Oral Order The original writ petitioner (Arun Kumar Tiwary) died during the pendency of the writ petition and has been substituted by his widow Urmila Tiwary pursuant to order passed by this Court in respect of I.A. No. 2825 of 2013. 2. The original writ petitioner had filed this writ petition claiming salary for the period 15.12.1998 to 4.5.2006 during which period he had been dismissed and then reinstated. Though the writ petition was filed in the year 2010 there was no counter affidavit. Today affidavits on behalf of respondent no. 3 Director, Secondary Education Department, Government of Bihar, Patna and respondent no. 5, District Education Officer, Patna, have been filed. 3. Heard the parties and with their consent this writ petition is being disposed of at this stage itself. 4. The facts are not in dispute. 5. The original writ petitioner pursuant to advertisement issued was examined, interviewed and selected as a Clerk alongwith 45 others. They were posted within the jurisdiction of Additional Director of Education, Ranchi, in the year 1990. In due course of time some controversy had been raised and certain orders were passed by this Court. In different proceedings all 45 clerks were dismissed in the year 1998. It is not in dispute that several of them approached Ranchi High Court, as then was, and the High Court set aside the orders of dismissal and directed for their reinstatement alongwith a direction to pay the back wages. The petitioner had not moved the High Court. He moved the authority stating that he was similarly situated to those who had moved the High Court and had been reinstated. It is not in dispute that considering the aforesaid fact, by order of the Director, Secondary Education, Government of Bihar (after bifurcation of the State of Bihar) he was reinstated by order dated 5.5.2006, as contained in Annexure-6 to the writ petition and the petitioner joined. He then petitioned the authority for payment of back wages demanding similar treatment that was meted out to others. That has been rejected by the impugned order as contained in Annexure-1 dated 25.7.2008 on the ground that other persons were reinstated pursuant to order of this Court and were paid their back wages pursuant to order of this Court and in the case of the petitioner there were no such order. The legality and propriety of this is under challenge. 6. The legality and propriety of this is under challenge. 6. Having considered the matter, in my view, the writ petition must succeed. Once the authority decided to reinstate the petitioner treating him to be similarly situated with the others who had got order from the High Court then the petitioner cannot be discriminated in regards consequence of reinstatement. The law is well settled by the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Ashwani Kumar and Others vs. State of Bihar and Others since reported in AIR 1997 Supreme Court 1628 [: 1997(1) PLJR (SC)59] wherein in para 17 what their Lordships had held is as follows:- "Nor can we say that benefit can be made available only to 1363 appellants before us as the other employees similarly circumscribed and who might not have approached the High Court or this Court earlier and who may be waiting in the wings/would also be entitled to claim similar relief against the State which has to give equal treatment to all of them otherwise it would be held guilty of discriminatory treatment which could not be countenanced under Articles 14 and 16( 1) of the Constitution of India." 7. Similar is the provision of clause 4.C(1) of the notified Bihar State Litigation Policy, 2011, which is quoted hereunder:- "4.C(1) A good number of cases are from the category of similar cases. Each Government Department will aim to consider and settle the claim of the representationist/applicant employee/citizen, if the claim is found covered by any decision of the Court. Many service matters of this nature, can be disposed of at the level of the Department itself without compelling the litigant to come to the Court. In this manner, the Government Departments would be acting as efficient litigants." 8. Learned counsel for the State then states that the petitioner should have come to this Court earlier. His claim is belated. In my view, the answer is in two folds. Firstly, he moved the authority for similar treatment when the authority refused the same by the impugned order dated 25th July, 2008, this writ petition was filed on 9.8.2010, that is within two years of the refusal. Secondly, whether such a claim filed late can be entertained by a writ court or not was the subject matter before a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court where this was virtually solitary question referred to it. Secondly, whether such a claim filed late can be entertained by a writ court or not was the subject matter before a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court where this was virtually solitary question referred to it. The Constitution Bench in the case of M/s Tilokchand Motichand & Ors. vs. H.B. Munshi, Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bombay and Another since reported in AIR 1970 Supreme Court 898, in para 11 has held as follows :- "Therefore, the question is one of discretion for this Court to follow from case to case. There is no lower limit and there is no upper limit. A case may be brought within Limitation Act by reason of some Article but this Court need not necessarily give the total time to the litigant to move this Court under Art. 32. Similarly in a suitable case this Court may entertain such' a petition even after a lapse of time. It will all depend on what the breach of the Fundamental Right and the remedy claimed are and how the delay arose." (emphasize supplied) 9. Recently this issue came up for consideration again before the Apex Court in the case of Anil Kumar Gupta vs. State of Bihar since reported in (2012)12 