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2013 DIGILAW 872 (BOM)

V. I. P. Industries Ltd. v. Vasant Ankushrao Potdar

2013-04-18

R.P.SONDURBALDOTA

body2013
JUDGMENT : R.P. Sondurbaldota, J. 1. This petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the award dated 27th March, 2012 passed by the Labour Court in Reference (IDA) No. 15 of 2010. The undisputed part of the history to the reference in question is as follows: The petitioner is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act carrying out business of manufacturing and exporting bags and briefcases having its factories at different places including Nashik. Respondent No. 1 was engaged at the Nashik factory as a helper from 13th February, 1977. He had been issued notices dated 21st July, 1978, 19th October, 1978 and 24th February, 1981 in respect of his frequent unauthorised absenteeism. The final warning came to be given to him on 4th December, 1978. On failure to respond to the third notice and reporting for duty, the petitioner by its letter dated 8th March, 1981 discharged him from service with effect from that date. About a year and 9 months thereafter respondent No. 1 by his letter dated 11th December, 1982 raised demand before the Government Labour Officer, Nashik Division that his termination from service was illegal and that he should be reinstated with full back wages and continuity of service with effect from 8th March, 1981. The Government Labour Officer took up the dispute u/s 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the ID Act') and referred the dispute to conciliation. In the conciliation proceedings a settlement was drawn up and executed before the Government Labour Officer on 15th February, 1983 settling the dispute in monetary terms with payment of Rs. 3,000/- (Rupees three thousand only). Respondent No. 1 has received the amount of Rs. 3,000/- (Rupees three thousand only) and signed a receipt in token of the acceptance. More than four years thereafter i.e., on 16th November, 1987 respondent No. 1 filed a complaint u/s 28 read with Items 1(a), (b) & (d) of Schedule (IV) of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (MRTU & PULP Act) seeking a relief of reinstatement with the benefit of continuity of service and back wages. The complaint was accompanied by an application for condonation of delay in filing the complaint. The petitioner contested the application for condonation of delay as well as the complaint on various grounds. The complaint was accompanied by an application for condonation of delay in filing the complaint. The petitioner contested the application for condonation of delay as well as the complaint on various grounds. The Labour Court by its judgment and order dated 19th October, 1996 dismissed the application for condonation of delay and by a separate order dismissed the complaint. It held that respondent No. 1 had during the discussions in the presence of the Government Labour Officer agreed to give up his demand for reinstatement and settled his claim on monetary basis. He had also not shown good or sufficient cause for condoning the delay. Being aggrieved by the order of the Labour Court respondent No. 1 preferred Revision Application (ULP) No. 159/1996 against the order before Industrial Court, Nashik. That Revision Application was subsequently withdrawn by respondent No. 1 with permission to approach the Labour Court for review of the order. He then preferred Review Application No. 1/1997 for review of the order refusing condonation of delay and dismissing the complaint. The review application was dismissed by the order dated 4th April, 2000 holding that there was no patent error in the order under review. 2. Respondent No. 1 then preferred second Revision Application against the order dated 19th October, 1996 passed in complaint (ULP) No. 419/1987 and the order on review application by filing revision application (ULP) No. 23/2000 u/s 44 of the MRTU & PULP Act. The Industrial Court after hearing the parties rejected the second revision application by its order dated 28th September, 2004 accepting the view of the Labour Court that the identical dispute raised by respondent No. 1 had been settled on monetary basis and the settlement amount was duly received by him. 3. During pendency of the second revision application respondent No. 1, on 3rd May, 2002 filed an application u/s 33-C(2) of the ID Act to seek diverse monetary benefits i.e., earned wages for February, March, 1981, bonus for the year 1980-81, one month pay in lieu of notice, retrenchment compensation, leave wages for one and half months, Provident Fund, etc. That application was dismissed in default on 5th August, 2006. That application was dismissed in default on 5th August, 2006. Respondent No. 1 had also, on 14th February, 2006, filed criminal complaint u/s 420 read with 34, Indian Penal Code before Judicial Magistrate, Nashik alleging that the petitioner had obtained his signature on a stamp paper with misrepresentation that he would be allowed to join services, which paper had been used for settling the dispute before