JUDGMENT A.M. Sapre, C J.- Petitioner has filed the instant petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, challenging his detention order dated 21.12.2012 (Annexure A/1) passed by the District Magistrate, Thouble (Detaining Authority). Vide order dated 29.12.2012 (Annexure A/3), the detention order has been confirmed by the State under provisions of National Security Act (for short "the Act"), which also is under challenge. 2. The impugned order of preventive detention reads as under: " IN THE COURT OF THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE THOUBAL,MANIPUR ORDER Thoubal, the 21th December, 2012 No. Cril. NSA Case No.54 of 2012: Whereas, a police report has been laid before me that Shri Sougrakpam Tamba Singh @ Tama @ Haying @ Chamba (37 yrs) S/o S. Sanaton Singh of Singjamei Sougrakpam Leikai, P.S. Singjamei, District - Imphal West, Manipur is acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of public order; Whereas, I, Shri T. Ranjit Singh, District Magistrate, Thoubal, Manipur, am satisfied that his activities are prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of public order under section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980; Whereas, it is considered necessary to detain Shri Sougrakpam Tamba Singh @ Tama @ Haying @ Chamba (37 yrs) S/o S. Sanaton Singh of Singjamei Sougrakpam Leikai, P.S. Singjamei, District - Imphal West, Manipur with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of public order; And whereas, I am satisfied from the police report that Shri Sougrakpam Tamba Singh @ Tama @ Haying @ Chamba (37 yrs) S/o S. Sanaton Singh of Singjamei Sougrakpam Leikai, P.S. Singjamei, District - Imphal West, Manipur who is now in Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa and also since he is likely to continue to act in the manner prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of public order, and also that an alternative preventive measure is called for; Now, therefore, I, Shri T. Ranjit Singh, District Magistrate, Thoubal, Manipur in exercise of the power conferred under sub-section 3 of Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 read with Home Department’s Order No. 17(l)/49/80-H (Pt-I) dated 12.11.2012 make this order that the above said person who is now in Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa be detained under Section 3(2) of National Security Act, 1980 until further orders. Given under my Hand and Seal of the Court on this 21st day of December, 2012. Sd/- T. Ranjit Singh, District Magistrate, Thoubal District." 3. Facts necessary for the disposal of the writ petition need mention herein below. The writ petitioner (hereinafter referred to as - "Detenu"), a resident of Singjamei Sougrakpam Leikai, P.S. Singjamei, District- Imphal West, Manipur was arrested on 21.10.2012 by the CDO/1W from Singjamei Thongam Leikai in connection with a criminal case registered against him bearing FIR No. - 643(10)2012 SJM P.S. for the offences punishable under Section 17/20 UA(P)A Act. He was then sent to police custody till 31.10.2012. 4. On 31.10.2012 when he was produced before the Court, he was again formally arrested on 31.10.2012 in connection with another criminal case registered against him bearing FIR No. 108(10)2012 Lil-P.S. for the offences punishable U/S 20 UA(P)A Act, 5 Expl.Sub Act & 21 NDPS Act. He was then formally remanded to police custody till 7.11.2012. The detenu was then remanded to judicial custody by the orders of the court on 7.11.2012 and since then he continues to be in Jail (Central Jail), Sajiwa. It may here be mentioned he was granted bail by CJM, Imphal West on 14.12.2012 in connection with FIR No. - 643(10)2012 SJM P.S. U/S 17/20 UA (P) A Act. However, he continued to remain in Jail in connection with other case registered against him. 5. On 21.12.2012 while the detenu was in jail as an under trial prisoner in connection with aforementioned criminal case, he was served with the impugned detention order by the detaining authority along with the grounds of his detention. The detenu felt aggrieved and submitted his representation on 5.1.2013. The State on perusal of the representation confirmed his detention order by their order dt. 30.1.2013. It is against these two orders; the detenu (writ petitioner) has filed this writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India questioning their legality and correctness. 6. The state filed the return/counter affidavit in answer to the writ petition in support of the detention/confirmation orders. It is inter alia stated that there was adequate material available against the detenu for forming a subjective satisfaction for passing the detention order while he was in custody. The details of the material said to have been collected against the writ petitioner are stated in the return/counter affidavit and filed as annexures. 7. It is inter alia stated that there was adequate material available against the detenu for forming a subjective satisfaction for passing the detention order while he was in custody. The details of the material said to have been collected against the writ petitioner are stated in the return/counter affidavit and filed as annexures. 