Judgment : Rule. Made returnable forthwith. By consent, the petition is taken on board for final hearing. Heard the Counsel. 2. The petitioners herein are the judgment debtors in Special Civil Suit No.85/1984 filed by the respondents for partition of the property that had been jointly purchased by petitioner no.1 and respondent no.1 in the year 1969. Petitioner no.1 and respondent no.1 are the real brothers. Petitioner no.2 and respondent no.2 are their respective wives. 3. The suit property “Madant” consists of plot no.51 admeasuring 532 square metres and plots no.14 and 15, together admeasuring 2040 square metres. The petitioners have their house at plot no.51. On a portion of the other two plots they have established a workshop for barge building business and allied works. In view of the existing structures on the suit property, the respondents in extreme fairness, while seeking partition of the property in the suit, offered to sell their share in plot no.51 to the petitioners and to have the other two plots so divided by metes and bounds, as far as possible, that the portion over which the workshop is situate would fall to the share of the petitioners. 4. Despite admitted position as regards the title of the suit property and the structures standing thereon the petitioners contested the suit by filing written statement. The parties led evidence in the suit. More than twelve years after its filing, i.e. on 10th December, 1996, preliminary decree was passed in the suit declaring that both the sides have equal share in the suit property. For the purpose of actual partition, the trial Court appointed Commissioner with a direction to him to (i) assess value of the property of plot no.51 and give an option to both the sides to purchase the land or an option to sell it by public auction and; (ii) partition the remaining two plots by metes and bounds as far as possible, in such a way that the workshop established for barge building and other structures located on the property shall be located in the half portion to be allotted to the petitioners. 5. The petitioners challenged the preliminary decree by preferring First Appeal No.49/1997 before this Court and sought stay of its execution. 5. The petitioners challenged the preliminary decree by preferring First Appeal No.49/1997 before this Court and sought stay of its execution. By the interim order dated 18th September, 1997 this Court directed that the trial Court could go ahead with the hearing of the suit for partition without carrying out actual partition of the property. In terms of the interim order the trial Court proceeded to hear the partition suit and appointed Mr. P.C. Gupta, an engineer from Public Works Division as Commissioner for ascertaining the value of plot no.51 and suggestions for division of plots no.14 and 15. The Commissioner submitted two reports dated 29th October, 1999 (exhibit 58) and 31st March, 2000 (exhibit 61) to the trial Court in respect of the two sets of properties. The report at exhibit 61 suggested two proposals for partition of plots no.14 & 15 along with two plans of partition for approval of the Court. The reports of the Commissioner were objected to by the petitioners by filing their objections. The trial Court by its order dated 14th September, 2001 dismissed the objections and accepted and confirmed the report of the Commissioner. It however, did not specify the proposal from the report at exhibit 61 which was accepted. With acceptance of the proposals the trial Court proceeded to pass final decree on the same day. The final decree was referred to this Court during the pendency of First Appeal No.49/1997. The First Appeal came to be disposed of by the order dated 22nd March, 2004 rejecting the Commissioner's report at exhibit 58 and remanded the matter to the trial Court for revaluation of plot no.51 under Section 3 of the Partition Act. The preliminary decree was modified to that extent. 6. The trial Court then appointed engineer Mr. Moniz as a Commissioner for partition of plot no.51. The Commissioner submitted his report dated 21st July, 2004 which was accepted by the trial Court by its order dated 8th August, 2005 and the suit was disposed off with that order. The petitioners then preferred First Appeal No.306/1985 to this Court and sought stay of execution of the decree. By the order dated 12th July, 2006 this Court stayed the decree on condition that the petitioners deposited in this Court a sum of Rs.2,50,000/- (Rupees two lacs fifty thousand only) within a period of fifteen days. The petitioners have complied with that order. By the order dated 12th July, 2006 this Court stayed the decree on condition that the petitioners deposited in this Court a sum of Rs.2,50,000/- (Rupees two lacs fifty thousand only) within a period of fifteen days. The petitioners have complied with that order. In the meantime, there was amendment to Goa Civil Courts Act, 1965. In view of the amendment to Section 22 read with Section 20A of the Act, the appeal was required to be transferred to the District Court. The appeal was accordingly transferred to the District Court and re-registered as Regular Civil Appeal No.174/2010. The District Court by its judgment and decree dated 7th January, 2011 dismissed the Regular Civil Appeal. The petitioners challenged the order by preferring Second Appeal before this Court in respect of the property at plot no.51. The Second Appeal was disposed of by the judgment and order dated 25th August, 2011. 