Judgment : 1. This Second Appeal, under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), is filed by the plaintiffs in O.S.No.331 of 2003 on the file of the Court of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Sangareddy against the judgment and decree dated 30-09-2009 passed in the said suit as confirmed by the Court of the Principal District Judge, Medak at Sangareddy by judgment and decree dated 23-06-2012 passed in A.S.No.1 of 2010. This Second Appeal is heard and being disposed of at the stage of admission at the request of the counsel for either side. 2. The appellants herein instituted the above said suit for cancellation of registered gift deed bearing document No.2550/2002, dated 20-12-2002 in respect of the suit schedule lands and for perpetual injunction against the defendants and their men from interfering with the peaceful and lawful possession. The following are the plaint schedule properties. SCHEDULE OF PROPERTY 1. The lands bearing Sy.No.201 to the extent of Ac.0.07 gts. situated at Mansanpally village, Nunipally Mandal, Medak Districted bounded by North: Land of the 1st plaintiff South: Land of Durga Reddy East: Cart-way West: Land of the defendant No.2 1. The lands bearing Sy.No.189 to the extent of Ac.0.02 gts. situated at Mansanpally village, Nunipally Mandal, Medak Districted bounded by North : Land of the 2nd defendant South: Land of 1st plaintiff East: Land of the 2nd defendant West: Land of plaintiff No.2 1. The lands bearing Sy.No.190/1 to the extent of Ac.0.01 gts. situated at Mansanpally village, Nunipally Mandal, Medak Districted bounded by North : Land of 2nd defendant South: Land of Plaintiff No.2 East: Land of Plaintiff No.1 West: Land of Myathari Manaiah 3. For the sake of convenience, the parties, hereinafter, are referred to as arrayed in the suit. 4. The case of the plaintiffs, in brief, as per the plaint, is that the first plaintiff is the owner and possessor of agricultural lands admeasuring Ac.7.15 gts. and Ac.3.10 gts. situated in Sy.Nos.201 and 189 respectively of Mansanpalli village, Munipally Mandal; the second plaintiff is the son of plaintiff No.1 and he is the absolute owner of agricultural lands admeasuring Ac.3.18 gts. and Ac.3.10 gts. situated in Sy.Nos.201 and 189 respectively of Mansanpalli village, Munipally Mandal; the second plaintiff is the son of plaintiff No.1 and he is the absolute owner of agricultural lands admeasuring Ac.3.18 gts. in Sy.No.190/1 of the same village; the said properties are suit schedule properties; the defendants 1 and 2 and one Venkat Reddy are the brothers of the first plaintiff; O.S.No.23 of 1973 was filed for the relief of partition and separate possession, in which compromise was arrived at and items 1 and 2 of the plaint schedule fell to the share of plaintiff No.1; item 3 of suit schedule was gifted by one Hanumantha Reddy by way of gift settlement deed in favour of second plaintiff; the plaintiffs are illiterates and were not worldly wise and the land of the first defendant is situated towards western side of the land of plaintiff No.1 and the land of the 2nd plaintiff is situated towards southern side of the land of defendant No.1; the plaintiffs and defendants decided to execute a document pertaining to a part of their lands for a cartway, but the defendants themselves guided the plaintiffs with an intention to cheat them; recently the plaintiffs came to know that the defendants got the gift deed, said to have been executed by the plaintiffs in favour of the former, in respect of the lands bearing Sy.Nos.201, 189 and 190/1, which is a void document; the second defendant joined the first defendant while executing the document and the defendants with ulterior motive created an impression that the signatures of the plaintiffs were obtained as witnesses to that document; the gift was not accepted by the donee and hence the same is a void document and the plaintiffs did not deliver possession of the lands admeasuring Ac.0.07 gts. Ac.0.02 gts. And Ac.0.01 gts. lying in Sy.Nos.201, 189 and 190/1 respectively in favour of the defendants and the plaintiffs have been in possession of the said lands and the defendants tried to interfere with the peaceful and lawful possession of the plaintiffs over the suit schedule property on 15-07-2003 and threatened to dispossess them from the suit schedule lands. 5. With the above said averments the appellants herein instituted the suit,O.S.No.331 of 2003. 6. Resisting the pleadings in the suit, the 1st defendant filed a written statement, contending, inter alia, that the lands admeasuring Ac.7.16 gts. and Ac. 5. With the above said averments the appellants herein instituted the suit,O.S.No.331 of 2003. 