JUDGMENT By Court:- The petitioner has approached this Court seeking quashing of the enquiry report, notice dated 20.11.2003, second show-cause notice dated 25.11.2003 and orders dated 01.12.2003 and 26.02.2005. 2. The brief facts of the case are that, by letter dated 28.10.1997, the petitioner was appointed as Clerk in the Civil Court, Gumla. On 25.09.2003, the District and Sessions Judge, Gumla directed the Judge Incharge (Administration), Civil Court, Gumla to conduct an enquiry into the incident in which a phone call was made to the District and Sessions Judge, at about 8.13 A.M on 25.09.2003 by someone, impersonating himself as the Zonal Judge and directing him to transfer one Bipin Kumar from the office of Registrar. Besides other necessary details about the incident, the telephone number from which the call was made to the District and Sessions Judge was also mentioned in confidential letter no. 33 dated 25.09.2003. On 26.09.2003, a report was submitted to the District and Sessions Judge, Gumla stating that the Civil Court employee namely, Narendra Prasad Sinha had made the said telephone call to the residence of the District and Sessions Judge. The Judge Incharge had summoned the said employee (the petitioner here) and when asked him about the said misconduct, the petitioner admitted his guilt and tendered apology. The petitioner had infact, tendered a written apology dated 25.09.2003 admitting his guilt. A show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 20.11.2003 by the District and Sessions Judge, Gumla requiring him to submit his reply as to why a disciplinary action for misconduct, indiscipline and insubordination, be not initiated against him. The details of charges were also furnished to the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his reply on 24.11.2003 stating that in an unstable mental condition he had made such call to the residence of the District Judge. On 24.11.2003 the reply submitted by the petitioner was considered and it was ordered to dispense with further enquiry as contemplated under Rule 166 of Bihar Board Miscellaneous Rules. The petitioner was held guilty of the misconduct and therefore, it was ordered to issue second show-cause notice to the petitioner. On 25.11.2003, a second show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner to submit his reply to the proposed punishment of removal from service. The petitioner submitted his reply on 29.11.2003 and an order of punishment dated 01.12.2003 was passed removing the petitioner from service. On 25.11.2003, a second show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner to submit his reply to the proposed punishment of removal from service. The petitioner submitted his reply on 29.11.2003 and an order of punishment dated 01.12.2003 was passed removing the petitioner from service. The petitioner preferred an appeal which was dismissed by order dated 26.02.2005. In these facts, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing the present writ petition. 3. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the District and Sessions Judge, Gumla, stating as under, “10. That with regard to the statements made in paragraph – 9 of the writ petition under reply, it is stated and submitted that the statements made therein are not correct to the extent that the written admission of guilt tendering apology was submitted by the petitioner to the District & Sessions Judge, Gumla without any pressure or duress whatsoever and it is the fact that the petitioner volunteered to admit his guilt after the matter was disclosed on enquiry from S.T.D. Booth owner, who recognized the petitioner as caller and also the computerized bill of call was also submitted and S.T.D. Booth owner himself submitted everything in writing before the enquiry officer on 25.09.2003 only then the petitioner finding no way out, then admitted his guilt. 16. That with regard to the statements made in paragraph – 15 of the writ petition under reply, it is stated and submitted that the statements made therein are disputed hence denied. It is further stated and submitted that the enquiry was conducted by the Chief Judicial Magistrate-cum-Judge Incharge, Gumla independently and in accordance with the fair procedure and rule and it is further stated that as per rule after holding the petitioner guilty, second show-cause notice was served upon the petitioner and representation therein was considered before passing the order of removal of the petitioner from service by the District & Sessions Judge, Gumla. 19. That with regard to the statements made in paragraph – 20 of the writ petition under reply, it is stated and submitted that the statements made therein are disputed hence denied in view of the seriousness and gravity of charges, which are well proved against the petitioner having bearing upon moral conduct of the petitioner for resorting to the extent of offence of impersonation for serving his own selfish motive.” 