JUDGMENT Dama Seshadri Naidu, J. 1. The present writ appeal is filed assailing the order dated 30.12.2009 in W.P. No. 7238 of 2003, whereby and whereunder, a learned single Judge of this Court allowed the writ petition, setting aside the punishment imposed on the 1st respondent herein by the appellant, Anakapally Rural Electrical Cooperative Society Limited. ("the Society" for brevity.) 2. The facts in brief are that the appellant is a society registered under the A.P. Cooperative Societies Act, with an all pervasive control exercised by the State, thus rendering itself an instrumentality of State. The 1st respondent herein was originally appointed as a Lower Division Clerk on 18.11.1974. He is said to have completed more than three decades of service by the time of filing of the writ petition. He was, in course of time, promoted as Administrative Officer from the category of Manager on 18.05.1999. 3. While he was the Manager, he was also required to act on full time, temporarily though, as Managing Director of the appellant Society, ever since the then Managing Director had been placed under suspension on the allegation of certain departmental irregularities. In the month of July, 2001, when the first respondent was working as an Administrative Officer, on certain complaints made against him, disciplinary proceedings were initiated by the appellant Society. On 01.08.2001, he was placed under suspension, and later on 10.08.2001, an enquiry officer, incidentally a practicing advocate of the region, was appointed by the Society. 4. Questioning his suspension, the 1st respondent filed W.P. No. 16268 of 2001 before this Court, but it was dismissed on 20.08.2001, with a direction to the appellant to complete the enquiry within three months. The record reveals that, yet again, on 23.08.2001, the 1st respondent made a representation to the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, A.P., Hyderabad, seeking his intervention in the matter, but to no avail. Eventually on 19.09.2001, the enquiry officer issued a charge memo with six charges, calling for the explanation of the 1st respondent. On 22.09.2001, the 1st respondent submitted a representation to the Managing Director of the RESCO, firstly denying all the articles of the charges, and secondly seeking further time till 15.10.2001 for submitting a detailed explanation. Eventually on 19.09.2001, the enquiry officer issued a charge memo with six charges, calling for the explanation of the 1st respondent. On 22.09.2001, the 1st respondent submitted a representation to the Managing Director of the RESCO, firstly denying all the articles of the charges, and secondly seeking further time till 15.10.2001 for submitting a detailed explanation. It is to be seen that on 26.09.2001, the 1st respondent made another representation to the Managing Director seeking postponement of the enquiry till a response was received from the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Hyderabad, since he had already made a representation to the said authority ventilating his grievance on various aspects, including that of appointing a practicing advocate, an outsider, as the enquiry officer. 5. The record further reveals that since there was neither judicial intervention nor any directions from the statutory authorities interdicting the departmental enquiry, the 1st respondent, eventually, submitted his explanation on 03.11.2001 to the Managing Director of the appellant Society, rather than to the enquiry officer. Having ostensibly not taken cognizance of the explanation submitted to the Managing Director, the enquiry officer conducted an enquiry on 20.10.2001, recorded the statements of certain witnesses and eventually submitted his report on 09.11.2001 to the appellant Society, holding that all the charges framed against the 1st respondent were proved. 6. On receipt of the enquiry report, the Managing Director of the appellant Society issued a show-cause notice dated 09.07.2002 to the 1st respondent why he should not be removed from service. Though detailed explanations are said to have been submitted by the 1st respondent on 19.07.2002 and 20.08.2002, the appellant Society, concurring with the findings of the enquiry officer, thus rejecting the explanation of the 1st respondent, imposed on him the major punishment of reversion from the post of Administrative Officer to that of the Assistant Accounts Officer/Manager with immediate effect, through proceedings in Rc. No. RECS/ADM/Estt./Dis.Action/2002-03, dated 22.11.2002. Assailing the said order of punishment, the 1st respondent filed 1 W.f. No. 7238 of 2003, which was allowed on 30.12.2009. In fact, the learned Single Judge set aside the impugned order of punishment, holding that the disciplinary proceedings had been vitiated, inter alia, on the ground that the 1st respondent had not been put on notice, nor had he been given any opportunity to participate in the enquiry so as to contest the charges levelled against him. In fact, the learned Single Judge set aside the impugned order of punishment, holding that the disciplinary proceedings had been vitiated, inter alia, on the ground that the 1st respondent had not been put on notice, nor had he been given any opportunity to participate in the enquiry so as to contest the charges levelled against him. Thus, holding that deprivation of an opportunity is in violation of the principles of natural justice, the learned Single Judge in toto allowed the writ petition. Assailing the same, the present writ appeal has come to be filed. 7. The primary contention raised by the learned Standing Counsel is that the appellant Society is neither a State nor an instrumentality of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, and as such, it is not amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court. It is further contended that there are no pleadings in the writ petition demonstrating as to how the appellant Society can be termed as a State proper or an instrumentality of the State. In this regard, the learned Standing Counsel has placed reliance on a Full Bench decision of this Court in Konaseema Co-op. Central Bank Ltd. v. N. Seetharama Raju AIR 1990 AP 171 (FB) In furtherance of his submissions on the question of jurisdiction, the learned Standing Counsel has submitted that the observation of the learned single Judge that the appellant Society is an instrumentality of the State does not have any material foundation. 8. The learned Standing Counsel, placing reliance on Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar AIR 1994 SC 1074 , and on State Bank of Patiala v. S. K. Sharma AIR 1996 SC 1669 , has further contended that mere violation of the principles of natural justice, without anything more, in the course of disciplinary proceedings, does not confer a direct and positive benefit of reinstatement on the delinquent. Thus, the learned Standing Counsel has contended that the learned single Judge could have, if at all, relegated the matter to a stage where it was found that there had been infraction of principles of natural justice. In the alternative, the learned Standing Counsel has also strenuously contended that if there were to be any procedural defect or shortcoming, it would at best be a curable defect, not going to the root of the matter. 