Judgment : The petitioner, a recognized political party, in this writ petition challenges, the validity of the orders passed on 12-10-2013 by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Central Zone, Hyderabad, rejecting the request made by it for permission to conduct a public meeting on 19-10-2013 at Lal Bahadur Stadium, Hyderabad. As per the directions of My Lord the Hon’ble Chief Justice, this writ petition was taken up for hearing on 13th, 14th and 15th October 2013 at my residence. Heard Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, learned senior counsel and Sri C. Nageswara Rao, counsel appearing for Sri Y. Nagireddy on behalf of the petitioner and Sri K. Janakirama Reddy, learned Government Pleader for home and Sri J. Venkata Narasimha Reddy, learned Assistant Government Pleader for Home, who have accepted notice on behalf of respondents 1 to 4 and Sri M.V.S. Prasad, learned Standing Counsel for the Sports Authority of Andhra Pradesh, who accepted notice on behalf of respondent 5. On behalf of respondents 1 to 4, a counter affidavit, sworn to by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, was filed. It is the case of the writ petitioner that seventeen Members of Legislative Assembly and two Members of Parliament (Lok Sabha), belonging to it are elected by the electorate and hence, it has legitimate right to propound and propagate its ideology. With a view to inform the general public of its opinion on an issue of contemporary social interest, it wanted to conduct a public meeting on 19-10-2013 at Lal Bahadur Stadium, Hyderabad, from 2-00 pm to 8-00 pm and hence, it sought for permission from the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Central Zone, Hyderabad, for the above-said meeting. The request of the petitioner was received at 6-45 pm on 03-10-2013 by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Central Zone, Hyderabad. On 07-10-2013, it has also submitted a representation to the Commissioner of Police, with a request to advise the concerned to accord necessary permission for the aforementioned meeting. On 01-10-2013, it has approached the Vice Chairman, Sports Authority of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, requesting him to allot Lal Bahadur Stadium, Hyderabad, on 19-10-2013 for holding a public meeting in accordance with the Sports Authority (Procedure for Allotment of Sports Stadia for Sporting and Non-Sporting Activities) Rules, 2012. On 01-10-2013, it has approached the Vice Chairman, Sports Authority of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, requesting him to allot Lal Bahadur Stadium, Hyderabad, on 19-10-2013 for holding a public meeting in accordance with the Sports Authority (Procedure for Allotment of Sports Stadia for Sporting and Non-Sporting Activities) Rules, 2012. It has also, earlier, instituted W.P.No.29309 of 2013 seeking a direction to the respondents therein to grant permission to the petitioner for conducting or organizing a public meeting on19-10-2013 at Lal Bahadur Stadium, Hyderabad. That writ petition was disposed of by the High Court on 09-10-2013 directing the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Central Zone, Hyderabad, to deal with the application of the petitioner dated 03-10-2013 and pass appropriate orders thereon before 12-10-2013 and communicate the same to the petitioner forthwith. Accordingly, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Central Zone, Hyderabad, passed orders through his Proceedings No.HC-1/4836/2013, dated 12-10-2013, rejecting the permission sought for. The Deputy Commissioner of Police, Central Zone, Hyderabad, during the course of his Order, has noticed that after the Congress Working Committee has announced its decision on 30-07-2013 for formation of Telangana State, intensive agitation was started at Seema-Andhra region for keeping the State of Andhra Pradesh united. It was further noted in the impugned Proceedings that on 03-10-2013 the Union Cabinet has approved a Note for formation of Telangana State and steps are initiated for carrying the decision forward. Consequently, the agitation has been intensified in Seema-Andhra region and large scale violence has erupted in Vijayanagaram District, where curfew has been imposed to bring the situation under control and sporadic incidents of violence have also been reported from several other districts of Seema-Andhra region affecting the peace and tranquility in the region. It was also noted by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Central Zone, Hyderabad, that after announcing the decision for formation of Telangana State, tempers are running very high amongst the APNGOs and TNGOs and it has led to polarization necessitating Police intervention on daily-basis at several government offices to prevent a clash between the employees of both the regions. Therefore, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Central Zone, Hyderabad, has opined that a small spark can also cause a major trouble in Hyderabad city. Therefore, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Central Zone, Hyderabad, has opined that a small spark can also cause a major trouble in Hyderabad city. It was further noted by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, that leaders of the Congress Party belonging to Telangana region, Telangana Rashtra Samithi, Telangana Advocates’ Joint Action Committee, Telangana