JUDGMENT G. RAJASURIA, J. 1. This second appeal is focused by the original plaintiff, animadverting upon the judgment and decree dated 25-8-2009 passed in A.S. No. 17 of 2009 by the Principal Subordinate Judge, Villupuram, reversing the judgment and decree of the learned Principal District Munsif, Ulundurpet in O.S. No. 188 of 2006. The parties are referred to hereunder according to their limitative status and ranking before the trial Court. 2. A summation and summarisation of germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this Second Appeal would run thus:- (a) The plaintiff - Devaki, respondent herein filed the suit for specific performance of agreement to sell in respect of an immovable property. (b) The defendants resisted the suit. (c) Whereupon the trial Court framed the relevant issues. (d) Up went the trial, during which the plaintiff/Devaki examined herself as P. W. 1 and Exs. A1 and A2 were marked; and D1/Vinayagamoorthy, D2/Manonmani examined themselves as D. W. 1 and D. W. 2 along with D. W. 3/Ayyappan and Exs. B1 to B3 were marked. (e) Ultimately the trial Court decreed the suit granting specific performance in respect of Plot No. 75, which is not the suit property, but dismissed the suit in respect of Plot No. 71, which was the suit property. 3. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment of the trial Court, the said Devaki preferred appeal, whereupon, the appellate Court modified the judgment and decree of the trial Court and granted specific performance in respect of the suit property bearing Plot No. 71. 4. Challenging and impugning the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court, this Second Appeal is focused on various grounds and also suggesting the following substantial questions of law: (a) Whether the Court below is right in decreeing the suit for specific performance in favour of the plaintiff when the plaintiff has failed to prove the alleged payment of balance of sale consideration? (b) Whether the Court below is right in decreeing the suit for specific performance when the plaintiff has come forward with a false plea regarding the payment of whole of the sale consideration? (c) Whether the Court below is right in decreeing the suit for specific performance when the plaintiff has even failed to aver in the pleadings the readiness and willingness? (c) Whether the Court below is right in decreeing the suit for specific performance when the plaintiff has even failed to aver in the pleadings the readiness and willingness? (d) Whether the Court below is right in decreeing the suit for specific performance when the plaintiff has failed to prove that she was ready and willing throughout? (Extracted as such) 5. At this stage, after hearing both sides, the following substantial question of law are framed for disposal: 1. Whether both the Courts below failed to take note of the fact that the plaint was bad for want of an averment as per Section of the Specific Relief Act the effect, that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform her part of the contract? 2. Whether the Courts below failed to take note of the non-production of the receipt before the Court concerning the payment of the remaining part of sale consideration of Rs. 6,000/- (Rupees six thousand only) by the plaintiff? 3. Whether both the Courts below did not adhere to the mandates as contained in Sections 16 and 20 of the Specific Relief Act? 4. Whether there is any perversity or illegality in the judgments and decrees of both the Courts below? 6. All these points are taken together for discussion as they are inter-linked and inter-woven with one another. 7. The learned counsel for the appellants/defendants would pyramid his arguments, which could succinctly and precisely be set out thus: (a) The plaint is silent as silence could be in respect of the averments relating to readiness and willingness to perform her part of the contract. (b) Even though in the deposition also the plaintiff admitted as P. W. 1 that she was having the receipt evidencing the payment of the remaining part of the sale consideration of Rs. 6,000/- (Rupees six thousand only) to the first defendant after the death of her husband, yet no such receipt was produced. But the Courts below simply ignoring that fact, passed the judgment in favour of the plaintiff. (c) The trial Court was not justified in passing specific performance decree in respect of the property bearing Plot No. 75 which was not the subject-matter of the suit itself. But the Courts below simply ignoring that fact, passed the judgment in favour of the plaintiff. (c) The trial Court was not justified in passing specific performance decree in respect of the property bearing Plot No. 75 which was not the subject-matter of the suit itself. The first appellate Court holus bolus without adhereing to Sections 16 and 20 of the Specific Relief Act, simply modified the judgment and decree of the tiral Court by granting specific performance in respect of the suit property bearing Plot No. 71. As such the judgment of the first appellate Court has to be reversed and the suit itself has to be dismissed. 