the Government Labour Officer. The complaint was registered as Criminal Case No. 122/2006 on which direction for investigation u/s 202, Criminal Procedure Code had been given by the Court. The Sarkarwada police station, Nashik had investigated into the complaint and after recording statements of all concerned persons including the Government Labour Officer concluded that services of respondent No. 1 had been terminated as per the company rules and the termination had been subject-matter of the settlement. It also found that the allegations inter alia that the settlement was fraudulent or bogus was a false allegation. The learned Magistrate considered the report and after hearing the Counsel for respondent No. 1 dismissed the criminal complaint by passing order dated 20th February, 2007 u/s 203, Criminal Procedure Code. 4. Respondent No. 1 then filed miscellaneous application (IDA) No. 1/2008 for restoration of his application (IDA) No. 93/2002 which came to be granted by the order dated 2nd September, 2008. On restoration of the original application to file, it was taken up for trial. The parties adduced their evidence in support of their respective pleadings. The Labour Court by its judgment and order dated 2nd December, 2008 partly allowed the application awarding a sum of Rs. 4,200/- (Rupees Four Thousand Two Hundred only) to respondent No. 1 towards his various claims. The petitioner in compliance with the order paid a sum of Rs. 4,200/- (Rupees Four Thousand Two Hundred only) to respondent No. 1 which has been accepted by him. 5. On 4th February, 2010, respondent No. 1 once again by his letter of even date raised demand for reinstatement along with full back wages and continuity of service since 8th March, 1981. On the very day he filed his statement justifying the demand. 5. On 4th February, 2010, respondent No. 1 once again by his letter of even date raised demand for reinstatement along with full back wages and continuity of service since 8th March, 1981. On the very day he filed his statement justifying the demand. In these proceedings he alleged for the first time that the settlement dated 15th February, 1983 was not genuine contending that it was executed not before the Government Labour Officer but in Hotel Padma, in the presence of only two officers of the petitioner. He further alleged that nobody had explained the contents of the document of settlement, which was in English, to him. It is his allegation that he was informed by the officers of the petitioner that the amount of Rs. 3,000/- (Rupees three thousand only) mentioned in the document was the compensation towards inconvenience and loss caused to him on account of termination of his services and he was asked to attend duty from the next day. Respondent No. 1 further alleged in his letter that when on the next date he went to the factory he was prevented from attending to the duty. Thereafter he claimed to have complained to the Labour Commissioner, Nashik without any results. According to respondent No. 1 the Conciliation Officer had no authority to enter into settlement u/s 18(1) of the ID Act. He raised some other objections also to the settlement to state that he is not agreeable to the same. With these allegations he sought reinstatement with continuity in service and complete back wages along with all other benefits due to him. 6. The petitioner replied the demand letter and the justification statement of respondent No. 1 vide its letter dated 9th February, 2010 submitting that the objections raised to the settlement of the year 1983 were untenable and also pointing out to the further proceedings initiated by respondent No. 1 and the orders passed in those proceedings. 7. The Government Labour Officer took cognizance of the demand of respondent No. 1 u/s 2-A of the ID Act and admitted the dispute in conciliation on 12th April, 2010. It was the contention of the petitioner before the Conciliation Officer in its correspondence that since there was neither existing dispute nor apprehended dispute, there was no cause of action contemplated u/s 12(1) of the ID Act, the dispute already having been settled in the year 1983. It was the contention of the petitioner before the Conciliation Officer in its correspondence that since there was neither existing dispute nor apprehended dispute, there was no cause of action contemplated u/s 12(1) of the ID Act, the dispute already having been settled in the year 1983. The Conciliation Officer however, submitted failure report dated 24th May, 2010 u/s 12(6) read with 12(4) of the ID Act to the Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Nashik Division, Nashik. The Deputy Commissioner of Labour considered the failure report and made order of reference dated 28th May, 2010 u/s 10(I)(c) read with section 12(5) of the ID Act to the Labour Court, Nashik in the following term: Shri Vasant Ankush Potdar should be reinstated in service with full back wages and continuity of services with effect from 8th March, 1981. 