4. A counter-affidavit has also been filed on behalf of the respondent nos. 2 and 3 in which a plea of loss of confidence has been taken. In paragraph nos. 9, 10, 11 and 12, the following plea has been taken by the respondent nos. 2 and 3: “9. That in reply to the statements made in Paragraph 9 of the writ petition under reply it is stated that it is completely false to allege that there was any kind of pressure or duress upon the Petitioner during admission of guilt. This allegation is after-thought and hence denied from its inception as there is not an iota of truth in such wild allegation. It is submitted that the Petitioner himself voluntarily admitted in writing twice, about impersonating the voice of Hon'ble Judge which is very serious in nature. Later part of this para relates with seeking pardon for his conduct, which itself speaks much in support of the voluntary admission of guilt; negating any element of undue pressure or duress. The Petitioner can not take both pleas simultaneously. 10. That in reply to the statements made in Paragraph 10 to 19 of the writ petition under reply it is stated that the matter in these paras are matters of record. In most of the Paras the details of annexures have been reproduced only to encumber the petition. All the facts and pleas taken by the Petitioner in these para (as well as in Annexures) have elaborately been considered during the departmental proceeding conducted against the Petitioner. It is submitted in this context that, the Petitioner for the first time in memo of appeal has taken the stand of undue pressure and duress which is neither tenable on facts nor maintainable under law. Petitioner had several opportunities viz: replying the notice to show cause before Judge in charge on 25.09.03, his written statement before D.J. On 24.11.03 and even during the second show cause on 29.11.03 but no where he raised this allegation nor led evidence also in support of his wild contention. As such, any plea at this stage is not permissible. 11. That in reply to the statements made in Paragraph 20 of the writ petition under reply, it is stated that the statement made in this para are completely denied. The admitted guilt of the Petitioner is very grave and violative of conduct of Govt. officials. A Govt. As such, any plea at this stage is not permissible. 11. That in reply to the statements made in Paragraph 20 of the writ petition under reply, it is stated that the statement made in this para are completely denied. The admitted guilt of the Petitioner is very grave and violative of conduct of Govt. officials. A Govt. employee is expected to be in strict observance of the conduct Rules which are the fundamental requirement and basic virtue for being a Govt. official. Any departure from the same is viewed very seriously as it breaks the thread of trust and discipline of an institution. Giving direction to the head of the judgeship and that too impersonating himself as Hon'ble Judge of the High Court is a very serious matter and it was done purposely and Petitioner can not be heard to say that it was due to his disturbed state of mind. Having been proved the charge aforesaid, the punishment awarded is perfectly proportionate. No principle of natural justice has been violated in conduct of the departmental inquiry, as alleged or at all. 12. That in reply to the statements made in Paragraph 21 of the writ petition under reply it is stated that with regard to the statement made in this para, it is submitted that the same are not correct and hence denied. It is repeatedly denied that there was any kind of pressure or duress on the Petitioner while admitting his guilt. The inquiry was conducted by C.J.M cum Judge in charge and thereafter, after giving opportunity to the Petitioner to file his second show cause, the final order was passed by the D.J. Gumla. It is again submitted that during the second show cause, no allegation of duress or pressure was alleged.” 5. A rejoinder affidavit has been filed by the petitioner controverting the statements made in the counter-affidavits of the respondents. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has raised a contention that the so-called admission of the petitioner is no admission in the eyes of law, and infact any admission to be acted upon must be clear and unambiguous and on the basis of a vague admission, no order of removal from service can be passed. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has raised a contention that the so-called admission of the petitioner is no admission in the eyes of law, and infact any admission to be acted upon must be clear and unambiguous and on the basis of a vague admission, no order of removal from service can be passed. He contended that even though the petitioner was a temporary employee who served for more than 6 years, he could not have been visited with the order of removal from service without holding a properly constituted departmental enquiry. He has further contended that the District and Sessions Judge, Gumla is the person on whose report an enquiry was conducted and therefore, he should not have passed the order of penalty as, no person can be a Judge in his own cause. He has relied on judgments reported in AIR 1961 SC 1070 and (1984) 2 SCC 578 7. As against the above, Mrs. A.R. Choudhary, learned counsel appearing for the respondent nos. 2 and 3 has submitted that in view of the admission of the petitioner, there was no necessity for holding a regular departmental enquiry. The High Court has specifically taken a plea of 'no confidence in the petitioner' in view of the gross misconduct of the petitioner which could not have been condoned. She has contended that in cases where the delinquent employee has admitted his guilt, there would not be any violation of the principles of natural justice and this is a fit case in which the disciplinary authority had taken a decision to dispense with further enquiry in the matter and proceeded to pass the order of penalty of removal from service. She has further contended that since the petitioner remained on probation, there was no need for conducting any regular departmental enquiry against him. She has relied on judgments reported in (1971) 1 SCC 1 , AIR 1968 SC 266 , (1997) 2 SCC 191 and (1996) 5 SCC 89 . 