8. Whereas in a bid to torpedo and slap down, challenge and impugn the arguments as put forth on the side of the appellants/defendants, the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff would advance his arguments, which could tersely and briefly be set out thus:- (a) The case of the defendants is fraught with inconsistencies and it is nothing but a load of a baloney and it should not be considered at all. (b) The defendants failed to challenge the judgment passed by the trial Court in respect of Plot No. 75, however the defendants have filed the Second Appeal for getting the judgment of the first appellate Court set aside in respect of Plot No. 71. If for any reason the judgment of the first appellate Court has to be set aside, then the judgment of the trial Court in granting specific performance in respect of plot No. 75 might be restored. (c) The practice of D1 who is a Real Estate agent should not be lost sight of. Normally the remaining part of the sale consideration would be received by him from the vendees only at the time of getting the sale-deed registered. If at all there was any remaining part of the sale consideration to be paid, in the advance receipt itself there would be a specification to that effect, but in this case, neither at the time of receiving Rs. 1,000/- (Rupees one thousand only) and issuing receipt, nor at the time of receiving Rs. 5,000/- (Rupees five thousand only) and issuing receipt, such specification relating to the remaining part of the sale consideration were found specified. 1,000/- (Rupees one thousand only) and issuing receipt, nor at the time of receiving Rs. 5,000/- (Rupees five thousand only) and issuing receipt, such specification relating to the remaining part of the sale consideration were found specified. (d) The plaintiff is an aged poor widow and she believed D1, who is a Real Estate agent and paid the remaining part of the sale consideration also and both the Courts below on that aspect believed her version, warranting no interference in the Second Appeal. Accordingly, he would pray for the dismissal of the Second Appeal. 9. I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court: (i) 2010 (10) SCC 512 : (2010 AIR SCW 6198) Man Kaur (Dead) By L.Rs. v. Hartar Singh Sangha; certain excerpts from it would run thus: 40. This contention has no merit. There are two distinct issues. The first issue is the breach by the defendant vendor which gives a cause of action to the plaintiff to file a suit for specific performance. The second issue relates to the personal bar to enforcement of a specific performance by persons enumerated in Section 16 of the Act. A person who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him (other than the terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant) is barred from claiming specific performance. Therefore, even assuming that the defendant had committed breach, if the plaintiff fails to aver in the plaint or prove that he was always ready and willing to perform the essential terms of contract which are required to be performed by him (other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the plaintiff), there is a bar to specific performance in his favour. Therefore, the assumption of the respondent that readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is something which need not be proved, if the plaintiff is able to establish that the defendant refused to execute the sale-deed and thereby committed breach, is not correct. Let us give an example. Take a case where there is a contract for sale for a consideration of Rs. 10 lakhs and earnest money of Rs. Let us give an example. Take a case where there is a contract for sale for a consideration of Rs. 10 lakhs and earnest money of Rs. 1 lakh was paid and the vendor wrongly refuses to execute the sale-deed unless the purchaser is ready to pay Rs.15 lakhs. In such a case there is a clear breach by the defendant. But in that case, if the plaintiff did not have the balance Rs. 9 lakhs (and the money required for stamp duty and registration) or the capacity to arrange and pay such money, when the contract has to be preformed, the plaintiff will not be entitled to specific performance, even if he proves breach by the defendant, as he was not ready and willing to perform his obligations. (II) (2011) 1 Supreme Court Cases 429: (AIR 2011 SC (Civ) 230) J.P. Builders and another v. A. Ramadas Rao and another; certain excerpts from it would run thus: 27. It is settled law that even in the absence of specific plea by the opposite party, it is the mandate of the Statute that the plaintiff has to comply with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and when there is non-compliance with this statutory mandate, the Court is not bound to grant specific performance and is left with no other alternative but to dismiss the suit. It is also clear that readiness to perform must be established throughout the relevant points of time. Readiness and willingness to perform the part of the contract has to be determined/ascertained from the conduct of the parties. 10. A mere reading of those precendents would unambiguously and unequivocally highlight and spotlight the fact, that in a suit for specific performance, there should not be any amount of falsity on the part of the plaintiff. The factual analysis would evince and evidence, demonstrate and display that the plaintiff as P. W. 1 pulling no punches would set out thus: (Vernacular matter omitted Ed.) 11. However, that fact she had not set out even in the complaint lodged by her with the police. Over and above that, she did not produce that receipt at all. As such, till date it remains a mystery and inexplicable, unexplainable and untenable as to what happened to the alleged receipt evidencing the payment of the remaining part of the sale consideration of Rs. Over and above that, she did not produce that receipt at all. As such, till date it remains a mystery and inexplicable, unexplainable and untenable as to what happened to the alleged receipt evidencing the payment of the remaining part of the sale consideration of Rs. 6,000/- (Rupees six thousand only) by the plaintiff to D1. 