Joint Action Committee, Telangana Students’ Joint Action Committee and others, who are espousing the cause of formation of a separate Telangana State, have vehemently criticized the change of stand of the writ petitioner political party in favour of United Andhra Pradesh and declared that they will obstruct the conduct of meeting at Lal Bahadur Stadium and issued press statements to the above effect. Therefore, the Deputy Commissioner of Police noted that all sections of Telangana region are opposing the conduct of a meeting at Lal Bahadur Stadium by the petitioner political party for the cause of United Andhra Pradesh. Further, the Deputy Commissioner of Police has noted that there was reliable information about the preparations for obstructing the meeting by mobilizing thousands of supporters and preparing for a major showdown. This apart, there was reliable information gathered by the Intelligence wing of the State that anti-social elements are likely to come to Hyderabad city in larger numbers from Seema-Andhra region in the guise of participants and it was apprehended that they may indulge in violence, arson and destruction of public and private properties in Hyderabad city. Similarly, there were also inputs that protagonists of separate Telangana and some anti-social elements are also planning to disrupt the meeting by entering into the stadium in larger numbers in the guise of participants and indulge in large scale violence and destruction of public and private properties. There were also inputs made available by the Intelligence that the Telangana supporters are planning to obstruct the vehicles and also trains of the participants coming from Seema-Andhra region enroute to Hyderabad and are likely to indulge in violence, arson and destruction of properties and this may result in clashes at several places between the people of the two regions, enroute to Hyderabad on National Highway No.7 and National Highway No.9. Therefore, the Deputy Commissioner of Police has opined that there is every possibility of occurrence of major clashes in between the people of two regions both inside and outside the Lal Bahadur Stadium and also enroute to Hyderabad resulting in breaking down of law and order and affecting seriously the maintenance of peace and public order in Hyderabad city and the incidents that might occur at Hyderabad city will have a bearing on the maintenance of peace and public order in the other parts of the State also. The Deputy Commissioner of Police has noted that a number of violent incidents occurred in connection with the conduct of the meeting by the APNGOs at Lal Bahadur Stadium on 07-09-2013. Taking into account and consideration of these factors and with a view to maintain law and order, peace and tranquility, the request of the petitioner for permission to conduct a public meeting on 19-10-2013 at Lal Bahadur Stadium, was rejected. However, the Deputy Commissioner of Police advised the petitioner to defer the conduct of public meeting to a later date till the normalization of the situation. Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, learned senior counsel, would submit that except opposition from the other political parties, as is evident from the various press reports, there is no material available with the Police to come to a firm conclusion that there was a strong opposition against the petitioner. Similarly, there is no basis for the Deputy Commissioner of Police to believe that anti-social elements from the Seema-Andhra region will be gaining entry into the Lal Bahadur Stadium as participants. Equally, there is no material before the Police to suspect that anti-social elements will be gaining entry into the stadium only with a view to cause trouble or disturbance to the meeting. The petitioner is a political party, which completely believes in a democratic value system. Therefore, if any of its members are desirous of airing any contrary opinion, the petitioner has never attempted to silence them. On the other hand, it has allowed them the opportunity to ventilate the contra viewpoint. The matter was allowed to be discussed completely, in keeping with the party constitution and discipline. Therefore, if any of its members are desirous of airing any contrary opinion, the petitioner has never attempted to silence them. On the other hand, it has allowed them the opportunity to ventilate the contra viewpoint. The matter was allowed to be discussed completely, in keeping with the party constitution and discipline. Most importantly, Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy would submit that the petitioner being a recognized political party, is entitled to the freedom of expression of its opinion guaranteed by Article 19(1) (a) and most significantly, to assemble peacefully and without arms guaranteed by Article 19(1) (b). These fundamental rights are only subject to reasonable restrictions in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, public order, but not otherwise. The learned senior counsel would submit that there is any amount of distinction between public order and law & order and hence, the impunged Proceeding of rejection of the permission passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police is contrary to law and amounts to imposing unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioner under the Constitution. The learned senior counsel would