7. Heard Mr. Chr Ngongo, learned counsel for the petitioner and also Mr. A. Modhuchandra, learned GA along with Mr. Amerjit Naorem, CGSC appearing for the respondents. 8. Submission of the learned counsel for the writ petitioner while challenging the legality and correctness of the detention order was essentially one. According to him, reading the impugned detention order would clearly go to show that it suffers from basic and fundamental error. Learned counsel contended that the detention order neither anywhere mentions, nor refers that "...detenu was likely to be released on bail in near future in connection with the offence pursuant to which he was arrested’. Learned counsel therefore contended that since the detenu was in Jail (judicial custody) from 21.10.2012, hence it was necessary for the detaining authority to have first formed its subjective satisfaction on the issue as to whether there was any likelihood of the detenu being released on bail in near future in connection with other case registered against him on the basis of any of the grounds and then on being so released he was likely to indulge in the activities detrimental to the interest of the State. Learned Counsel contended that such material/grounds should have been mentioned in so many words in the detention order itself. Learned counsel contended that when this basic requirement in so far as the first limb of subjective satisfaction is concerned was missing in this case and hence the impugned detention order cannot be said to have been passed in conformity with the requirement of the Act and is thus legally unsustainable. Learned counsel contended that when this basic requirement in so far as the first limb of subjective satisfaction is concerned was missing in this case and hence the impugned detention order cannot be said to have been passed in conformity with the requirement of the Act and is thus legally unsustainable. In other words, the submission was that when the detaining authority failed to record its subjective satisfaction in so far as it relates to detenu being likely to be released on bail in near future in connection with other criminal case registered against him in the detention order, then in such event, the recording of its satisfaction in so far as the second limb is concerned, even if it is found to have been made out against the writ petitioner, yet it would be of no consequence. Learned Counsel maintained that in order to legally sustain the detention order both the limbs must satisfy the test of recording of the subjective satisfaction by the detaining authority. Failure of either of the two renders the detention order bad in law. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent (State), defended the impugned order and contended that even if the facts of the first limb were not mentioned by the detaining authority in the order, yet if such facts are mentioned in the affidavit then also it would amount to ensuring sufficient compliance of the Act. Learned counsel contended that since in this case, the necessary facts for forming subjective satisfaction on the first limb of the case have been mentioned in the affidavit/return, filed before this Court, hence the so-called infirmity, even if exists in the detention order, stood cured on perusal of the affidavit. 10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we are inclined to allow the writ petition finding force in the submission of the learned counsel for the writ petitioner. 11. The law on the point in so far as first limb of the case and its requirements are concerned is no more res Integra and stands decided by a number of decisions rendered by the Supreme Court. 12. In Kamarunnissa vs. Union of India ((1991) 1 SCC 129), Ahmadi J. (as his Lordship then was) speaking for the bench held as under: "13. 12. In Kamarunnissa vs. Union of India ((1991) 1 SCC 129), Ahmadi J. (as his Lordship then was) speaking for the bench held as under: "13. From the catena of decisions referred to above it seems clear to us that even in the case of a person in custody a detention order can validly be passed (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail, and (b) that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this behalf, such an order cannot be struck down on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition, to question it before a higher court. What this Court stated in the case of Ramesh Yadav (1985) 4 SCC 232 was that ordinarily a detention order should not be passed merely to pre-emptor circumvent enlargement on bail in cases which are essentially criminal in nature and can be dealt with under the ordinary law. It seems to us well settled that even in a case where a person is in custody, if the facts and circumstances of the case so demand, resort can be had to the law of preventive detention. This seems to be quite clear from the case law discussed above and there is no need to refer to the High Court decisions to which our attention was drawn since they do not hold otherwise. We, therefore, find it difficult to accept the contention of the counsel for the petitioners that there was no valid and compelling reason for passing the impugned orders of detention because the detenus were in custody." 