8. Mr. Saket Upadhyay, learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No.1 has reiterated the stand taken by the Respondent Nos. She has relied on judgments reported in (1971) 1 SCC 1 , AIR 1968 SC 266 , (1997) 2 SCC 191 and (1996) 5 SCC 89 . 8. Mr. Saket Upadhyay, learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No.1 has reiterated the stand taken by the Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and has submitted that in view of the gross misconduct committed by the petitioner though, it was open to the District and Sessions Judge to pass an order of removal from service without conducting an enquiry in the matter, however, in the interest of justice a preliminary enquiry was conducted in course of which the petitioner admitted his guilt. 9. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents on record. 10. Adverting to the contention raised by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that without conducting a regular departmental enquiry, the penalty of removal from service could not have been imposed upon the petitioner, I am of the opinion that in the facts of the present case such a contention is not tenable. There are exceptions provided in Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India itself in which an enquiry can be dispensed with. Further, in case of a probationer also, the order of dismissal from service can be passed without holding an enquiry. 11. In Satyavir Singh and Others Vs. Union of India and Others, reported in (1985) 4 SCC 252 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that taking appropriate action in exceptional circumstances is a matter of assessment to be made by the disciplinary authority and must be judged in the light of the circumstances then prevailing. Taking note of the judgment in Satyavir Singh's case, in “Ajit Kumar Nag Vs. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., Haldia & Others”, reported in (2005) 7 SCC 764 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under, “50. ….......find place in the final order or they should be communicated to the delinquent. It was no doubt emphasised that it would be better if such reasons are recorded in the order itself and communicated to the delinquent officer. Regarding suspension of a civil servant, the Court opined that it is not necessary that the civil servant should be placed under suspension until such time the situation is improved and it becomes possible to hold inquiry against him. Regarding suspension of a civil servant, the Court opined that it is not necessary that the civil servant should be placed under suspension until such time the situation is improved and it becomes possible to hold inquiry against him. According to the Court, it would be difficult to foresee how long the situation would last and when normalcy would return or be restored.” 12. In “Union of India and Another Vs. M. M. Sharma and Others”, reported in (2011) 11 SCC 293 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has discussed the doctrine of 'pleasure' as thus, “12. Within the scheme of the Constitution of India, provisions relating to public service may be found in Articles 309, 310 and 311. It is important to note that these provisions (namely Articles 310 and 311) afford protection to public servants from penalty in the nature of dismissal, removal, or reduction which cannot be imposed without holding a proper inquiry or giving a hearing. An explicit articulation of “protection” in Article 311 of the Constitution itself gives an impression of complete “protection” to the civil servants. 13. Article 311 provides for protection to public servant from punitive action being taken against him by an authority subordinate to one who appointed him, or without holding an inquiry in accordance with law. Exceptions in Article 311 are contained in the second proviso in the nature of sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) which provide that the said article shall not apply to employees who have been punished for conviction in a criminal case or where inquiry is not practicable to be held for reasons to be recorded in writing or where the President or the Governor as the case may be is satisfied that such an order is required to be passed without holding an enquiry in the interest of security of the State. 