8. After receiving notices from the Labour Court, respondent No. 1 filed statement of claim dated 5th January, 2011 in support of his demand of reinstatement and the petitioner filed written statement dated 7th April, 2011 opposing the reference. In its written statement petitioner No. 1 specifically put forth defence of estopel and res judicata along with other defences. After completion of the formalities the evidence on the dispute was led which consisted of deposition of respondent No. 1 alone. On appreciation of the evidence the Labour Court passed the award dated 27th March, 2012, which is impugned in the present proceedings. The two main issues raised by the Labour Court were about legality of the termination of employment of respondent No. 1 by the petitioner and maintainability of the reference in view of section 59 of MRTU & PULP Act, 1971. Both the issues were answered in favour of respondent No. 1. As regards the back wages the Labour Court felt that since respondent No. 1 had not led any evidence to show that he had tried to seek employment during the intervening period he was entitled to back wages only to the extent of 50%. It thus partly allowed the reference granting reinstatement in service along with 50% of the back wages. 9. The main grounds of challenge to the impugned award are as under: (a) The Conciliation Officer had no jurisdiction to admit the second demand as raised in Conciliation in view of settlement dated 15th February, 1983. (b) The Failure Report dated 24th May, 2010 (Exh. 9. The main grounds of challenge to the impugned award are as under: (a) The Conciliation Officer had no jurisdiction to admit the second demand as raised in Conciliation in view of settlement dated 15th February, 1983. (b) The Failure Report dated 24th May, 2010 (Exh. G, Page 10) is ultra vires sections 12(1) and 12(2) of the ID Act. (c) The order of Reference does not refer the true and real dispute between parties and hence incompetent. (d) The order of Reference is made without application of mind and is fill in the blank order made in a mechanical manner and hence untenable in law. (e) The impugned Award is ultra vires the provisions of ID Act and is perverse not being based on pleadings or legal evidence. 10. Some of the grounds above relate to the report of failure by the Conciliation Officer and the nature of the reference made thereafter. Since these grounds go to the root of the impugned award they need to be addressed first. If the petitioner succeeds in establishing these grounds then the grounds of objection on merits of the award may not require consideration. The petitioner contends that the failure report dated 24th May, 2010 submitted by the Conciliation Officer is ultra vires sections 12(1) and 12(2) of the ID Act and that the order of reference is not competent since it does not refer the true and real dispute between the parties. 11. Mr. Naidu, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that respondent No. 1 had submitted his demand for reinstatement in service more than 29 years after the termination. The statement of demand made a reference to the earlier demand which had resulted into settlement. But respondent No. 1 raised disputes about that settlement alleging that it was not genuine. The petitioner in its reply referred not only to the earlier settlement but also to the decisions of the Labour Court in complaint (ULP), review applications, Miscellaneous Application (IDA) No. 93/2002 and the orders passed by the Industrial Court in revision applications. Mr. Naidu submits that in view of the contents of the demand and the reply before him the Conciliation Officer was bound to examine the claim in detail and investigate whether the dispute stood settled as claimed by the petitioner or whether the settlement was not genuine as contended by respondent No. 1. Mr. Naidu submits that in view of the contents of the demand and the reply before him the Conciliation Officer was bound to examine the claim in detail and investigate whether the dispute stood settled as claimed by the petitioner or whether the settlement was not genuine as contended by respondent No. 1. This was an obligation cast upon him by section 12(2) of the ID Act, which provision requires the Conciliation Officer, for the purpose of bringing about settlement of the dispute, to investigate into the dispute and all the matters affecting its merits. Since the records and proceedings of the earlier settlement were in the very office of the Conciliation Officer, he ought to have looked into the records even in the absence of the petitioner. The petitioner had not appeared before the Conciliation Officer after sending its reply to the letter of demand of respondent No. 1. Thus according to Mr. Naidu the Conciliation Officer has failed in his statutory duty u/s 12(2) of the ID Act, consequently, affecting the failure report sent by him. The impugned award, the reference and the failure report are therefore required to be quashed and the matter remanded to the Conciliation Officer for fresh reconciliation as per letter. 