9. In the alternative, the learned Standing Counsel has also strenuously contended that if there were to be any procedural defect or shortcoming, it would at best be a curable defect, not going to the root of the matter. 9. The learned Standing Counsel has further submitted that, even after the receipt of the enquiry report, the appellant Society did not act in haste, but instead, once again provided an opportunity to the 1st respondent to answer the findings of the enquiry officer. Only when his explanation was not satisfactory, did the appellant Society impose the punishment impugned in the writ petition. The learned Standing Counsel has also further submitted that the findings of the learned Single Judge are inconsistent with the legal principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S. K. Sharma case (supra). In the end, the learned Standing Counsel has contended that the 1st respondent had an efficacious alternative remedy open to him under the provisions of A.P. Shops and Establishments Act, 1988 or Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, but he did not avail himself of either of the alternative remedies. 10. Thus, summing up his submissions, the learned Standing Counsel has said that the order dated 30.12.2009 of the learned single Judge in W.P. No. 7238 of 2003 is totally unsustainable and is required to be set aside, thereby restoring the order dated 22.11.2002 of the appellant Society. 11. Per contra, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent has submitted, with equal vehemence, that, apart from stating in a passing manner that the appellant Society is not an instrumentality of the State, no further foundation was laid in the pleadings in the counter affidavit filed by the respondent Society, nor did it maintain any substantive objection on this count in the course of writ proceedings. To sustain the said objection, the appellant Society, it is submitted, ought to have made out a prima facie case on the question of the appellant Society not being an instrumentality of State. Only then would the burden shift on to the 1st respondent to dispel the said contention. 12. To sustain the said objection, the appellant Society, it is submitted, ought to have made out a prima facie case on the question of the appellant Society not being an instrumentality of State. Only then would the burden shift on to the 1st respondent to dispel the said contention. 12. Adverting to the merits of the matter, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent has submitted that when the 1st respondent was officiating as the full time Managing Director, he had to defend the interests of the appellant Society by opposing departmentally and judicially the claims of the then Managing Director under suspension. Since he dutifully opposed the unsustainable claims of the suspended Managing Director facing the disciplinary enquiry, only in the interest of the appellant Society though, the Managing Director on his reinstatement, in a vindictive manner, bore a grudge against the 1st respondent and indulged in witch-hunting. He has contended that, unknown in the realm of departmental enquiries, for the first time, the appellant Society appointed an advocate as the enquiry officer with an oblique motive. 13. It is further contended that despite the 1st respondent's submitting his explanation to the Managing Director of the Society, instead of to the enquiry officer, the appellant Society, taking advantage of the said minor irregularity, if at all it were to be an irregularity, chose to ignore his entire explanation and handed out the punishment of reversion, which is a major punishment. It was done by the Society merely acting on the unilateral findings of the enquiry officer. 14. The learned counsel has further strenuously contended that putting a person on notice regarding the commencement of the enquiry is one thing, and the delinquent's failure to participate in the enquiry to defend himself is another thing. Insofar as the lack of notice is concerned, it goes to the root of the matter and it vitiates the proceedings. Once the delinquent participates in the enquiry, any shortcomings during the course of that enquiry could perhaps be curable. Thus, contending that the entire enquiry was vitiated, the learned counsel has submitted that the order dated 30.12.2009 in W.P. No. 7238 of 2003 is justly in accordance with the established principles of law, calling for no interference, more particularly when the writ jurisdiction, in the nature of judicial review, is discretionary. Thus, contending that the entire enquiry was vitiated, the learned counsel has submitted that the order dated 30.12.2009 in W.P. No. 7238 of 2003 is justly in accordance with the established principles of law, calling for no interference, more particularly when the writ jurisdiction, in the nature of judicial review, is discretionary. He has finally submitted that, in the absence of any perversity, no interference is called for, only because an equally possible view, if at all, can be taken. 15. Heard the learned Standing Counsel for the appellant Society and the learned counsel for the 1st respondent, apart from perusing the record. 16. Evidently, the learned single Judge initially considered the objection raised by the 1st respondent that the Managing Director of the society had no power to initiate the disciplinary proceedings against the 1st respondent, inasmuch as the Managing Director is not the appointing authority for the post of Administrative Officer. The learned single Judge has held that though the Board is the competent one, there is, in fact, a delegation of power, and as such the said argument cannot be countenanced. Further on the count of appointing an advocate as an enquiry officer, the learned single Judge has held that unless there is a clear embargo on appointing an outsider as an enquiry officer, it cannot be held that a departmental person alone should be appointed as an enquiry officer. In other words, in the absence of any specific rule for appointing an enquiry officer only from the ranks of departmental personnel, it is always open to the appellant Society to appoint any independent person as an enquiry officer. Thus, those aspects being in favour of the appellant Society, they need not be reagitated. 