7. During the period 2004 to 2011 the respondents had filed four applications for modification of the decree to the trial Court for approving the first proposal of commissioner's report. All the applications were dismissed by the trial Court. Then they filed execution proceedings being Special Execution No.1/2008 in the trial Court. The petitioners raised objection to the execution proceedings raising several contentions including that the final decree had been passed during the pendency of the appeal before this Court against the preliminary decree. The trial Court accepted the objections and dismissed the execution proceedings by its order dated 17th June, 2009. It held that the application for modification of the final decree with regard to partition of the other two plots filed by the respondents was yet to be decided and the final decree had been passed pending the decision of this Court in the appeal against the preliminary decree. The execution application was thus dismissed on the ground of it being premature. The respondents then sought review of that order and after failing in the review application challenged that order vide Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No.13/2009 to the District Court. By its order dated 9th December, 2010 the District Court dismissed the appeal. 8. In the meantime, the application filed by the respondents for correction of the decree was heard and disposed of by the trial Court by its order dated 29th June, 2011 holding that an application for modification of the final decree was not maintainable. By its order dated 9th December, 2010 the District Court dismissed the appeal. 8. In the meantime, the application filed by the respondents for correction of the decree was heard and disposed of by the trial Court by its order dated 29th June, 2011 holding that an application for modification of the final decree was not maintainable. The respondents then preferred second execution application bearing no.2/2012. The petitioners resisted the execution by contending that the same was not maintainable in view of dismissal of the earlier execution application and that the execution application was barred by res-judicata or principles analogous thereto. The trial Court by its order dated 9th July, 2012 dismissed the petitioners' objections and directed them to make payment of Rs.96,000/- (Rupees ninety six thousand only) to the respondents with a further direction for appointment of commissioner to carry out the demarcation and execute the decree of partition. It further directed the petitioners to demolish their southern boundary wall and the steel structures that had been put up subsequent to the preliminary decree. The petitioners carried the order to the District Court by filing Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No.20/2012. The District Court was pleased to dismiss the appeal by its order dated 4th July, 2012. The order of the trial Court in the second execution application and the order of the District Court upholding the order of the trial Court have been impugned in the present petition. 9. By this petition the petitioners seek to contend that the impugned judgments are perverse since they have been passed ignoring the findings given earlier that the decree dated 14th September, 2001 was not executable in respect of plots no.14 & 15 since the final decree does not specify the proposal of the commissioner that had been accepted. It is also contended that the issues that had been earlier decided having been raised in the second execution application were barred by the principles of res judicata. According to the petitioners dismissal of the first execution application and upholding of that order by the District Court attained finality as the respondents did not challenge the same in the superior courts. The petitioners claim that execution of the decree would take away their source of livelihood and income by demolishing the structure of shipyard, workshop building and the saw mills. 10. The order of the trial court impugned herein is an exhaustive order. The petitioners claim that execution of the decree would take away their source of livelihood and income by demolishing the structure of shipyard, workshop building and the saw mills. 10. The order of the trial court impugned herein is an exhaustive order. The trial Court is seen to have considered all the objections to the second application for execution and held that the same were not maintainable. As regards the first objection raised of the decree dated 14th September, 2001 not having attained finality on account of noncompliance by the respondents of the directions issued by this Court in the second appeal in respect of plot no.51, the trial Court noted that the execution application was not in respect of plot no.51. It noted that the preliminary decree gave the modes in which the partition was to be effected. This decree has been confirmed by the final decree wherein reports of the commissioner were accepted by the Court. The petitioners though preferred an appeal against the final decree they had restricted it to plot no.51. Thus the final decree of the trial court in respect of plots no.14 & 15 has been accepted by the petitioners. The second objection was that the final decree was not specific. The trial Court found that the shares of the parties having been ascertained in the preliminary decree, which is confirmed by the final decree there could be no substance in the objection. The next objection considered was of maintainability of the second execution application after dismissal of the first application. The trial Court found that the earlier application for execution being dismissed on the ground of being premature the respondents were not debarred from filing fresh application for second part of the decree which had attained finality. The petitioners had next raised the question of interpretation of the final decree before the executing court contending that the decree does not specify the proposal of the commissioner that has been accepted. The trial court once again found that the petitioners had not preferred any appeal against acceptance of the report in respect of plots no.14 and 15. Further the final decree had been passed after consideration of the objections to the report of the commissioner. Therefore no objection could be raised in the execution application. The trial court once again found that the petitioners had not preferred any appeal against acceptance of the report in respect of plots no.14 and 15. Further the final decree had been passed after consideration of the objections to the report of the commissioner. Therefore no objection could be raised in the execution application. Moreover the first part of the decree in terms of commissioner's report at exhibit 58 for plot no.51 was already executed in compliance with the directions of this Court and what had remained was execution of second part of the decree in terms of exhibit 61 in respect of plots no.13 & 14. In the facts of the case, the trial Court opined that the objections raised by the petitioners was nothing but dilatory tactics adopted by them. 11. The District Court confirmed the order of the trial Court accepting its reasoning that dismissal of the first execution application was only on the ground that it was premature and hence it could not debar the decree holders from filing the second execution application in respect of the second part of the decree which had attained finality. 