12. Mr. D'Costa, the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 submits per contra that the Conciliation Officer is duty bound only to promote a just and fair settlement. The settlement of the year 1983 cannot be said to be a settlement and the Conciliation Officer has rightly ignored the same. He points out that it has been the consistent case of respondent No. 1 that the agreement of settlement was recorded in English. He did not understand the language and was not explained its contents. Respondent No. 1 was made to understand that in view of his illegal termination he was being paid some amount as back wages and that he would be taken back on duty. Instead of recording this term as discussed before the Labour Officer the two company Officials cheated him at Padma hotel and made him sign the papers that recorded acceptance of termination. When he attempted to join the duty on the next day he was not allowed to enter the premises of the factory. Instead of recording this term as discussed before the Labour Officer the two company Officials cheated him at Padma hotel and made him sign the papers that recorded acceptance of termination. When he attempted to join the duty on the next day he was not allowed to enter the premises of the factory. He also submits that though the settlement is signed by the Labour Officer there is no seal of the office of the Labour Officer put on the settlement. Mr. D'Costa further submits that after the settlement was recorded and sealed it was mandatory for the Conciliation Officer to send a report thereof to the appropriate Government together with the memorandum of settlement as required u/s 12(3) of the ID Act. There is nothing on record to show that there is compliance of section 12(3). Therefore, the settlement deed cannot be held binding on the parties. 13. There is no dispute that respondent No. 1 had by his letter dated 11th December, 1982 raised a demand before the Government Labour Officer about his termination and in that demand deed of settlement had been signed by the parties. The deed was countersigned by the Labour Officer. There is also no dispute that the settlement had been subjected to judicial scrutiny in the other proceedings initiated by respondent No. 1 i.e., complaint (ULP) No. 419 of 1987, Application (IDA) No. 93 of 2002, Revision Application Nos. 1 and 2 of 2000 and Criminal complaint No. 122 of 2006. In all these proceedings the Courts have accepted the settlement and dismissed the proceedings. In these circumstances when respondent No. 1, 27 years after the settlement, raised a dispute for the first time about the genuineness and hence validity of the settlement it was necessary for the Conciliation Officer to give due consideration to the rival claims and ascertain whether the dispute had in fact been settled as claimed by the petitioner. 14. Mr. Naidu submits that any settlement arrived at between the employer and the employee before a Conciliation Officer is binding on the parties and that such settlement is placed on a higher pedestal than an award passed after adjudication. In this connection he relies upon following decisions of the Apex Court and of Division Bench of our High Court: (i) National Engineering Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, AIR 2000 SC 469 . In this connection he relies upon following decisions of the Apex Court and of Division Bench of our High Court: (i) National Engineering Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, AIR 2000 SC 469 . (ii) Johnson and Johnson Ltd. Vs. Gautam Hari Vedi and Others, (2001) 89 FLR 95. The Apex Court observes in the decision cited that there is an underlying assumption that a settlement reached with the help of the Conciliation Officer must be fair and reasonable and can, therefore, safely be made binding not only on the workmen belonging to the union signing the settlement but also on others. And the observations of the Division Bench are: Any settlement between the employer and the employees is placed on a higher pedestal than an award passed after adjudication. The machinery under the I.D. Act envisages resolution of industrial disputes and conflicts at the grassroot level by conciliation by which settlement can be arrived at between the employer and the workmen and industrial peace can be achieved by putting industrial strife to an end. 15. Mr. D'Costa, on the other hand, relying upon the decision of Division Bench of our High Court in N.R.C. Employees' Union and Others Vs. The Government of Maharashtra Department of Industries, Energy and Labour and Others, (2012) 2 LLJ 661 submits that a Conciliation Officer has to promote a just and fair settlement which is within the provisions of Chapter V-A of the ID Act. While the above submission as a general proposition cannot be disputed, the reference to the decision cited will not be relevant in the factual situation of the case in hand. The Division Bench in the N.R.C. case (supra) had found that the settlement in question before it dealt with aspects other than the industrial dispute as defined u/s 2(K) of the ID Act. Such are not the facts in the present case. 16. A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under the ID Act has special