17. Adverting to the merits of the matter, insofar as the charges are concerned, it is profitable to extract the said charges, which are as follows: "1. "That you while working as Administrative Officer, RECS Kasimkota in abuse of your official position and actuated by corrupt motive demanded and collected from Sri Doddi Siva Sanyasi Rao, S/o. late Doddi Joga Rao of Kasimkota Village, illegal gratification of a sum of Rs. "That you while working as Administrative Officer, RECS Kasimkota in abuse of your official position and actuated by corrupt motive demanded and collected from Sri Doddi Siva Sanyasi Rao, S/o. late Doddi Joga Rao of Kasimkota Village, illegal gratification of a sum of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) in the month of November, 2000 in the presence of his brother Doddi Venkata Suri Satyanarayana at your residence at Anakapalle, for providing compassionate appointment consequent on the death of his father, Sri Doddi Joga Rao an employee of the RECS: Kasimkota.." 2. "that you, while working as Administrative Officer, RECS Kasimkota in abuse of your official position and actuated by corrupt motive, demanded and collected from the following contractors of the RECS: Kasimkota the sums noted against each of them for processing their bills in respect of the works and executed by them in RECS: Name of the Contractor Date of Payment Amount 1. Chadaram Sanyasi Naidu 03.05.2001 Rs.1,500-00 2. R. Sanyasi Rao 14.06.2001 Rs.500-00 3. Kandregula Jagga rao 27.06.2001 Rs.500-00 3. "that you were instrumental in the petition dt. 16.6.2001 put in by one Sri Bheesetti Appa Rao of Anakapalle against the management and affairs of the Rural Electric Cooperative Society, Kasimkota in that you furnished copies of the following records of the society in utter disregard of official discipline and secrecy: 1. Proceedings Lr. No. RECS/PUR/PE(P)/2001-02 dt. 6.4.2001 of the Managing Director, RECS: Kasimkota 2. Proceedings Re. No. RECS/ADM/Estt/Acctt/dt. 12.4.2001 of the Managing Director, RECS: Kasimkota 3. Lr.RECS/PUR/Pre(P)/2001-02 dt. 4.5.2001 of the Managing Director, RECS: Kasimkota addressed to Sri Venkateswara Electric & hardware, Gopalapuram 4. Lr.RECS/PUR/PE(P)/2001-02 dt. 7.5.2001 of the Managing Director, RECS: Kasimkota 5. Lr.RECS/PUR/PE(P)/2001-02 dt. 5.5.2001 of the Managing Director, RECS: Kasimkota 6. Lr.RECS/PUR/PE(P)/2001-02 dt. 3.5.2001 of the Managing Director, RECS: Kasimkota 4. "that you in abuse of your official position and in utter disregard of office discipline and secrecy indulged in sending petitions against the institution Rural Electric Cooperative Society, Kasimkota and its officials on the names of third parties with a view to tarnish the image of the Rural Electrical Cooperative Society and its officials and management. 5. "that in utter disregard of office discipline you were found absent in the office when the Managing Director, RECS: Kasimkota sent for you during the following dates. 28th and 29th June, 2001 18th and 19th July, 2001 23rd and 24th July, 2001 6. 5. "that in utter disregard of office discipline you were found absent in the office when the Managing Director, RECS: Kasimkota sent for you during the following dates. 28th and 29th June, 2001 18th and 19th July, 2001 23rd and 24th July, 2001 6. "that in gross violation of office discipline, you abstained from duty on the 30th July, 2001 without applying for leave whatsoever." 18. The above charges have to be examined in the back drop of the facts, such as the role reversal of the MD of the Society and the 1st respondent, and the procedure adopted by the Society while conducting the departmental enquiry. It is indisputable that there was a role reversal inasmuch' as the 1st respondent officiated as a full time Managing Director when the incumbent Managing Director was under suspension. The very Managing Director, apparently after the culmination of the departmental proceedings in his favour, resumed his position as a Managing Director and subjected the 1st respondent, who then stood reverted to his original position, to the disciplinary proceedings, albeit on certain complaints. Thus, one should be circumspect of the attendant circumstances in examining the manner of conducting the departmental enquiry that had come to be held against the 1st respondent. 19. It is not in dispute that the 1st respondent submitted his detailed explanation to the Managing Director of the appellant Society, rather than to the enquiry officer. In all fairness, the Managing Director ought to have forwarded the said explanation of the 1st respondent to the enquiry officer, which he did not. The enquiry officer, on the other hand, without any reference to the explanation submitted by the 1st respondent, treated the explanation to have never been submitted to him. Though the enquiry was conducted on 20.08.2001 and certain witnesses were examined, there is no whisper in the enquiry report, which is the part of the record, whether the 1st respondent was intimated at least of the date of enquiry, if nothing more. The learned Single Judge has specifically observed that the record did not disclose that the 1st respondent had been put on notice. Further even the learned Standing Counsel, as has been observed by the learned Single Judge, at the bar had fairly conceded that there was no notice issued to the 1st respondent. The learned Single Judge has specifically observed that the record did not disclose that the 1st respondent had been put on notice. Further even the learned Standing Counsel, as has been observed by the learned Single Judge, at the bar had fairly conceded that there was no notice issued to the 1st respondent. On this count, it was held that in the face of infraction of principles of natural justice, the departmental enquiry stood vitiated. 20. Thus, in the light of the rival submissions and the findings of the learned Single Judge, the issues that emerge for consideration in the present writ appeal are: "1. Whether the appellant society is an instrumentality of State or not? And 2. Whether the denial opportunity to participate in the enquiry vitiates the enquiry in its entirety or whether it is curable in nature?" In Re. Issue No. 1: 21. Before appreciating this issue, it has to be borne in mind that the definition of State under Article 12 is only for the purpose of application of the provisions contained in Part-Ill, but it has nothing to do with the rest of the Articles, such as Arts.300-A, 309, 310 and 311 of the Constitution of India. Hence, even though a body of persons may not constitute the State within the instant definition, a writ under Article 226 may lie against it on a non-constitutional grounds or on the ground of contravention of some provisions of the Constitution outside Part-Ill, e.g., where such body has public duty to perform or its acts are supported by the State or public officials. (see: Durga Das Basu's Shorter Constitution of India, page 47, vol.1, 14th Edition). 22. In Chapter III of the Constitution, exclusively dealing with Fundamental Rights, the lexical provision is Art. 12, which is as follows: "12. Definition.