SCC 443 and this what the Apex Court had to say in para 13 of the said reports:- "We shall now examine whether the appellant was guilty of laches and the Division Bench of the High Court had rightly set aside the order passed by the learned single Judge on that ground. In this context, it is apposite to observe that the framers of the Constitution have not prescribed any period within which a petition can be filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, However, in the last six decades, the superior courts have evolved several rules of self-imposed restraint which are required to be kept in view by the High Court while exercising power under Article 226. One of these rules is that the High Court will not come to the aid of a person who approaches the Court with delay and no explanation is offered for the same (State of M.P. vs. Bhailal Bhai and Tilokchand Motichand vs. H.B. Munshi). One of these rules is that the High Court will not come to the aid of a person who approaches the Court with delay and no explanation is offered for the same (State of M.P. vs. Bhailal Bhai and Tilokchand Motichand vs. H.B. Munshi). In the first of two cases, the Constitution Bench observed that even though no period of limitation has been prescribed for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court will come to the rescue of only those who are vigilant and a petition filed after expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing a suit will not be entertained unless cogent explanation is offered for the same. In the second case, Hidayatullah, C.J. who concurred with R.S. Bachawat and G.K. Mitter, JJ. expressed the view that there is no upper or lower limit for filing a writ petition and each case has to be decided on its own facts. The learned Chief Justice further observed that even if the petition is filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed for filing a suit, the Court may entertain the petition provided the petitioner gives satisfactory explanation or may decline relief in a case where the petition is filed within the limitation but the explanation for the delay is not satisfactory." 10. If I understand the ratio of the said decisions correctly, which is, binding on me by virtue of Art. 141 of the Constitution, the entertainment and grant of relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and not controlled by prescribed period of limitation. It depends on facts and circumstances of the case. A party may move within limitation prescribed, yet be denied relief and a party may come beyond the prescribed period but yet be granted relief. A question would be, if relief was due to a citizen then why, how and can the State deny the same? Would it not be an infraction of Art. 14 as it now stands interpreted. 12. If I understand learned counsel for the State what he submits is that as the petitioner has sought arrears of salary he should have prayed for the same within the period of limitation as prescribed by the Limitation Act. He relied on a recent Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Malti Kumari vs. State of Bihar & Ors. He relied on a recent Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Malti Kumari vs. State of Bihar & Ors. since reported in 2013(2) PLJR 677 . Most humbly put the aforesaid binding precedents of the Apex Court were not brought to the notice of this Court. Here I may refer to the case of Mangalore Chemicals and Fertilizers L vs. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes & Ors. since reported in 1992 Suppl.(1) SCC 21 wherein in paras 22 and 23 of the said reports the Apex Court has said :- "22.......What we have here is a pure technicality. Clause 3 of the notification leaves no discretion to the Deputy Commissioner to refuse the permission if the conditions are satisfied. The words are that he "will grant". There is no dispute that appellant had satisfied these conditions. Yet the permission was withheld-not for any valid and substantial reason but owing to certain extraneous things concerning some inter-departmental issues. Appellant had nothing to do with those issues. Appellant is now told, "we are sorry. We should have given you the permission. But now that the period is over, nothing can be done". The answer to this is in the words of Lord Denning: "Now I know that a public authority cannot be estopped from doing its public duty, but I do think it can be estopped from relying on a technicality and this is a technicality". 23. Francis Bennion in his Statutory Interpretation, (1984 edn.) says at page 683 :- "Unnecessary technicality: Modern courts seek to cut down technicalities attendant upon a statutory procedure where these cannot be shown to be necessary to the fulfilment of the purposes of the legislation"." 13. As noticed above, the petitioner was reinstated only in 2006. Upon being reinstated he asked for his arrear of salary as others were given the same upon their reinstatement. That was rejected by Annexure-1 in the year 2008. He filed this writ petition in 2010 challenging the said order. Thus, in my view, there is no delay, much less inordinate delay which prevent me not to exercise my discretion in the matter. Apart from technical objection, State, which is a welfare State as well, has shown no good reason to deprive the original petitioner of similar treatment. 14. In view of the aforesaid, the writ petition is allowed. 15. Thus, in my view, there is no delay, much less inordinate delay which prevent me not to exercise my discretion in the matter. Apart from technical objection, State, which is a welfare State as well, has shown no good reason to deprive the original petitioner of similar treatment. 14. In view of the aforesaid, the writ petition is allowed. 15. The respondents are directed to make payment, which was due to the original writ petitioner for the period, as indicated above, within three months from today.