6. Resisting the pleadings in the suit, the 1st defendant filed a written statement, contending, inter alia, that the lands admeasuring Ac.7.16 gts. and Ac. in Sy.No.189 were allotted to plaintiff No.1 in the compromise arrived between the parties to the suit—O.S.No.23 of 1973 on 06-12-1973; the defendants 1 and 2 and plaintiff No.1 are real brothers and the first defendant filed the said suit for partition and separate possession in respect of agricultural lands and residential houses on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Sangareddy and the same ended in compromise; after settlement of the partition all the brothers have been cordial to each other and defendant No.2 and the plaintiffs voluntarily with free-will and consent executed a registered gift deed in favour of defendant No.1 vide document No.2550/2002, dated 20-12-2002 in respect of suit schedule properties and Ac.0.02 gts in Sy.No.200/A and 200/AA situated in Mansanpally village; the donee accepted the gift and received delivery of possession from the donors, which is clearly mentioned in the gift deed itself; there was no fraud, misrepresentation and cheating committed by any of the parties to the said gift deed and in pursuance of the gift deed, the Mandal Revenue Officer (MRO), Munipally mutated the lands covered by the said document vide proceedings dated 10-01-2003 in accordance with the Record of Rights Act and at that time the plaintiffs did not choose to file any objections either before the MRO, Munipally or before the Sub-Registrar, Sadasivpet at the time of making entries in their title deeds; the 1st defendant on the same day i.e. on 20-12-2002 executed a registered gift deed vide document No.2549/2002 in favour of plaintiff No.1 herein in respect of Ac.0.10 gts. of land in Sy.No.30/E1 with free-will and consent and delivered possession to him, which was accepted by the donee, as mentioned in that gift deed; there are independent witnesses to the gift deeds and the same was voluntarily executed and the same is valid in the eye of law. 7. Contending in the above said manner, the first defendant prayed the Court to dismiss the suit. The 2nd defendant failed to file written statement. Basing on the said pleadings, the trial court framed the following issues for trial: 1. 7. Contending in the above said manner, the first defendant prayed the Court to dismiss the suit. The 2nd defendant failed to file written statement. Basing on the said pleadings, the trial court framed the following issues for trial: 1. Whether the gift deed bearing document No.2550/2002 dated 20-12-2002 is liable to be declared as void, inoperative and ineffective insofar as Sy.Nos.201, 189 and 190/1 to the extent of Ac.0.07 gts Ac.0.02 gts and Ac.0.01 gts. respectively situated at Mansanpally village. 1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the perpetual injunction as prayed for. 2. To what relief. 8. During the course of trial, the first plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and one Sri M. Papaiah was examined as P.W.2 and Ex.A1—registered gift deed dated 20-12-2002 was marked. On defendants side, D.Ws.1 to 3 were examined and Exs.B1 to B10 were marked. 9. The learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, by virtue of judgment and decree dated 30-09-2009, dismissed the suit, O.S.No.331 of 2003. Felt aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the appellants herein filed A.S.No.1 of 2010 on the file of the Court of the Principal District Judge, Medak at Sangareddy. The learned District Judge framed the following points for consideration. 1. Whether the gift deed executed by the plaintiffs is voluntary and binding on them. 2. Whether the judgment of the trial Court is sustainable. 3. To what relief. 10. The learned District Judge, by virtue of judgment and decree dated 26-03-2012, dismissed the appeal, A.S.No.1 of 2010. As against the said concurrent findings of fact the present Second Appeal has been filed under Section 100 of CPC, raising the following substantial questions of law. a) Whether the Courts below are justified in dismissing the suit of the appellants herein when admittedly no notice was given to the plaintiffs/appellants herein by the revenue authorities before effecting the mutation of the lands in question and also issuance of pattedar pas books and title deeds in favour of the defendants/respondents herein? b) Whether the Courts below are justified in dismissing the suit of the appellants herein when admittedly (admitted by D.W.1) plaintiff No.1 cannot sign and he can only put his thumb impression and as such Ex.A1/Ex.B1 is brought into existence by fraud played by the defendants/respondents herein? b) Whether the Courts below are justified in dismissing the suit of the appellants herein when admittedly (admitted by D.W.1) plaintiff No.1 cannot sign and he can only put his thumb impression and as such Ex.A1/Ex.B1 is brought into existence by fraud played by the defendants/respondents herein? c) Whether the Courts below are justified in dismissing the suit of the appellants herein when D1 clearly deposed that he could not identify the signatures on Ex.B1 and other documents? d) Whether the Courts below are justified in dismissing the suit of the appellants herein when Ex.B1/Ex.A1 does not show that its contents were read over and explained to the plaintiffs/appellants herein and thereafter they signed the document? e) Whether the Courts below are justified in dismissing the suit of the appellants herein when admittedly there is no way to go to the lands of the defendants/respondents herein except through the lands of the plaintiff/appellants herein as admitted by D.Ws.1 and 2 and defendant No.1 as D.W.1 admitted that he requested the plaintiffs/appellants herein to give way to reach his lands? f) Whether the Courts below are justified in dismissing the suit of the appellants herein when Ex.B1 is not acted upon? 11. Heard Sri M.Rajamalla Reddy, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri K.B. Ramanna Dora, learned counsel for the respondents and perused the material available on record. 12. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below went wrong in dismissing the suit and appeal filed by the plaintiffs and the Courts below failed to consider the case of the plaintiffs and that Ex.A1 was brought into existence by playing fraud on the plaintiffs by the defendants. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in dismissing the suit since Ex.A1 was never acted upon. 13. Per contra, it is contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that this Second Appeal is not maintainable under Section 100 of CPC in view of concurrent finding of fact recorded by the trial Court and the lower appellate Court. It is further contended that the Courts below, by meticulously appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record and after taking into consideration the respective contentions of the parties to the litigation, dismissed the suit and first appeal as such interference under Section 100 of CPC is not warranted. It is further contended that the Courts below, by meticulously appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record and after taking into consideration the respective contentions of the parties to the litigation, dismissed the suit and first appeal as such interference under Section 100 of CPC is not warranted. 14. In view of respective pleadings of the parties to the present lis and in the light of the evidence available on record, the following points emerge for consideration and determination by this Court under Section 100 of CPC. 1. Whether the plaintiffs could establish that the defendants have not accepted Ex.A1— gift settlement deed, dated 20-12-2002 by adducing cogent and convincing evidence? 2. Whether non-issuance of notice by the revenue authorities before effecting mutation in the revenue records disentitles the defendants from seeking a right under Ex.A1—gift settlement deed? 3. Whether the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below warrant any interference under Section 100 of CPC? 15. After thoroughly and meticulously appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record, the Courts below concurrently held that the plaintiffs failed to prove their case and upheld Ex.A1—gift settlement deed, dated 20-12-2002. The trial Court, after duly taking into consideration the evidence of P.W.1 and D.Ws.1 to 3, and documents—Ex.A1 and Exs.B1 to B10, recorded a categorical finding on the allegation of fraud at para-15 of its judgment, which reads as under: “… As already observed by me in the foregoing paras, the plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence in support of their case to show that there was no cart-way accessible to the lands of defendant No.1 and that there was an agreement between the parties to this suit to provide cart-way by the plaintiff herein to defendant No.1 and that the plaintiffs were made to execute Ex.A1—gift deed by the defendants by playing fraud upon them. The plaintiffs having admitted execution of Ex.A1—gift deed, they have to prove that their signatures were obtained on Ex.A1 by playing fraud on the defendants. In the instant case, the evidence of P.W.2 itself is clear that there is a cart-way near the suit land, though not in the suit lands. The plaintiffs having admitted execution of Ex.A1—gift deed, they have to prove that their signatures were obtained on Ex.A1 by playing fraud on the defendants. In the instant case, the evidence of P.W.2 itself is clear that there is a cart-way near the suit land, though not in the suit lands. ……the failure of the plaintiffs to examine plaintiff No.2 who was not hospitalized during the period of mutation of revenue records in favour of defendant No.1, failure of plaintiff to examine any independent witnesses to support their contentions as to agreement between the parties for giving cart-way to defendant No.1 together show that the plaintiffs have failed in discharging the burden cast upon them as required under Section 103 of Indian Evidence Act to be entitled for seeking cancellation of gift document Ex.A1 and to prove that Ex.A1 was obtained by the defendants by playing fraud upon them. Accordingly, issue No.1 answered against the plaintiffs”. 