further urge that the petitioner being a political party cannot be prevented from exercising its right to a peaceful assembly without arms and express its opinion for the general public to appreciate its viewpoint. Therefore, the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be restrained by imposing unreasonable restrictions on the petitioner. The learned senior counsel would submit that in a multi-party democracy, the views and opinions of each party would be varying with the other. It is, therefore, unlikely that various other political parties may not agree or see merit in the views and opinions held by the petitioner party. If the Deputy Commissioner of Police is looking for some kind of a consensus of opinion, it, perhaps, may not happen at all. In the same vein, the learned senior counsel would maintain that the Deputy Commissioner of Police cannot hold any assurance that after a while, normalcy will come back and then a public meeting can be held by the petitioner. The learned senior counsel would windup his submissions by making it clear that no inflammatory speeches are ever intended to be made by the petitioner and, in fact, it is willing to abide by any conditions, which the Court might consider reasonable to impose upon. The learned senior counsel would windup his submissions by making it clear that no inflammatory speeches are ever intended to be made by the petitioner and, in fact, it is willing to abide by any conditions, which the Court might consider reasonable to impose upon. The learned Government Pleader for home would counter the arguments of the learned senior counsel by urging that the impugned Proceeding does not amount to imposing a ban on the fundamental rights of the petitioner party. On the other hand, the Deputy Commissioner of Police rightly advised the petitioner party to defer the conduct of public meeting for a while so that as soon as the normalcy returns, the meeting can be conducted. The learned Government Pleader would painstakingly point out the detailed reasons assigned by the Deputy Commissioner of Police while rejecting the permission sought for by the petitioner party and would urge that the impugned Proceeding has been passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police after a great deal of thought-process is involved. The learned Government Pleader would submit that the State primarily is concerned about the maintenance of peace and tranquility and hence, any measure or subject, which is likely to throw the law & order out of hand, is required to be dealt with firmly. The learned Government Pleader would submit that the Police are the best people to make a careful assessment of the law & order situation. When all relevant factors are taken into account and consideration by the Police, the Court should not examine the same as an Appellate or Revisional Authority would have done. The learned Government Pleader, therefore, suggests that this Court should not reappraise the entire matter and should not take a different view than the one taken by the Police. Further, the learned Government Pleader would urge that the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) and Article 19(1)(b) are not absolute rights and they can be subjected to reasonable restrictions and hence, the constraints of law & order form part of such reasonable restrictions. The learned Government Pleader has placed strong reliance upon the Judgment of the Supreme Court in STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER v. DR. PRAVEEN BHAI THOGADIA ( (2004) 4 SCC 684 )and S.RAJA MARAVAN @ MANICKAVASAGAM v. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE AND ANOTHER (2013(1)CTC314)and would submit that the decision of the Deputy Commissioner of Police, is not an unreasonable one. The learned Government Pleader has placed strong reliance upon the Judgment of the Supreme Court in STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER v. DR. PRAVEEN BHAI THOGADIA ( (2004) 4 SCC 684 )and S.RAJA MARAVAN @ MANICKAVASAGAM v. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE AND ANOTHER (2013(1)CTC314)and would submit that the decision of the Deputy Commissioner of Police, is not an unreasonable one. The learned Assistant Government Pleader for Home would submit in support of the impugned Proceedings that the risk of violence erupting prior to the meeting, during the meeting and the post-meeting scenario, is certainly a vital factor for the police administration to worry about while considering the request of the petitioner for conduct of a public meeting on 19-10-2013 and, therefore, the rejection of the permission by the Deputy Commissioner of Police based upon a realistic assessment of such risks and dangers, should not be interdicted. The learned Assistant Government Pleader would further submit that the possibility of tempers running high and then resulting in multiple clashes cannot be ruled out and hence, it is not at all appropriate to permit the scheduled public meeting on 19-10-2013. The learned Standing Counsel for the Sports Authority of Andhra Pradesh on behalf of the 5th respondent would submit that unless the Police grants permission, the infrastructure available at Lal Bahadur Stadium cannot be permitted to be utilized by the petitioner political party. This apart, the petitioner will have to not only assure that no destruction / damage would be caused to the property