JUDGMENT : N.K. BALAKRISHNAN, J. 1. Plaintiff is the appellant. His suit for injunction was dismissed by the Trial Court. The counter-claim filed by the defendants was decreed. The appeal filed by the plaintiff was dismissed. There was a family settlement evidenced by Ext. B1 entered into between the parties to the suit and other parties. Ext. C4(a) is the plan relied upon by both sides. Plot No. 1 is the plaint A Schedule property. Plot No. 2 in Ext. C4(a) is the plaint B Schedule property. Plaint C Schedule takes in Plots 4 and 6 shown in Ext. C4(a). Item No. 7 belongs to the defendant. As per the terms of Ext. B1 the defendant was to get only a right of way from the road. It is contended that Ext. C4(a) will go to show that the plaintiff had surrendered 54.9 Sq. metre land for the formation of the pathway in favour of D4 and D5. Instead the plaintiff obtained 35.7 Sq. metre of land for widening the C Schedule pathway. The fact that the pathway having a width of 10 feet was formed taking in Plot Nos. 4 and 6, is not disputed. But the core of the issue is whether the plaintiff is having absolute right over the said pathway and whether the plaintiff is entitled to put up a compound wall on either side of the pathway preventing the defendants from using the same, having direct access to the 'C Schedule road/pathway from their respective plots, Plot Nos. 7, 3 and 10. 2. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that a gap of one metre was provided on either side of the compound wall so as to enable the person in possession of Plot No. 10 to enter into the C Schedule and then to enter into the item which is on the other side. The learned counsel for the appellant relies upon Ext. A1 the compromise allegedly entered into between the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 5. The Courts below did not act upon Ext. A1. It is pointed out by the respondents that as per Ext. The learned counsel for the appellant relies upon Ext. A1 the compromise allegedly entered into between the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 5. The Courts below did not act upon Ext. A1. It is pointed out by the respondents that as per Ext. B1 the family settlement, the appellant had right to use the C Schedule way having a width of 10 feet but there is nothing to show that the appellant had obtained absolute right over the C Schedule pathway so as to construct the compound wall on their side preventing the user of the C Schedule way by the defendants who are admittedly having plots on either side of the said pathway. 3. The substantial question of law raised by the appellant is whether the Courts below were right in not acting upon Ext. A1 compromise which was accepted by the Appellate Court when the CM Appeal 34 of 2003 was pending before that Court. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant would submit that explanation to Rule 3 of Order XXIII of CPC makes it clear that if a party denies having entered into a compromise or disputes the correctness of the compromise then it is for them to seek review of the compromise or to file appeal against the same but since Ext. A1 was not challenged by the respondents by filing application for review or by filing appeal against the same the parties to Ext. A1 are bound by the same. But this is strongly refuted by the learned counsel for the respondents pointing out that Ext A1 compromise was not produced before the Sub Court when CMA was pending before that Court. The CMA was disposed of by the Sub Court in the following lines: Heard both sides. Based on the compromise dated 01/12/2003 parties are agreed to keep the status quo. Accordingly, this CMA is closed directing the parties to keep the present State till the disposal of the suit. No cost. 5. It is beyond any pale of doubt that Ext. A1 was not produced before the Sub Court. The alleged compromise was not recorded by that Court. The CM Appeal filed before the Sub Court against the order passed on the application for temporary injunction does not show that the Sub Court had recorded the compromise. No cost. 5. It is beyond any pale of doubt that Ext. A1 was not produced before the Sub Court. The alleged compromise was not recorded by that Court. The CM Appeal filed before the Sub Court against the order passed on the application for temporary injunction does not show that the Sub Court had recorded the compromise. That is quiet evident from the fact that the Sub Court directed both parties to maintain status quo till the disposal of the suit. If as a matter of fact Ext. A1 was acted upon by that Court and the compromise entered into therein was recorded by that Court, then the suit itself would have been disposed of recording the said compromise in which event the compromise so entered by the parties would have formed part of the decree. No compromise decree was admittedly passed by that Court. 