and distinct sanctity. The emphasis under the ID Act for resolution of industrial dispute is on conciliatory settlement, which furthers industrial peace, rather than adjudication. Therefore the settlement is made binding in nature and has been placed on higher pedestal. Also that is the reason why specific duty is cast upon the Conciliation Officer u/s 12 of the ID Act. 17. The emphasis under the ID Act for resolution of industrial dispute is on conciliatory settlement, which furthers industrial peace, rather than adjudication. Therefore the settlement is made binding in nature and has been placed on higher pedestal. Also that is the reason why specific duty is cast upon the Conciliation Officer u/s 12 of the ID Act. 17. In view of the above position once the attention of the Conciliation Officer was drawn to the fact of settlement by both the sides, he was duty bound to investigate into the settlement and also consider the dispute about it. Another fact which ought to have alerted him to the need for investigation was the unusual delay of 27 years in raising a dispute about the settlement. Though respondent No. 1 had filed several proceedings in the interregnum he had not challenged the settlement at any point of time. The Conciliation Officer has by completely ignoring these facts made the failure report in an absolutely mechanical manner. The failure report therefore violates sections 12(1) and 12(2) of the ID Act. It is vitiated and deserved to be quashed. 18. The second ground of challenge that goes to the root of the matter is that the order of reference is bad as a consequence of which the proceedings before the Labour Court get vitiated. The order of reference is alleged to be bad because it does not refer the real dispute between the parties. Mr. Naidu submits that the real dispute between the parties was whether the settlement arrived at between them in the year 1983 was genuine or whether it was a fraud played upon respondent No. 1. This dispute was lost sight off by the appropriate Government also while making reference u/s 12(5) of the ID Act. In case the settlement is found genuine respondent No. 1 will not be a workman within the meaning of the ID Act. A question therefore arises whether the demand as made by respondent No. 1 was competent to be referred to the Labour Court. Two other objections to the order of reference are non-consideration by the appropriate authority of (i) unexplained inordinate delay of almost 30 years in raising the dispute and (ii) Respondent No. 1 having attained the age of superannuation on the date the dispute was raised. 19. It has been submitted by Mr. Two other objections to the order of reference are non-consideration by the appropriate authority of (i) unexplained inordinate delay of almost 30 years in raising the dispute and (ii) Respondent No. 1 having attained the age of superannuation on the date the dispute was raised. 19. It has been submitted by Mr. Naidu that the order of reference herein presupposes that there is termination of respondent No. 1 and proceeds on that basis for adjudication of the legality of the order of termination and the consequential relief to respondent No. 1. In the light of the pleadings in the statement in support of the demand and the reply filed by the petitioner it was obvious that the true and real dispute raised by respondent No. 1 was about the settlement dated 15th February, 1983 not being valid, it being vitiated by the fraud allegedly played upon respondent No. 1. The appropriate authority therefore was required to refer for adjudication this true and real dispute between the parties. In the absence of reference as made of this dispute the Labour Court could not have considered the allegation of respondent No. 1 in respect of the settlement dated 15th February, 1983. Mr. Naidu seeks support from decision of Division Bench of our High Court in Sitaram Vishnu Shirodkar Vs. The Administrator, Government of Goa and others, (1985) 1 LLJ 480. In the proceedings before the Division Bench it was the case of the workman that the management had terminated his services, whereas it was the case of the Management that the workman had absented himself from duty and abandoned the job. The Government made a reference as if the services of the workman were terminated. A writ petition was filed challenging the order of reference. The Division Bench while allowing the writ petition held that Tribunal constituted under the ID Act cannot travel beyond the reference and decide whether the workman had abandoned his services. 