belonging to the 5th respondent and that it had to undertake reconstruction / repair thereof in the event of any such destruction / damage. The learned Standing Counsel also pointed out that the petitioner would also be required to submit security deposit, pay rent for using the stadium and also the flood-light charges apart from bearing the power consumption charges on its own. The crucial question that falls for consideration is whether the permission sought for by the petitioner has been rejected by the Deputy Commissioner of Police for valid and tenable reasons or not. The crucial question that falls for consideration is whether the permission sought for by the petitioner has been rejected by the Deputy Commissioner of Police for valid and tenable reasons or not. Much prior to India gaining freedom, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru realizing that peace is the harmonizing factor amongst men in their differences noted (In his letter dated September 3, 1936, to Sheila Grant Duff.)“I do not want war, even for the sake of Indian freedom or perhaps it should be more correct to say that I do not look forward to any real freedom for India as a result of devastating conflict. …………………….. We are forced to look deeper down and examine the roots of the evil and try to remove them, avoiding, as far as we can, the destruction of the good that we have. (In his letter dated September 3, 1936, to Sheila Grant Duff.)” The profound feeling expressed by Pandit Nehru is rested upon the notion that there is certain duplicity in human nature, which makes them do things even when they recognize them to be wrong. Brotherhood of man requires the recognition of common purpose and human cooperation. After India attained its freedom, it had firmly given shape to the values, which it has cherished for too long and as a result the constitution of India declares in a profound voice that India is a Democratic Republic. Thereafter, India has accepted multi-party democratic governance. Consequently, plurality of political parties have come up to play an effective role in our Sovereign, Secular Democratic Republic. The views & opinions, theories & thoughts vary vastly from one with the other amongst our political parties. The common goal, perhaps, is to secure the very best for the people of this country, which they deserve nothing short of. Divergence of opinion on an issue of public importance is, therefore, only expected to exist. The multiple choices that become available for the countrymen can be possible only if each of the political parties is allowed the necessary freedom to express its opinions. The constitution has, therefore, while granting various political rights, recognized, rightly, the fundamental rights relating to freedom of speech and expression and to assemble peacefully and without arms in Article 19 (1) clauses (a) and (b). These fundamental rights are undoubtedly subjected to reasonable restrictions spelt out in Article 19(2) and (3) respectively. The constitution has, therefore, while granting various political rights, recognized, rightly, the fundamental rights relating to freedom of speech and expression and to assemble peacefully and without arms in Article 19 (1) clauses (a) and (b). These fundamental rights are undoubtedly subjected to reasonable restrictions spelt out in Article 19(2) and (3) respectively. Thus, the scheme of our Constitution while guaranteeing the fundamental rights in the form of freedom of speech and expression and to assemble peacefully and without arms, provided for imposition of reasonable restrictions by law upon exercise of such rights amongst others, in the interests of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of State, public order, decency or morality or incitement to an offence. In SUPERINTENDENT, CENTRAL PRISON, FATEHGARH v. RAM MANOHAR LOHIA ( AIR 1960 SC 633 ), the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the scope of the expression “public order” found a mention in Article 19(2) and (3). Koka Subba Rao, J, (as the learned Chief Justice then was) has pointed out that “public order” is synonymous with public safety and tranquility. It is the absence of disorder involving breaches of local significance in contradistinction to national upheavals, such as revolution, civil strife, war, affecting the security of the State. The learned Judge further went on to say that a Legislation may in the interests of public order may impose restrictions, but, there must be a proximate and reasonable nexus between the nature of speech prohibited and the public order, which is wider than the words “for maintenance of public order”. The Supreme Court in ARUN GHOSH v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL ( AIR 1970 SC 1228 ), has pointed out: “In Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia's case this Court pointed out the difference between maintenance of law and order and its disturbance and the maintenance of public order and its disturbance. Public order was said to embrace more of the community than law and order. Public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished, from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquility. Public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished, from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquility. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order. Take for instance, a man stabs another. People may be shocked and even disturbed, but the life of the community keeps moving at an even tempo, however much one may dislike the act. Take another case of a town where there is communal tension. A man stabs a member of the other community. This is an act of a very different sort. Its implications are deeper and it affects the even tempo of life and public order is jeopardized because the repercussions of the act embrace large Sections of the community and incite them to make further breaches of the law and order and to subvert the public order. An act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may be very different. Take the case of assault on girls. A guest at a hotel may kiss or make advances to half a dozen chamber maids. He may annoy them and also the management but he does not cause disturbance of public order. He may even have a fracas with the friends of one of the girls but even then it would be a case of breach of law and order only. Take another case of a man who molests women in lonely places. As a result of his activities girls going to colleges and schools are in constant danger and fear. Women going for their ordinary business are afraid of being waylaid and assaulted. The activity of this man in its essential quality is not different from the act of the other man but in its potentiality and in its affect upon the public tranquility there is a vast difference. The act of the man who molests the girls in lonely places causes a disturbance in the even tempo of living which is the first requirement of public order. The act of the man who molests the girls in lonely places causes a disturbance in the even tempo of living which is the first requirement of public order. He disturbs the society and the community. His act makes all the women apprehensive of their honour and he can be said to be causing disturbance of public order and not merely committing individual actions which may be taken note of by the criminal prosecution agencies. It means therefore that the question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society. The French distinguish law and order and public order by designating the latter as order publique. The latter expression has been recognized as meaning something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order. Justice Ramaswami in Writ Petition No. 179 of 1968 drew a line of demarcation between the serious and aggravated forms of breaches of public order which affect the community or endanger the public interest at large from minor breaches of peace which do not affect the public at large. He drew an analogy between public and private crimes. The analogy is useful but not to be pushed too far.” Again the Supreme Court in KUSO SAH v. THE STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS ( AIR 1974 SC 156 ), has noted the distinction, in principle, between “public order” and “law and order” in the following words: “The two concepts have well defined contours, it being well established that stray and unorganised crimes of theft and assault are not matters of public order since they do not tend to affect the even flow of public life. Infractions of law are bound in some measure to lead to disorder but every infraction of law does not necessarily result in public disorder. As observed in Pushkar Mukherjee &.Ors. Infractions of law are bound in some measure to lead to disorder but every infraction of law does not necessarily result in public disorder. As observed in Pushkar Mukherjee &.Ors. v. The State of West Bengal(1), a line of demarcation must be drawn between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest.” A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in HIMMAT LAL K. SHAH v. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, AHMEDABAD AND ANOTHER ( AIR 1973 SC 87 ), had an occasion to deal with the refusal of permission by the Deputy Commissioner of Police for conducting a public meeting on the ground that when a meeting was held earlier thereto on 07-08-1969, where after certain elements had indulged in rioteering and caused mischief to private and public properties, regarding which a crime also has been registered. The question has been answered in the following manner by Justice Mathew, in his concurring opinion: “Freedom of assembly is an essential element of any democratic system. At the root of this concept lies the citizens' right to meet face to face with others for the discussion of their ideas and problems-religious, political,, economic or social. Public debate and discussion take many forms including the spoken and the printed word, the radio and the screen. But assemblies face to face perform a function of vital significance in our system, and are no less important at the present time for the education of the public and the formation of opinion than they have been in our past history. The basic assumption in a democratic polity is that Government shall be based on the consent of the governed. But the consent of the governed implies not only that the consent shall be free but also that it shall be grounded on adequate information and discussion. Public streets are the 'natural' places for expression of opinion and dissemination of ideas. Indeed it may be argued that for some persons these places are the only possible arenas for the effective exercise of their freedom of speech and assembly. Public meeting in