-In this part, unless the context otherwise requires, "the State" includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India. On the other hand, Part VI dealing with the federal provision ‘States’ contains Article 226, which is as follows: "226. On the other hand, Part VI dealing with the federal provision ‘States’ contains Article 226, which is as follows: "226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.-(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, [***] every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including [writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. (3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1), without- (a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order; and (b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the said next day, stand vacated. (4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of Article 32." 23. Essentially, not in literal terms though, Part III of the Constitution begins with Art. 12 and ends with Art. 32, forming an arch with Art. 21 being its keystone. As such, importing the lexical limitation of Art. 12 for every constitutional remedy may not be necessary. In the present instance, the discussion could be with regard to the scope and ambit of Art. 226, rather than Art. 12, of the Constitution. 24. In his celebrated cerebral work on Constitutional Law, the learned author D.D. Basu has enlisted the agencies against whom a writ under Art.226 lies: "(i) the State (Government); (ii) an authority; (iii) a statutory body; (iv) an instrumentality or agency of the State; (v) a company financed and owned by the State; (vi) a private body run substantially on State funding; (vii) a private body under liability to discharge any function under any statute, to compel it to perform such a statutory function. However, a writ of mandamus can be issued to any person or authority performing a statutory function. However, a writ of mandamus can be issued to any person or authority performing public duty, owing positive obligation to the affected party. Where the cooperative society is not the department of the State and is also not a creature of a statue but is merely governed by a statute, i.e., it is a private party, writ petition against it would be maintainable only if it is established that a mandatory provision of a statute has been violated." 25. Further as to what purpose, the learned Author would say: "4. 'Any other purpose' means a purpose for which any of the writs could, according to well-established principles, issue. The result is that while under the first part, a writ may be issued under the Article only after a decision that the aggrieved party has a fundamental right and that it has been infringed under the second part, it may be issued only after a finding that the aggrieved party has a legal right which entitles him to any of the aforesaid writs and that such right has been infringed. Any other purpose,' in short, means 'the enforcement of nay legal right and the performance of any legal-duty'. Any other purpose,' in short, means 'the enforcement of nay legal right and the performance of any legal-duty'. A legal right, of courts, means any legally enforceable right, and includes contractual right, other than merely personal right. When there is negligence of public duty on the face of it and infringement of Art. 21, there will be no bar to proceed under Art. 226." 26. The learned Standing Counsel, however, has placed reliance on Sri Konaseema Co-op. Central Bank Ltd. v. N. Seetharama Raju AIR 1990 AP 171 (Full Bench), and has submitted that the respondent society is neither a state nor an instrumentality of State. As such, the ratio in Konaseema needs to be discussed at some length. The solitary submission made in this regard was that the society was registered under the Societies Registration Act, but not under a specific statute, and as such it cannot be termed as an instrumentality of State. If we examine Konaseema case (supra), the learned Full Bench of this Court has summarized the legal principles on this score in para 51 (AIR) as follows: "51. Summary : From the above discussion the following propositions emerge:-- (i) If a particular co-operative society can be characterised as a 'State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution (applying the tests evolved by the Supreme Court in that behalf), it would also be an 'authority' within the meaning, and for the purpose, of Art. 226 of the Constitution. In such a situation, an order passed by a Society against its employee in violation of the bye-laws, can be corrected by way of a writ petition. This is not because the bye-laws have the force of law, but on the ground that having framed the bye-laws prescribing the service conditions of its employees, the Society must follow them, in the interest of fairness. If it is left to the sweet will and pleasure of the Society either to follow or not to follow the bye-laws, it would be inherently arbitrary? and may very likely give rise to discriminatory treatment. A society, which is a 'State', has to act in conformity with Art. 14 and, for that reason, it will be made to follow the bye-laws. and may very likely give rise to discriminatory treatment. A society, which is a 'State', has to act in conformity with Art. 14 and, for that reason, it will be made to follow the bye-laws. (ii) Even if a Society cannot be characterised as a 'State' within the meaning of Art. 12, even so a writ would lie against it to enforce a statutory public duty which an employee is entitled to enforce against the Society. In such a case, it is unnecessary to go into the question whether the Society is being treated as a 'person', or an 'authority', within the meaning of Art. 226 of the Constitution. What is material is the nature of the statutory duty placed upon it, and the Court will enforce such statutory public duty. (iii) The bye-laws made by a co-operative society registered under the A.P. Co-operative Societies Act do not have the force of law. They are in the nature of contract, terms of contract, between the Society and its employees, or between the Society and its members, as the case may be. Hence, where a Society cannot be characterised as a 'State', the service conditions of its employees, governed by bye-laws, cannot be enforced through a writ petition. However, in the matter of termination of service of the employees of a co-operative society, S. 47 of the A.P. Shops and Establishments Act provides a certain protection, and since the said protection is based upon public policy, it will be enforced, in an appropriate case, by this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Ordinarily, of course, an employee has to follow the remedies provided by the A.P. Shops and Establishments Act; but, in an appropriate case, this Court will interfere under Art. 226, if the violation of a statutory public duty is established. It is immaterial which Act or Rule casts such a statutory public duty. (iv) Mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition are public law remedies. They are not available to enforce private law rights. Every act of a society which may be a ‘State’ within the meaning of Art. 12, does not necessarily belong to public, law field. A society, which is a 'State', may have its private law rights just like a Government. A contractual obligation, which is not statutory, cannot be enforced by way of a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. A society, which is a 'State', may have its private law rights just like a Government. A contractual obligation, which is not statutory, cannot be enforced by way of a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Prior to entering into contract, however, Art. 14 operates, as explained by the Supreme Court in E.E. and C. Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 SC 266 , and Ramana Dayaram Shetty, AIR 1979 SC 1628 ." 27. The learned Full Bench, while considering the issue whether Sree Konaseema Co-operative Central Bank is a 'State' within the meaning of Art.12, has firstly observed that cooperative society can also be an 'authority' within the meaning of Article 12 and, therefore, a 'State' is beyond dispute. Having thus observed, it took the test formulated in Ramana Dayaram Shetty AIR 1979 SC 1628 , as affirmed in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib AIR 1981 SC 487 , listing out the criteria as follows: "(1) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government. (2) Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with governmental character. (3) It may also be a relevant factor....... whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is the State conferred or State protected. (4) Existence of "deep and pervasive State control" may afford an indication that the Corporation is a State agency or instrumentality. (5) If the functions of the corporation of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government. (6) "Specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference" of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government...". 28. After setting out the parameters, their Lordships have observed that a Corporation to be characterized as an instrumentality or agency of State need not satisfy all the six tests. They have further held that of the six tests indicated above, tests 2, 3 and 6 are inapplicable to the case on hand. 29. 28. After setting out the parameters, their Lordships have observed that a Corporation to be characterized as an instrumentality or agency of State need not satisfy all the six tests. They have further held that of the six tests indicated above, tests 2, 3 and 6 are inapplicable to the case on hand. 29. Examining the facts of the case, the Full Bench has held that there is no financial assistance of the State, much less is it of such an extent as to meet almost all the expenditure of the Corporation. The Government's contribution to the share capital of the Bank is said to be 10%. It is further held that the appellant-Bank also does not enjoy any monopoly. On the question of deep and pervasive State control, it is held: "29. The aforesaid control vested in the Government and the Registrar, particularly the power to divide, amalgamate or merge the societies, power to conduct elections to the committee (disabling the Society to conduct such an election itself), power to supersede the committee, power to recover amounts due to the societies as arrears of land-revenue, power to provide common cadres for the employees of several independent societies, as also the extensive power to give binding directions vested in both the Government and the Registrar not only in the interest of share-holders, depositors and creditors, but also in the interest of public and of cooperative movement, is liable to be characterized as deep and pervasive control, within the meaning of the fourth test aforesaid. It must be noted that in this particular Writ Appeal, the society concerned is a Co-operative Central Bank, which is included within the categories of Societies, included in Section 116-A." 30. The Full Bench went on to consider another aspect, namely whether the functions of the Society are of public importance and closely related to governmental functions. This test, it is held, is too general to be precise. On examination of the bye-laws and the functioning of the Bank, their Lordships have held that the Bank's dealings are confined to its members and its membership consists of member-societies, Government, or a few nominal members. The appellant would not advance loan to a non-member, whoever he is. This test, it is held, is too general to be precise. On examination of the bye-laws and the functioning of the Bank, their Lordships have held that the Bank's dealings are confined to its members and its membership consists of member-societies, Government, or a few nominal members. The appellant would not advance loan to a non-member, whoever he is. On the issue whether it discharges a function of public importance, the Full Bench has gone one to observe: "But so does every other financial institution and Bank which provides credits to Industry, Commerce, Communications, and other bodies providing various services to the society. More important, according to the fifth test evolved by the Supreme Court, not only the functions of a Corporation should be of public importance, but they must also be closely related to governmental functions. Inasmuch as the operation of the appellant-Bank is not confined to State funds, and also because it cannot be termed as an agency created by the State for distributing the rural credit provided by it, it cannot be said that it satisfies this test. As stated above, the appellant-Bank has its own funds, and the credit provided by central agencies is only a part of it.... X X X X X 32. In the circumstances, it is not possible to say that the appellant-Bank/Society satisfies the fifth test enunciated by the Supreme Court." 31. Eventually the Full Bench has held that the appellant Society cannot be characterized as a ' State' within the meaning of Article 12. 32. In this regard, it is pertinent to submit that much water has flowed under the judicial bridges since 1990. After a series of undulating judicial pronouncements, the Courts have fixed various other parameters in that regard to determine the scope of Art. 12 of the Constitution. Now, what holds the field is the ratio laid down in Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology (2002) 5 SCC 111 , a judgment of 7-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In any event, for our purpose what is required to be examined is the scope of Art. 226 rather than Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. 33. Examining the scope of Article 226, we may refer to certain definitive pronouncements on it. In U.P. State Coop. In any event, for our purpose what is required to be examined is the scope of Art. 226 rather than Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. 