JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioners have prayed for quashing of the FIR No.183/11, registered at Police Station Sikandara, District Dausa for offences under Sections 143, 447, 341, 323 IPC and have challenged the cognizance order dated 3.1.2012 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Sikarai, District Dausa. 2. The brief facts of the case are that on 22.6.2011, the petitioner No.2, Bhagwan Sahai, lodged a written report at Police Station Sikandara, District Dausa wherein he claimed that in Khasra No.213/14 situated in Village Nanga Wali Dhani, he and his family members are the registered owner of 8 Bigha, 13 Biswa of land. According to him, this land was bought through a registered sale deed. Ever since they bought the land, they have been cultivating it. He further alleged that on 22.6.2011 around 12.00 O'clock in the afternoon, accused Ramjilal, Srinarain, Man Singh, Chiranji, Ram Khiladi, Kishanlal, Mohar Singh, Surjan, Ramotar, Rajendra, Bhoma, Pukhraj, Vishram, Srikishan, Amar Singh, Ramveer, Veer Singh, Om Prakash, Mukesh, Kajod, Man Bhawan, Ummed, Kilan, Surjan, Singari, Tofali, Nangi, Kaushalya, Keshanta, Badam, Gaindi, Foranta, wives of Surjan and Rajendra, Kamod, Sumotri, Mukeshi, Meera, wife of Mukesh, trespassed into his land and started cultivating the land. When he and his family members protested these persons who were armed with Axe, Barchhi (a sharp edged weapon), Dharia (a sharp edged weapon), Lathi (bamboo stick), they attacked them. He further claimed that Rajendra tried to drive the tractor over them. Consequently, he claimed that he himself, Sardar and Rambho have suffered injuries on their head. Moreover, Gajaraj, Roopa, Shiv Charan, Manju and Subuddhi have also suffered injuries over their head caused by sharp edged weapons. On the basis of this report, a formal FIR, FIR No.182/11 was chalked out for offences under Sections 143, 323, 341, 447 IPC. 3. On the next date, i.e. on 23.6.2011, the complainant in the present case, namely Pukhraj, also lodged a written report at the same police station wherein he claimed that on 22.6.2011 around 12.30 PM, Bhagwan Sahay, Ramotar, Sardar, Jagdish, Om Prakash, Vikram, Mahendra, Totaram, Fateh, Prem, Kesa, Aganti, Kaushalya, Kesa, Asha, Ghasi, Mohar Singh, Subedar, Mukesh, Gajraj, Hanuman, Dharma, Manju, Rambho, Shrawan, Hansraj, Bharatlal, Harjan, Subuddhi, Ramniwas, Radhakishan, Sardar, Kamali, Resham, Kamlesh, Mansingh, Pana, Girraj, Chiranji, Failiram, Bhoti Devi, Manohar Dev, entered into his land which was under his possession. These persons also carried Axe, Barchi, iron rods with them. These persons also carried Axe, Barchi, iron rods with them. These persons came in five tractors and illegally trespassed his land. Once these persons assaulted him and his family members, consequently, Srikishan, Ram Khiladi, Ramjilal, Pukhraj, Ramkesh, Ramotar, Chhangari, Kamod, Badam, Gaindi were seriously injured. The injured were rushed to the Government hospital situated in Dausa. On the basis of this report, the police registered a formal FIR, FIR No.183/11 for offences under Sections 143, 447, 341, 323 IPC. Thus, out of the same incident, two cross cases were registered. 4. According to the learned counsel, the police has submitted chargesheet in both the cases before the court concerned. By order dated 3.1.2012, the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance for offences under Sections 323, 341, 324, 325, 447, 148, 149, 307 IPC against Ramotar, Shiv Charan and Sardar Singh and for offences under Sections 149, 323, 341, 324, 325, 447, 307 IPC against Gajraj Singh and Bhagwan Singh. Hence, this petition before this court. 5. Mr. Suresh Pareek, the learned senior counsel for the petitioners, has raised the following contentions before this court: firstly, both the parties, the petitioners and the complainant, are embroiled in series of litigation's with regard to the land which the petitioners claim to be under their possession. According to the petitioners, they are the registered owners who bought the land through a registered sale deed. But according to the complainant, they bought the said land through an agreement to sell. The petitioners had also challenged on an earlier occasion the veracity and validity of the agreement to sell and claimed that the agreement to sell is a forged one. The agreement to sell was sent to the FSL. However, the FSL report has not been received so far. According to the learned senior counsel, there is still a question mark over the authenticity of the agreement to sell. Moreover, the petitioners have already moved and have restrained the complainant party under Sections 106 and 116 Cr.P.C. Thus, there is a grave animosity between both the parties. 6. Secondly, the civil dispute has now been given a criminal color. But the same is merely an afterthought so as to pressurise the petitioners to withdraw the other litigation which is pending against the complainant party. 7. Thirdly, the petitioners are being embroiled in a false case by the complainant. 6. Secondly, the civil dispute has now been given a criminal color. But the same is merely an afterthought so as to pressurise the petitioners to withdraw the other litigation which is pending against the complainant party. 7. Thirdly, the petitioners are being embroiled in a false case by the complainant. The falsity of the case is apparent from the fact that the FIR is delayed by one day. Although the alleged incident is said to have taken place on 22.6.2011, but the complainant, Pukhraj, did not lodge the FIR till 23.6.2011. Moreover, there is no explanation for the inordinate delay of a day. Furthermore, the discharge ticket of Srikishan, one of the injured persons, clearly reveals that he did not inform the doctors that he has received the injuries sustained by him in an assault committed by the petitioners. In fact, according to him, he had fallen on an iron nail. The explanation given by Srikishan belies the case of the complainant. According to the learned senior counsel, the learned Magistrate has failed to take notice of these glaring facts and has passed the cognizance order mechanically. Thus, both the FIR as well as the impugned cognizance order deserve to be quashed and set aside. 8. On the other hand, Mr. Piyush Kumar, the learned Public Prosecutor, has vehemently raised the following contentions: firstly, mere animosity between the parties does not necessarily mean that the FIR has been lodged in order to wreck personal vengeance upon the petitioners. In fact, the animosity could be a motive for the petitioners to commit the alleged crime. 