Judgment : R. Subhash Reddy, J. This appeal suit is filed under Section 96 of CPC, by the plaintiffs in the suit in O.S.No.69 of 1997 on the file of learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry, aggrieved by the judgment and decree, dated 3rd October 2001, passed in the said suit. By the aforesaid judgment and decree, the suit filed by the appellant/plaintiffs for recovery of an amount of Rs.8,49,571/- with future interest, is dismissed. The suit in O.S.No.69 of 1997 is filed with the following averments : The 1st plaintiff is a Company registered under the Companies Act of 1956 and is engaged in the Insurance business, having its offices all over India. The 2nd plaintiff is a Limited Company, having its registered office at Mangalore. The Defendant is a proprietary concern, engaged in the business of transportation. The branch office of 2nd plaintiff at Rajahmundry engaged the defendant for transportation of 441 tins of cashew kernels and other goods valued at Rs.6,00,000/- and the defendant arranged the lorry bearing No. TSX 5002 for carrying goods from Meruvada village to Mangalore under lorry receipt No.B/1 and way bill No.2594, dated 06.11.1993. The defendant charged Rs.8,320/- for carrying the goods and collected an amount of Rs.3,820/- towards advance. Though the goods were booked on 06.11.1993, they were not delivered to the 2nd plaintiff at Rajahmundry, as such, a Police complaint was given at III-Town Police Station, Rajahmundry on 23.11.1993, regarding non-delivery of consignment. Basing on such complaint, a case was registered in Crime No.339 of 1993 and the lorry was reported undetected by the Police, on 04.08.1994. The consignor-2nd plaintiff, who insured the goods with the 1st plaintiff as per the policy bearing No.602307/21/26/00201/93, gave a declaration, dated 06.11.1993, estimating the value of goods booked at Rs.6,00,000/- and the 2nd plaintiff preferred claim of Rs.6,00,000/- by addressing the defendant by way of Letter, dated 9th December 1993, but there was no reply from the defendant. The 1st plaintiff, as an insurer, has settled the claim of 2nd plaintiff at Rs.5,78,471/- as assessed by the surveyor, namely, “One Season Services Pvt. Ltd.”, and obtained letter of subrogation and special power of attorney from the 2nd plaintiff. The 1st plaintiff, as an insurer, has settled the claim of 2nd plaintiff at Rs.5,78,471/- as assessed by the surveyor, namely, “One Season Services Pvt. Ltd.”, and obtained letter of subrogation and special power of attorney from the 2nd plaintiff. Thereafter, the 1st plaintiff has issued notice to the defendant on 09.09.1996, demanding payment of Rs.5,78,471/-, which was settled in favour of 2nd plaintiff, but as there was no response, suit is filed for recovery of an amount of Rs.8,49,571/- including interest at the rate of 24% per annum. The defendant/Transporter, through its proprietor, has filed written statement. While denying the various allegations of plaintiffs in the suit, it was the case of defendant in the written statement that the Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit and the claim of plaintiffs is hopelessly time-barred. It is further pleaded that the defendant cannot be called as carrier doing transport business. In the written statement, defendant also denied undertaking of any such transportation as alleged and charging an amount of Rs.8,320/- for carrying the goods and collecting Rs.3,820/- towards advance. Precisely, it was the case of defendant before the trial Court that the defendant was neither the consignor nor the consignee, but is a simple lorry broker and his job ended when he took the lorry driver to the consignor. With the above pleadings, the defendant has prayed for dismissal of suit. On the basis of above pleadings, the trial Court has framed the following issues: “1. Whether the 2nd plaintiff engaged the defendant for transportation of 441 tins of Cashew Kernels and whether there is any negligence or misconduct on the part of the defendant ? 2. Whether the 1st plaintiff is entitled to recover the suit amount as prayed for ? 3. To what relief ? On behalf of plaintiffs, Pws.1 to 3 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-13 were marked, whereas, the Proprietor of the defendant-concern was examined as DW-1. On appreciating the oral and documentary evidence on record, the trial Court rejected the contention of defendant that it is not a common carrier but is only a lorry broker, and thus, held that it falls within the definition of “common carrier”. On appreciating the oral and documentary evidence on record, the trial Court rejected the contention of defendant that it is not a common carrier but is only a lorry broker, and thus, held that it falls within the definition of “common carrier”. But, with regard to the limitation aspect, the trial Court has recorded a finding that the claim of plaintiffs is barred by limitation, as much as they failed to file the suit by 9th December 1996, but it was filed after expiry of 3 years period stipulated in Article 11 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. With regard to limitation, the trial Court has relied on Ex.A-2 and recorded a finding that the 1st plaintiff gave Police complaint on 23.11.1993 at III-Town Police Station, Rajahmundry, with a request to take action in the matter and to trace the goods. Basing on the recitals under Ex.A-2, the trial Court found that the consignment was to reach Mangalore, in any case, by 10.11.1993, therefore, the cause of action arose to the plaintiffs on the next date i.e. 11.11.1993 as the time begins to run from the said date under Article 11 of the Indian Limitation Act. Though the appellant/plaintiffs rely on Ex.A-7, alleging that there is an acknowledgment by the defendant on 10.12.1994 that the goods were not delivered by the said date, having regard to the language used in the same, it cannot be termed as an acknowledgment so as to consider it as a fresh cause of action for filing the suit. While holding so, the trial Court has dismissed the suit on the ground of limitation. In this appeal, it is contended by Sri Kota Subba Rao, learned counsel appearing for the 1st appellant-Company that three years period is to be computed from the date of confirmation of loss by the defendant.It is further submitted that the goods under dispute should be treated to have lost from the date when the Police gave a certificate that the goods lost could not be recovered. It is pleaded that as the Police gave such certificate only on 04.08.1994 under Ex.A-3, the suit is filed on 19.03.1997, as such, it is well within time.The learned counsel has further submitted that under Ex.A-7, the defendant-Company has confirmed that goods were not delivered, and as the suit was filed within three years from the date of Ex.A-7, it is well within limitation, but the trial Court has not considered the issue of limitation in proper perspective.The learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Transport Corporation of India Ltd. Vs. M/s. Veljan Hydrair Ltd.