33. Examining the scope of Article 226, we may refer to certain definitive pronouncements on it. In U.P. State Coop. Land Development Bank Ltd. v. Chandra Bhan Dubey (1999) 1 SCC 741 , the Supreme Court has held that the language of Article 226 does not admit of any limitation on the powers of the High Court for the exercise of jurisdiction thereunder though by various decisions of the Court, with varying and divergent views, it has been held that the jurisdiction under Article 226 can be exercised only when a body or authority, the decision of which is complained against, was exercising its power in the discharge of public duty and that writ is a public law remedy. 34. In Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. Rohtas Industries Staff Union (1976) 2 SCC 82 it has been held that the expansive and extraordinary power of the High Courts under Article 226 is as wide as the amplitude of the language used indicates and so can affect any person - even a private individual - and be available for any (other) purpose - even one for which another remedy may exist. The amendment to Article 226 in 1963 inserting Article 226(1-A) reiterates the targets of the writ power as inclusive of any person by the expressive reference to 'the residence of such person'. But it is one thing to affirm the jurisdiction, another to authorise its free exercise like a bull in a china shop. The Supreme Court has spelt out wise and clear restraints on the use of this extraordinary remedy and High Courts will not go beyond those wholesome inhibitions except where the monstrosity of the situation or other exceptional circumstances cry for timely judicial interdict or mandate. The mentor of law is justice and a potent drug should be judiciously administered. The Supreme Court has further observed that the writ power has, by and large, been the people's sentinel on the qui vive. To cut back on or liquidate that power may cast a peril on human rights. The conclusion is that this power is to be kept on a judicious leash. 35. The Supreme Court has further observed that the writ power has, by and large, been the people's sentinel on the qui vive. To cut back on or liquidate that power may cast a peril on human rights. The conclusion is that this power is to be kept on a judicious leash. 35. In Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani (1989) 2 SCC 691 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held: "20. The term "authority" used in Article 226, in the context, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article12. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32. Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights. The words "any person or authority" used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed, if a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied. 22. Here again we may point out that mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the statute. Commenting on the development of this law, Professor de Smith states: "To be enforceable by mandamus a public duty does not necessarily have to be one imposed by statute. It may be sufficient for the duty to have been imposed by charter, common law, custom or even contract." [Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th Edn., p. 540] We share this view. The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into watertight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances. Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available "to reach injustice wherever it is found". Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances. Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available "to reach injustice wherever it is found". Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226. We, therefore, reject the contention urged for the appellants on the maintainability of the writ petition." 36. In T. Gattaiah v. Commissioner of Labour, Hyderabad (1981) 1 APLJ 280 , his Lordship Sri Justice P. A. Chowdhury, has, in a scintillating style, opined as follows: "The very wide and special language of Article 226 of the Constitution occurring as it does in a primordial document like the Constitution must, in my opinion be given its full meaning. In doing so, we must take note of the fact that the Constitution itself declares that the General Clause Act would apply to its interpolation. According to the General Clauses Act, the word 'person' refers not only to a natural person but even to a legal person. If so done, there is no doubt, in my opinion, that a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution would be available not only against an authority or Government, but also against a private person. The restrictive meaning suggested to be given to the word 'person' occurring in Article 226 would render that word a surpluage because according to that interpretation the word 'person can only mean another governmental authority. The rule of interpretation that the meaning of a word should be ascertained from the association it keeps cannot, therefore, be applied to the word 'person' occurring in Article 226 of the Constitution. The above considerations, in my opinion, would clearly liberate the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution from the limiting constraints of the dictum of Atkin L.J., in the above mentioned case. I, therefore, hold that in appropriate cases a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution could issue even against private persons. 23. That apart the State power to render justice between a citizen and a citizen and between a citizen and the State belongs to the constitutional courts of our country more by reason of their establishment and less by reason of conferment of power by the co-ordinate organs of the State acting under the Constitution. Renunciation of such jurisdiction cannot easily be accepted. Renunciation of such jurisdiction cannot easily be accepted. Some of the aforementioned cases drew a picture of dreadful consequences as flowing from giving a wider meaning to the word 'person'. In my humble opinion, there is no scope for any such apprehension so long as we understand that the power under Article 226 of the Constitution is exercised on the basis of its public law foundations and the field of public law is clearly different from the field of private law. Although there is high authority and uniform practice to the contrary we cannot in principle issue the private remedy of an injunction in place of the public remedy of mandamus or vice verse. Regarding Hariharan case (supra) of our High Court and the Neyveli Lignite Corporation (supra) case of Madras High Court, I must make a special mention. Both these cases had proceeded on the assumption that the limited companies in those two cases although owned and controlled by the Government of India are two separate and distinct legal entities from the Government and that therefore, they are not amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. This