Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya, J.;— Heard Sri Rajendra Pratap Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri M.S. Siddiquie, who has put in appearance on behalf of opposite party no.3. Assailing the impugned order dated 28.02.2013, passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Faizabad in Restoration Application No.282 in re; Reference No.44; Sachchidanand vs. Ramanand and others pertaining to village-Bhatpuragopal, Pargana-Khandasa, Tehsil-Milkipur, District-Faizabad, learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that once the village concerned was notified under Section 52 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, the Deputy Director of Consolidation did not have any jurisdiction to entertain the application moved by the opposite parties no.3. He has further stated that in fact the order under challenge passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is not an order of restoring the case; rather he, in the garb of exercising the jurisdiction of restoration, he has in fact exercised review jurisdiction which under the scheme of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act is not vested with him. Shorn of unnecessary details, facts of the case are that on a reference made by the consolidation authorities under section 48, learned Deputy Director of Consolidations decided the reference case by means of an order dated 31.10.2009. It appears that opposite party no.3 moved an application for recall of the said order dated 31.10.2009 and restoration of the case by means of an application filed by him on 26.09.2011 i.e. after expiry of a period of about two years. Along with the said application dated 26.09.2011 opposite party no.3 also sought condonation of delay in moving an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. In the application dated 26.09.2011 opposite party no.3 stated that plot no.38 was the original holding of opposite party no.3 and the petitioner both. It was further stated by opposite party no.3 that in the said plot eastern portion of plot no.38 is saline and, therefore, earlier an objection was moved to exclude the said plot or the said portion of the plot from consolidation proceedings, however, the objection was rejected and accordingly plot no.38 was valued. It was further stated by opposite party no.3 in the said application that in plot no.38 valuation of 20.73 was to be given to both the parties which has been done by making Reference No.44 in which the order dated 31.10.2009 was passed. It was further stated by opposite party no.3 in the said application that in plot no.38 valuation of 20.73 was to be given to both the parties which has been done by making Reference No.44 in which the order dated 31.10.2009 was passed. Opposite party no.3 also stated that on 23.09.2011, Lekhpal told opposite party no.3 that in plot no.38 opposite party no.3 is being given a Chak on eastern side whereas petitioner is being given a Chak on western side. On coming to know of all these developments, opposite party no.3 appears to have moved the application on 26.11.2011 along with application seeking condonation of delay before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. Deputy Director of Consolidation allowed the application moved by opposite party no.3 by means of the impugned order dated 28.02.2013. It is this order that the petitioner has assailed in the writ petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner apart from submitting that after notification under Section 52 of the Holdings of Act whereby the village concerned was denotified from consolidation operation, the Deputy Director of Consolidation did not have jurisdiction even to entertain the application moved by opposite party no.3 and that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has in fact exercised review jurisdiction and not that of restoration, it has also stated that opposite party no.3 had knowledge of the reference proceedings all along and it is only when the opposite party no.3 found that he is being given a Chak in plot No.38 on the eastern side that he moved the application on false ground. So far as the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner to the effect that after denotification of the village under Section 52 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, learned Deputy Director of Consolidation did not have jurisdiction to entertain the application moved by the opposite party no.3, be it an application for restoration or even an application for review is concerned, submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is fallacious. This Court way back in the year 1983 in the case of Bhagwati vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation reported in [(1983 Allahabad Law Journal 1250] has categorically held that it is well settled that limitation does not destroy a right; rather it only bars a remedy in Court and further that the right remains but it cannot be enforced by judicial process except by taking recourse to section 5 of the Limitation Act and in case the delay is condoned, it would be deemed that the proceedings have been brought within limitation. In the said case this Court has further observed that if the delay is condoned then in law, it would be taken as if proceedings are filed within limitation and hence the same would be deemed to be pending on the date of denotification of the village so as to attract the provisions of Section 52(2) of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner could not controvert the aforesaid dictum of this Court in the case of Bhagwati (supra). In this view, the first submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner merits rejection. Accordingly, it is rejected. As regards the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has in fact exercised jurisdiction as if he was hearing a petition for review and not a petition for restoration, it would suffice to say that a bare perusal of the impugned order reveals that a categorical finding has been recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation to the effect that no summons were served to opposite party no.3 by the courts