14. In order to appreciate the ambit or scope of power to be exercised under Article 311 of the Constitution of India it is to be noticed that in India we apply the doctrine of “pleasure”, which is recognised under our Constitution by way of Article 310 of the Constitution of India. Under the aforesaid provision, all civil posts under the Government are held at the pleasure of the Government under which they are held and are terminable at its will. Under the aforesaid provision, all civil posts under the Government are held at the pleasure of the Government under which they are held and are terminable at its will. The aforesaid power is what the doctrine of pleasure is, which was recognised in the United Kingdom and also received the constitutional sanction under our Constitution in the form of Article 310 of the Constitution of India. But in India the same is subject to other provisions of the Constitution which include the restrictions imposed by Article 310(2), Article 311(1) and Article 311(2). 15. Therefore, under the Indian Constitution dismissal of civil servants must comply with the procedure laid down in Article 311, and Article 310(1) cannot be invoked independently with the object of justifying a contravention of Article 311(2). There is an exception provided by way of incorporation of Article 311(2) with sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c). No such inquiry is required to be conducted for the purposes of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons when the same relates to dismissal on the ground of conviction or where it is not practicable to hold an inquiry for the reasons to be recorded in writing by that authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or reduce him in rank or where it is not possible to hold an enquiry in the interest of the security of the State. These three exceptions are recognised for dispensing with an inquiry, which is required to be conducted under Article 311 of the Constitution of India when the authority takes a decision for dismissal or removal or reduction in rank in writing. 16. In other words, although there is a pleasure doctrine, however, the same cannot be said to be absolute and the same is subject to the conditions that when a government servant is to be dismissed or removed from service or he is reduced in rank a departmental inquiry is required to be conducted to enquire into his misconduct and only after holding such an inquiry and in the course of such inquiry if he is found guilty then only a person can be removed or dismissed from service or reduced in rank. 17. 17. However, such constitutional provision as set out under Article 311 of the Constitution of India could also be dispensed with under the exceptions provided in Article 311(2) of the Constitution where sub-clause (a) relates to a case where upon a conviction of a person by a criminal court on certain charges he could be dismissed or removed from service or reduced in rank without holding an inquiry. Similarly, under sub-clause (c) an inquiry to be held against the government employee could be dispensed with if it is not possible to hold such an inquiry in the interest of the security of the State. Sub-clause (b) on the other hand provides that such an inquiry could be dispensed with by the authority concerned, after recording reasons, for which it is not practicable to hold an inquiry. The aforesaid power is an absolute power of the disciplinary authority who after following the procedure laid down therein could resort to such extraordinary power provided it follows the preconditions laid down therein meaningfully and effectively. 18. It should also be pointed out at this stage that sub-clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India mandates that in case the disciplinary authority feels and decides that it is not reasonably practical to hold an inquiry against the delinquent officer the reasons for such satisfaction must be recorded in writing before an action is taken. Sub-clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) on the other hand does not specifically prescribe for recording of such reasons for the satisfaction but at the same time there must be records to indicate that there are sufficient and cogent reasons for dispensing with the enquiry in the interest of the security of the State. Unless and until such satisfaction, based on reasonable and cogent grounds is recorded it would not be possible for the court or the Tribunal, where such legality of an order is challenged, to ascertain as to whether such an order passed in the interest of the security of the State is based on reasons and is not arbitrary. If and when such an order is challenged in the court of law the competent authority would have to satisfy the court that the competent authority has sufficient materials on record to dispense with the enquiry in the interest of the security of the State.” 13. If and when such an order is challenged in the court of law the competent authority would have to satisfy the court that the competent authority has sufficient materials on record to dispense with the enquiry in the interest of the security of the State.” 