Shambhu Kumar Das v. State of Bihar through Secretary, Food, Civil Supply and Consumer Protection Bihar, Patna
2013-08-01
JAYANANDAN SINGH
body2013
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER 1. Annexure-3 is an order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Kharagpur by which licence of the petitioner was suspended. Though in the body it is mentioned that on the complaints of some consumers, an F.I.R. was instituted against petitioner under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, the operative part thereof mentions that in terms of clause 7 (ii) of the Public Distribution System (Control) Order 2001, suspension order was being passed and he was being asked to file his show cause as to why his licence may not be cancelled. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that thereafter no further action was taken by the Licensing Authority while the criminal proceeding continued which finally ended in acquittal of petitioner on 18.09.2012 in Trial No.3557/2012, vide Annexure-4. Thereafter petitioner filed an application before the Licensing Authority for restoration of his licence in the light of the order passed in the criminal proceeding which was referred to the District Level Selection Committee by the Licensing Authority. 3. From the order of cancellation of licence of the petitioner, vide Annexure-5, it appears that the District Level Selection Committee decided to cancel the licence of the petitioner on the ground that petitioner was acquitted in the trial due to non-appearance of the witnesses. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that if suspension of licence was under clause 7 (ii) of the Control Order, subsequent punishment of cancellation of licence could not be awarded to the petitioner in view of the judgment of the Division Bench passed in LPA No.15 of 2011, a copy whereof has been annexed as Annexure-6. He submits that in case suspension of licence had been passed on account of institution of a substantive criminal case against the petitioner under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities act, the same had to go on account of his acquittal. He submits that the Selection Committee could not sit over the judgment of the trial court and could not find that there is flaw in the judgment or in conduct of the trial and on that account he could get acquitted. He submits that net result was that petitioner was acquitted by the trial court in the criminal proceeding, for whatever reasons. Hence, the Selection Committee could not go behind the judgment. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents fairly accepts the legal position. 6.
He submits that net result was that petitioner was acquitted by the trial court in the criminal proceeding, for whatever reasons. Hence, the Selection Committee could not go behind the judgment. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents fairly accepts the legal position. 6. In the circumstances, this Court finds that the Selection Committee has erred in law in taking a decision of cancellation of licence of the petitioner on account of the fact that there was some flaw in the trial ending in acquittal of petitioner. Any executive authority has no liberty to sit over any judgment and order of a competent court of law and ignore the same by finding flaw in it. If at all, he has liberty to file an appeal against the said judgment and order, it gets the same set aside by any higher court of law or gets it reviewed or recalled, if law permits. Unless the same is done and till the order remains operative, the same has to be accepted by all the concerned executive authority as binding on them. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also referred to Clause 14 of Notification, G.S.R. No.1 dated 20.02.2007, as issued by the State Government, Food, Supply & Commerce Department, Public Distribution System (Control) Order 2001, to submit that in terms of this Clause, on the ground of conviction, where a licensee has been convicted by a court of law, the Licensing Authority shall, by order in writing, cancel his licence. But he submits that the said clause also provides that if the conviction is set aside in appeal or revision, licence has to be restored to the dealer on an application submitted in this regard. He submits that, obviously, by analogy, the same clause is applicable in this case also, and, as the trial court has acquitted the petitioner, his licence has to be restored without looking into the merits of the acquittal order. 8. In the circumstances, this writ application is allowed. The order of cancellation of licence as contained in memo No. 27 dated 01.2.2013, vide Annexure-5, is quashed. It is also held that since petitioner has completed maximum period of 90 days of suspension of licence, his licence stands restored.