below, neither any summons were even issued so far as his appearance before the Court of Deputy Director of Consolidation is concerned. Section 41 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act makes Chapter IX and X of the U.P. Land Revenue Act,1991 applicable to all proceedings including appeal, revision and miscellaneous applications under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Section 41 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act makes Chapter IX and X of the U.P. Land Revenue Act,1991 applicable to all proceedings including appeal, revision and miscellaneous applications under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Section 201 of U.P. Land Revenue Act falls in Chapter IX of the said Act, according to which, in case a party against whom a judgment has been rendered appears within fifteen days from the date of such order and in case of a defendant within, he appears fifteen days after such order has been communicated to him or after any process for enforcing the judgment has been executed and shows good cause for his non-appearance and satisfies the officer making an order that there has been a failure of justice, such officer may revive the case and alter or rescind the order according to the justice of the case. Section 201 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act is quoted herein below;- 201. No appeal from orders passed ex parte or by default.-No appeal shall lie from an order passed under Section 200 ex parte or by default. Re-hearing on proof of good cause for non-appearance.-But in all such cases, if the party against whom judgment has been given appears either in person or by agent (if a plaintiff, within fifteen days from the date of such order, and if a defendant, within fifteen days after such order has been communicated to him, or after any process for enforcing the judgment has been executed or at any earlier period), and shows good cause for his non-appearance, and satisfies the officer making the order that there has been a failure of justice, such officer may, upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as he thinks proper, revive the case and alter or rescind the order according to the justice of the case." A bare reading of the aforesaid quoted Section 201 of U.P. Land Revenue Act reveals that every revenue officer has been vested with the power to revive a case in case the defendant against whom a judgment has been rendered by the Court appears within fifteen days even from the time when any process for enforcing the judgment has been executed and the defendant is able to show good cause for his non-appearance in the eyes of the Officer or the Court concerned. In such a situation, case can be revived and the judgment passed earlier can not only be rescinded but can be altered as well according to the justice of the case. The second submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is thus to be examined in the light of provisions of Section 201 of the Land Revenue Act. In the instant case the Deputy Director of Consolidation by the impugned order has not only set aside the earlier order dated 31.10.2009 but also altered the same which in the opinion of the Court is an equitable order for the reasons which follows. Apart from raising the grievance of not being heard, opposite party no.3 had also raised a grievance that in execution of the orders passed in reference proceedings the Chak on plot no.38 is being carved out and eastern portion of the said plot admittedly comprises of saline soil. The Deputy Director of Consolidation while passing the impugned order has changed the shape of the Chak and instead of carving it north-south, the Chak in favour of petitioner as well as opposite party no.3 has now been carved in the direction of east-west wherein north portion has been given to the opposite party no.3 and the southern portion has been given to the petitioner. Thus the eastern portion of plot no.38, which admittedly is saline has gone in equal proportion to both, petitioner as well as opposite party no.3. The impugned order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, thus, in my view, is in complete in consonance with the provisions of Section 201 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act wherein the Revenue Officers or Courts have been vested with the authority not only a rescinded the order against which a restoration is sought but also to alter the judgment according to the justice of the case. In the instant case by altering direction of the Chak and making it east-west and thereafter allotting north portion to the opposite party no.3 and south portion to the petitioner, the Deputy Director of Consolidation has done justice by balancing the equities between the parties for the reason that good portion as well as bad portion of plot no.38 are now being shared by both, the petitioner as well as opposite party no.3 in equal proportion. In this view of the matter, the second argument being canvassed by the petitioner is also hereby rejected. As regards the last submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner to the effect that opposite party no.3 was all along in the know of reference proceedings and he complained only when he came to know that he is being allotted the eastern portion of plot no.38, it would suffice to say that under the provisions of section 201 the limitation provided for moving an application starts running also from the date after the process for enforcing the judgment has been executed. In the instant case on the basis of the reference, the order passed by the learned Deputy Director of Consolidation on 31.10.2009 could be said to be executed only once the Chak on the spot were finally carved out and possession thereof was given to the respective parties. Since the said process of execution of the judgment/order passed in the reference proceedings on 31.10.2009 was not complete, as such, the argument that petitioner was barred from moving the application for restoration of the case does not appear to be valid. For the reasons given above, the writ petition thus deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to cost. _____________