13. In “Ajit Kumar Vs. State of Jharkhand and Others”, reported in (2011) 11 SCC 458 , a case in which a Subordinate Judge was removed from service without holding a departmental enquiry, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that if a person is found not worthy to be a member of judicial service or it is found that he has committed a misconduct he can be removed from service by following the procedure as laid down under Article 311 (2) second Proviso (b). The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under, “11. There is an exception provided by way of incorporation of Article 311(2) with sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c). No such enquiry is required to be conducted for the purposes of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons when the same related to dismissal on the ground of conviction or where it is not practicable to hold an enquiry for the reasons to be recorded in writing by that authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or reduce him in rank or it is not practicable to hold an enquiry for the security of the State. These three exceptions are well recognised for dispensing with an enquiry, which is required to be conducted under Article 311 of the Constitution of India when the authority takes a decision for dismissal or removal or reduction in rank in writing. In other words, although there is a pleasure doctrine, however, the same cannot be said to be absolute and the same is subject to the conditions that when a government servant is to be dismissed or removed from service or he is reduced in rank, a departmental enquiry is required to be conducted to enquire into his misconduct and only after holding such an enquiry and in the course of such enquiry if he is found guilty then only a person can be removed or dismissed from service or reduced in rank. 12. 12. As stated herein such constitutional provision for holding an enquiry as set out under Article 311 of the Constitution of India could also be dispensed with under the exceptions provided to Article 311(2) of the Constitution where clause (a) relates to a case where upon a conviction of a person by a criminal court on certain charges he could be removed from service without holding an enquiry. Similarly, under clause (c) an enquiry to be held against the government employee could be dispensed with if it is not possible to hold such an enquiry in the interest of the security of the State. Sub-clause (b) on the other hand provides that such an enquiry could be dispensed with by the authority concerned, after recording reasons, for which it is not practicable to hold an enquiry. The aforesaid power is an absolute power of the disciplinary authority who after following the procedure laid down therein could resort to such extraordinary power provided it follows the preconditions laid down therein meaningfully and effectively. 13. In the case in hand, the officer concerned was working as Subordinate Judge and during the course of inspection by the Inspecting Judge it was found that he did not use to prepare judgments on his own, he used to get them prepared through somebody else before delivering the judgments. Undisputedly, the Inspecting Judge submitted his report to the Chief Justice of the High Court. The High Court considered the said report and thereafter was of the opinion that it is not possible to hold an enquiry in the case of the appellant and that holding of such enquiry should be dispensed with in view of the fact that if an enquiry is held the same may lead to the question of validity of several judgments rendered by the appellant. The aforesaid reason recorded by the High Court was a legal and valid ground for not holding an enquiry. There was therefore also no necessity of giving him any opportunity of hearing as the scope of holding an enquiry and giving him an opportunity of hearing was specifically dispensed with. 14. Consequently, the High Court recommended the removal of the appellant from service. There was therefore also no necessity of giving him any opportunity of hearing as the scope of holding an enquiry and giving him an opportunity of hearing was specifically dispensed with. 14. Consequently, the High Court recommended the removal of the appellant from service. Subsequent to that, the Governor decided to invoke the provisions of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India as holding of enquiry may lead to the question of the validity of several judgments delivered by the appellant. The procedure and the preconditions laid down for invoking the extraordinary power under Article 311(2)(b) having been complied with and properly exercised within the parameters of the provisions, the order passed by the competent authority removing the appellant from the services cannot be held to be without jurisdiction and power.” 14. Replying to the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent nos. 2 and 3 has relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in “Channabasappa Basappa Happali Vs. State of Mysore”, reported in (1971) 1 SCC 1 , in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has distinguished the judgement in the case of “Jagdish Prasad Saxena Vs. State of Madhya Bharat (Now Madhya Pradesh)” reported in AIR 1961 SC 1070 and held thus; “5. It was contended on the basis of the ruling reported in Regina v. Durham Quarter Sessions Ex-parte Virgo that on the facts admitted in the present case, a plea of guilty ought not to be entered upon the record and a plea of not guilty entered instead. Under the English law, a plea of guilty has to be unequivocal and the Court must ask the person and if the plea of guilty is qualified the Court must not enter a plea of guilty, but one of not guilty. The police constable here was not on his trial for a criminal offence. It was a departmental enquiry, on facts of which due notice was given to him. He admitted the