JUDGMENT Alok Aradhe, J.:- 1. This appeal by the plaintiff was admitted by a Bench of this Court on the following substantial questions of law: - “(i) Whether the finding of learned first Appellate Court holding that the family settlement has no sanctity in the eye of law since it is an unregistered document, runs contrary to the dictum of Supreme Court Tek Bahadur Bhujil v. Debi Singh Bhujil and others, AIR 1966 SC 292 ? (ii) What is the impact of admission of defendant No. 1-Smt. Khilona Bahu in her testimony that Ratanlal is the Karta of the family? (iii) Whether in view of admission of defendant No. 1-Smt. Khilona Bahu that Ratanlal was the Karta of the family, the judgment of learned first Appellate Court holding that Ratanlal was not Karta, is vitiated by ignoring the admission of defendant No. 1-Smt.Khilona Bahu? (iv) Whether Ratan being Karta of HUF was having authority to settle the suit property in the name of plaintiff?” 2. Thereafter, following additional substantial questions of law were framed: “(v) Whether the lower Appellate Court committed an error of law in reversing the findings with regard to possession of the plaintiff and in consequently setting aside the decree for injunction, without meeting the reasoning of the trial Court with regard to finding of possession of the plaintiff over the suit land ? (vi) Whether the family settlement can be read in evidence, as the same is an unstamped document ?” 3. In order to appreciate the relationship between the parties, genealogical tree as mention in the plaint is reproduced: - Pooranlal Ratanlal (Died in 1992) = Smt Khilona Bahu Hargovind Babulal Halkuram (Defendant No. 1) (widow) Smt. Kusumrani (Dead) = Smt. Siyadulari Laxmi Narayan Umashanker Soni Sharad Chand = Smt. Malti Bai (wife) (Plaintiff) Makhanlal Devraj (Defendant No. 2) 4. The plaintiff filed a suit, inter alia, on the ground that plaintiff, defendant No. 1, 2 and 4 are the members of joint family. The suit lands admeasuring 0.405 and 0.404 hectares of Khasra No. 68/2 and 68/3 were purchased 'Benami' vide registered sale deed dated 20-6-1969 from the funds of joint family. However, in the revenue records the name of defendant No. 1 alone was recorded. The plaintiff from her husband's income and from her 'stridhan' purchased a land in village Raheli which was situated adjacent to the land bearing khasra Nos. However, in the revenue records the name of defendant No. 1 alone was recorded. The plaintiff from her husband's income and from her 'stridhan' purchased a land in village Raheli which was situated adjacent to the land bearing khasra Nos. 69/2 and 69/4 i.e. the land belonging to joint family of which Ratanlal was the 'Karta'. The plaintiff in order to have one consolidated plot appointed Ratanlal, namely, husband of defendant No. 1, to be her attorney and authorized him to sell her land. In pursuance of aforesaid authority Ratanlal sold the land admeasuring 0.607 hectares of Khasra No. 48/6 for a consideration of Rs. 7000/- vide registered sale deed dated 7-4-1985 (Exhibit-P-1) to one Bhagawndas. However, the sale consideration was not paid to plaintiff. 5. Thereafter Ratanlal executed a family settlement deed dated 6-1-1986 (Exhibit-P-2) under which the plaintiff was placed in possession of land bearing Khasra No. 68/2 and 68/3 admeasuring 0.405 and 0.404 hectares respectively and he further authorized the defendants No. 1 and defendant No. 4 to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the land bearing Khasra No. 69/2 and 69/4. In pursuance of the aforesaid family settlement deed the defendants No. 1 and 4 executed registered sale deeds dated 6-7-1987 (Exhibits-P-3 and P-4) for a consideration of Rs. 6000/- in respect of the land comprised in Khasra Nos. 69/2 and 69/4 in favour of the plaintiff. However, in violation of the terms and conditions of the family settlement the defendant No. 1 got the name of defendant No. 2 mutated in the revenue records in respect of the suit lands. The defendants threatened the plaintiff with dispossession. Thereupon the plaintiff filed the suit seeking relief of declaration that she is the owner and in possession of land bearing Khasra No. 68/2 and 68/3 admeasuring 0.405 and 0.404 hectares respectively by virtue of family settlement deed dated 6-1-1986. The plaintiff also sought permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with her possession. 6. The defendants No. 1 and 2 filed the written statement in which, inter alia, the claim of the plaintiff was denied and it was pleaded that the suit lands are the self acquired property of defendant No. 1 which were purchased by her from her 'Stridhan' under the family settlement. 