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2013 DIGILAW 893 (PAT)

Deo Narain Yadav v. State of Bihar

2013-07-29

ADITYA KUMAR TRIVEDI

body2013
Judgment Heard both sides. 2. Vide order dated 16.09.2002 this application was admitted only on the point of sentence. 3. Petitioners Deo Narain Yadav, Lallu Yadav, Dwarika Yadav, Batan Yadav, Sitabi Yadav, Ladu Yadav, Mauji Yadav and Mahabir Yadav have independently been convicted for an offence punishable under Sections 147, 341, 427 and 325 of the Indian Penal Code by Sri Udaibhan Dwivedi, Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Jamui vide judgment dated 24.03.2001 passed in G.R.No.1258 of 1992/Trial No.85 of 2001 and directed to undergo each of them rigorous imprisonment for six months under Section 147 of the IPC, rigorous imprisonment for one month under Section 341 of the IPC, rigorous imprisonment for six months under Section 427 of the IPC and petitioner Deo Narain Yadav has further been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years under Section 325 of the IPC with a direction to run the sentences concurrently. 4. Appeal bearing No.73 of 2001 filed on their behalf was dismissed by 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Jamui. 5. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioners that the occurrence happens to be of the year 1992. There happens to be dispute amongst the parties relating to inheritance as is evident from the evidence of P.W.3 Lothi Devi, wife of informant. Further there happens to be counter case also so admitted on their behalf as admitted by P.Ws.3 and 4 and therefore need sympathetic approach. 6. However, the learned Additional P.P. opposed and submitted that as the petitioners indulged themselves in aggressive manner and brutally assaulted the prosecution party, hence rightly been convicted and sentenced therefor. 7. In a case of State of M.P. v. Sk. Shahid (2009)12 SCC 715 relying upon its earlier judgment in State of M.P. v. Munna Choubey (2005) 2 SCC 710 the Hon’ble Apex Court has recorded its observations on the yardstick of determining sentence as the nature and gravity of the offence and has cautioned against placing reliance upon reasons such as accused being from a rural background or length of time in following way: “9. The law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflicting claims and demands. Security of persons and property of the people is an essential function of the State. It could be achieved through instrumentality of criminal law. The law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflicting claims and demands. Security of persons and property of the people is an essential function of the State. It could be achieved through instrumentality of criminal law. Undoubtedly, there is a cross-cultural conflict where living law must find answer to the new challenges and the courts are required to mould the sentencing system to meet the challenges. The contagion of lawlessness would undermine social order and lay it in ruins. Protection of society and stamping out criminal proclivity must be the object of law which must be achieved by imposing appropriate sentence. Therefore, law as a cornerstone of the edifice of “order” should meet the challenges confronting the society. Friedman in his Law in Changing Society stated that: “State of criminal law continues to be—as it should be—a decisive reflection of social consciousness of society.” Therefore, in operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective machinery or the deterrence based on factual matrix. By deft modulation the sentencing process should be stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to be. The facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons used and all other attending circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the area of consideration. For instance a murder committed due to deep-seated mutual and personal rivalry may not call for penalty of death. But an organised crime or mass murders of innocent people would call for imposition of death sentence as deterrence. In Mahesh v. State of M.P. (1987) 3 SCC 80 this Court while refusing to reduce the death sentence observed thus: (SCC p. 82, para 6). “6. … it will be a mockery of justice to permit these appellant-accused to escape the extreme penalty of law when faced with such evidence and such cruel acts. To give the lesser punishment for the appellant-accused would be to render the justicing system of this country suspect. The common man will lose faith in courts. In such cases, he understands and appreciates the language of deterrence more than the reformative jargon.” 10. To give the lesser punishment for the appellant-accused would be to render the justicing system of this country suspect. The common man will lose faith in courts. In such cases, he understands and appreciates the language of deterrence more than the reformative jargon.” 10. Therefore, undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law, and society could not long endure under such serious threats. It is, therefore, the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed, etc. This position was illuminatingly stated by this Court in Sevaka Perumal v. State of T.N. (1991)3 SCC 471 . 8. Taking into account the rival claim/counter claim in the background of the fact that there happens to be case and counter case and the parties are inter-related and the genesis of dispute happens to be with regard to land dispute, really attracts modification in sentence. As a result of which, the sentence so inflicted by the trial court is accordingly modified as the period already undergone. 9. With the aforesaid modification in sentence, instant revision is disposed of. Petitioners are on bail, hence are discharged from its liability. Revision disposed of.