is a view which in my humble opinion, totally missed to take into account the significance of the great American doctrine of State action as applicable to Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. I am one of these few who have first sought for the applicability of this American doctrine in our Courts. In D. Jayasri v. Kakatiya Medical College, Warangal (9) 1967 (1) An. W.R. 247, this Court held that a writ would lie at the instance of the Petitioner seeking admission into a medical college, against a Society which was registered under the Societies Registration Act. I further sought for the enforcement of this American doctrine of State action in cases like Kanska Durga v. Kakatiya Medical College AIR 1972 AP 83 Subhadra Devi v. Andhra Girls College (11) 1973 (1) An W.R. 94 and P.V. Naidu v. A.P. Mining Corporation 1974 (1) A.P.L.J. 222 and also in unreported judgments in writ petitions 4239/69 dated 12-5-70 and 3103/75 dated 17-4-78 This doctrine has now been firmly implanted into our Corpos Juris by a recent judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Ajay Kasia v. Khalid Mujib (1981) 1 SCC 722 . The acceptence of this doctrine by our Courts would clearly constitute at least partial though not total rejection of the dictum of Atkin L.J., in the above case. According to the traditional theory incorporated company is a distinct legal person as Hindustan Shipyard and Neyvtli Lignite Corporation are undoubtedly. The Constitution did not confer any powers on these bodies to affect the traditional rights of the citizens relating to freedom and liberty. If the dictum of Atkin L.J., was to be followed, no writ would issue to such bodies. The fact that writs are now being issued against such bodies would clearly show the partial atrophy that the doctrine of Atkin L.J., had suffered. For our constitutional purposes it is now clear that a private person can transform himself into a person in authority not merely by sharing in and exercising the State power affecting the rights of the citizen but even by possessing power to grant bounties and facilities. Such a private person's activities should be amenable to writ, jurisdiction." 37. In Sadhu Varahala Babu And Ors. Vs. Government Of A.P., Co-Operation Dept., & Others 2005 (5) ALT 126 , a judgment of erudition and exertion, this Court, per Dr. Justice G. Yethirajulu J has summarised the entire case law on the issue and has held: "49. A body that can be called 'State' under Article 12 is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 32. Though Article 226 is not in Part III, this article empowers the High Court to issue writs to 'persons' to enforce ordinary rights. A writ of Prohibition/Certiorari will lie against a body, which is not judicial or quasi-judicial and they are available against bodies clothed with such powers. The writ of certiorari cannot be issued against private persons even under Article 226. But Article 226 empowers High Court to issue directions against private persons also." Eventually, his Lordship has held: "77. The co-operative societies are established under the A.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1964. The rules regarding the functioning of the societies were framed from time to time giving statutory recognition. The bye-laws of the societies are also given statutory flavour on account of their enforcement after getting approval from the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. The co-operative societies are established under the A.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1964. The rules regarding the functioning of the societies were framed from time to time giving statutory recognition. The bye-laws of the societies are also given statutory flavour on account of their enforcement after getting approval from the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. Though the authorities of the State are not directly involving in the ordinary functioning of the societies, the authorities under the statute are regulating the functioning of the societies by fixing the staffing pattern, regulating the expenditure towards establishment charges, supervising the elections to the respective societies, conducting audit of the accounts of the societies, instructing the concerned authorities to take disciplinary actions against the erring officials and to reduce the members of the establishment in tune with the ceiling provided under the Act. In the first set of decisions mentioned in the aforementioned paragraphs, though the Courts held that a cooperative society is not a "State" or "other authority" under Article 12 of the Constitution, they did not put any embargo for treating it as "an authority" mentioned under Article 226 of the Constitution and for issuing necessary directions by invoking powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. The second set of decisions are to the effect that a cooperative society would also come within the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution. Keeping in view the above trend of decisions rendered by various Courts, I wish to summarise as under: (1) Article 226 empowers the High Court to issue writs to 'persons' or 'authorities' to enforce ordinary rights. (2) An order can be issued against private persons by granting appropriate relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. (3) Even if a society cannot be characterized as a "State" within the meaning of Article 12, a writ would lie against it to enforce a statutory public duty. (4) In the matter of termination of service of the employees of a cooperative society, Section 47 of the A.P. Shops and Establishments Act provides a certain protection and since the said protection is based upon public policy, it will be enforced, in an appropriate case, by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. (5) A writ can be maintained under Article 226 if there is flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice, which are required to be followed under a statute. (5) A writ can be maintained under Article 226 if there is flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice, which are required to be followed under a statute. (6) The power of the High Court is not confined only to issue of writs to a public authority. It can also issue directions to enforce any of the fundamental rights or for any other purpose. (7) The scope of Article 226 has been widened by maintaining the writ petition against other authorities and persons also. (8) Mandamus under Article 226 may issue even to a private person or a body regarded as a government instrumentality even when it is incorporated or registered under a statute viz., a co-operative society or a limited company. 78. In the light of the above findings, I hold that even if a cooperative society is not treated as a "State" within the scope of Article 12 of the Constitution, it can be treated as "an authority" for the purpose of Article 226 of the Constitution and, therefore, a writ against a co-operative society under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be maintained." 