open spaces and public streets forms part of the tradition of our national life. Public streets are the 'natural' places for expression of opinion and dissemination of ideas. Indeed it may be argued that for some persons these places are the only possible arenas for the effective exercise of their freedom of speech and assembly. Public meeting in open spaces and public streets forms part of the tradition of our national life. In the pre- Independence days such meetings have been held in open spaces and public streets and the people have come to regard it as a part of their privileges and immunities. The State and the local authority have a virtual monopoly of every open space at which an outdoor meeting can be held. If, therefore, the State or Municipality can constitutionally close both its streets and its parks entirely to public meetings, the practical result would be that it would be impossible to hold any open air meetings in any large city. The real problem is that of reconciling the city's function of providing for the exigencies of traffic in its streets and for the recreation of the public in its parks' with its other obligations, of providing adequate places for public discussion in order to safeguard the guaranteed right of public Assembly.” Further, in a Suo Motu Writ Petition (Crl.) No.122 of 2011, in RE- RAMLILA MAIDAN INCIDENT v. HOME SECRETARY, UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS ((2012) 5 SCC 379), the Supreme Court has examined elaborately the principles of law governing the fundamental rights enshrined under Article 19(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution of India read together with the restrictions contemplated under Article 19(2) and (3) respectively. In the conclusions set out by Justice Swatanter Kumar, it has been spelt out: “(3) The State has a duty to ensure fulfilment of the freedom enshrined in our Constitution and so it has a duty to protect itself against certain unlawful actions. It may, therefore, enact laws which would ensure such protection. The rights and the liberties are not absolute in nature and uncontrolled in operation. While placing the two, the rule of justice and fair play requires that State action should neither be unjust nor unfair, lest it attracts the vice of unreasonableness or arbitrariness, resultantly vitiating the law, the procedure and the action taken thereunder. (4) …………………. The rights and the liberties are not absolute in nature and uncontrolled in operation. While placing the two, the rule of justice and fair play requires that State action should neither be unjust nor unfair, lest it attracts the vice of unreasonableness or arbitrariness, resultantly vitiating the law, the procedure and the action taken thereunder. (4) …………………. The police authorities, who are required to maintain the social order and public tranquillity, should have a say in the organizational matters relating to holding of dharnas, processions, agitations and rallies of the present kind. However, such consent should be considered in a very objective manner by the police authorities to ensure the exercise of the right to freedom of speech and expression as understood in its wider connotation, rather than use the power to frustrate or throttle the constitutional right. Refusal and/or withdrawal of permission should be for valid and exceptional reasons………………. (6) As difficult as it is to anticipate the right to any freedom or liberty without any reasonable restriction, equally difficult it is to imagine existence of a right not coupled with a duty. The duty may be a direct or an indirect consequence of a fair assertion of the right. Part III of the Constitution, although confers rights, duties, regulations and restrictions are inherent thereunder. It can be stated with certainty that the freedom of speech is the bulwark of democratic Government. This freedom is essential for the appropriate functioning of the democratic process. The freedom of speech and expression is regarded as the first condition of liberty in the hierarchy of liberties granted under our constitutional mandate. (11) Every person/body to whom such permission is granted, shall give an undertaking to the authorities concerned that he/it will cooperate in carrying out their duty and any lawful orders passed by any competent court/authority/forum at any stage of the commencement of an agitation/dharna/ procession and/or period during which the permission granted is enforced. This, of course, shall be subject to such orders as may be passed by the court of competent jurisdiction.” When we bear in mind these principles, the action of the Deputy Commissioner of Police in rejecting the permission sought for by the petitioner does not appear to be based upon any reasonably credible material. This, of course, shall be subject to such orders as may be passed by the court of competent jurisdiction.” When we bear in mind these principles, the action of the Deputy Commissioner of Police in rejecting the permission sought for by the petitioner does not appear to be based upon any reasonably credible material. I am thoroughly conscious that the State and its Intelligence mechanism is under no legal obligation to disclose the sources of its information, not is it required to set out in detail the manner in which it gathers the information or the networking system through which it gathers the inputs concerning the