12. Indubitably and incontrovertibly, admittedly and axiomatically, the total sale consideration was Rs. 12,000/- (Rupees twelve thousand only). Devakis husband during his life time initially paid a sum of Rs. 1,000/- (Rupees one thousand only) and subsequently paid a sum of Rs. 5,000/- (Rupees five thousand only), but there is no pint or jot, shred or shard, iota or miniscule extent of evidence to convey and demonstrate that the entire sale consideration of Rs. 12,000/- (Rupees twelve thousand only) was paid. It is not the case of Devaki that she has been ready and willing to pay the remaining part of the sale consideration as and when the Court might direct her to deposit in accordance with Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act. She came to Court with the specific case that the remaining part of the sale consideration of Rs. 6,000/- (Rupees six thousand only) was paid by her after the death of her husband to D1 and she obtained a receipt also, but that turned out to be totally an untenable plea and that itself disentitled her from claiming any relief of specific performance. But both the Courts below failed to take note of the same. If at all the case of the plaintiff had been to the effect that no such receipt was issued by D1, then the matter would have been slightly different, and the Court might have been driven to the extent of deciding as to whether the sole testimony of P. W. 1 is believable or not. But in this case, once the plaintiff herself had come forward with a specific case that D1 issued receipt evidencing the receipt of Rs. 6,000/- (Rupees six thousand only) by him and that such receipt was not produced by the plaintiff, certainly the Court should have drawn adverse inference as against her, but both the Courts below believed the ipse dixit of P. W. 1 and granted relief in her favour, warranting interference in the Second Appeal. 13. 6,000/- (Rupees six thousand only) by him and that such receipt was not produced by the plaintiff, certainly the Court should have drawn adverse inference as against her, but both the Courts below believed the ipse dixit of P. W. 1 and granted relief in her favour, warranting interference in the Second Appeal. 13. The learned counsel for the defendants also would point out that the plaint does not disclose any readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform her part of the contract. A question might arise as to where would be the question of the plaintiff expressing her readiness and willingness to perform her part of the contract would arise, when as per her, she parted with the full consideration. Even in a hypothetical case if the plaintiff realy had parted with full consideration, still the plaintiff being the proposed purchaser is bound to purchase stamp-papers and prepare necessary preliminaries for the purpose of getting the sale-deed executed and registered and to that effect there should be averments in the plaint, but in this case, absolutely there is no semblance of averments to that effect. 14. I am fully aware of the fact that from the circumstances set out in the plaint, the Court can very well infer the readiness and willingness of the part of the plaintiff in performing her part of the contract, but in this case, no such circumstances also are found spelt out. 15. Not to put too fine a point on it, a fortiori, the plaint fails foul of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. 16. The learned counsel for the plaintiff would make an extempore submission that in the event of the Court inclining to set aside the judgment of the first appellate Court, the trial Courts judgment in ordering specific performance in respect of plot No. 75, might be revived, because that was not challenged by the defendant at any point of time. For that the learned counsel for the appellants would convincingly point out, that when the trial Court passed the order in respect of a property which was not the subject-matter of the suit property itself, he was not enjoined to prefer any appeal. This Court being seized of the matter could very well ignore the judgment of the trial Court and dismiss the suit itself. This Court being seized of the matter could very well ignore the judgment of the trial Court and dismiss the suit itself. This Court being the High Court should necessarily apply the law strictly in a specific performance suit. The Court should be careful in ordering specific performance. It is settled law that no Court is having carte blanche to order specific performance in a suit with regard to a property which is not the subject-matter of the suit property. In such a case, the judgment of the trial Court is having no legs to stand and as such, ultimately the suit has to be dismissed and by allowing this appeal, judgment of both the Courts below are set aside and the suit also stands dismissed. No costs. Consequently connected miscellaneous petition is closed. 17. My learned Predecessor at the time of passing order in M.P. No. 1 of 2010 mandated the petitioners/defendants to deposit a sum of Rs. 6,000/- (Rupees six thousand only) representing presumably the advance amount received by them. Now this Court has dismissed the Second Appeal itself, hence, I would mandate that the said sum of Rs. 6,000/- (Rupees six thousand only) shall be release in favour of the plaintiff. 18. The learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff would make an extempore submission on hearing the judgment pronounced, that liberty might be given to the plaintiff to work out her remedy, if any, de hors the proceedings initiated already by her, and it is open for her to do so, if law permits. Appeal allowed.