the respondent, the petitioners have every right to place him under suspension pending enquiry and even if there exists any defect in the initiation of the proceedings by the CBI, at the most, they would have impact upon the prosecution that may be launched and not upon the order of suspension, pending enquiry. He further submits that mere mentioning of an incorrect provision in the order does not vitiate the proceedings. He placed reliance upon certain precedents in support of his contentions. 5. Sri J. Sudheer, learned senior counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that the order of suspension was passed, only as a vindictive measure and without any basis. He submits that the so-called search by the CBI was absolutely, without any basis or jurisdiction, and the CBI has not only communicated the factum of raid, but also recommended that the respondent be placed under suspension. He contends that the 1st petitioner has just acted upon the recommendation of the CBI and the proceedings are, accordingly, vitiated. The learned counsel further submits that each Clause in Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 (for short ‘the Rules’) has its own significance and that the one cited in the impugned order has no relevance to the facts of the case. He contends that the order passed by the Tribunal does not warrant any interference. 6. The respondent was on deputation to the BSNL, since a long time. He was heading the Unit of BSNL at Rajahmundry. He filed the O.A. with a prayer to call for the records relating to the letter, dated 23.07.2012, issued by the 1st petitioner and the proceedings, dated 25.04.2012, relating to the repatriation, and to declare them as illegal and arbitrary. The grounds raised by him are that the basis for passing the order of suspension, dated 23.07.2012, is the raid by the CBI, and it was conducted, in violation of Section 26(6) (a) of the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 and that the repatriation was only a ruse. It is also pleaded that Rule 10(2) of the Rules mentioned in the order of suspension has no relevance. It is also pleaded that Rule 10(2) of the Rules mentioned in the order of suspension has no relevance. The O.A. was opposed by the petitioners, by adverting to every ground. The Tribunal allowed the O.A., on three grounds, namely, (a) the order of suspension was not communicated to the respondent, (b) the provision mentioned in the order of suspension does not justify it, and (c) the raid conducted by the CBI, without obtaining prior permission from the appointing authority, is improper. 7. The first ground that weighed with the Tribunal is untenable. It is fairly well settled that an order of suspension, whenever passed, would come into effect forthwith. It is only an order of appointment, which comes into force, on being received by a concerned person and on his reporting to duty. The operation of the order of suspension or of the one imposing penalty, does not depend upon the service of the employee. It was held so, by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab Vs. Khemi Ram ( AIR 1970 SC 214 ). 8. Added to that, further there is a contradiction in terms in this behalf. On the one hand, the Tribunal had before it, the order of suspension and examined it in detail, and on the other hand, a view was taken that it cannot operate, since it was served upon the respondent. It is just understandable, as to how the order had its way to the Tribunal, if it was not served upon the respondent. 9. Coming to the second ground, it is, no doubt, true that the petitioners have cited Sub Rule 2 of Rule 10 of the Rules in the order of suspension and the said provision becomes applicable, only when an employee is arrested. However, citing of a wrong provision does not by itself render the proceedings illegal. Hardly any support of precedents is necessary for this. However, reference can be made to the reference of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kedar Shashikant Deshpande and others Vs. Bhor Municipal Council and others ( (2011) 2 SCC 654 ). 10. The third ground, namely, the CBI did not have the competence to conduct the search against the respondent or his relatives, without prior sanction of the appointing authority, ought not to have been dealt with by the Tribunal, at this stage. Bhor Municipal Council and others ( (2011) 2 SCC 654 ). 10. The third ground, namely, the CBI did not have the competence to conduct the search against the respondent or his relatives, without prior sanction of the appointing authority, ought not to have been dealt with by the Tribunal, at this stage. It is only in relation to the prosecution, if launched, that such question could have been raised. When an appointing authority can place an employee under suspension, without making reference to any proceedings whatever, mere reference to the report of the CBI does not enable the Tribunal to look into the validity of the steps taken by the CBI. Rule 10 of the Rules is worded in such general terms that it would be possible for an appointing authority to place an employee under suspension, just contemplating enquiry. The authority, who passes such order, does not owe any answer to the employee at that stage, as to what prompted him to pass it. 11. The suspension pending enquiry, by itself does not sever the relationship of the employer and the employee. Even while the relationship continues, the employee is disabled from discharging the official functions. His interests are taken care of, by providing for payment of subsistence allowance. It is only when the suspension is operation for an unduly wrong period, without any progress in the matter or when it is passed by an authority, not vested with power, that the Court can review the validity of the same. 12. We find that there was no basis for the Tribunal for setting aside the order of suspension. Now that the respondent has been repatriated to his parent department, he can certainly make a representation to his appointing authority, ventilating his grievances. There is no reason why the appointing authority would not look into the same. 13. Hence, the Writ Petition is allowed and the order, dated 08.10.2012, passed in O.A.No.875 of 2012, is set aside. It is, however, left open to the respondent to make a representation to his appointing authority, ventilating his grievances. As and when such representation is made, the appointing authority shall pass appropriate orders, within a period of four (4) weeks from the date of receipt thereof. There shall be no order as to costs. 14. The Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in the writ petition shall stand disposed of.