20. The other decision cited by Mr. Naidu is of Calcutta High Court in Organon India Ltd. Vs. State of West Bengal and Others, (2004) 1 LLJ 301 . In this case also the reference made by the appropriate Government was regarding legality of termination of the service of a workman and the reliefs available to him. This reference was made in the face of the contention by the employer that the workman had abandoned the services. State of West Bengal and Others, (2004) 1 LLJ 301 . In this case also the reference made by the appropriate Government was regarding legality of termination of the service of a workman and the reliefs available to him. This reference was made in the face of the contention by the employer that the workman had abandoned the services. The employer filed a Writ Petition contending that the reference in question was wrong in terms of the dispute and that the question of abandonment of service by the workman could not be construed as an issue incidental to the industrial dispute of which reference had been made. The Calcutta High Court after noting the provision of section 10(4) of the ID Act held as follows: The aforesaid italicized portion of sub-section (4) of section 10 of the Act gives a clear impression that when a reference is made by the appropriate Government specifying any point of dispute for adjudication by the Tribunal, such Tribunal shall confine its adjudication to those points and matters incidental thereto. The word "shall" is the guiding factor for the purpose of the adjudication by the Tribunal, save and except the incidental matters. The Tribunal is a statutory Tribunal under the Act for the purpose of investigation and settlement of industrial disputes referred by the appropriate Government. Therefore, the scope and ambit of the adjudication is restricted unlike the Civil Courts having unfettered jurisdiction to settle the issues and go into the controversy in its own way. The Tribunal is guided by the issues framed by the appropriate Government. It cannot frame issues out of its own volition unless and until it is coming under the four corners of the referred issues. At times, Civil Courts can construe some issues are hidden issues under an indispensable condition, i.e. sine qua non but such scope is not open for the statutory Tribunal, unless and until the hidden issues are hidden within the four corners of the referred issues. The issue as raised by the management cannot be said to be incidental issue. 21. The third decision cited by Mr. Naidu is an unreported decision of Single Judge of our High Court (Nagpur Bench) dated 1st October, 2008 in Writ Petition No. 247/2005 in the case of Bank of India Workers Organization v. Bank of India and another. The issue as raised by the management cannot be said to be incidental issue. 21. The third decision cited by Mr. Naidu is an unreported decision of Single Judge of our High Court (Nagpur Bench) dated 1st October, 2008 in Writ Petition No. 247/2005 in the case of Bank of India Workers Organization v. Bank of India and another. In the facts of the decision cited, the reference made was of termination of services of workman and the question that had arisen was whether the workman was an employee of the Bank. Our High Court after noting the decision in the case of Sitaram Vishnu Shirodkar (supra) and the decision of Full Bench of Delhi High Court in the case of Indian Tourism Development Corporation Vs. Delhi Administration and Others, (1982) ILR Delhi 535 held that because of the language of the reference the employment of the workman as a driver was fastened upon the employer and as such it was not open for the Tribunal to consider whether the relationship of employer and employee existed between them. Since the decision of the Tribunal was outside the reference the award was set aside. The Court had however, on the basis of the documents on record held that the workman was in fact working with the Bank, and remanded the matter to the Tribunal to record the finding on the reference as placed before it by the appropriate Government. 22. Coming to the facts of the present case it is obvious that the real dispute between the parties, and the dispute in fact raised by respondent No. 1 also, was about the correctness and legality of the settlement arrived at in the year 1983. Therefore, the appropriate Government was required to refer this dispute u/s 12(5) of the ID Act in addition to the dispute as regards termination of respondent No. 1. In the absence of reference of this real dispute any observations made by the Labour Court in the impugned award on the legality of the settlement, falling beyond the ambit of the reference cannot be sustained. Therefore, the award impugned is vitiated on this ground also. Since the petitioner has succeeded in establishing the first objection to the order of reference it is needless to go into the other two objections raised by the petitioner. Therefore, the award impugned is vitiated on this ground also. Since the petitioner has succeeded in establishing the first objection to the order of reference it is needless to go into the other two objections raised by the petitioner. It has already been held above that the failure report submitted by the Conciliation Officer which is the starting point of proceedings before the Labour Court cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed. Further the order of reference is also in the wanting. Hence, the petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause 'a'. Respondent No. 1 is at liberty to move the Conciliation Officer for fresh conciliation on his letter of demand dated 4th February, 2010.