6. There is one more aspect which assumes importance. The alleged compromise was signed only by D1 and D5. Other parties did not sign it. It is also worthwhile to note that the counsel appearing for the defendants did not sign it. That must precisely be the reason why Ext A1 was not produced before the Sub Court, for, had it been produced, the Sub Court would not have acted upon it because it was not signed by all the parties to the proceedings and also because the said compromise was not signed by the counsel appearing for the respondents therein. Simply because the compromise was signed by the appellant and his counsel, it cannot be said that the compromise was lawful to give an imprimatur of the Court so as to preclude the defendants from challenging the same. Since the compromise was not recorded and no decree was passed, the contention that the parties to the suit are bound by the said compromise cannot be countenanced for a moment. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued with vehemence that Ext. A1 was admittedly signed by the 5th defendant But her contention is that she was unaware of the contents of Ext. A1 at the time when she signed the same. It is true that such a plea cannot be easily accepted or digested. But at the same time, the fact remains that the said compromise was not signed by her counsel nor was it signed in the presence of her counsel. A1 at the time when she signed the same. It is true that such a plea cannot be easily accepted or digested. But at the same time, the fact remains that the said compromise was not signed by her counsel nor was it signed in the presence of her counsel. The counsel appearing for the appellant in the CM Appeal should have ensured that the compromise was signed by all the parties and the counsel appearing for both sides. But, surprisingly enough, the signature of the counsel appearing for the respondents was not obtained. Further the signatures of all the parties were also not obtained. In view of the towering circumstances mentioned earlier, it is difficult to hold that there was a lawful and genuine compromise so as to preclude the defendants from questioning the validity of the same. Though it was vaguely contended that Ext. A1 was produced before the Sub Court, in CMA 34/2003, there is nothing on record to show that Ext. A1 was produced before that Court. The very fact that the alleged compromise was not recorded by the Appellate Court in CMA 34/2003 would demolish the case of the plaintiff that Ext. A1 was recorded by the Court. The fact that the parties were directed to maintain status quo based on the alleged compromise entered into between the parties will not prove that Ext. A1 compromise was acted upon by the Court. It was only a temporary arrangement made by the Court till the disposal of the Case as is evident from the order itself that both parties were to maintain status quo till the disposal of the suit. 8. The fact that there was something else to be investigated or decided in the suit is quite evident, for otherwise, the entire suit itself could have been directed to be disposed of by the Trial Court in the light of Ext. A1 compromise, had it been found by the Appellate Court that the compromise was lawful and it can be acted upon by the Court. Nothing of that sort was there. Therefore, it would be a futile exercise on the part of the plaintiff/appellant to contend that the suit should be disposed of in terms of Ext. A1 compromise. 9. A1 compromise, had it been found by the Appellate Court that the compromise was lawful and it can be acted upon by the Court. Nothing of that sort was there. Therefore, it would be a futile exercise on the part of the plaintiff/appellant to contend that the suit should be disposed of in terms of Ext. A1 compromise. 9. The order sheet of the Appellate Court in CMA 34/2003 has also been made available for perusal which shows that parties had agreed to maintain status quo and accordingly the CMA was dosed directing the parties to "keep the present State". The order as aforesaid can never be construed to hold that the compromise was accepted by the Court or that a final order or decree was passed based on the same. 10. As said earlier the CMA was only against the order passed in the injunction application and therefore, the parties were directed to maintain status quo. That has nothing to do with the final adjudication of the dispute raised by the parties in the suit. Therefore, the contention raised by the appellant that a decree should have been passed in terms of Ext. A1 cannot be sustained at all. 11. The learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the decision in Moti Ram (D) Thr. L.Rs. and Another Vs. Ashok Kumar and Another, and submits that the mediation proceedings are totally confidential proceedings and that if the mediation succeeds, then the mediator should send the agreement signed by both the parties to the Court without mentioning what transpired during the mediation proceedings. It was also held that if the happenings in the mediation proceedings are disclosed it will destroy the confidentiality of the mediation process. Here the case was not referred for mediation at all. 12. The decision in Subramoniaru Sankararu Vs. State has also been referred