6. The defendants No. 1 and 2 filed the written statement in which, inter alia, the claim of the plaintiff was denied and it was pleaded that the suit lands are the self acquired property of defendant No. 1 which were purchased by her from her 'Stridhan' under the family settlement. It was further pleaded that under the family settlement the defendant No. 1 conveyed suit land to defendant No. 2. The defendants No. 3 and 4 were proceeded ex pane. 7. The trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 5-12-2006, inter alia, held that Late Ratanlal was the 'Karta' of the family as there is no denial to his status as 'Karta' in the written statement filed on behalf of defendants No. 1 and 2. It was further held that the land admeasuring 1.50 acres of Khasra No. 48/6 which belonged to the plaintiff was sold by Ratanlal vide registered sale deed dated 7-4-1985 as attorney of the plaintiff and late Ratanlal had executed the family settlement deed (Exhibit-P-2) in favour of the plaintiff which has duly been proved, in pursuance of which, the defendants No. 1 and 4 executed the sale deeds dated 6-7-1987 (Exhibits-P-3 and P-4) in respect of the land comprised in Khasra No. 69/2 and 69/4. The trial Court further held that since execution of the family settlement (Exhibit-P-2) has not been denied by the defendants No. 1 and 2, therefore, its registration was not required. The trial Court on the basis of entries made in the revenue records (Exhibit-P-13) as well as the documents (Exhibits-P-20 to P-25) held that the plaintiff is in cultivating possession of the land in dispute. On the basis of statement of defendant No. 1 and defendant witness-Umashanker the trial Court held that defendant No. 1 and her witness have not been able to disclose the name of the persons and the amount of consideration for which suit lands were purchased in the name of defendant No. 1 therefore from evidence of defendants it was not proved that suit lands were the self acquired property of defendant No. 1. Accordingly, the trial Court decreed the suit. 8. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid decree of the trial Court, the defendants No. 1, 2 and 4 filed an appeal. Accordingly, the trial Court decreed the suit. 8. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid decree of the trial Court, the defendants No. 1, 2 and 4 filed an appeal. The lower Appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 13-10-2007, inter alia, held that there is no evidence on record to establish that suit lands were the joint family property. It was further held that defendants No. 1 and 4 had sold the lands comprised in Khasra No. 69/2 and 69/4 as owner thereof and not in the capacity as member of the joint family. It was further held that document dated 6-1-1986 (Exhibit- P-2) cannot be held to be family settlement as it contained the signature of Ratanlal and not the signatures of other members of the family and there is no evidence on record to show that sale consideration received from the sale of land of the plaintiff was utilized for the purpose of joint family. The lower Appellate Court further held that plaintiff was not present at the -time of execution of the family settlement (Exhibit-P-2) which contains the recital that possession was delivered. Therefore, it is not possible to infer that in pursuance of the family settlement the possession of the land in question was delivered to the plaintiff. The lower Appellate Court set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the document (Exhibit P-2) i.e. family settlement was executed by Ratanlal who was admittedly 'Karta' of the joint family. It is further submitted that Exhibit P-2 does not require registration and the defendant No. 2 has failed to prove that property in question was purchased by her from 'Stridhan'. It is also submitted that the possession of the land in question was handed over to the appellant in pursuance of family settlement (Exhibit P2). It is urged that testimony of Siyadulari (PW-6) has not been challenged by the defendants in cross-examination. The lower appellate Court grossly erred in holding that family settlement dated 6-1-1986 can be prepared subsequently and while recording the findings, the lower appellate Court has travelled beyond the pleadings of the parties. It is urged that testimony of Siyadulari (PW-6) has not been challenged by the defendants in cross-examination. The lower appellate Court grossly erred in holding that family settlement dated 6-1-1986 can be prepared subsequently and while recording the findings, the lower appellate Court has travelled beyond the pleadings of the parties. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the decision in Tek Bahadur Bhujil v. Debt Singh Bhujil and others, AIR 1966 SC 292 and Sahu Madho Das and others v. Mukand Ram and another, AIR 1955 SC 481 . Lastly it is urged that the lower Appellate Court grossly erred in reversing the finding that the plaintiff is in possession of the land in question without meeting the reasonings of the trial Court. 10. On the other hand, learned senior counsel for the respondent No. 2 submits that plaintiffs' title flows from Exhibit P-2. However, the aforesaid document is neither stamped nor is registered. It is further submitted that from perusal of document (Exhibit P-2) i.e. alleged family settlement, it is apparent that transaction is in praesenti and, therefore, the same requires registration. In support of his submissions, learned senior counsel has placed reliance on the decisions in Tek Bahadur Bhujil (supra) and Kale and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, AIR 1976 SC 807 . It is also submitted that since the document has not been properly stamped therefore, the same cannot be read for any purpose. In support of this submission, learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision in Avinash Kumar Chauhan v. Vijay Krishna Mishra, 2009(3) MPLJ (S.C.) 289 = (2009) 2 SCC 532 . It is also urged that if Exhibit P-2 is excluded from consideration, the entire basis of claim of the plaintiff collapses. It is further contended that the plaintiff is not in settled possession of the land in question. She is a member of joint family and is in possession of the land being member of the joint family especially in view of the fact that no plea of ouster of other family members has been taken. The plaintiff is also not in possession as a trespasser as her claim is based on family settlement. In support of his submission, learned senior counsel has placed reliance on the decision in Rome Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu, (2004) 1 SCC 769 . 11. The plaintiff is also not in possession as a trespasser as her claim is based on family settlement. In support of his submission, learned senior counsel has placed reliance on the decision in Rome Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu, (2004) 1 SCC 769 . 11. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the records. It is well settled in law that if a family settlement does not create or extinguish any rights in immovable property and merely recognises antecedent title of the same kind, the same does not require registration. [See: Tek Bahadur Bhujil v. Debt Singh Bhujil and others, AIR 1966 SC 292 , Ram Charon Das v. Girja Nandini Devi and others, AIR 1966 SC 323 , Kale an d others vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, AIR 1976 SC 807 and Roshan Singh and others v. Zile Singh and others, AIR 1988 SC 881 ] Section 2(24) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 defines the expression 'settlement' to mean any non-testamentary deposition in writing of any movable or immovable property, inter alia for the purpose of distributing property of settlor among his family or those from whom he desires to provide, or for purpose of providing for same person dependant on him. From careful scrutiny of the definition, it is evident that if by any document a separate interest is created in favour of a person who may have a legal right against the settlor, the same would be 'settlement'. Article 5 of the Schedule I-A to the Act deals with agreement and prescribes stamp duty payable thereon. 12. Now, I may advert to document (Exhibit P-2) dated 6-1-1986. The aforesaid document is written on plain paper. It is neither stamped nor registered. It is executed by Ratanlal i.e. Karta of the family. Under the said document, possession of two acres of land comprised in khasra number 68 has been given to the plaintiff on 6-1-1986 i.e. on the day of execution of the document. The document has been styled as an agreement. It is neither stamped nor registered. It is executed by Ratanlal i.e. Karta of the family. Under the said document, possession of two acres of land comprised in khasra number 68 has been given to the plaintiff on 6-1-1986 i.e. on the day of execution of the document. The document has been styled as an agreement. In Ram Rattan v. Parama Nand, AIR 1946 PC 51 while construing the words 'for any purpose' in section 35 of the Act, it was held that words 'for any purpose' in section 35 of the Stamp Act should be given their natural meaning and effect and