security aspects of the State. By the very nature of the exercise of such power, absolute confidentiality and secrecy has to be maintained by the State and its Intelligence wings, lest, the pipelines through which the information is sourced constantly can get chocked, resulting in far graver, if not, disastrous consequences. Therefore, I have no hesitation to reject the contention canvassed by Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy that the Proceeding of rejection passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, is not based upon any realistic material. But however, the Proceeding of rejection is based on multiple grounds. One such ground was that there was an all-round opposition to the view point of the writ petitioner political party in one particular region of the State. The leaders of various political parties, who are espousing the cause for formation of a separate State, have certainly condemned the idea of the writ petitioner holding a public meeting at Hyderabad. As was noticed supra, agreement in all respects amongst all the political parties can seldom be expected. Divergence of opinion amongst the political parties and the general public is not uncommon. But, that is no valid reason for not allowing people subscribing to a particular idea or notion from assembling peacefully. If a public meeting is liable to be allowed to be held only when a common consensus emerges, in such an event, perhaps, no public meeting can ever be held. Inasmuch as, there is bound to be a contra viewpoint. If the democracy were to survive, there shall be room and freedom for expression of various thoughts and viewpoints on subjects of public importance. That was one safe mechanism by which a choice becomes available for the discerning society at large. Inasmuch as, there is bound to be a contra viewpoint. If the democracy were to survive, there shall be room and freedom for expression of various thoughts and viewpoints on subjects of public importance. That was one safe mechanism by which a choice becomes available for the discerning society at large. Therefore, the fact that several other political parties or organizations are opposing the ideas proposed to be canvassed by the petitioner cannot be a ground for rejection of the permission sought for, for holding a public meeting. The true meaning of a democracy is a rule by consent and by rule of law. It is, in fact, a rule of good reason. It calls for humility in thought and deed, with no sense of infallibility. A working democracy demands for tolerance of a counter viewpoint. It calls for an adjustment in the form of give and take. The State must strive to achieve for all it’s policies as much of wider consent as is possible. Democracy, in fact, stands for the courageous but compassionate society and holds aloft the dignified human values in governance. Democratic policy strives primarily to achieve decent, civilized and human conditions of life and it’s governance. There is no room, in such a society, for acts of violence or intolerance. Any such wrong notion calls for a stern rebuke. The right to freedom of peaceful assembly must necessarily be recognized as of significant importance in a democracy. Those who wish to restrict or curtail or interfere with any such peaceful assembly would correspondingly carry significant burden of providing legal justification for their acts. The recognizable force behind the constitutionally guaranteed right of peaceful assembly cannot be negated by any restrictions imposed upon any such assembly so long as any reprehensible act is not likely to be committed by any such assembly. Further, the State acting through it’s public authorities is obligated to take all reasonable and appropriate measures to enable people to exercise their right by providing adequate protection against the counter viewpoint group. It is appropriate to notice that if anybody could strifle the expression of views by threatening violence, then the freedom of expression and the concomitant freedom of protest in a democracy would be worth very little. It is appropriate to notice that if anybody could strifle the expression of views by threatening violence, then the freedom of expression and the concomitant freedom of protest in a democracy would be worth very little. Justice O’Brien observed more than a century ago in R.V.LONDONDERRY JUSTICES (1891) 28 LR lr 440 @ 450: “If danger arises from the exercise of lawful rights resulting in a breach of the peace, the remedy is the presence of sufficient force to prevent the result, not the legal condemnation of those who exercise those rights.” The need to balance the rights on one hand and larger societal interests is inherent in the very structure of the political rights. It is the duty of the State and its Police administration to ensure that nothing untoward takes place in the society. Whenever it suspects likelihood of breach of peace, it is empowered to take recourse to law and prevent any such breach occurring in the society. Most importantly, preventive measures are conceded for keeping the possible troublemakers at bay. Therefore, the likelihood of clashes or violence erupting prior to the meeting or during the meeting or in its aftermath, cannot be also a factor for the Police to prevent the meeting from taking place at all. The Police have got power to prevent the troublemakers from succeeding in their