16. The trial Court on the point of non-issuance of notice recorded a finding at para-12 of the judgment, which reads as follows: “The defendants 1 and 2 were examined as D.Ws.1 and 2 respectively. D.W.1 admitted in his cross-examination that ever since passing of final decree in O.S.No.23/1973 basing on the compromise entered into by the parties to that suit, who include the parties to this suit, the parties have been in possession of their respective shares which they got under the compromise. He admitted that plaintiff No.1 was not given any notice by the M.R.O. at the time when he applied to the latter for effecting mutation and further admitted that he has to go through the land of plaintiff No.1 to enter into his land and that he requested the plaintiff No.1 to give way to reach his land so as to avoid future disputes. At this stage, D.W.1 again answered that he has not requested the plaintiff No.1 to give such a way to him, thus contradicting his earlier evidence. This witness denied all other suggestions put for the plaintiffs. In the cross0 examination of D.W.2 he too admitted that to enter into their land i.e. land defendants Nos.1 and 2 they need to pass through the land of plaintiff No.1 and through which one has to pass to enter into the land of the defendants. This witness denied all other suggestions put for the plaintiffs. In the cross0 examination of D.W.2 he too admitted that to enter into their land i.e. land defendants Nos.1 and 2 they need to pass through the land of plaintiff No.1 and through which one has to pass to enter into the land of the defendants. He later deposed that no notice was given by them (defendants) to the plaintiff No.1, at the time of applying for mutation of the land under the registered gift deed—Ex.A1 in favour of defendant No.1 after the application of defendants for mutation. According to him, the enquiry was conducted by the MRO himself. The evidence of D.Ws.1 and 2 as detailed above shows that the plaintiffs were successful in eliciting from these witnesses that no notice was issued to plaintiff No.1 before conduct enquiry and order for mutation of name of defendant No.1 in respect of the suit in the revenue records by the MRO. However, though the plaintiffs challenged the validity of mutation of D1’s name in the revenue records without issuing notice to them, they did not prefer to make the MRO as a party to this suit and to seek correction of entries in the revenue records. Above all it should be mentioned here that though P.W.1 was admitted in hospital due to his head injury in an accident, subsequent to which, this suit was field and his relations with defendants got strained, the plaintiff No.2 was very much available in the village. It is not elicited from D.Ws.1 and 2 anywhere that plaintiff No.2, who is one of the donors in Ex.A1, was also not issued any notice by the M.R.O. prior to passing of mutation proceedings”. 17. The lower appellate Court also considered the findings of fact recorded by the trial Court and categorically held that Ex.A1—gift settlement deed was proved, as voluntary executed, by examining D.W.3, attesting witness of the registered document, and at para-14 of the judgment held as under: “D.W.2 is defendant No. No.2. His evidence shows that his brother i.e. defendant No.1 also executed a gift deed in favour of plaintiff No.1, which shows that there was some mutual transaction between the parties. The said gift deed is marked as Ex.B1. D.W.2 examined in the cross-examination that there is a path way on one side of the land of plaintiff No.1. His evidence shows that his brother i.e. defendant No.1 also executed a gift deed in favour of plaintiff No.1, which shows that there was some mutual transaction between the parties. The said gift deed is marked as Ex.B1. D.W.2 examined in the cross-examination that there is a path way on one side of the land of plaintiff No.1. through which one can enter into the land of the defendants. D.W.3 is attestor of the gift deed, through whom it is proved that the gift deed was voluntarily executed by the plaintiffs, though in the cross-examination he stated that no negotiations took place in his presence. It being a gift deed, does not require any negotiations. Hence, with the above, it can be concluded that the gift deed was executed by the plaintiffs voluntarily”. The lower appellant at para-15 held as under: “The pahanis filed by the defendants would show that the possession was delivered to defendant No.1 in respect of the suit schedule property and that he has been enjoying the same without any interruption. The plaintiffs did not adduce any evidence in proof of their possession over the suit schedule property. Hence, it is evident that the possession of defendant No.1 over the suit schedule property is known to plaintiff No.1 and that no objection was raised by him in respect of the same.” 18. Aggrieved by the said concurrent findings of fact, the present Second Appeal has been filed, by raising the substantial questions of law as mentioned supra. 19. The provisions of law which are germane and relevant for the purpose of adjudicating the controversy in the present Second Appeal are: Section 17 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872; Order VI Rule 4 of CPC; Section 6 of A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971; Sections 122, 123 and 126 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and also Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 20. 