JUDGMENT Hon’ble P.K.S. Baghel, J.—This petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution, has been preferred by the petitioner for quashing of the order dated 27.12.2002 (Annexure-8 to the writ petition) on the ground that it is illegal and contrary to the provisions of the U.P. Recruitment of Dependents of Government Servants Dying in Harness Rules, 1974. 2. Shorn off unnecessary details the brief facts of the case are that the petitioner’s father, late Sri Ram Sundar was a head constable in police department, who died in harness on 7.4.1980 while he was on leave. Her father left behind his widow, a son and a daughter, who were minor at that point of time. The date of birth of the petitioner is 1.2.1979 which is evident from the High School certificate filed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition. When the petitioner become major in the year 1997, her mother moved an application for her appointment on the compassionate ground on 23.10.1997. A copy whereof has been placed by the petitioner on record as annexure-2 to the writ petition. Her mother sent a reminder also on 10.9.1998, wherein, she stated that after the death of her husband, her family was living in penury as there was no other source of livelihood. 3. By the impugned order, the petitioner’s claim has been rejected on the ground that her case is not covered under the Government Order dated 30.5.2001. No other ground has been mentioned in the impugned order. A counter-affidavit has been filed by the respondents. The stand taken in the counter-affidavit is that the Government Order dated 30.5.2001 permits for employment to the dependent of a person who died during his duty. A copy of the Government Order dated 30.5.2001 has been placed by the petitioner on record as Annexure C.A.-1. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is entitled for appointment on compassionate ground in terms of the U.P. Recruitment of Dependents of Government Servants Dying in Harness Rules, 1974 and the Government Order has been misinterpreted by the authority concerned. 5. Learned Standing Counsel submit that death of the petitioner’s father occurred in the year 1980 and after a long gap of time, an application for appointment has been moved, therefore, petitioner is not entitled for appointment on compassionate ground. Learned Standing Counsel drew the attention of the Court to Annexure-1 to the counter-affidavit. 6. 5. Learned Standing Counsel submit that death of the petitioner’s father occurred in the year 1980 and after a long gap of time, an application for appointment has been moved, therefore, petitioner is not entitled for appointment on compassionate ground. Learned Standing Counsel drew the attention of the Court to Annexure-1 to the counter-affidavit. 6. I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the record. Indisputably, the facts are that the petitioner’s father was a head constable in police department and died on 7.4.1980 while he was on leave. His death occurred on account of injuries sustained during the course of some scuffle which had taken place among the family members. It is stated that the petitioner’s date of birth is 1.2.1979. She passed her High Schools examination in the year 1995 and immediately after attaining the age of majority in 1997, her mother moved an application for appointment of the petitioner. 7. In the impugned order, only ground mentioned is that her case is not covered by the Government Order dated 30.5.2001. The said Government Order dated 30.5.2001 provides that five years period mentioned in the Rules may be relaxed or the death occurred during performing his duty, the matter should be sent to the State Government for relaxation in the period of five years. The Government Order would not override the statutory provisions, moreover, from perusal of the Government Order also it is evident that it does not provide any specific time for the purpose and the appointment on compassionate ground shall be provided only to the dependent of a persons who died during action/duty. 8. The matter with regard to the appointment is no more res-integra. The petitioner has placed reliance on a judgment in the case of Manoj Kumar Saxena v. State of U.P. and others, 2012(11) ADJ 671 . The similar issue with regard to the power of relaxation of five years has been considered by a Division Bench in the case of Subhash Yadav v. State of U.P., 2010(10) ADJ 289 (DB) and in the case of Vivek Yadav v. State of U.P. and others, 2010 (7) ADJ 1 . 9. In the case of Vivek Yadav (supra) also, the minor had moved an application for appointment on compassionate ground after attaining the age of majority. 9. In the case of Vivek Yadav (supra) also, the minor had moved an application for appointment on compassionate ground after attaining the age of majority. The paragraph No. 4 of this judgment reads as under; "A perusal of Rule 5 would show that an application for employment on compassionate basis is to be made within five years from the date of death of the deceased Government servant. There is a proviso conferring power upon the Government for relaxing the time-limit fixed for making such application, where the Government is of the opinion that it causes undue hardship and for dealing with the case in a just and equitable manner. Reading of this rule would demonstrate that the application must be by a competent person, who is competent to make it. A minor, therefore, could not have made application. The time-limit for an application contemplated by the rule, therefore, could only be read to mean ‘by a competent person’, in other words, who has attained the age of majority. In a case, where the applicant is minor, it would not be possible for the minor to make an application for various reasons including that he is minor and as such he cannot be appointed to a post in the Government. Rule 5, therefore, will have to be read in such manner that it gives effect to the policy of the Government, which is to provide employment to a member of the family of a Government employee, who dies in harness, so as to mitigate the hardship. The issue whether the family of the deceased over long passage of time continues to face the hardship, would be examined on the merits of the claim. Rule 8 of the Rules, 1974 itself contemplates that a candidate seeking appointment under the Rules must not be less than 18 years of age at the time of appointment. In the instant case, as averred by the appellant, his mother was uneducated or illiterate, he was a minor though the elder son and there were elder sisters. Therefore, in such cases, considering the object of the Rules, the proviso to Rule 5 must normally be exercised, as for the purpose of dealing with the cases in a just and equitable manner. In exercising such discretion, no doubt, the authority exercising the discretion will examine the record before him.” 10. Therefore, in such cases, considering the object of the Rules, the proviso to Rule 5 must normally be exercised, as for the purpose of dealing with the cases in a just and equitable manner. In exercising such discretion, no doubt, the authority exercising the discretion will examine the record before him.” 10. In the present case, no other ground has been considered by the competent authority. The application of the petitioner has been simply rejected on the ground that the death of the petitioner’s father did not occur during action/duty. In my view, the said reason is unsustainable. The petitioner’s mother moved an application immediately after attaining the age of majority and as such, the impugned order needs to be set aside and it is accordingly set aside. The matter is remitted to the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Establishment) U.P. Police Headquarter, Allahabad, the respondent No. 3, who will consider the cause of the petitioner in the light of law laid down, as mentioned herein above, as expeditiously as possible but not later than three months from the date of communication of this order. The writ petition is allowed. No order as to costs. ——————