(2007 (2) ACJ 1360) and also on the judgment of Gujarat High Court in the case of Kirankumar Kamalkumar Vs. Himmat Transport Service & another.(2002 (2) ACJ 1200) On the other hand, it is submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent/defendant that even according to the case of plaintiffs, goods were booked on 06.11.1993, and in ordinary course, they were to be reached Mangalore by 10.11.1993, as such, the limitation period starts from the aforesaid date. It is further submitted that it is a case of compensation for non-delivery of goods, and as per Article 11 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation is three years from the period when the goods ought to have been delivered. It is submitted that the judgments relied on by the learned counsel for appellants are not applicable to the facts of the case. The learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Boota Mal Vs. Union of India ( AIR 1962 SC 1716 )and in the case of M/s. Bhagwan Dass Rama Shanker (dead) through L.Rs. Vs. Union of India & others. ( AIR 2000 SC 3634 ) Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we have also perused the material on record. As issue No.1 in the suit was decided in favour of plaintiffs and as there was no appeal by the respondent/defendant, it is not necessary to go into the said issue in this appeal. The only question which falls for consideration in this appeal is whether the suit filed by the plaintiffs for recovery of money is within the limitation, as prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 or not. The only question which falls for consideration in this appeal is whether the suit filed by the plaintiffs for recovery of money is within the limitation, as prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 or not. As evident from Ex.A-1, the consignment was booked on 06.11.1993 at Maruvada village near Tuni in East Godavari District of Andhra Pradesh and it was to be delivered at Mangalore of Karnataka State, but it did not reach the factory of 2nd plaintiff at Mangalore even after the lapse of 15 days from the date of its booking. It is also not in dispute that the 2nd plaintiff gave a complaint at III-Town Police Station, Rajahmundry on 23.11.1993, suspecting misappropriation of goods by the driver of the vehicle. The 2nd plaintiff also addressed a letter to the defendant on 9th December 1993, intimating that the lorry did not reach the factory at Mangalore even by that date. Ex.A-4 is the copy of the letter, dated 9th December 1993. It is true that in the crime registered in Crime No.339 of 1993, Ex.A-3 proceedings were issued by the Police on 04.08.1994, stating that the lorry could not be detected. It is also relevant to note that the defendant had issued Ex.A-7 letter, dated 12.10.1994, confirming that the lorry did not reach the destination. As the goods booked by the 2nd plaintiff were insured with the 1st plaintiff, the 1st plaintiff-insurer has paid the value basing on the assessment of value of goods which were not delivered at destination point. It is also to be noticed in this case that the suit is filed on 19.03.1997. Having regard to the pleadings and evidence on record, it is the case for recovery of amount towards compensation for non-delivery of goods booked by the 2nd plaintiff, insured with the 1st plaintiff, therefore, the period of limitation in this case, is governed by Article 11 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, which reads as under : Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run Against a carrier for compensation for non-delivery of, or delay in delivering goods. Three years When the goods ought to be delivered. Three years When the goods ought to be delivered. Various dates and events in this case are not in dispute, but the 2nd appellant claims that as the goods were not delivered at the destination point, they were to be treated as lost and the period of limitation is to be counted from the certificate given under Ex.A-3 by the Police on 04.08.1994. It is the case of appellants that only from the said date, it is to be construed that the plaintiffs have suffered loss and injury and as the suit is filed within three years from the date of Ex.A-3, it is well within the period of limitation. Ex.A-2, which is the complaint made by the plaintiffs to the III-Town Police at Rajahmundry, is relevant for the purpose of deciding the issue of limitation. The said complaint reads as under : “The said lorry in the usual course has to reach at Mangalore by 10-11-1993, but on enquiries and by Telephone calls at our Head Office we came to know that the lorry has not reached Mangalore as per the enquiries on 11.11.1993 and continuously, we have enquired on all dates till today whether the lorry with goods has reached to Mangalore and as the delay may occur due to heavy rains in the Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka and Madras (Tamilnadu). But to our surprise the lorry has not reached till yesterday evening i.e. 18-11-1993.” From the aforesaid complaint, it is clear that the goods were booked on 06.11.1993, and the lorry was to reach Mangalore by 10.11.1993, but it did not reach Mangalore even by one day prior to the date of filing of complaint, which was filed on 23.11.1993. As it is never the case of plaintiffs that either the goods were lost or any damage was caused to the goods booked by them, it is