facts. In fact his counsel argued before us that he admitted the facts but not his guilt. We do not see any distinction between admission of facts and admission of guilt. When he admitted the facts, he was guilty. The facts speak for themselves. It was a clear case of indiscipline and nothing less. He admitted the facts. In fact his counsel argued before us that he admitted the facts but not his guilt. We do not see any distinction between admission of facts and admission of guilt. When he admitted the facts, he was guilty. The facts speak for themselves. It was a clear case of indiscipline and nothing less. If a police officer remains absent without leave and also resorts to fast as a demonstration against the action of the superior officer the indiscipline is fully established. The learned Single Judge in the High Court was right when he laid down that the plea amounted to a plea of guilty on the facts on which the petitioner was charged and we are in full agreement with the observations of the learned Single Judge. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant further relied upon a ruling of this court in Jagdish Prasad Saxena v. State of Madhya Bharat (now Madhya Pradesh). That case is absolutely distinguishable. There are of course certain general observations about the importance of a departmental enquiry and how it should be conducted. We have here a clear case of a person who admitted the facts and did not wish to cross-examine any witness or lead evidence on his own behalf. He only stated that his acts should be adjudged on the basis of the documents which were in the case. This was done and there cannot be a complaint that the departmental enquiry was either one-sided or not fair. On the whole therefore we are satisfied that the appellant was properly adjudged guilty of indiscipline in the departmental enquiry and the order of dismissal which was passed against him was merited...........” 15. I further find that the judgment in “Jagdish Prasad Saxena Vs. State of Madhya Bharat (Now Madhya Pradesh)”, (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is clearly distinguishable as in the said case, the Court came to a conclusion that admission on the part of the delinquent employee was not clear and therefore, it could not have been acted upon. In the present case, I find that the petitioner admitted his guilt in writing on 25.09.2003 before the Judge Incharge. In the present case, I find that the petitioner admitted his guilt in writing on 25.09.2003 before the Judge Incharge. When a show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner, the petitioner again admitted his guilt in his reply dated 24.11.2003 and again in reply to the second show-cause notice, the petitioner admitted his guilt in his representation dated 29.11.2003. The specific charge against the petitioner was put to the notice of the petitioner still, the petitioner failed to controvert or deny the specific allegations levelled against him and in his reply/representation he prayed for pardon. I find no force in the contention of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner has not specifically admitted his guilt. This is a case in which the petitioner has not denied or controverted the specific allegation levelled against him and therefore, the plea raised on behalf of the petitioner that, he has not specifically admitted his guilt, is not tenable. There is no distinction between admission of facts and admission of guilt. [“Channabasappa Basappa Happali” Vs. State of Mysore”, (supra)] 16. In The Central Bank of India Ltd. Vs. Karunamoy Banerjee, reported in AIR 1968 SC 266 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under, “19. We must, however, emphasize that the rules of natural justice, as laid down by this Court, will have to be observed, in the conduct of a domestic enquiry against a workman. If the allegations are denied by the workman, it is needless to state that the burden of proving the truth of those allegations will be on the management; and the witnesses called, by the management, must be allowed to be cross-examined, by the workman, and the latter must also be given an opportunity to examine himself and adduce any other evidence that he might choose, in support of his plea. But, if the workman admits his guilt, to insist upon the management to let in evidence about the allegations, will, in our opinion, only be an empty formality........” 17. A perusal of the appointment letter dated 28.10.1997 of the petitioner would clearly disclose that the petitioner was to remain on probation for a period of two years, however, the period of probation was to be extended automatically unless his service was expressly confirmed. A perusal of the appointment letter dated 28.10.1997 of the petitioner would clearly disclose that the petitioner was to remain on probation for a period of two years, however, the period of probation was to be extended automatically unless his service was expressly confirmed. In the present case, it is a matter of record that the service of the petitioner was not confirmed and he remained on probation. 