to in this connection. There it was held that in a case where the matter is adjusted as a result of a compromise the parties agree not to try out their titles and rights but acknowledge and define them for the purpose of the compromise with a view to avoid a determination of their true nature the parties cannot detract and attack the finality and binding character of the compromise. This has been produced by the learned counsel for the appellant in support of his submission that even if one or both the parties may have been under a mistake in respect of the title, subsequently discovered, that circumstance will not detract from the finality and binding character of the compromise. It was held in that case that when a matter is compromised it binds the parties and mistake has no place therein. Here the compromise was not signed by the parties. The vitiating circumstances as to the acceptability of the compromise have already been referred to earlier and so the contention that the respondent is estopped from going behind that compromise is also found to be devoid of any merit. 13. The learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the decision of the Delhi High Court in A.V.M. (Retired) K.G. Mohan v. Arun Mohan Chandra and Others, CS (OS) No. 1236/2003, in support of his submissions that the settlement arrived at between parties before Court can only be considered as a tentative settlement and if the parties refuse to file an application under Order 23 Rule 3 the Court cannot pass a compromise decree in terms of the settlement. Here the compromise was not recorded. The compromise was not signed by all the parties and their counsel also. It is contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that compromise is always based on the principle of mutuality and consent of the parties and such consent of the parties must be available before the Court at all relevant times. It is also argued that for a compromise to be effective and binding it has to be a voluntary act on the part of the parties, for which free and fair consent should be there at all relevant times. Even if at some point of time one of the parties had signed the compromise petition it cannot be said that so long as the Court has not acted upon the compromise and recorded the same, the party who has signed the same is not entitled to resile from the same when subsequently a glaring defect or mistake was found out. If that be so, no finality can be attached to such a compromise. 14. The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon a decision of the Orissa High Court in Bhaja Govinda Maikap and Another Vs. If that be so, no finality can be attached to such a compromise. 14. The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon a decision of the Orissa High Court in Bhaja Govinda Maikap and Another Vs. Janaki Dei and Others, in support of his submission that when an agreement or compromise is denied by one of the parties, the Court has power to decide whether as a fact the alleged agreement or compromise was made and if it is satisfied that it was made, the Court can record the same. The only point to be considered is whether the agreement was lawful, to mean, whether there was a lawful compromise. Hence the learned counsel for the appellant submits that here it cannot be said that the compromise was not lawful and so the Trial Court was bound to record the compromise. But this contention has been taken exception to by the learned counsel for the respondents pointing out the vitiating circumstances pointed out earlier. It was not signed by all the parties who would be bound by the compromise and also by their counsel. It was never acted upon by the Court. So the contention that the Trial Court should have accepted and acted upon that compromise (Ext.A), is unsustainable. The decision of the Division Bench in Jacob, K.B. Vs. Najma Barneto and Others also has no application to the facts of this case since the Division Bench was dealing with the provision contained in Order XXXIII Rule 3 CPC, dealing with the scope of enquiry into the allegation by a party to the compromise. It was held that the scope of enquiry is limited as to whether an adjustment or satisfaction has or has not been arrived at. The learned counsel for the respondents would submit that the existence of the alleged adjustment or satisfaction has to be enquired into when there was specific denial of the same by the disputing party. The Courts below have analysed the evidence in that aspect and found whether a lawful compromise was entered into between the parties so as to enable the Court to act upon the same. That decision was rendered by the Courts below based on the evidence available on record. 15. The decision in Vasudevan Namboodiri Vs. Krishnan Namboodiri, has also been relied upon in this connection. That decision was rendered by the Courts below based on the evidence available on record. 