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2013 DIGILAW 89 (ALL)

Shishu Pal Singh v. Additional District Judge (Court No. 2), Firozabad and Others

2013-01-08

SUDHIR AGARWAL

body2013
Sudhir Agarwal, J.— 1. The petitioner is tenant of a shop located at Mandi Sriganj Bada Bazar Shikohabad, District Firozabad. Apprehending ejectment from accommodation in question in view of order dated 29.07.2002 passed by Small Cause Court, Firozabad in SCC Suit No. 01 of 1996 whereby petitioner's defence has been struck off and revisional order dated 25.09.2003, whereby the Additional District Judge, Court No. 2, Firozabad has dismissed his Revision No. 10 of 2002, the present writ petition has been filed assailing both the aforesaid orders seeking a writ of certiorari for quashing the same. 2. The respondent no. 3, admittedly, is the owner and landlord of disputed accommodation. By notice dated 01.11.1995, he (the landlord) alleged default in payment of rent on the part of petitioner, demanded the same and also determined tenancy. Consequently, SCC Suit No. 01 of 1996 was filed by respondent no. 3 seeking eviction of petitioner from shop in dispute as also arrears of rent, damages etc. The respondent no. 3 claimed non payment of rent by petitioner since 01.03.1994. It also alleged that shop in dispute being a new construction, completed in 1990, is exempted from the provisions of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 1972"). The rate of rent between the parties was not disputed and it was admitted by both the sides being Rs. 400/- per month. 3. The petitioner contested the suit by filing his written statement dated 12.12.1996 alleging that rent upto September, 1995 was already paid but thereafter respondent no. 3 declined to accept rent, hence it was deposited in court under Section 30 of Act, 1972 in Misc. Case No. 92 of 1995. The petitioner claims to have paid rent upto December, 2000 in the aforesaid proceedings under Section 30 of Act, 1972. 4. The respondent no. 3 filed an application under Order XV Rule 5 C.P.C. claiming that admitted rent has not been paid by tenant and, therefore, his defence must be struck off. It was contested by petitioner. The Trial Court vide order dated 29.07.2002 allowed application of respondent no. 3-landlord and struck off petitioner's defence, whereagainst petitioner filed SCC Revision No. 10 of 2002 which has been rejected by Revisional Court by impugned judgment dated 25.09.2003. 5. It was contested by petitioner. The Trial Court vide order dated 29.07.2002 allowed application of respondent no. 3-landlord and struck off petitioner's defence, whereagainst petitioner filed SCC Revision No. 10 of 2002 which has been rejected by Revisional Court by impugned judgment dated 25.09.2003. 5. Sri Arvind Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner has not disputed before this Court that provisions of Act, 1972 are not applicable to the shop in dispute and this Court has to examine the only question, whether petitioner's defence has been rightly struck off or not. 6. Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C., as amended in U.P. by U.P. Act No. 57 of 1976 and thereafter, reads as under: "5. Striking off defence for failure to deposit admitted rent, etc.-(1) In any suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee after the determination of his lease and for the recovery from him of rent or compensation for use and occupation, the defendant shall, at or before the first hearing of the suit, deposit the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum and whether or not he admits any amount to be due, he shall throughout the continuation of the suit regularly deposit the monthly amount due within a week from the date of its accrual, and in the event of any default in making the deposit of the entire amount admitted by him to be due or the monthly amount due as aforesaid, the Court may, subject to the provisions of Sub-rule (2), strike off his defence. Explanation 1.- The expression "first hearing" means the date for filing written statement for hearing mentioned in the summons or where more than one of such dates are mentioned, the last of the dates mentioned. Explanation 1.- The expression "first hearing" means the date for filing written statement for hearing mentioned in the summons or where more than one of such dates are mentioned, the last of the dates mentioned. Explanation 2.- The expression "entire amount admitted by him to be due" means the entire gross amount, whether as rent or compensation for use and occupation, calculated at the admitted rate of rent for the admitted period of arrears after making no other deduction except the taxes, if any, paid to a local authority in respect of the building on lessor's account and the amount, if any, paid to the lessor acknowledged by the lessor in writing signed by him and the amount, if any, deposited in any Court under Section 30 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. Explanation 3.