JUDGMENT Mr. Rakesh Kumar Jain, J.:- The land in dispute measuring 417 Kanals 18 Marlas, situated in village Nigdhu in District Karnal, is owned by 4 brothers to the extent of 1/4th share each. The aforesaid land is situated in 3 blocks; Plot No.1 measuring 257 Kanals 14 Marlas adjoins the main road, i.e. Nilokheri- Pehowa Road, is very valuable as it could be used for commercial and residential purposes. The value of the land adjoining the road is Rs. 50,00,000/- per acre, whereas the land situated on the back portion is of the value of Rs.20,00,000/- per acre. Plot No.2 is measuring 149 Kanals 01 Marla in which the parties have constructed their houses/deras, whereas Plot No.3 is measuring 10 Kanals, adjoining the village abadi and a colony has been built adjoining to this piece of land. 2. Since respondent nos.3 and 4 have been enjoying the possession of entire valuable land, father of the petitioners filed an application under Section 111 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”) on 26.02.2004 before the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Nilokheri, for partition of the land in dispute, in which one of the brothers, namely, Dhian Singh made a statement before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade on 23.03.2004 that he has no objection if the land is partitioned keeping in view the value and nature, but the other two brothers, namely, respondent nos.3 and 4 raised an objection that the application for partition is not maintainable as there has been already a family partition and the parties are in possession of their respective shares accordingly. 3. The Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, vide his order dated 04.06.2004, dismissed all the objections of respondent nos.3 and 4 by holding that there is no private partition between the parties; the partition application is maintainable and that the entire valuable land adjoining the pucca road is in possession of respondent nos.3 and 4. This order was not challenged by way of appeal or revision by respondent nos.3 and 4 and, thereafter, the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, framed the mode of partition according to which 4 kurras were carved out for all the 4 brothers. In clause no.3 of the mode of partition, it has been provided that “the land to be partitioned is situated in four plots. The land which adjoins the road, is very valuable. In clause no.3 of the mode of partition, it has been provided that “the land to be partitioned is situated in four plots. The land which adjoins the road, is very valuable. Therefore, equal front be given to each of the four co sharers. From the remaining plots all the co-sharers be given equal shares according to their entitlement. Therefore, the partition be carried out without taking into consideration the possession”. 4. It is alleged that none of the parties raised any objection against the proposed mode of partition which has been sanctioned by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Nilokheri, on 03.09.2004. It is also alleged that although the statuary remedy of appeal lies under Section 118(2) of the Act against the sanctioning of mode of partition but no appeal was filed. Section 118 of the Act reads as under:- “118. Disposal of other questions.— (1) When there is a question as to property to be divided, or the mode of making a partition, the Revenue-officer shall, after such inquiry as he deems necessary, record an order stating his decision on the question and his reasons for the decision. (2) An appeal may be preferred from an order under sub-section (1) within fifteen days from the date thereof, and, when such an appeal is preferred and the institution thereof has been certified to the Revenueofficer by the authority to whom the appeal has been preferred the Revenue-officer shall stay proceedings pending the disposal of the appeal. (3) If the applicant for partition is dissatisfied with an original or appellate order under this section, and applies for permission to withdraw from the proceedings in so far as they relate to the partition of his shares, he shall be permitted to withdraw therefrom on such terms as the Revenue-officer thinks fit. (4) When an applicant withdraws under the last foregoing sub-section the Revenue-officer may where the other applicants if any desire the continuance of the proceedings, continue them in so far they relate to the partition of the shares of those other applicants.” 5. After sanctioning of mode of partition, Naksha-Be was prepared against which respondent nos.3 and 4 filed their objections. While the proceedings for sanctioning of Naksha-Be were pending, respondent nos.3 and 4 filed an application for review of order of the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade by raising objections against clause nos.3 and 7 of the mode of partition. After sanctioning of mode of partition, Naksha-Be was prepared against which respondent nos.3 and 4 filed their objections. While the proceedings for sanctioning of Naksha-Be were pending, respondent nos.3 and 4 filed an application for review of order of the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade by raising objections against clause nos.3 and 7 of the mode of partition. Their objection was that their possession from the land in front of road should not be disturbed. It is alleged that the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, without looking into the fact that the remedy was only to file an appeal under Section 118(2) of the Act and the review petition was not maintainable, allowed the same vide his order dated 03.12.2004. Later on, when the reference was made by the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade to the Collector with regard to review, he appointed a Local Commissioner for inspection, who submitted his report on 15.01.2005 in which it was alleged that the partition of land is impossible without disturbing the possession as all the co-sharers have to be given equal share on the land abutting the road. Consequently, vide order dated 31.05.2005, the Collector, Karnal, rejected the reference of review made by the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade. Respondent nos.3 and 4 challenged the order of the Collector by way of revision petition before the Commissioner, Rohtak Division, Rohtak, which was also dismissed on 16.11.2006, but the revision filed by respondent nos.3 and 4 before the Financial Commissioner has been allowed on 20.12.2010, by which the mode of partition has been ordered to be revised. 6. Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that when the mode of partition was sanctioned on 04.06.2004, a remedy of statutory appeal was available with the respondent nos.3 and 4 under Section 118(2) of the Act which could have been preferred within 15 days from the order passed under Section 118(1) of the Act, but no appeal was filed by respondent nos.3 and 4, for the reasons best known to them and after expiry of the period of limitation, when even Naksha-Be was prepared and the objections were filed by respondent nos.3 to 4 against the Naksha-Be, a review application was filed which is provided under Section 15 of the Act. It is submitted that the parameters of review is only to correct the error which is apparent on the face of record, which has not been found to be there in the mode of partition as there was no objection thereto, therefore, the review application was not maintainable. He has further submitted that as per Naksha-Be (Annexure P-1) attached with the writ petition, no land has been given to the petitioners on the metalled road as the petitioners are the children of Mehar Singh who has been given the land shown in yellow colour which is on the backside of the land of the private respondents. In support of his submissions, he has relied upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Hardeva and another v. State of Haryana and others, 2013(2) R.C.R. (Civil) 897. 7. In reply, counsel for the private respondents has submitted that the land in dispute has been allotted to respondent nos.3 and 4 in the family partition which took place amongst the 4 brothers and every brother was in possession of his share. It is also submitted that the mode of partition was sanctioned on 03.09.2004. Although it has been admitted that the remedy of statutory appeal is provided under Section 118(2) of the Act which could be filed within 15 days from the date of sanctioning of mode of partition but the respondents, who were rustic villagers, came to know about the sanctioning of mode of partition on 27.09.2004 and immediately on 28.09.2004, after a gap of 25 days, filed their application for review. It is further submitted that if the order of the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade is not challenged in appeal, the review application can be filed. 8. I have heard both the counsel for the parties and perused the record with their able assistance. 9. The question involved in this case is as to whether respondent nos.3 and 4 could have filed the review application in the presence of statutory remedy of appeal under Section 118(2) of the Act. 10. 8. I have heard both the counsel for the parties and perused the record with their able assistance. 9. The question involved in this case is as to whether respondent nos.3 and 4 could have filed the review application in the presence of statutory remedy of appeal under Section 118(2) of the Act. 10. Since the facts are not much in dispute, it would be relevant to refer to the averments made by respondent nos.3 and 4 in their written statement that the mode of partition was sanctioned on 03.09.2004 and that order was appealable, but they came to know about the sanctioning of mode of partition on 27.09.2004 and immediately thereafter on 28.09.2004, after expiry of 25 days, review application was filed but since appeal was not filed, the review application was competent. 11. In the ordinary course of nature, if an order is appealable, before the appeal is filed, the remedy of review can be availed especially when it is found that there is an error of fact apparent on the face of record, but in a case like the present one in which review application has been filed only because of the reason that the limitation to file the statutory appeal had expired, it cannot be granted as a remedy available to respondent nos.3 and 4 because the appeal could have been filed along with application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, if any, as the scope of appeal is altogether different from the scope of review because in an appeal the Court has the jurisdiction to reconsider the matter while re-appreciating the evidence to find out any perversity, but in the jurisdiction of review, the Court is only confined to correct the errors of omission or commission which too are apparent on the face of the record. 12. Thus, in my view, the procedure adopted by respondent nos.3 and 4 in filing the review application, as has been referred to above, is not appropriate and in accordance with law and as such, its reference, which has been confirmed by the Financial Commissioner, is also illegal. 13. Even otherwise also, it has been held in Hardeva and another’s case (supra) that if the land is abutting the road, which is in possession of the objectors, it has to be equally divided amongst the cosharers. 13. Even otherwise also, it has been held in Hardeva and another’s case (supra) that if the land is abutting the road, which is in possession of the objectors, it has to be equally divided amongst the cosharers. Merely because the objectors were in possession of the said land, they cannot be given the entire land on the road, because as per the mode of partition, the partition was to be effected while taking into account the quality of the land also. 14. In the present case as well, a bare look on the mode of partition sanctioned by the authorities suggests that the land which adjoins the road become valuable and equal fronts have to be given to each co-sharer. 15. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the present writ petition is found to be meritorious and hence, the same is hereby allowed and the impugned orders dated 20.12.2010 (Annexure P-11) and dated 03.12.2004 (Anexure P-5) are set aside. ---------0.B.S.0------------