20. The term ‘fraud’ has been defined under Section 17 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which reads as follows: “Fraud” means and includes any of the following acts committed by a party to a contract, or with his connivance, or by his agent, with intent to deceive another party thereto or his agent, or to induce him to enter into the contract: 1) the suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true; 2. the active concealment of a fact by one having knowledge or belief of the fact; 3. a promise made without any intention of performing it; 4) any other act fitted to deceive; 5) any such act or omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent. Explanation: Mere silence as to facts likely to affect the willingness of a person to enter into a contract is not fraud, unless the circumstances of the case are such that, regard being had to them, it is the duty of the person keeping silence to speak, or unless his silence is, in itself, equivalent to speech. 21. Order VI Rule 4 of CPC reads as under: In all cases in which the party pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default, or undue influence, and in all other cases in which particulars may be necessary beyond such as are exemplified in the forms aforesaid, particulars (with dates and items if necessary) shall be stated in the pleading. 22. Section 6 of A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 reads as under: Presumption of correctness of entries in record of rights. Every entry in the record of rights shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved or until it is otherwise amended in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Any mortgage or charge created earlier to a mortgage or charge created in favour of a credit agency shall lose its priority if it is not entered in the pattadar pass book. 23. Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defines the term ‘gift’ as follows: “Gift” is the transfer of certain existing moveable or immoveable property made voluntarily and without consideration, by one person, called the donor, to another, called the donee and accepted by or on behalf of the donee. 23. Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defines the term ‘gift’ as follows: “Gift” is the transfer of certain existing moveable or immoveable property made voluntarily and without consideration, by one person, called the donor, to another, called the donee and accepted by or on behalf of the donee. Acceptance when to be made — Such acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the donor and while he is still capable of giving. If the donee dies before acceptance, the gift is void. Section 123 — Transfer how effected For the purpose of making a gift of immoveable property, the transfer must be effected by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor, and attested by at least two witnesses. For the purpose of making a gift of moveable property, the transfer may be effected either by a registered instrument signed as aforesaid or by delivery. Such delivery may be made in the same way as goods sold may be delivered. Section 126—when gift may be suspended or revoked. The donor and donee may agree that on the happening of any specified event which does not depend on the will of the donor a gift shall be suspended or revoked; but a gift which the parties agree shall be revocable wholly or in part, at the mere will of the donor, is void wholly or in part, as the case may be. A gift may also be revoked in any of the cases (save want or failure of consideration) in which, if it were a contract, it might be rescinded. Save as aforesaid, a gift cannot be revoked. Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to affect the rights of transferees for consideration without notice. 24. Sections 91 and 92 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 reads as under: 91. Evidence of terms of contracts, grants and other dispositions of property reduced to form of document. Save as aforesaid, a gift cannot be revoked. Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to affect the rights of transferees for consideration without notice. 24. Sections 91 and 92 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 reads as under: 91. Evidence of terms of contracts, grants and other dispositions of property reduced to form of document. When the terms of a contract, or of a grant, or of any other disposition of property, have been reduced to the form of a document, and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be given in proof of such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or of such matter, except the document itself, or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under the provisions hereinbefore contained. Exception 1.When a public officer is required by law to be appointed in writing, and when it is shown that any particular person has acted as such officer, the writing by which he is appointed need not be proved. Exception 2:Wills (admitted to probate in India may be proved by the probate. Explanation 1:This section applies equally to cases in which the contracts, grants or dispositions of property referred to are contained in one document, and to cases in which they are contained in more documents than one. Explanation 2:Where there are more originals than one, one original only need be proved. Explanation 3:The statement, if any document whatever, of a fact other than the facts referred to in this section, shall not preclude the admission of oral evidence as to the same fact. Explanation 2:Where there are more originals than one, one