13. We, therefore, find it difficult to accept the contention of the counsel for the petitioners that there was no valid and compelling reason for passing the impugned orders of detention because the detenus were in custody." 13. When we peruse the impugned order in the light of law laid down by the Supreme Court in Kamarunnissa’s case (supra), we find that the order impugned does not record in it the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority on the first limb of the issue, namely, how and on what material / grounds, the detaining authority was in a position to form such subjective satisfaction that "...detenu was likely to be released on bail in near future in connection with the second offense in which he was arrested". 14. In our opinion, in a case where the detenu was in jail, it was necessary for the detaining authority to have formed its subjective satisfaction on two issues - firstly, that the detenu was likely to be released on bail in near future in connection with the offence in which he was arrested and secondly, on being so released, he was likely to indulge in activities detrimental to the interest of the State. The subjective satisfaction on both the issues should have been based on the adequate material collected against the detenu before passing the detention order and it should have been so mentioned in the detention order itself. Such was not the case here so far as the first limb of issue was concerned. It is not even mentioned that petitioner has applied for grant of bail in FIR 108(10)2012. Since he had not applied for grant of bail, and hence there did not arise any occasion for his release on bail in the said case registered on FTR 108(10)2012. Moreover, nothing is stated in the impugned order what to say recording of satisfaction on this issue. 15. Placing reliance on the observations made by the Supreme Court in G Reddeiah vs. Government of A.P. ( (2012) 2 SCC 389 ), learned counsel for the respondent (State) contended that even if the detention order did not contain the necessary requirement of subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in so far as the first limb was concerned, yet it could be said to have been complied with from the averments made in the return/affidavit of the State. In other words, submission is, that it was not necessary that such requirement must form part of the detention order itself, but it can be justified by reading the return/affidavit filed in the case by the State. 16. We do not agree. In our opinion, it is not so laid down in G Reddeiah’s case (supra). In our view, the basic requirement of law is that subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in support of both the limbs must be based on the adequate factual relevant material and secondly it must be mentioned in the detention order itself. This law is neither changed, nor diluted and continues to hold the field. The detaining authority must therefore ensure that it is complied with in letter and spirit. However, while examining this issue, and subject to ensuring compliance of such requirement, the court can also look into the record when produced on affidavit with a view to find out as to whether there existed any material which enabled the detaining authority to form its subjective satisfaction in support of both the issues for passing the detention order. 17. When in this case, the basic requirement in so far as subjective satisfaction of the first limb itself was missing, then it cannot be substituted by mere production of the record in the form of affidavit before the court on the basis of law laid down in G Reddeiah’s case. In our view, this is a case where we can hold that detaining authority failed to record its subjective satisfaction on the first limb of the issue, namely - that detenue was likely to be released on bail in near future in connection with the second offense registered against him in FIR 108(10)2012 LIL-PS in which he was arrested, because as is clear, the detention order is silent on this issue. 18. We thus need not go in to the issue relating to the second limb of subjective satisfaction. It is not necessary in view of our finding recorded on the first issue. 19. hi the light of foregoing discussion, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned detention order dt. 21.12.2012 (Annexure - A/1) and its confirmation order dt. 29.12.2012 (Annexure-A/3) are quashed by issuance of writ of certiorari. 20. It is not necessary in view of our finding recorded on the first issue. 19. hi the light of foregoing discussion, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned detention order dt. 21.12.2012 (Annexure - A/1) and its confirmation order dt. 29.12.2012 (Annexure-A/3) are quashed by issuance of writ of certiorari. 20. Before parting with the case, we consider it apposite to again clarify and make it clear that we have not gone into the adequacy and relevancy of the material collected against the writ petitioner by the detaining authority for passing the detention order on the second limb. No cost. ____________