- (1) The expression "monthly amount due" means the amount due every month, whether as rent or compensation for use and occupation at the admitted rate of rent, after making no other deduction except the taxes, if any, paid to a local authority, in respect of the building on lessor's account. (2) Before making an order for striking off defence, the Court may consider any representation made by the defendant in that behalf provided such representation is made within 10 days of the first hearing or, of the expiry of the week referred to in Sub-section (1), as the case may be. (3) The amount deposited under this rule may at any time be withdrawn by the plaintiff: Provided that such withdrawal shall not have the effect of prejudicing any claim by the plaintiff disputing the correctness of the amount deposited: Provided further that if the amount deposited includes any sums claimed by the depositor to be deductible on any account, the Court may require the plaintiff to furnish the security for such sum before he is allowed to withdraw the same." 7. It says that lessee or the defendant shall, at or before the first hearing of the suit, deposit entire amount admitted by him, due, together with interest at the rate of 9% per annum and shall throughout deposite, during continuation of suit, monthly amount due within a week from its accrual and in the event of any default, court may, subject to provisions of sub-rule (2), strike off his defence. Sub-rule (2) requires the court to pass appropriate order on representation, if nay, made by defendant, before making an order for striking off his defence. 8. It is not disputed by Sri Arvind Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner that on or before the first date of hearing of suit, the petitioner had not deposited the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest thereon at the rate of 9%. He, however, contended that petitioner did not admit non-payment of rent w.e.f. 10.03.1994 but the petitioner's specific case was that rent upto September, 1995 was already paid to landlord and thereafter since the landlord declined to accept rent, it was deposited in the court under Section 30 of Act, 1972. 9. For the time being, even if the rent claimed by respondent no. 3 upto September, 1995, is not held to be the admitted amount, due on the part of tenant, yet, the rent from October, 1995 and onwards was admittedly unpaid by petitioner. It is his own case that rent for October, 1995 and onwards was not accepted by landlord and, therefore, it was admittedly not paid to landlord. Now the question is, whether the deposit made under Section 30 of Act, 1972 would give any protection to petitioner. 10. Once it is admitted that Act, 1972 has no application to the case, the deposit, if any, made by petitioner thereunder would be of no legal consequence. Even if according to own written statement filed by petitioner and looking to his stand, rent upto September, 1995 is not held to be admitted due amount, it is the subsequent rent thereafter, i.e., from October, 1995 which was admittedly due but not deposited by petitioner on or before the first date of hearing of suit. He also did not deposit subsequent, month to month rent, in the court below within prescribed time. No explanation has come forward in respect to aforesaid subsequent rent except the fact that it was deposited by petitioner under Section 30 of Act, 1972. 11. The two decisions sited at the Bar by Sri Srivastava, have no application to the facts of the present case. In Jayant Kumar Chakraborty Vs. No explanation has come forward in respect to aforesaid subsequent rent except the fact that it was deposited by petitioner under Section 30 of Act, 1972. 11. The two decisions sited at the Bar by Sri Srivastava, have no application to the facts of the present case. In Jayant Kumar Chakraborty Vs. Xth Additional District Judge and others, 2004(1) AWC 498 there was no amount of rent due admitted by tenant, inasmuch as he has challenged the very liability of payment of rent and, therefore, the Court held that Rule 5 Order XV C.P.C. has no application since the tenant denies his liability to pay any rent altogether. Same is the position in Radha Kisan VIIth Additional District Judge, KIanpur Nagar and others, 2000(1) AWC 843 . 12. In the present case, it is not in dispute that tenant has to pay rent to landlord and his liability altogether was not disputed. On the contrary, he claimed that he has paid rent upto September, 1995 and thereafter he has deposited in a forum which has no applicability or legal consequence in the case. Therefore, payment made thereto would give no benefit to petitioner. It is a valid payment which can have any legal consequences and may provide benefit to the petitioner. Once Act, 1972 has no application to the shop in question, it was not open to petitioner to deposit any rent under Section 30 of Act, 1972 and the same was wholly unauthorized and illegal. The compliance of Order XV Rule 5 C.P.C. is mandatory. If not observed substantially, the court has no option but to proceed to strike off defence of the defendant. The orders impugned thus cannot be faulted. 13. That being so, I find no legal or otherwise error in the impugned judgments, warranting interference in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 14. The writ petition lacks merit. Dismissed. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. _____________