original only need be proved. Explanation 3:The statement, if any document whatever, of a fact other than the facts referred to in this section, shall not preclude the admission of oral evidence as to the same fact. 92: Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement When the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document have been proved according to the last section, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying adding to, or subtracting from, its terms: Proviso (1)Any fact may be proved which would invalidate any document, or which would entitle any person to any decree or order relating thereto; such as fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due execution, want of capacity in any contracting party want or failure of consideration, or mistake in fact or law: Proviso (2)The existence of any separate oral agreement as to any matter on which a document is silent, and which is not inconsistent with its terms, may be proved. In considering whether or not this proviso applies, the Court shall have regard to the degree of formality of the document: Proviso (3)the existence of any separate oral agreement, constituting a condition precedent to the attaching of any obligation under any such contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved. Proviso (4) The existence of any distinct subsequent oral agreement to rescind or modify any such contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved, except in cases in which such contract, grant or disposition of property is by law required to be in writing, or has been registered according to the law in force for the time being as to the registration of documents. Proviso (5)Any usage or custom by which incidents not expressly mentioned in any contract are usually annexed to contract of that description, may be proved: Provided that the annexing of such incident would not be repugnant to, or inconsistent with the express terms of the contract: Proviso (6)Any fact may be proved which shows in what manner the language of a document is related to existing facts. 25. 25. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer the judgments of the Honourable Apex Court; in the case of Ranganayakamma v. K.S. Prakash reported in (2008) 15 SCC 673 , in the case of Prem Singh v. Birbal reported in (2006) 5 SCC 353 ; in the case of A.C.Ananthaswamy v. Boraiah reported in (2004) 8 SCC 588 ; in the case of Ramesh B. Desai v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta reported in (2006) 5 SCC 638 ; in the case of Bellachi v. Pakeeran reported in (2009) 12 SCC 95 and the judgment of this Court in the case of Nanda Mohanamma v. Markonda Narasimha Rao reported in AIR 2006 AP 8 and the judgment of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court in the case of Yog Raj v. Kuldeep Raj Gupta reported in AIR 1991 J&K 26 . In the case of Ranganayakamma v. K.S. Prakash reported in (2008) 15 SCC 673 the Honourable Supreme Court at paragraphs 38, 39, 40 and 43 categorically held that Section 16 of the Contract Act provides that any transaction which is an out come of undue representation, coercion or fraud shall be voidable and if, however, a document prima facie valid, a presumption arises in regard to its genuineness and when a fraud is alleged particulars thereof are required to be pleaded and that when a contract is said to be voidable by reason of any coercion, misrepresentation or fraud, the particulars thereof are required to be pleaded. In the case of Prem Singh v. Birbal reported in (2006) 5 SCC 353 the Honourable Apex Court at para-27 held that there is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed and that a registered document, therefore, prima facie would be valid in law and onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut the presumption. In the case of A.C.Ananthaswamy v. Boraiah reported in (2004) 8 SCC 588 the Honourable Supreme Court held that in establishing alleged fraud, it must be proved that the representation made was false to the knowledge of the party making such representation or that the party could have no reasonable plea that it was true and that the level of proof required in such a case was held to be extremely high. In the case of Ramesh B. Desai v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta reported in (2006) 5 SCC 638 the Honourable Supreme Court, while dealing with Order VI Rule 4 CPC held, at para-32 that undoubtedly Order 6 Rule 4 CPC requires that complete particulars of fraud shall be stated in the pleadings and that the particulars of alleged fraud, which are required to be stated in the plaint, will depend upon the facts of each particular case and no abstract principle can be laid down in this regard. In the case of Bellachi v. Pakeeran reported in (2009) 12 SCC 95 the Honourable Supreme Court at paras-10 and16 held as follows: “The jurisdiction of the High Court in terms of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is limited. It can interfere with the concurrent findings of two courts if any substantial question of law arises for its consideration. Whether the respondent despite the fact that he was brother of the appellant was in a dominating position is