designs. Simultaneously, the State has an obligation to protect the innocent from any such troublemakers. Violence, in any form, is a betrayal of the letter and spirit of democracy. It is, in fact, the duty of the Police administration to prevent the anti-social elements from gaining an upper-hand or succeeding in their dubious designs. The State is, after all, larger and powerful than a handful of trouble mongers. Hence, I am of the opinion that the State is entitled to take all such appropriate measures to prevent the troublemakers from succeeding in their designs and protect the innocent people from peacefully assembling. It is time to notice the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in DR. PRAVEEN BHAI THOGADIA’s case cited (1) supra. It is set out as under: “6. Courts should not normally interfere with matters relating to law and order which is primarily the domain of the concerned administrative authorities. It is time to notice the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in DR. PRAVEEN BHAI THOGADIA’s case cited (1) supra. It is set out as under: “6. Courts should not normally interfere with matters relating to law and order which is primarily the domain of the concerned administrative authorities. They are by and large the best to assess and to handle the situation depending upon the peculiar needs and necessities, within their special knowledge. Their decision may involve to some extent an element of subjectivity on the basis of materials before them. Past conduct and antecedents of a person or group or an organisation may certainly provide sufficient material or basis for the action contemplated on a reasonable expectation of possible turn of events, which may need to be avoided in public interest and maintenance of law and order. No person, however, big he may assume or claim to be, should be allowed irrespective of the position he may assume or claim to hold in public life to either act in a manner or make speeches which would destroy secularism recognised by the Constitution of India…………………….. Therefore, whenever the concerned authorities in charge of law and order find that a person's speeches or actions are likely to trigger communal antagonism and hatred resulting in fissiparous tendencies gaining foot hold undermining and affecting communal harmony, prohibitory orders need necessarily to be passed, to effectively avert such untoward happenings.” The case on hand is slightly different. The right of the State’s police administration to form a reasonable opinion of a possible jolt to the law and order situation from the inputs, it gathered, is not to be doubted. But however, that is not enough to form an opinion for a possible breach of public order. Since, no other political party or any other group in favour of formation of a separate State is willing to tolerate the viewpoint of the petitioner herein, the State Police cannot arrive at a conclusion of a possible breach to ‘Public Order’. Hence, I am of the opinion that the restriction imposed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police in the instant case amounts to an unreasonable restriction. Further, the Judgment of the Madras High Court in S.RAJA MARAVAN @ MANICKAVASAGAM’s case cited (2) supra provides the answer to the question raised therein, in Paragraphs 7 and 8 thereof. Such a situation is not available on hand. Further, the Judgment of the Madras High Court in S.RAJA MARAVAN @ MANICKAVASAGAM’s case cited (2) supra provides the answer to the question raised therein, in Paragraphs 7 and 8 thereof. Such a situation is not available on hand. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the contentions canvassed by the learned Government Pleader and the learned Assistant Government Pleader for Home cannot be sustained. The petitioner has sought for permission for conducting a public meeting from 2-00 pm to 8-00 pm. Perhaps, with a view to ensure that those who have assembled can smoothly disburse before the day break, the Police could have restricted the meeting to be held for a duration of three hours from 2-00 pm to 5-00 pm instead. The Police could have also secured necessary undertaking from the petitioner that no inflammatory speeches and no incitement to any offence be attempted at the meeting and no private or public property be destroyed / damaged in the process of conducting a public meeting. I, therefore, have no hesitation to set aside the impugned Proceeding dated 12-10-2013 and direct the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Central Zone, Hyderabad, to grant permission to the writ petitioner for conducting a public meeting peacefully between 200 pm to 5-00 pm on 19-10-2013 at Lal Bahadur Stadium, Hyderabad. Further, the petitioner shall comply with all such conditions / terms of payment which the 5th respondent is legitimately entitled to impose. With this, the writ petition stands allowed at the admission stage, but however without costs. Towards the evening and long after the hearing was complete, an Affidavit has been be circulated by Sri Y. Nagireddy, learned counsel for the petitioner indicating that the writ petitioner needs one weeks time for conducting the public meeting and hence, sought for appropriate directions accordingly to the Deputy Commissioner of Police. I have not taken the same into account and consideration as it travels beyond the relief prayed for in the writ petition.