JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—Heard Sri B.Khan, Advocate assisted by Sri Atul Srivastava, Advocate for the petitioner and Sri Sanjai Singh, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. This writ petition has arisen from an order dated 23rd February, 2013 passed by Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Court No. 7 Meerut rejecting plaint in Original Suit No. 1432 of 2012 under Order VII, Rule 11 C.P.C. on the ground that the suit being barred by Section 34 of Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 2002”), the plaint is liable to be rejected. 3. The plaintiff-petitioner instituted the aforesaid original suit seeking a declaration in his favour that notices dated 4.7.2012 and 19.10.2012 issued under Section 13(2) of Act, 2002 are illegal in respect to land, falls in khasra No. 102, Village Alipur, Jigmana, Hapur Road, Meerut and kasra No. 58 measuring 1.0960 hectare in Village Kikoli Tehsil Meerut Sadar, District Meerut. The plaintiff petitioner also sought a decree of permanent injunction in his favour restraining defendant from taking action with respect of agricultural land in the aforesaid two plots where petitioner-plaintiff’’s plant and machinery/stocks etc. were lying. 4. The Trial Court relied on to Apex Court’s decision, and, in particular, observations and law laid down in para 50 of judgment, in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India, II(2004) BC 397 : AIR 2004 SC 2371 , wherein Apex Court said that bar of jurisdiction under Section 34 will cover even matters which can be taken cognisance of by Debt Recovery Tribunal though no measure in that direction has so far been taken under sub-section (4) of Section 13. The bar of jurisdiction is in respect of a proceeding which matter may be taken to the Tribunal. Therefore, any matter in respect of which an action may be taken even later on, the Civil Court shall have no jurisdiction to entertain any proceeding thereof and bar of Civil Court applies to all such matters which may be taken cognisance of by the Debt Recovery Tribunal, apart from those matters in which measures were already taken in sub-section (4) of Section 13. 5. 5. It cannot be doubted that plaintiff had a remedy against notice under Section 13(2) of Act, 2002, by filing representation under Section 3(3A) and thereafter Bank may take recourse to Section 13(4) of Act, 2002, and, if such an order is passed, borrower like the petitioner has remedy of appeal under Section 17 of Act, 2002 before Debt Recovery Tribunal and thereafter a further appeal before DRAT under Section 18 of Act, 2002. 6. Ex facie, the kind of suit instituted by petitioner comes within the ambit of Section 34 of Act, 2002, as explained and observed by Apex Court in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. (supra). The Court below thus has rightly held that suit was not maintainable. Therefore, the plaint, showing ex facie lack of jurisdiction in the Court below, has rightly been rejected under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C.. 7. Sri B.Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner however placed reliance on a Division Bench decision in GIC Housing Finance Ltd. v. M/s Crescent Housing Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2010 Mad 163 . The Division Bench of Madras High Court has observed, if there is a case of non proper application of provisions of Act, 2002, in such circumstances jurisdiction of Civil Court is not ousted. 8. From the judgment it does not appear that Apex Court’s decision in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. (supra) was brought to the notice of Madras High Court. With greatest respect to the Bench, I find it difficult to subscribe the view it has taken. If such a view is taken in every case wherever borrower intend to obstruct proceedings under Act, 2002, it would always be possible to bring suit with allegation that there is no proper application of Act, 2002 and so long this is not decided, proceedings under Act, 2002 can always be obstructed. If such a view is taken and jurisdiction of Civil Court despite bar under Section 34 of Act, 2002 is permitted in such a manner, it is bound to frustrate and paralyse the very purpose and effect of enactment of Act, 2002. The legislative intendment cannot be allowed to be frustrated by such a circuitous approach. An interpretation which furthers the object of an enactment must be followed. I, therefore, find myself unable to be persuaded to agree with the above view. 9. Moreover even the facts therein were so apparent. The legislative intendment cannot be allowed to be frustrated by such a circuitous approach. An interpretation which furthers the object of an enactment must be followed. I, therefore, find myself unable to be persuaded to agree with the above view. 9. Moreover even the facts therein were so apparent. 25 flats were mortgaged but financial institution proceeded to take possession and auction of 88 flats and that is how borrower claimed that auction by Bank was tainted with fraud. The facts of that case may have persuaded the Court to uphold jurisdiction of Civil Court but, as a proposition, the reason mentioned in para 3 of judgment, I find it difficult to accept, that, whenever it is claimed that there is improper application of Act, 2002, Civil Court’s jurisdiction will have to be accepted and Section 34 of Act, 2002 shall not come into picture. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Upasana Garg v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 2011 All 166, but I do not find application thereof to the issue in question, inasmuch as, Division Bench had no occasion to consider the question whether civil suit under Section 34 in respect to a notice issued under Section 13(2) would be maintainable or not. A notice under Section 13(2) straightway was challenged before this Court in a writ petition under Article 226. In the aforesaid decision nothing has been decided by the Court at all. In para 10 of the judgment the Court says that no cause of action survives therefore no further order is required to be passed in the writ petition. 