essentially a question of fact. Per se it does not give rise to a substantial question of law.” “Section 16 of the Contract Act provides for as to what constitutes undue influence. Relationship between the parties so as to enable one of them to dominate the will of the other is a sine qua non for constitution of undue influence. Findings of fact as noticed hereinbefore have been arrived at by both the trial court as also the appellate court that the respondent was not in a position to dominate the plaintiff’s will.” In the case of Nanda Mohanamma v. Markonda Narasimha Rao reported in Air 2006 AP 8 this Court at paragraphs 15 to 19 held as follows: “15. As for the first question, reference needs to be made to Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act. Section 91 mandates that where the terms of a contract, or of a grant, or of any other disposition of the property, have been reduced to the form of a document, no oral evidence shall be adduced in proof of the terms of such contract, grant or disposition. The document itself o its secondary evidence, if admissible, becomes the basis for proof. The document itself o its secondary evidence, if admissible, becomes the basis for proof. Section 92 provides for exclusion of evidence of any oral agreement, when the terms of a contract have been reduced into writing, or whether the contract is required by law to be in writing. Certain exceptions are provided to this general rule. For instance, where a party pleads fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of capacity, absence of contracting party, mistake of law, etc. in relation to the written contract, it shall be open to him to lead oral evidence to prove such facts. 16. It is settled principle of law that any allegation as to fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of execution etc. needs to be specifically pleaded. Unless there exists corresponding plea and an issue framed thereon, it is impermissible to lead evidence thereon. In fact, Rule 4 of Order 6, CPC makes this aspect clear. It reads as under: “Particulars to be given where necessary in all cases in which the party pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default, or undue influence, and in all other cases in which particulars may be necessary beyond such as are exemplified in the forms aforesaid, particulars (with date and items if necessary) shall be stated in the pleading.” 16. In the written statement filed by the appellants, there is no even a whisper about any of these factors, much less a plea or a detailed paragraph. Therefore, it was impermissible for the appellants to lead any oral evidence, in relation to the terms of Exs.A1 and A2. 17. Learned counsel for the appellants tried to maintain a distinction between the evidence that is adduced on behalf of his clients, on the one hand, and the so-called admissions elicited through P.Ws.1 and 2, in the cross-examination of P.Ws.1 and 2 does not come within the prohibition of Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act. It is difficult to accept this proposition. The expression “oral evidence”, referred to in Section 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act, is not confined to the one to be led by the party opposing the document referred to therein in the form of chief examination of a witness to be examined by him. It is difficult to accept this proposition. The expression “oral evidence”, referred to in Section 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act, is not confined to the one to be led by the party opposing the document referred to therein in the form of chief examination of a witness to be examined by him. The oral evidence includes not only the one, adduced by examining the witnesses, on behalf of such party, but also the cross-examination of witness by the opposite party, in relation to it. An admission or confession of a witness constitutes oral evidence and it makes little difference whether the witness was examined at the instance of the plaintiff or defendant. In other words, the prohibition operates not only in relation to the evidence of witnesses, examined by the concerned party, in relation to the evidence of witnesses, examined by the concerned party, in relation to documents referred to in Section 91 and 92, but also to the cross-examination of the witness examined on behalf of other party. What is prohibited directly, cannot be permitted to be done indirectly. Therefore, the distinction urged by the learned counsel for the appellants cannot be maintained in law. 18. There is strong reason underlying the prohibition of oral evidence to contradict the terms of a written agreement. It is only after the terms and conditions of the contract are crystallized between the parties that a written contract is brought about. Law attaches certainty and sanctity to such terms, unless they are tainted with the factors such as fraud, undue influence, incapacity, misrepresentation, etc. It is only after the terms and conditions of the contract are crystallized between the parties that a written contract is brought about. Law attaches certainty and sanctity to such terms, unless they are tainted with the factors such as fraud, undue