18. In K.V. Krishnamani v. Lalit Kala Academy, reported in (1996) 5 SCC 89 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under, “4. It is contended by the appellant that since the averments made in the counter would constitute foundation for dismissal for misconduct, an enquiry in this behalf was required to be made. On the other hand, it is contended by the respondent that during the probation the appellant did not acquire any right to the post. If on being found suitable he was regularised, only then he would have acquired the right to continue in the post. During probation, it was found that his services were not satisfactory and reasons were given in support thereof. Thus they do not constitute foundation but motive to terminate the services. We find force in the contention of the respondent. They have explained that the driving of the staff car was not satisfactory and that, therefore, they have terminated the services of the appellant during probation. The very object of the probation is to test the suitability and if the appointing authority finds that the candidate is not suitable, it certainly has power to terminate the services of the employee. Under these circumstances, it cannot but be held that the reasons mentioned constitute motive and not foundation for termination of service. Therefore, we hold that the High Court has not committed any error of law.” 19. In Kunwar Arun Kumar v. U.P. Hill Electronics Corpn. Ltd. and Others, reported in (1997) 2 SCC 191 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under, “5. The petitioner challenged the order of termination in the High Court. The High Court without going into the question whether or not it is a stigma, came to the conclusion that the respondents had totally lost confidence in the appellant and that he was totally unsuitable for the job for which he was employed and, therefore, he was found not entitled to any enquiry. Consequently, it dismissed the writ petition. The High Court without going into the question whether or not it is a stigma, came to the conclusion that the respondents had totally lost confidence in the appellant and that he was totally unsuitable for the job for which he was employed and, therefore, he was found not entitled to any enquiry. Consequently, it dismissed the writ petition. Shri Sehgal, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, contends that the finding recorded amounts to a stigma; action taken without conducting enquiry and giving an opportunity to the petitioner, is violative of Article 311(2) of the Constitution and the rules made thereunder. Therefore, he is entitled to an opportunity of being heard and be dismissed only on the ground of misconduct and not by termination simpliciter. We do not agree with the learned counsel. The reasons mentioned in the order may be a motive and not a foundation as a ground for dismissal. During the period of probation, the authorities are entitled to assess the suitability of the candidates and if it is found that the candidate is not suitable to remain in service they are entitled to record a finding of unsatisfactory performance of the work and duties during the period of probation. Under these circumstances, necessarily the appointing authority has to look into the performance of the work and duties during the period of probation and if they record a finding that during that probation period, the work and performance of the duties were unsatisfactory, they are entitled to terminate the service in terms of the letter of appointment without conducting any enquiry. That does not amount to any stigma. If the record does not support such a conclusion reached by the authorities, a different complexion would arise. In this case, they have recorded the finding that the petitioner was regularly absent on one ground or the other. Under these circumstances, the respondents terminated his services. We do not find any illegality in the action taken by the respondents.” 20. Coming again to the facts of the case, I find that the District and Sessions Judge, Gumla, when received a telephone call, entrusted the enquiry to the Judge Incharge and, therefore, it cannot be said that the person who is the complainant himself conducted the enquiry. We do not find any illegality in the action taken by the respondents.” 20. Coming again to the facts of the case, I find that the District and Sessions Judge, Gumla, when received a telephone call, entrusted the enquiry to the Judge Incharge and, therefore, it cannot be said that the person who is the complainant himself conducted the enquiry. The petitioner admitted his guilt on 25.09.2003 before the Judge In-charge, Gumla and he is not the person who has passed the order of penalty. Moreover, the petitioner has not denied the charge levelled against him nor raised any objection at any stage when the show-cause notice was issued to him or the second show-cause notice was issued to him and therefore, it is not open to the petitioner to raise the plea in this proceeding that the District and Sessions Judge on whose report, the enquiry was initiated and a charge-memo was served upon the petitioner, would not have passed the order of penalty. 21. In view of the aforesaid I hold that there was no necessity for holding any regular departmental enquiry against the petitioner. The order passed by the disciplinary authority does not suffer from bias and there is no violation of the principles of natural justice. 22. The writ petition lacks merit and accordingly it is dismissed. Petition dismissed.