12. The two grounds that have been urged now before this Court are that; (i) the second application for execution is barred by res-judicata, and (ii) the final decree is inexecutable on the account of being vague. 13. Mr. Menezes submits that the courts below failed to appreciate that the second application for execution was not maintainable as it was barred by the principle of res-judicata or principles analogous to res-judicata. For the significance of the principle of res-judicata he relies upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Hope Plantations Ltd. V/s. Taluk Land board, Peermade and Another reported in (1199) 5 SCC 590 and the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Abdul Sattar & Ors. V/s. Gurlingayya & Anr. reported in IV (2002) CLT 426. He points out that it has been held by the Apex Court that the principle of res-judicata is based on public policy and justice. It is a branch of a law of estopel which prevents the parties from litigating the same question again and again despite a decision thereon. Further one of the purposes of estopel is to work justice between the parties. Mr. It is a branch of a law of estopel which prevents the parties from litigating the same question again and again despite a decision thereon. Further one of the purposes of estopel is to work justice between the parties. Mr. Ramani, the learned Counsel for the respondents submits per contra that since the dismissal of the first execution application was on the ground of it being premature the question of res-judicata does not arise. 14. The principle of re-judicata recognised under Section 11 Civil Procedure Code becomes applicable only on satisfaction of the conditions prescribed therein which conditions are absolutely mandatory. One of the conditions is that the issue or the question or the cause which is claimed to be barred by the re-judicata has been finally decided by the earlier Court. In the facts of this case it is not necessary to go into the other conditions of Section 11 Civil Procedure Code. As already seen earlier the first application for execution was held to be premature in view of the pendency of the application for modification of the decree as also pendency of the appeal against the preliminary decree. Once the application was found to be premature there could be no consideration of it on merits. Resultantly any question or issue raised therein remained to be finally decided. Therefore the bar of res-judicata under Section 11 Civil Procedure Code would not get attracted to the second application for execution. Since the application was held to be premature, any observations on merits, even if made in the order, can be of no consequence. The same will have to be ignored for the purpose of deciding whether the second application for execution is barred by the principles of res-judicata. In these circumstances, in my opinion there is no substance in the argument that the application for execution is barred by the principles of res-judicata. 15. There can be no substance in the second ground of objection also. The petitioners contend that the decree of partition is vague because it does not specifically accept one of the two proposals for partition by metes and bounds of plots no.14 & 15 from the report of the commissioner. In my considered opinion there was no need for the trial court, at the time of passing of the final decree to select one of the options from the commissioner's report. In my considered opinion there was no need for the trial court, at the time of passing of the final decree to select one of the options from the commissioner's report. The purpose of appointment of commissioner was to find out the possible and feasible ways of actual partition of the two plots of land with minimum disturbances of the petitioner's structures thereon. The respondents themselves desired so. The commissioner in his report could come out with two options to divide the properties. While passing the final decree the trial court did not find any difficulty in respect of either of the options. It therefore left the exercise of selection of the option to the stage of the execution. That does not render the decree vague. It only gives an opportunity to the decree holders to select one of the two options for execution of the decree while limiting the modes of execution to the two options only. 16. It is unfortunate that in the absence of any real defence to the suit for partition of the property that was admittedly jointly purchased by the parties, the petitioners have successfully dragged the proceedings for the last more than 28 years, thereby preventing respondents from enjoying the fruits of the purchase. The trial court therefore has rightly observed that the objections raised by the petitioners are nothing but the dilatory tactics adopted by them in execution of decree of partition. 17. For the reasons set out above the petition is dismissed with costs. The petitioners shall pay costs quantified at Rs.25,000/-(Rupees twenty five thousand only) to the respondents within a period of eight weeks from today. 18. At the request of Mr. Menezes, interim order dated 12th September, 2012 passed in the petition is extended for a period of eight weeks from today, to enable the petitioners to challenge the order before the higher forum.