9. Secondly, the fact that both the parties were injured clearly proves that the injured persons were present at the time of the alleged occurrence. Therefore, it cannot be claimed that the petitioners are being falsely implicated by the complainant. 10. Thirdly, considering the fact that Ramjilal had sustained five injuries out of which, two injuries were grievous in nature, considering the fact that Srikishan received four injuries out of which, two injuries were grievous in nature, it cannot be said that a case of civil nature is being given a color of a criminal case. 11. Fourthly, the jurisdiction of this court in interfering with a FIR or even with a cognizance order is an extremely limited one. 11. Fourthly, the jurisdiction of this court in interfering with a FIR or even with a cognizance order is an extremely limited one. At the initial stage of taking of cognizance the Magisterial Court is merely concerned with the existence of a prima facie case with regard to the commission of a cognizable offence. Therefore, the issue with regard to delay in lodging the FIR cannot be gone into by this court at this initial stage. 12. Lastly, even if there is an explanation given by Srikishan in his discharge ticket, since the said ticket did not form part of the charge-sheet, the learned Magistrate cannot be expected to look into the same. 13. Mr. Abdul Rahim Khan, the learned counsel for the complainant-respondent No.2, has further contended that there is ample evidence in the charge-sheet to prima facie make out the offences for which cognizance has been taken by the learned Magistrate. Therefore, both the learned Public Prosecutor and the learned counsel for the complainant have supported the impugned cognizance order. 14. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the charge-sheet as well as the impugned cognizance order. 15. It is, indeed, trite to state that the jurisdiction of the trial court at the time of taking cognizance is an extremely limited one. The learned Magistrate is not permitted to meticulously examine the evidence which is produced by the prosecution in the form of the charge-sheet. At this stage, he is merely concerned to see if a prima facie case is made out with regard to commission of an offence or not. Moreover, he is not permitted to look into a document which may eventually be produced by the defence as part of the defence evidence. At this stage, he is only concerned with the documents submitted by the prosecution and with none else. 16. Merely because there is an animosity between the parties, merely because they are embroiled in a series of litigation would not, ipso facto, make the FIR lodged by the complainant, Pukhraj, as a FIR lodged with certain ulterior motive. Moreover, allegedly both the parties, the petitioners and the complainant, have suffered injuries. Therefore, it cannot be held that the complainant is trying to falsely implicate the petitioners into a criminal case. The very presence of the injured persons cannot be doubted at this stage. Moreover, allegedly both the parties, the petitioners and the complainant, have suffered injuries. Therefore, it cannot be held that the complainant is trying to falsely implicate the petitioners into a criminal case. The very presence of the injured persons cannot be doubted at this stage. Hence, the first contention raised by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that due to animosity and as an afterthought, the petitioners are being falsely implicated in the present case, cannot be accepted at this initial stage. 17. The fact that there are injuries on both the sides, the fact that there is an allegation that the offence under Sections 323, 307 IPC has been committed by the petitioners, obviously, this case is not confined merely to a civil liability. Once there is a formation of an unlawful assembly, once there is an assault, once there are injuries sustained, naturally an offence against the body has been committed. Undoubtedly, such a case would fall within the ambit of penal code. Therefore, the contention of the learned senior counsel that a case of civil nature is now being given a color of criminal nature is clearly unacceptable. 18. The question with regard to inordinate delay in filing of the FIR by the complainant, the issue with regard to its impact on the veracity of the case of the prosecution, is an issue that this court cannot go into at this moment. After all, these are the issues which need to be adjudicated upon after due appreciation of evidence. Hence, the contention of the learned senior counsel that inordinate delay in lodging of the FIR casts a cloud of doubt over the case of the prosecution is unacceptable at this juncture. 19. Similarly, the issue with regard to genuineness of the agreement to sell, about its impact on the case of the prosecution again are issues which need to be appreciated by the trial court after holding a thorough trial. It is too early and too premature to comment on these issues at this stage. 20. Lastly, the explanation given by Srikishan, the injured person, and its impact on the case of the prosecution again is an issue which needs to be assessed by the trial court. It is too early and too premature to comment on these issues at this stage. 20. Lastly, the explanation given by Srikishan, the injured person, and its impact on the case of the prosecution again is an issue which needs to be assessed by the trial court. Moreover, since the discharge ticket did not form part of the charge-sheet, the learned Magistrate could not have looked into the same as the said document may be used by the defence as a part of the defence evidence. It is, indeed, trite to state that at the time of taking cognizance, the learned Magistrate is not concerned with the defence which may offer during the trial. In fact, he is not concerned with the issue whether the case would eventually end into a conviction or not? Therefore, the explanation given by Srikishan and its affect on the prosecution case would have to be tried and tested during the course of trial. 21. A bare perusal of the impugned cognizance order clearly reveals that prior to taking cognizance of the offences, the learned Magistrate has gone through the charge-sheet submitted before him. The cognizance order is not required to be a detailed one. It is sufficient if the Magistrate has examined the charge-sheet and has concluded that there is prima facie evidence to show that cognizable offence has occurred. Moreover, the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence and not of the offender. 22. For the reasons stated above, this court does not find any illegality or perversity either in the FIR, or in the order of cognizance dated 3.1.2012. 23. This petition being devoid of merits is, hereby, dismissed. The stay application is also dismissed. *******