influence, incapacity, misrepresentation, etc. In the absence of such factors, grant of permission to the parties, to lead evidence contrary to the terms, would defeat the very purpose of the execution of the document and tends to remove the element of sanctity from it.” While referring to the judgments of the Privy Council in the case of Bharat Dharma Syndicate Ltd., v. Harish Chandra reported in AIR 1937 PC 146 and the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Bishundeo Narain v. Seogeni Rao reported in AIR 1951 SC 280 the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir in the case of Yog Raj v. Kuldeep Raj Gupta reported in AIR 1991 J&K 26 held at para-5A as follows: “…The plaintiff in the instance case has based his claim on the alleged fraud and misrepresentation allegedly practised by the defendants in obtaining the decree against him which is sought to be quashed in the suit. Fraud has been defined under Section 17 of the Contract Act and misrepresentation under Section 18. Under Order Vi, Rule 4 of the CPC, it is provided that in all cases in which the parties pleadings rely on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default or undue influence, particulars with dates and items shall be stated in the pleadings. The plaintiffs basing a suit upon misrepresentation and fraud cannot come to the Court on the general pleas and has to give specific circumstances prima facie showing commission of fraud or the practising of undue influence have to be detailed to the satisfaction of the Court. General allegations are not the substitutes of the requisite pleadings as required under Order VI, Rule 4 of the CPC. It is well established that in suits filed on the basis of fraud, the allegations of fraud must be clear, definite and specific. General allegations however, the strong words in which they are stated may be, if not accompanied by particulars are insufficient to amount an averment of fraud on which any court may take a notice. Mere mention of the allegations of fraud is not sufficient. General allegations however, the strong words in which they are stated may be, if not accompanied by particulars are insufficient to amount an averment of fraud on which any court may take a notice. Mere mention of the allegations of fraud is not sufficient. The plaintiff seeking the annulment of a decree on the ground of fraud is under an obligation to specifically state the particulars as to how he was kept out of knowledge of his rights by the fraudulent acts of the defendants, and the time when he discovered it”. 26. From a reading of above mentioned provisions of law and the principles laid down in the above mentioned judgments, it would manifestly evident that the allegation of fraud must be clearly and specifically pleaded and proved by the party pleading so by adducing unimpeachable, cogent and convincing evidence. In the instant case, except the personal testimony of P.W.1, on the allegation of fraud, there is no other independent evidence adduced by the plaintiffs. On the other hand, the defendants by examining the attestor of Ex.A1 as D.W.3, proved the due execution of Ex.A1. It is also a settled proposition of law that any amount of oral evidence is of no consequence when there is a written document contra to the same as per the provisions of Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act. As per Section 6 of the A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 “every entry in the record of rights shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved or until it is otherwise amended in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Such a presumption is also available in favour of the defendants in the present suit. The plea of non-issuance of notice, if any, as urged by the plaintiffs, by the revenue authorities at the time of changing the entries in the revenue records is of no consequence in the facts and circumstances of the case, in view of existence of Ex.A1—registered document and the recitals contained therein. Since the Courts below concurrently recorded findings of fact by meticulously taking consideration the entire material available on record, this Court is of the opinion that it is not a fit case warranting interference of this Court under Section 100 CPC. 27. Since the Courts below concurrently recorded findings of fact by meticulously taking consideration the entire material available on record, this Court is of the opinion that it is not a fit case warranting interference of this Court under Section 100 CPC. 27. In view of the reasons records supra and in view of the principles laid down in the above referred judgments, this Court is of the view that the appellants have failed in making out a case, warranting any interference or indulgence of this Court under Section 100 of CPC. This Court does not find any infirmities in the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Courts below. There are no merits in the Second Appeal and is liable to be dismissed. 28. Accordingly, the Second Appeal is dismissed by confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court and also the appellant Court. Consequent to this judgment, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.