11. In Upasana Garg (supra) there was no issue raised about bar of Civil Court under Section 34 of Act, 2002 nor any arguments were advanced nor there is any adjudication on the said judgment. A judgment lays down a binding precedent only when an issue is raised, argued and decided. When confronted, Sri Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner also could not point out any findings of this Court on the question about jurisdiction of Civil Court. 12. Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on para 6 of the judgment but I find it contains only contentions and the facts giving rise to the writ petition in Upasana Garg (supra) and there is no adjudication by the Court. 12. Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on para 6 of the judgment but I find it contains only contentions and the facts giving rise to the writ petition in Upasana Garg (supra) and there is no adjudication by the Court. Therefore, reliance placed thereon is thoroughly misconceived. 13. I, however, find several other authorities which go to show that the view taken by learned Court below deserve to be upheld in this particular case. In United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon and others, AIR 2010 SC 3413 , interpreting Section 34 of Act, 2002, the Court said: “5. Section 34 lays down that no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which a Tribunal or Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine. It further lays down that no injunction shall be granted by any Court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken under the SARFAESI Act or the DRT Act. Section 35 of the SARFAESI Act is substantially similar to Section 34(1) of the DRT Act. It declares that the provisions of this Act shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law.” 14. The Court reiterated observations in Mardia Chemicals (supra) which highlight the objective of enactment of Act, 2002 and an attempt on the part of Court to interpret provisions of Act, 2002 in the manner so as to advance achievement of that objective and not to defeat it. The observations made in para 31 in Mardia Chemicals (supra) was quoted in para 6 of the judgment in United Bank of India (supra) as under: “The effect of some of the provisions may be a bit harsh for some of the borrowers but on that ground the impugned provisions of the Act cannot be said to be unconstitutional in view of the fact that the object of the Act is to achieve speedier recovery of the dues declared as NPAs and better availability of capital liquidity and resources to help in growth of the economy of the country and welfare of the people in general which would subserve the public interest.” 15. In Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank through Branch Manager, Bodla Agra and others, 2012(3)ADJ 457, Hon’ble Prakash Krishna, J also referred to observations of Apex Court in Mardia Chemicals (supra) to reiterate that prohibition under Section 34 covers even the matters which can be taken cognizance of by Debts Recovery Tribunal though no measure is taken in that direction under Section 34. It is also observed that there is a very little scope for maintaining a civil suit. Jurisdiction of Civil Court can be invoked only when action of the secured creditor is alleged to be fraudulent or his claim may be so absurd and untenable which may not require any proof whatsoever or to say precisely to the extent the scope is permissible to bring an action in the Civil Court in cases of English Mortgages. The Court, however, further observed, where only part of the plaint is sought to be rejected then it would not be covered by Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. For this purpose relied on decision in Roop Lal v. Nachhattar Singh, (1982) 3 SCC 487 and D. Ramachandran v. R.V. Janakiraman, AIR 1999 SC 1128 . 16. The plaint case set up by petitioner does not allege any fraudulent act on the part of respondent-defendant Bank or that it has not taken loan and is not liable to pay the same or the property in dispute has not been mortgaged or placed as security. Having obtained the loan after placing the property in question as security, now plaintiff cannot be allowed to turn back and to raise dispute whether the property was liable to be made a security or not etc. and at his instance it cannot be said that limited permissible scope allowed by Apex Court in Mardia Chemicals (supra) is attracted in the case in hand. 17. In the above facts and circumstances, I find myself in entire agreement with Trial Court that suit in the case in hand, ex facie having challenged notices issued under Section 13(2) of Act, 2002 is clearly barred by Section 34 of Act, 2002 in the light of the exposition of law laid down by Apex Court in Mardia Chemicals (supra). 18. There is another aspect of the matter. 18. There is another aspect of the matter. An order of rejection of plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 C.P.C. results as if nothing is pending before the Court and definition of “decree” under Section 2(2) C.P.C. specifically says that it shall include rejection of a plaint. As a result thereof, it cannot be doubted that rejection of plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 C.P.C. would give a right of appeal under Section 96 C.P.C. This is what has also been held by Madras High Court in K.S. Geetha v. Stanleybuck & Dr. P. Sedhu Ammal, AIR 2003 Mad 146 and this Court in Harihar Bakhsh Singh v. Jagannath Singh, AIR 1924 Oudh 413. 19. Since, the petitioner has a statutory right of appeal and there is no reason to allow him to bypass such statutory remedy and to entertain is writ petition directly under Article 226 of Constitution of India. However, since learned counsel for the petitioner took enough time in advancing his argument, despite pointing out this fact that he has statutory right of appeal and stressed upon this Court, that his argument should be considered on merits also, I have proceeded to consider the same on merits. 20. The writ petition is devoid of merit. 21. Dismissed. ——————