would include a collateral purpose and that an unstamped partition deed cannot be used to corroborate the oral evidence for the purpose of determining even the factum of partition as distinct from its terms. Similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Avinash Kumar Chauhan v. Vijay Krishna Mishra, 2009(3) MPLJ (S.C.) 289 = (2009) 2 SCC 532 . In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, even if the document (Exhibit P-2) is treated to be an 'instrument', 'agreement' or 'settlement', the same cannot be read in evidence for any purpose and thus, the entire foundation of the claim of the plaintiff collapses. Accordingly, the 6th substantial question of law is answered in the negative and against the appellant. 13. In view of answer to 6th substantial question of law, the issue whether document (Exhibit P-2) requires registration pales into insignificance and therefore it is not necessary for the Court to examine the same. Consequently, the substantial questions of law, namely, (i) to (iv) also lose their relevance therefore, it is not necessary to answer the same. 14. The first Appellate Court while reversing the finding of the trial Court must meet the reasonings on which the finding of the trial Court is based. [See: Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, 2001(2) Mh.L.J. (S.C.) 786 = (2001) 3 SCC 179 , Nopany Investments (P) Ltd. v. Santokh Singh, (2008) 2 SCC 728 and Nicholas V. Menezes v. Joseph M. Menezes, 2009(4) MPLJ (S.C.) III = (2009) 4 SCC 791 ]. The trial Court on the basis of meticulous appreciation of evidence on record has recorded a finding that the plaintiff is in possession of the suit land. The trial Court on the basis of meticulous appreciation of evidence on record has recorded a finding that the plaintiff is in possession of the suit land. The trial Court has taken into account the evidence of Tulsiram (defendant witness number 4) as well as Umashankar (defendant witness number 1) who have admitted in their statement that the plaintiff is in possession of the suit land. The trial Court has also relied on the entries made in the documents (Exhibits P-14 to P-20) to hold that the plaintiff is in possession of the suit land. The trial Court also placed reliance on entries made in khasra panchshala (Exhibit P-13) to hold that the plaintiff is in possession of the suit land. However, the aforesaid material evidence has not been considered by the lower Appellate Court and finding with regard to possession has been reversed merely on the ground that at the time of execution of family settlement deed (Exhibit P-2) since the plaintiff was not present therefore, it cannot be inferred that, the possession has been handed over to the plaintiff. At this stage, it is pertinent to mention here that the document (Exhibit D-5) dated 16-11-1963 shows that partition had taken place between Ratanlal and Babulal. The suit property was acquired vide sale deed dated 20-6-1969 (Exhibit P-9) i.e. after partition had taken place between Ratanlal and Babulal. The defendants 1 and 2 have also pleaded the factum of partition between Ratanlal and Babulal in paragraph 3 of the written statement. Thus, neither at the time of execution of sale deed (Exhibit P-9) dated 20-6-1969 nor at the time of execution of family settlement deed dated 6-1-1986 (Exhibit P-2) Ratanlal was 'Karta' of the family. However, the fact remains that the plaintiff is in possession of the suit land. It is well settled in law that law respects possession even if there is no title to support it. [See: Yashwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh, AIR 1968 SC 620 and Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu, AIR 2004 SC 4609 ]. Since, the plaintiff is in possession of the suit land therefore, she cannot be dispossessed except in accordance with law. Accordingly, the fifth substantial question of law is answered. 15. Accordingly, the judgment and decree passed by the lower Appellate Court is set aside. The claim of the plaintiff in respect of declaration of title is dismissed. Since, the plaintiff is in possession of the suit land therefore, she cannot be dispossessed except in accordance with law. Accordingly, the fifth substantial question of law is answered. 15. Accordingly, the judgment and decree passed by the lower Appellate Court is set aside. The claim of the plaintiff in respect of declaration of title is dismissed. However, the respondents are restrained from dispossessing the plaintiff from the suit land except in accordance with law. 16. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. Appeal partly allowed.