15. The decision in Vasudevan Namboodiri Vs. Krishnan Namboodiri, has also been relied upon in this connection. That was a case where settlement was arrived at without signature of the parties. It was held that it is the duty of the Court or Adalat to insist upon the parties to reduce the terms of the compromise in writing and to sign. Here though the agreement or compromise was reduced to writing and signatures of some of the parties were obtained, it was not signed by other contesting parties and also by their counsel. Considering the entire aspects the Courts below found that there was no valid compromise so as to act upon by the Court. It was held by the Supreme Court in B.P. Moideen Sevamandir and Another Vs. A.M. Kutty Hassan. 19. Any admission made, any tentative agreement reached, or any concession made during the negotiation process before the Lok Adalat cannot be used either in favour of a party or against a party when the matter comes back to the Court on failure of the settlement process. To deny hearing to a party on the ground that his behaviour before the Lok Adalat was cantankerous or unreasonable would amount to denial of Justice. The Courts below have analysed the evidence on the point and came to the conclusion that there was no valid compromise. That did not deter the Court from considering the case on merits. But, here, the Courts below considered the entire evidence and circumstances to hold that the plaintiff is not entitled to get the reliefs as prayed for. Therefore, it can be seen that the Courts below were not biased or prejudiced in any manner. 16. Then the next question is whether the Courts below went wrong in deciding the issue against the plaintiff and whether there is any substantial question of law involved in the matter. It is the case of defendants 1, 4 and 5 that as per Ext. B1 family settlement, the width of 'C' Schedule pathway was only 11/2 metres. Hence subsequently D4 and D5 surrendered 5 feet of land each and thus the 'C Schedule pathway was widened to make it a 10 feet wide road. It is the case of defendants 1, 4 and 5 that as per Ext. B1 family settlement, the width of 'C' Schedule pathway was only 11/2 metres. Hence subsequently D4 and D5 surrendered 5 feet of land each and thus the 'C Schedule pathway was widened to make it a 10 feet wide road. It is contended that defendants 4 and 5 had surrendered land for the formation of 'C' Schedule pathway to have a total width of 10 feet The contention that since the plaintiff had provided a pathway having a width of 10 feet starting from Kallamparam Tar Road to Plot No. 7 which is the property of the 5th defendant that much portion of land was surrendered does not appear to be correct. Ext. C4(a) plan gives a true picture of the lie and position of the disputed pathway/road. As stated earlier the pathway of a portion of which is shown in yellow colour as Plot No. 4 was the pathway of a width of 1.500 metres originally provided as per Ext. B1 settlement deed. Plot 6 which is the eastern portion of the pathway/road was formed after getting the land surrendered by the 5th defendant who is holding Plot No. 7. The blue coloured plot marked as 3 is the property held by the 1st defendant. There is nothing on record to show that as per Ext. B1 settlement deed the width of the pathway was 10 feet as it now exists. On the other hand, the evidence would show that the pathway was widened to 10 feet after taking land from the property of D1, D4 and D5. There is also nothing on record to show that the 'C' Schedule pathway which now takes in Plot Nos. 4 and 6 is the exclusive pathway of the appellant. As per Ext. B1 family settlement that pathway was kept in common and not to be obstructed by the appellant. The contention that since two wicket gates have been provided on either side of the pathway there would be no difficulty for A1, A4 and A5 to use that pathway/road cannot be countenanced since they are not at the mercy of the appellant. They have got every right to use 'C' Schedule pathway as was kept apart as per Ext. The contention that since two wicket gates have been provided on either side of the pathway there would be no difficulty for A1, A4 and A5 to use that pathway/road cannot be countenanced since they are not at the mercy of the appellant. They have got every right to use 'C' Schedule pathway as was kept apart as per Ext. B1 settlement deed and also because they themselves provided the remaining width of the land to make it a road of a width of 10 feet. It is also in evidence that after obtaining a temporary injunction the appellant constructed compound wall on either side of the 'C' Schedule pathway. The appellant had no right to construct the compound wall so as to prevent defendants 1, 4 and 5 from using the 'C' Schedule pathway without any hindrance or obstruction. Since Ext. A1, the alleged compromise has been found to be unenforceable and since 'C' Schedule pathway was kept apart in common and also because it was formed by using the land surrendered by D1, D4 and D5, the contention to the contrary advanced by the appellant cannot be sustained. I find no merit in the appeal. It is hence dismissed. Parties are directed to suffer their respective costs.