38. Continuing in the same vein, we may examine the ratio laid down in Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani (1989) 2 SCC 691 , wherein their Lordships, as a matter of comparative jurisprudence, have observed: "16. The law relating to mandamus has made the most spectacular advance. It may be recalled that the remedy by prerogative writs in England started with very limited scope and suffered from many procedural disadvantages. To overcome the difficulties, Lord Gardiner (the Lord Chancellor) in pursuance of Section 3(1)(e) of the Law Commission Act, 1965, requested the Law Commission "to review the existing remedies for the judicial control of administrative acts and omissions with a view to evolving a simpler and more effective procedure". The Law Commission made their report in March 1976 (Law Commission Report No. 73). It was implemented by Rules of Court (Order 53) in 1977 and given statutory force in 1981 by Section 31 of the Supreme Court Act, 1981. It combined all the former remedies into one proceeding called Judicial Review. Lord Denning explains the scope of this "judicial review": "At one stroke the courts could grant whatever relief was appropriate. Not only certiorari and mandamus, but also declaration and injunction. It combined all the former remedies into one proceeding called Judicial Review. Lord Denning explains the scope of this "judicial review": "At one stroke the courts could grant whatever relief was appropriate. Not only certiorari and mandamus, but also declaration and injunction. Even damages. The procedure was much more simple and expeditious. Just a summons instead of a writ. No formal pleadings. The evidence was given by affidavit. As a rule no cross-examination, no discovery, and so forth. But there were important safeguards. In particular, in order to qualify, the applicant had to get the leave of a judge. The statute is phrased in flexible terms. It gives scope for development. It uses the words "having regard to". Those words are very indefinite. The result is that the courts are not bound hand and foot by the previous law. They are to "have regard to" it. So the previous law as to who are - and who are not - public authorities, is not absolutely binding. Nor is the previous law as to the matters in respect of which relief may be granted. This means that the judges can develop the public law as they think best. That they have done and are doing." [See The Closing Chapter by Rt. Hon. Lord Denning, p. 122] 17. There, however, the prerogative writ of mandamus is confined only to public authorities to compel performance of public duty. The "public authority" for them means everybody which is created by statute - and whose powers and duties are defined by statute. So government departments, local authorities, police authorities, and statutory undertakings and corporations, are all "public authorities". But there is no such limitation for our High Courts to issue the writ "in the nature of mandamus". Article 226 confers wide powers on the High Courts to issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs. This is a striking departure from the English law. Under Article 226, writs can be issued to "any person or authority". It can be issued "for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose." 39. In the light of the above definitive judicial pronouncements of unquestionable efficacy, we hold that the appellant Society is to be treated as an entity amendable to writ jurisdiction under Art. 226, if not Art. 12, of the Constitution of India. In Re. Issue No. 2: 40. In the light of the above definitive judicial pronouncements of unquestionable efficacy, we hold that the appellant Society is to be treated as an entity amendable to writ jurisdiction under Art. 226, if not Art. 12, of the Constitution of India. In Re. Issue No. 2: 40. The next question is whether the denial opportunity to participate in the enquiry vitiates the enquiry in its entirety or whether it is curable in nature. It does not require any restatement that the principles of natural justice have acquired constitutional status, and thus have become inviolable. In A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India (1969) 2 SCC 262 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: "20. The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules namely: (2) no one shall be a Judge in his own case (nemo debet esse judex propria causa) and (2) no decision, shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is now questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala [ AIR 1969 SC 198 ] the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case." 41. In Biecco Lawrie Ltd. v. State of W.B. (2009) 10 SCC 32 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: "24. It is fundamental to fair procedure that both sides should be heard - audi alteram partem i.e. hear the other side and it is often considered that it is broad enough to include the rule against bias since a fair hearing must be an unbiased hearing. One of the essential ingredients of fair hearing is that a person should be served with a proper notice i.e. a person has a right to notice. Notice should be clear and precise so as to give the other party adequate information of the case he has to meet and make an effective defence. Denial of notice and opportunity to respond result in making the administrative decision as vitiated. 25. The adequacy of notice is a relative term and must be decided with reference to each case. But generally a notice to be adequate must contain the following: (a) time, place and nature of hearing; (b) legal authority under which the hearing is to be held; (c) statement of specific charges which a person has to meet."; 42. 25. The adequacy of notice is a relative term and must be decided with reference to each case. But generally a notice to be adequate must contain the following: (a) time, place and nature of hearing; (b) legal authority under which the hearing is to be held; (c) statement of specific charges which a person has to meet."; 42. Without multiplying the precedents, it can be stated that, providing an opportunity of fair hearing, which includes putting the affected person on notice, is sine qua non and it does not admit of any trifling with. In this case, the very appellant Society has not expressly denied that the petitioner was not put on notice at the time of hearing. 43. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not see any valid grounds to upset the findings of the learned Single Judge in the impugned Order, dated 30.12.2009 passed in W.P. No. 7238 of 2003 and accordingly, the writ appeal is dismissed. No costs. 44. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending in this writ appeal, shall stand closed. Appeal dismissed