a clear case where plaintiffs claimed compensation for non-delivery of goods, in which event, only Article 11 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 will apply. If said Article 11 is to be applied, the limitation starts from the date when the goods ought to have been delivered. The judgment relied on by the learned counsel for respondent/defendant in Boota Mal’s case (3 supra) supports his case. If said Article 11 is to be applied, the limitation starts from the date when the goods ought to have been delivered. The judgment relied on by the learned counsel for respondent/defendant in Boota Mal’s case (3 supra) supports his case. In the aforesaid judgment, while considering identical issue under Article 31 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (Act 9 of 1908), which corresponds to Article 11 of the Limitation Act, 1963, in clear terms, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the time would run after elapsing of reasonable time, on the expiry of which, delivery ought to have been made. Even in the case of M/s. Bhagwan Dass Rama Shanker (4 supra), it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the time of delivery of goods to the consignee has to be ascertained from the terms of contract between the consignor and the consignee and the carrier, and in the absence of any contract, express or implied, the normal time of delivery of goods is to be determined having regard to the nature of carrier, distance and other relevant factors on the facts of each case. Coming to the facts of the case on hand, as evident from Ex.A-2, goods were booked on 06.11.1993 and they were to reach Mangalore by 10.11.1993. The complaint under Ex.A-2 itself was filed before the Police on 23.11.1993, and even in the said complaint, it is categorically pleaded that the goods were not delivered even by that time. Article 11 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deals with both the cases of non-delivery of goods as well as the delay in delivering the goods, and in either case, the starting point for limitation is after reasonable time is elapsed for carrying the goods from the place of transport to the place of destination. In this case, goods were dispatched from Maruvada village in Andhra Pradesh, to be delivered at Mangalore in Karnataka State. Having regard to the distance, and further, based on Ex.A-2, even according to the plaintiffs, the goods were to be delivered by 10.11.1993. By applying the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Boota Mal’s case (3 supra), reasonable time is to be gauzed having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. Having regard to the distance, and further, based on Ex.A-2, even according to the plaintiffs, the goods were to be delivered by 10.11.1993. By applying the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Boota Mal’s case (3 supra), reasonable time is to be gauzed having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. Unless some circumstances are shown by way of cogent evidence that goods could not have been reached for the reasons beyond human control i.e. like damage of bridges or roads etc., for the purpose of computing the period of limitation, Article 11 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 is to be taken into consideration, and as admitted by the plaintiffs, the reasonable time for reaching the goods at destination i.e. Mangalore, would have been by 10.11.1993. Even the complaint was also lodged with the Police at III-Town Police Station, Rajahmundry on 23.11.1993, and even from that date also, suit was not filed within the period of three years, but it was filed only on 19.03.1997, after the expiry of three years period as prescribed under Article 11 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. Thus, by applying the above said provisions, we are of the view that the Tribunal has correctly appreciated the evidence on record and recorded the finding that the suit claim is barred by limitation. Though the learned counsel for appellants has placed reliance on the judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Transport Corporation of India Ltd. (1 supra) and in the case of Kirankumar Kamalkumar (2 supra), the said judgments are with reference to a provision under the Carriers Act of 1865. As per Section 10 of the Carriers Act of 1865, no suit shall be instituted against a common carrier for the loss of, or injury to, goods entrusted to him for carriage, unless notice in writing of the loss or injury has been given to him before institution of the suit and within six months of the time when the loss or injury first came to the knowledge of the plaintiff. Having regard to the language used under Article 11 of the Limitation Act of 1963, the judgments relied on by the learned counsel for appellant/plaintiffs, which are with reference to the provision under Section 10 of the Carriers Act of 1865, are of no help to their case. Having regard to the language used under Article 11 of the Limitation Act of 1963, the judgments relied on by the learned counsel for appellant/plaintiffs, which are with reference to the provision under Section 10 of the Carriers Act of 1865, are of no help to their case. As it is not the case of appellants that there is loss or injury to the goods, so as to compute the limitation from the date of confirmation by the Police, we reject such contention advanced by the learned counsel for appellants. Similarly, we also reject the contention that Ex.A-7 gives a fresh cause of action for filing the suit. Ex.A-7 is a mere confirmation by the defendant with regard to non-reaching of the vehicle and it need not be taken as a fresh cause of action for the purpose of starting point of limitation under Article 11 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963. Looking from any angle, we are of the view that the findings recorded by the trial Court are based on the evidence on record and are in conformity with the view taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgments relied on by the learned counsel for respondent/defendant. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merit in this appeal and it is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.